



FACES OF WAR

VOLUME 6

City and War

edited by

Tadeusz Grabarczyk and Magdalena Pogońska-Pol



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WYDAWNICTWO
UNIWERSYTETU
ŁÓDZKIEGO

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Photo of Polish town Wieluń, bombed by German Luftwaffe at 1 September 1939. Photo from the collection of The District of Wieluń Museum in Wieluń (Muzem Ziemi Wieluńskiej w Wieluniu)

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CONTENTS

Tadeusz Grabarczyk, Magdalena Pogońska-Pol	
Editors' Preface	7
Ferenc Sebők	
Cities and Warfare in the Angevin Era (1301–1387) in Hungary	9
Zoltán Szolnoki	
The Fight for Nocera. Conspiracy and Vendetta Against the Trinci Brothers in <i>Croniche di Lucca</i>	19
Piotr Strzyż	
How Matthias Corvinus' Bombards Captured Głogów in 1488	37
Maciej Talaga	
Emperor's Gambit? On the Role of Urban Culture and Fencing Fraternities in the Military Reform of Maximilian I Habsburg	59
Tadeusz Grabarczyk	
Terebovlia as the Location for the Polish Troops' Stay in 1557 and 1558	81
Aleksander Bołdyrew	
Towns as the Recruitment Base to Mercenaries During the Reign of the Last Jagiellons	103
István Petrovics	
Hungarian Towns Against the Ottoman Advance in the Middle Ages: the Cases of Pécs, Szeged and Temesvár	123
Silviu Oța	
Excavations from Medieval City of Caransebeș	151
Jacek Zinkiewicz	
Arms and Armour of Kraków Guilds in Light of the 1683 Register	175
Robert Gawęł	
Automotive Services in "Festung Krakau" During World War I	193

István Tóth	
Szeged as Hinterland Between 1915–1917	213
Beata Kozaczyńska	
The Reaction of the Underground Press to the Displacement of Polish Children from the Zamość Region to Siedlce in 1943	231
Agnieszka Kita	
Relations of the KL Auschwitz Staff with the Civilians of Oświęcim and the Sur- rounding Area in the Years 1940–1945	243
Marek Brylew	
Qana – a Town of two Tragedies	263
About Authors	287

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EDITORS' PREFACE

In November 2020, the 5th International Academic Conference of the *Oblicza Wojny* (*The Faces of War*) series took place at the Institute of History of the University of Lodz.¹ The COVID epidemic had just begun spreading around the world, forcing humanity to change its lifestyle and work arrangements overnight. Of course, the pandemic also affected the organisation of academic conferences. Many were cancelled due to fear of the disease, others were held remotely via the internet, instead of in the familiar form of face-to-face meetings. As the organisers of the *Oblicza Wojny* conference, we suddenly had to deal with a dilemma – what to do? Today it may seem funny, but initially, we decided to wait out the epidemic, which would surely end soon, and we decided to postpone the conference originally planned for June to November. However, as the new meeting date approached and the virus was only getting bolder, we decided to hold the conference online. Admittedly, all the organisers are historians themselves, so it won't surprise anyone that we didn't have a clue how to go about it, but we figured we could make it work. And we did! The theme of the conference *Miasto i wojna – City and War*, which we proposed at the time, aroused interest among representatives of various academic disciplines, and the possibility of participating in the conference in the online formula attracted researchers not only from different corners of Poland, but also from the Czechia, Hungary, Lithuania, Romania, Russia, and Ukraine. And thus, a deadly virus helped raise our conference to an international level.

¹ For more information about the *Oblicza Wojny* conference, please visit www.obliczawojny.uni.lodz.pl

All reputable conferences traditionally publish the most interesting articles presented during the sessions, and it was no different in our case. Since 2020, we have been publishing our own series under the eponymic title – how else – *Oblicza Wojny*. The volume you are holding in your hands (if you are lucky enough to have a paper copy) or reading on your screen is the sixth in the series and the first to be published entirely in English. This will make the results of the research published in this volume more accessible and available to a wider audience. When preparing the content of this publication, we have tried to select papers with universal themes, hence the group of texts on the role that towns played in Germany, Hungary, Italy, Poland, Romania, and Ukraine as places of combat or military bases. We have also included articles that talk about towns, with the main focus on army equipment and armaments. In total, this volume contains fourteen articles, the results of research conducted by scholars from Hungary, Poland, and Romania, whose papers were based on the analysis of previously unknown sources, both written records and archaeological materials. In this way we were able to present these research issues in a new light. As a result, all papers published in this volume are original and certainly contribute to the knowledge of the role that towns played during times of war.

We believe that this is the right place and time to thank all those who have contributed to this volume. So, firstly we would like to express our thanks to the authors – not only for making their texts available, but also for patiently waiting for the completion of the editorial and publishing work. The reviewers – Hassan Ali Jamsheer and Jan Szymczak – greatly contributed to the preparation of this publication and their comments helped to improve the texts which we now present to the readers. The difficult task of translation, editing, and linguistic supervision of the papers was performed by excellent proofreaders: Karolina Płoska and Rebecca Górzyńska. Last, but not least, we thank the team of the Lodz University Press, with whom we have prepared all our post-conference publications to date. We, the editorial team, would like to thank all the above-mentioned for their work, sharing their knowledge, skills, and talent.

We wish the readers a rewarding read and – *signum temporis* – good health.

Keywords: city, war, history, archaeology, Hungary, Romania, Poland, Middle East, Auschwitz, medieval, 19th century, World War I, World War II, landsknechts, Maximilian I Habsburg, mercenaries, armament, Caransebeș, Krakow, Jerusalem, Quana, Siedlce, Terebovlia, Zamość, cars

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CITIES AND WARFARE IN THE ANGEVIN ERA (1301–1387) IN HUNGARY

Summary. The period between 1301–1387 is known in Hungarian history as the age of the Angevin dynasty. The first part of this era can be characterised by internal wars between royal power and feudal lords as a result of which King Charles I managed to stabilise his power, in which cities played an important role. From 1324 onwards internal peace enabled the king to focus on his foreign policy. Charles himself, too, but his son, Louis I led several campaigns abroad, some of which were important from the viewpoint of European power politics, especially the ones he led in the Kingdom of Naples. These wars displayed the differences, which can be observed between contemporary western European warfare and that of a central European army, the most important of them being the predominance of light cavalry and an almost total lack of infantry. Cities in Hungary and Dalmatia were crucial for providing the army with weapons and war materiel as well as serving as pools for recruiting soldiers.

Keywords: Angevin kings, cities, warfare, chivalry, charters, Hungary, 14th century

The Angevin Era in Hungary means most of the 14th century. The new dynasty originating from the Kingdom of Naples claimed the Hungarian throne on the pretext of having family relations with the Árpád dynasty on the female line of succession. Though two other dynasties (the Premyslid and the Wittelsbach) had as good as a basis for their respective claims, too, it was eventually the Angevin dynasty, which emerged victorious from the power struggle with a substantial aid of the papacy. The dynasty gave three rulers to the realm, Charles I (1301–1342), his son, Louis I (the Great) (1342–1382), who was also king of Poland from 1370 till his death in 1382, and Mary, the daughter of Louis I, who subsequently was married to King Sigismund of Luxemburg (1387–1437), which marked the beginning of a new era.¹

¹ For an overview of the general events *vide*: B. HÓMAN, *Geschichte des ungarischen Mittelalters*, vol. 1: *Von den ältesten Zeiten bis zum Ende des XII. Jahrhunderts*, Berlin 1940; P. ENGEL, *The Realm of Saint Stephen. A History of Medieval Hungary*, London–New York 2001.

The territory of the medieval kingdom of Hungary is now a large Central European region comprising no less than 8 countries (or 9, if we count Bosnia-Herzegovina as well), so when one deals with the history of medieval Hungary and its surrounding areas, the topic may draw the attention of historians from all these countries. My study will cover those events, too, which took place outside this area, but may be in relation with the theme mentioned in the title.

According to our current knowledge, there are approximately 300 000 medieval charters, which survived the stormy centuries of history, and shed light on the medieval history of this realm, which is entitled to be called 'The Realm of Saint Stephen', because it was him, who laid the foundation stone of this state in the year of 1000. Among these 300 000 charters there are about 80 000, which contain the sources relating to the Angevin era. Up to the beginning of the 1990s the huge majority of these charters were unpublished, only a handful of scattered documents saw the light of the day in different source publication series, the most important of them being published in the 19th century.² However, this source publication could not contain all the important documents of the Angevin dynasty, as the number of surviving charters is so high, and it published the documents *in extenso*, which rendered it impossible to make all the charters available, and the series stopped at the year of 1359 due to lack of funds.

Another ambitious source publication series was initiated at the end of the 1980s by Gyula Kristó, professor of history at the University of Szeged.³ This new series aims at the publication of the entire archival source material preserved in different archives dating from the Angevin era. Up to now more than 40 volumes have been published in this series, which contains Hungarian language excerpts of the charters surviving from this period. Once the series is completed, it will be possible to analyse the history of the 14th century on the basis of all the information preserved in these documents.

As far as the narrative sources are concerned, the two most important ones are the 14th century chronicle composition,⁴ one of its manuscripts being the

² *Anjou-kori okmánytár*, vol. 1–7, ed. I. NAGY, G. TASNÁDI NAGY, Budapest 1878–1920.

³ *Anjou-kori oklevéltár. Documenta res Hungaricas tempore regum Andegavensium illustrantia*, Budapest–Szeged 1990.

⁴ *Scriptores Rerum Hungaricarum tempore ducum regumque stirpis Arpadianae gestarum*, ed. I. SZENTPÉTERY, Budapest 1937, pp. 217–506.

so-called *Picture Chronicle*, the other is the *Chronicle on the Life of King Louis* written by his chaplain, John of Küküllő.⁵

The next thing to be considered is how far the process of urbanisation got in Hungary by the beginning of the 14th century. According to an unknown eyewitness from western Europe, Hungary was a huge country, and a traveller needed 40 days to cross it from west to east, or from south to north. Despite, this big area was almost empty, to a great extent lacking inhabitants.⁶ To this, we must add that this is only true to somebody coming from western Europe, because these travellers were accustomed to the density of population in western Europe, and to them the scarcity of population still common in central and eastern Europe was strange.

The process of urbanisation in Hungary started at the turn of the 12–13th centuries, and by the 14th century basically two types of settlements emerged, the so-called ‘real towns’ or *civitates* in Latin, and ‘market towns’, or *oppida*. The former usually came into being in royal, while the latter in archiepiscopal, episcopal or feudal centres. In the case of market towns predominantly, but very often in the case of the former, too, trade played a key role.⁷

At the end of the former period, the Árpád Era, the dissociation of Hungary was almost complete. After the Mongol invasion (1241–1242), King Béla IV changed his former policy and he himself donated huge estates to feudal lords on condition that they should build stone castles to provide the population with shelters in the event of a second Mongol invasion. However, by the end of the 13th century, the descendants of the formerly faithful lords of King Béla IV became in most of the cases oligarchs, who had the power to defy the king’s

⁵ JOHANNES DE THURO CZ, *Chronica Hungarorum*, vol. 1, Budapest 1985, pp. 160–188. The whole chronicle in English: JÁNOS THURÓ CZY, *Chronicle of the Hungarians*; transl. F. MANTELLO, foreword and notes by P. ENGEL, Bloomington 1991.

⁶ *Anonymi Descriptio Europae Orientalis*, eds. T. ŽIVKOVIĆ, V. PETROVIĆ, A. UZELAC, Beograd 2013, pp. 136, 139.

⁷ A. KUBINYI, *Város*, [in:] *Korai Magyar Történeti Lexikon*, chief ed. G. KRISTÓ, eds. P. ENGEL, F. MAKK, Budapest 1994, pp. 716–718. For a more diversified view *vide*: I. PETROVICS, *The Cities and Towns of Medieval Hungary as Economic and Cultural Centres and Places of Coexistence. The Case of Pécs*, “Colloquia. Journal for Central European History” 2011, vol. 18, pp. 5–26; I. PETROVICS, *From Misunderstanding to Appropriate Interpretation: Market Towns in Medieval Hungary with Special Reference to the Great Hungarian Plain*, “Offene Landschaften. Siedlungsforschung. Archäologie–Geschichte–Geographie” 2014, vol. 31, pp. 271–296.

will, and the most powerful of them had their own court, which imitated the royal court, the pursued independent foreign policy, and of course, their conduct in internal policy depended entirely on their ever-changing interests.⁸

This situation placed the towns and market places (*oppida*) in a precarious situation. The landlords, ecclesiastical and secular either, had no far-reaching plans in mind in connection with towns and their inhabitants, they considered them only a possible source of income, and in several cases blackmailed the cities and towns for protection money, which led to a general decay in the process urbanisation. This was parallel to the decay of trade, too, because of unsafe travel, merchants – Hungarian and foreign alike – began to avoid trading in unsafe areas of the kingdom, which resulted in a general decay of economic activity.

The history of the role played by cities and towns in warfare in the Angevin period can be divided into two parts. The first phase can be characterised by the alliance of royal power and the cities in order to crush the oligarchs and create stability in the realm. This is roughly the first part of King Charles I's rule. The second phase begins after the stabilisation of royal power and the creation of law and order, when cities could play an active part in the king's warfare abroad, which period lasted until the end of Louis I's rule.

The future King Charles I arrived in Hungary in the summer of 1300, when the last king of the former dynasty, Andrew III was still alive. However, in January, 1301, Andrew died, and the long struggle for the succession started between Charles, Venceslas, the son of the king of Bohemia, and later Otto Wittelsbach also joined the power struggle, at the end of which Charles I emerged as legitimate and lawfully crowned king of Hungary in 1310. But this did not mean that his power was a stable and consolidated one, as the most powerful oligarchs were still in a position to defy his power if they deemed it necessary. The most powerful of them was Matthew Csák of Trencsén (Trenčín, Slovakia), who had huge territories at his disposal, practically the western half of present-day Slovakia was under his rule, and he did not acknowledge the rule of Charles I as a legitimate one.⁹ He played an important role in the first set

⁸ G. KRISTÓ, *A feudális széttagolódás Magyarországon*, Budapest 1979; J. SZÜCS, *Az utolsó Árpádok*, Budapest 2002.

⁹ G. KRISTÓ, *Csák Máté tartományúri hatalma*, Budapest 1973.

of events which I should like to refer to in this paper, when a town contributed to the king's successful military efforts against the oligarchs.

In 1311 a conflict evolved between the Aba family, a powerful baronial family, whose estates lay in the north-eastern parts of medieval Hungary, and the citizens of Kassa (Košice, Slovakia). During the conflict citizens of Kassa killed Amadé Aba, head of the family, and a trial started over the event in the royal court. The Aba family had been a supporter of Charles I, so they hoped that the king would decide in their favour and against the citizens. However, the sentence favoured the city, which led to the breakdown of relations between the Aba family and Charles I. The ensuing situation led to open warfare, in the course of which the Aba family asked for the aid of Matthew Csák, their former opponent and rival, against the king. In 1312 a huge battle was fought in Rozgony (Rozhanovce, Slovakia), in which the king supported the citizens of Kassa, while Matthew Csák sent 1200 armoured soldiers to aid the Aba family, but it was all in vain. According to narrative sources, this was the biggest battle in Hungary since the time of the Mongol invasion. The king managed to defeat the oligarchs' forces and won a big victory.¹⁰ The success was also a symbolic one: royal power took sides with town dwelling citizens to defy the oligarchs even at the cost of losing a former supporter. This fact clearly showed what direction royal policy would take in the future. However, there was still a long way to go in the process of stabilising royal power. Matthew Csák continued to defy the king's will and even attempted to capture Charles I. That is why in 1316 the king decided to transfer his seat to Temesvár (Timișoara, Romania), a good and safe distance from the territories under the control of Matthew Csák. Temesvár remained the residence of the king for seven years, and Charles I decided to return to Visegrad only in 1323, two years after the death of Matthew Csák. The fact that Temesvár was the place of royal residence for seven years contributed a great deal towards its becoming one of the most important political, economic and military centres in the south of Hungary, which would play a strategic role in the coming centuries of anti-Ottoman warfare.

To sum up Charles I's policy in the wars against the oligarchs, we can come to the conclusion, that in opposition to that of the oligarchs, Charles had a far-reaching view for the cities in his policy and he even confronted his formerly

¹⁰ G. KRISTÓ, *A rozgonyi csata*, Budapest 1978.

faithful supporters, when they were in conflict with an important city, with which the king wanted to establish a long-lasting, working relationship for the interests of his realm. In other words, we can speak about a political alliance of royal power, loyal supporters of the king and the cities, whose interests coincided with that of the king to establish law and order within the realm.

In the second half of his realm (from about 1324) Charles I could concentrate on his economic reforms¹¹ and active foreign policy, which concern our paper only from that viewpoint that cities and towns contributed to warfare in the same way as they did during the rule of Louis I, who inherited an economically and politically stabilised kingdom from his father. In the course of his reign the realm was powerful enough to lead an active foreign policy, which meant that the king several times participated in campaigns abroad, in Dalmatia, Italy, Lithuania, in the Balkan peninsula to name a few.

To answer the question about the cities' and towns' contribution towards these campaigns one has to perform a careful and close analysis of the sources, which is now becoming more and more accessible as a result of thorough research into the archival sources of the period.

In the second half of the 14th century substantial economic development can be observed in Hungary. Foreign and internal trade thrives and this gives rise to the economic importance of cities, making it possible that towns and cities contribute to the military efforts of the realm predominantly in two ways. In order to evaluate the situation objectively, we need to focus on the composition of contemporary Hungarian army and the way it fought in different campaigns.

The beginnings of chivalry in Hungary can be traced back to the 12th century, but in the Árpád era the Hungarian army did not fully comply with the composition of western European armies. The two main differences were the following. On the one hand, the number of knights in heavy armour was lower, which resulted in a greater role played by light cavalry in campaigns throughout the 13th century, a phenomenon, which continued in the next century as well according to eyewitnesses, though the number of knights evidently rose in the Angevin period.¹² On the other hand, one can observe the almost total lack of infantry, which may be due to several reasons. One might be the Hungarian

¹¹ B. HÓMAN, *Károly Róbert gazdaságpolitikája*, Budapest 1921.

¹² G. KRISTÓ, *Az Anjou-kor háborúi*, Budapest 1988; Nagy Képes *Milleniumi Hadtörténet*, ed. A. RÁCZ, Budapest 2000, pp. 51–59.

equestrian tradition, because of which members of the Hungarian lesser nobility considered fighting on foot a warfare characteristic of peasants, something derogatory for themselves. Another reason might be the fact that as compared with western Europe, in central-eastern Europe the distances to be covered by armies were much longer, the road system much worse, the network of settlements, which could provide all the necessities for an army much scarce, so armies simply needed a higher level of mobility, than armies in western Europe. As we will see, this is not true in all the cases, because warfare in certain areas of central Europe still made it necessary to deploy infantry as well.

The army of the Angevin period began to follow the example of western European models more closely in composition, the way campaigns were fought and in the use of weapons, too. The number of knights grew, members of the royal household and high-ranking families fought in a knight's armour, on similar stallions as their western counterparts and with the same weapons. Their sergeants also followed the examples set by western armies. But the Hungarian army still retained a substantial element of light cavalry, which in the 14th century were mostly made up by Cumans settled in Hungary in the former century, and Szeklers (*Siculi*), who had joined the Hungarians before the occupation of the Carpathian Basin in the 9th century, and still retained some of their archaic features, including their light cavalry warfare.

The composition of the army depended on the direction of the campaign is question and the way the enemy fought. King Louis I led two campaigns in Italy (1347–1348 and 1350), where his army consisted of Hungarian heavy and light cavalry, but he also heavily relied on German mercenaries, who were well-versed in contemporary western European warfare. What struck the eyes of Italian observers was the role of Hungarian light cavalry and its way of fighting, which they were unaccustomed to.¹³

In the case of the Balkan campaigns King Louis I (1343, 1350, 1354, 1358, 1359, 1361, 1378 against Serbia, 1365, 1368, 1375 against Wallachia) employed infantry, too, who were recruited from town and village dwellers, who were much poorly equipped, than members of the lesser nobility. However, they were needed in the mountainous areas of the peninsula, where cavalry was less appropriate to fight the opponent.

¹³ Nagy Képes Milleniumi Hadtörténet, *op. cit.*, p. 58.

The king kept a close eye on the military developments elsewhere in Europe. The Hundred Years' War gave rise to the employment of English archers equipped by the deadly longbow to devastating effect. Louis drew the necessary conclusion from this development and he himself hired English archers to garrison one of his castles in Transylvania, Töröcsvár (Bran, Romania).¹⁴

As I mentioned, cities and towns in Hungary went through a substantial degree of economic development in the 14th century, which led to a rise and differentiation of their output. Guilds appeared not only in walled cities, but in market towns as well, producing almost everything, which was needed for warfare, ranging from bows and arrows, hand weapons, saddles and other necessities for equestrian warfare. The Dalmatian cities also contributed to the military efforts of King Louis I. In 1360 he requested Ragusa (Dubrovnik, Croatia) to build three galleys for his fleet on the Adriatic sea and to provide them with docks in their port.¹⁵ Ragusa was also the first city to provide the king with fire-arms, in 1358 they cast the first guns in Hungarian military history.¹⁶ The cities and towns did not only provide the army with the necessary equipment, but also everything needed in connection with horses. The only exception may be plate armour, which was predominantly obtained from abroad, but this was used only by knights, whose number was still relatively low, although it was increasing rapidly in the second half of the 14th century. From this period we also have evidence about Hungarian soldiers employed in Italy as mercenaries, the best known examples are Nicholas Toldi, who made a fortune by serving in Italy, and the mercenary company known as *Magna Societas Hungarorum*.¹⁷ We do not have the direct evidence yet, but on the basis of 15th and 16th century parallels, we can fairly safely conclude that the cities and towns also served as a pool for mercenaries to be recruited from, while positive evidence shows that members of the nobility did serve as mercenaries. Further research into this issue may throw new light on these developments.

¹⁴ JOHANNES DE THURO CZ, *Chronica...*, vol. 1, p. 182.

¹⁵ J. GELCICH, L. THALÓCZY, *Raguza és Magyarország összeköttetései nek oklevéltára*, Budapest 1887, p. 16 (document No. 12).

¹⁶ G. KRISTÓ, *Az Anjou-kor...*, p. 237.

¹⁷ S.L. TÓTH, *Zsoldosság*, [in:] *Korai Magyar Történeti...*, pp. 752–753.

To sum it up we can draw the conclusion that in the first part of the 14th century royal power and town dwellers both realised their overlapping interests in crushing the tyranny of the oligarchs, and after a considerable time Charles I with the help of the papacy, his loyal lords, followers, who later became the pool of the new aristocracy of the Angevin era, and with the aid of cities and towns managed to stabilise his power and initiate an economic and cultural upsurge in the history of Hungary. In the second half of the century internal stability provided the cities and towns with an almost unprecedented opportunity to develop economically and culturally. This led to the fact that cities and towns in Hungary proper, but also in Dalmatia could substantially contribute to the equipment and modernisation of Hungarian army as well as serving as a pool for manpower for military campaigns. However, the low level of urbanisation as compared to that of western Europe had several consequences, one of them being that the rise of well-organised and equipped infantry, which can clearly be observed in western European battlefields (and due to Ottoman invasion soon in central Europe, too) still did not materialise in east-central Europe. This may be one of the causes of successful Ottoman onslaught in the next century.

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THE FIGHT FOR NOCERA CONSPIRACY AND VENDETTA AGAINST THE TRINCI BROTHERS IN *CRONICHE DI LUCCA*

Summary. Giovanni Sercambi (1348–1424) wrote on several acts of violence in his main work, entitled *Croniche di Lucca*. On the pages of his chronicle we can often read about vendettas, factional fights and the guilty of traitors. As regards to the latter category, the most important ones were probably the killing of Lazzaro Guinigi, Lord of Lucca in 1400, and the conspiracy against the Trinci brothers. Nicolaò and Bartolomeo Trinci were killed in 1421 by Pedro de Argillaia *castellano*, in the fortress of Nocera, which was the property of them. The third brother Corrado Trinci and his allied troops immediately moved to Nocera. Braccio da Montone, *signore* of Perugia (and famous *condottiero*) participated in the campaign. The army recaptured Nocera and the conspirators died. Giovanni Sercambi wrote one of the longest chapters of his historical work about the death of Niccolò and Bartolomeo Trinci. The interest of the Luchese writer is unquestionable. In contrast to the other Tuscan writers, none of whom mentions the bloody events of 1421. In my present paper, I examine the motives behind Sercambi's account. Jean-Baptist Delzant wrote about it recently, but I approach the context differently. With the comparing analysis and the research of the contemporary political circumstances and family relations I conclude that Sercambi's personal interest in violent events and his teaching will was only one reason. On the other hand the writer was sensible to the Guinigi's external politics. He knew the difficult situation in external politics: the Guinigi had marriage relations with the Varani of Camerino and the Trinci of Foligno. Giovanni Sercambi could get information from the Trinci wife of Paolo Guinigi. In the light of this, I examine the special elements of the Sercambi-kind storytelling.

Keywords: vendetta, *Croniche di Lucca*, Lucca, Nocera, Italy, Middle Ages, Italy

Giovanni Sercambi (1348–1424), the well-known luchese chronicler, was the author of a lot of special urban history sources. The *Croniche di Lucca*¹ which covers the history of Lucca between 1168 and 1424 (until the death of writer)

¹ *Le croniche di Giovanni Sercambi*, [in:] *Fonti per la storia d'Italia*, vol. 19–21, ed. S. BONGI, Lucca 1892 (hereinafter: SERCAMBI).

is probably the most important. The chronicle was contemporary with *Istoria di Firenze* by Goro Gati, and the extends of the work could be placed parallel with the writings of Giovanni Villani and Marchionne di Coppo Stefani. Sercambi lived and worked in the period when the *ricordi* or *ricodanze* – which were personal diaries of merchants – distinct from the city chronicles. Huge difference from the Florentine writers that the *Croniche di Lucca* was not part of a history writing tradition, but a substantive work.² Other important works of Sercambi were the *Novelle* and *Nota ai Guinigi*. The first is a collection of short stories in several topics; the latter is an advisory lesson for the Guinigi younglings how to govern the city.³ On the pages of *Croniche* we can read about violent acts, such as vendetta, factional strives and treason too. Sercambi wrote about the latter category in three different contexts: (1) volte-face on battle field (2) intrigues in great politics and (3) conspiracies against *signore*. For Sercambi, maybe the third one was the most important. We can observe this viewpoint on the pages of Lucca chronicle. He wrote plenty of chapters about the murder of Lazzaro Guinigi (1400) and the conspiracy against the Trinci brothers (1421) too. The author participated by himself in the aftermath of the first event. About the revenge against the murders of Lazzaro, Sercambi wrote that the injuries should be health not by cry but sword.⁴ The later tragically death of Nicolò and Bartolomeo Trinci had similar weight on Sercambi's pages.⁵

The Trinci was the ruler family of the Umbrian⁶ city, Foligno. They were one of the well-known *signore* families of those ages. They governed their territories with shorter breaks from 1226 to the fall of Corrado Trinci in 1439. From this view we can't say that the thoughtfulness of Sercambi about the 1421 murder

² L. GREEN, *Chronicle Into History: An Essay on the Interpretation of History in Florentine Fourteenth-Century Chronicles*. Cambridge 1972, pp. 88–90, 112; D. OSHEIM, *Chronicles and Civic Life in Giovanni Sercambi's Lucca*, [in:] *Chronicling history: chroniclers and historians in medieval and Renaissance Italy*, eds. S. DALE, A.W. LEWIN, D.J. OSHEIM, Pennsylvania 2007, pp. 145–149.

³ CH. MEEK, *Il tempo di Giovanni Sercambi*, [in:] *Giovanni Sercambi e il suo tempo. Catalogo della mostra. Lucca, 30 Novembre 1991*, Lucca 1991, p. 3; S. NELLI, M. TRAPPANI, *La vita familiare e sociale*, [in:] *Ibidem*, pp. 37–47; *Nota ai Guinigi, Le croniche di Giovanni Sercambi, Lucchese*, ed. S. BONGI, [in:] *Fonti per la storia d'Italia*, vol. 19–21, Lucca 1892.

⁴ SERCAMBI, vol. 1, p. 677.

⁵ J.B. DELZANT, *Les Trinci à nocera. mise en scène et construction de la violence dans une seigneurie italienne du premier Quattrocento*, “*Questes. Revue pluridisciplinaire d'études médiévales*” 2008, vol. 14, pp. 64–75; A. PICUTI, *La strage di Nocera. La vendetta dei Trinci*, Foligno 2004.

⁶ *Medieval Italy. An Encyclopedia*, vol. 1–2, ed. CH. KLEINHENZ, New York–London 2004, pp. 173, 360.

was irregular. Although the long of the regarding chapter in *Croniche di Lucca* suggest it had a significant and special role: it's almost seven pages long in the relevant printed edition from 1892. It's similar long as the longest stories from *Novelle*. Secondly, the murder of the Trinci brothers wasn't mentioned in any other Tuscan writings, neither in the level of notes. The lords of Foligno was well known, although the murders were unmentioned in Tuscany, just in in Umbria. From this viewpoint the chapter of Sercambi is important not only because of its lengths but its special in its kind. We can ask that which cogitation motivated the luchese writer and politician to write in this length about the Trinci murders? In my current article I try to answer this question. Before the analysis of the relevant caput, it's worthy to introduce Sercambi's career.

Giovanni Sercambi as a politician

Giovanni Sercambi, the author of *Croniche di Lucca* had a colourful career not only as history writer, but as a politician and – as the *Nota ai Guinigi* shows – as a political advisor too. He was holder a lot of city positions from his young ages to his death. As Giorgio Tori phrased, Sercambi's carrier was started after the liberate of Lucca from the Pisan rule in 1372.⁷ First he introduced into the bigger city councils, than placed in positions which needed more specific knowledge and responsibility. Sercambi was many times in *anziani* and in 1391 he was nominee to *Gonfaloniere nel Consiglio nel Trentasei*,⁸ in 1393 he was *Capitano delle Milizie del Comune*,⁹ and in 1404 became *Condottiero*.¹⁰ We can conclude that the Guinigi leaded city government trusted in Sercambi: he got military and law enforcement positions. In a case of riot he commanded his troops, as *gonfaloniere*.¹¹ The importance of it shown by the fact that in many periods the Guinigi family members or their entrusted followers (*amici*) held this position.¹² Beyond these Sercambi was the *vicar* of Casiglione, which

⁷ G. TORI, *La carriera politica*, [in:] *Giovanni Sercambi e il suo tempo...*, p. 109.

⁸ *Ibidem*, p. 110.

⁹ *Ibidem*.

¹⁰ M. BROGI, *Sercambi e Paolo Guinigi*, [in:] *Giovanni Sercambi e il suo tempo...*, p. 148.

¹¹ It is possible that Sercambi underlined his own role in the events and wrote with distortions. About this topic: D. OSHEIM, *Chronicles and Civic Life in Giovanni Sercambi's Lucca*, pp. 145–170.

¹² C. MEEK, *Lucca 1369–1400. Politics and society in an Early Renaissance City-State*, Oxford 1978, p. 281.

means he was delegated governor of some *contado* parts near Lucca.¹³ In the councils he was a determining member in *Consiglio nel Trentasei*, *Consiglio Generale*, and the *Quindici*. Sercambi could hold these as the mentored friend of the Guinigi.¹⁴ This family was the most important political power of Luchese politics in those times. The leader was Francesco until 1384, he followed by his son Lazzaro (1392–1400), than Paolo, until 1430. The latter was not just the head of his clan, but the first *signore* from the Guinigi family. As we know from the pages of *Croniche di Lucca*, Paolo Guinigi's rule in 1400 was depended from the unswerving appearance of the *amici*, and within that, Giovanni Sercambi. They made pressure upon the *Consiglio Generale* to elect Paolo ruler. From this excel the relevant opinion is that Sercambi participated of the inner circle of the Guinigi family. We can say that the writer knew the political environment in first hand, and he had a good sight upon the Guinigi's relations. In the following analysis of the Trinci murder chapter we have to keep in mind these facts.

The murder of Nicolò Trinci in Sercambi's work

We can read the antecedents of the Trinci murders as the following in *Croniche di Lucca*.¹⁵ Ugolino Trinci, who was the *signore* of the Umbrian Foligno,¹⁶ gave properties and offices to a man, named Pasquale di Argilaia. As it turns out from the chronicle pages, he did it despite Pasquale's bad reputation: it was a surmise that he was a notorious ruthless man who done dishonoured things.¹⁷

¹³ G. TORI, *La carriera politica*, p. 110.

¹⁴ *Ibidem*.

¹⁵ Sercambi wrote a short teaching-kind part as an introduction to the caput. In this he wrote about the importance of distinguish the friendly relations from the false friendships. Jean-Baptist Delzant reviewed this part carefully. I don't analyse this in my current study, but I reflect to Delzant's words when is' necessary, J.B. DELZANT, *op. cit.*, pp. 72–74.

¹⁶ About the role of Foligno within the Umbrian *signorie* vide: Ch.F. BLACK, *La grande politica e le politiche locali: il problema di una signoria umbra*, [in:] *Signoria in Umbria tra medioevo e Rinascimento. L'esperienza dei Trinci Foligno. 10–13 dicembre 1986*, vol. 1–2, Perugia 1989, p. 91; J.C. MAIRE VIGUEUR, *Comuni e signorie in Umbria, Marche e Lazio*, Torino 1987, p. 252; M. SENSI, *I Trinci*, [in:] *Signoria in Umbria tra medioevo e Rinascimento. L'esperienza dei Trinci Foligno. 10–13 dicembre 1986*, vol. 1–2, Perugia 1989, p. 177.

¹⁷ “Si narra che essendo gran tempo fa in ella città di Fuligno uno signore nomato Ugolino Trinci, avendo preso alcuna domestichezza con uno suo soctoposto nomato ser Pasquale da Argil-

Although Ugolino not just gave preferences to him, but in his deathbed mandatory gave order to his oldest son, Nicolò to attend with Pasquale and his adherents similarly. In the Sercambi-kind story Ugolino talk over his oldest son with smooth words (*con melato parlare*). Nicolò listened to his father and gave properties and offices to Pasquale's children. Pedro di Argiliai became the *castellano* of Nocera,¹⁸ Nanni di Argiliaia became the *cubiculario* of Nicolò.¹⁹ After this, in 1421,²⁰ Nicolò Trinci organised a hunting event in the woods near Nocera with the present of his *amici*, his escort and Berardo di Rodolfo da Camerino, who was the son and heir of Rodolfo Varani, *signore* of Camerino. During the hunting they decided that they should get a rest in the castello of Nocera. Sercambi wrote that Nicolò thought he was in a secured place as in his own house – of course it was a property of Foligno, so the Trinci.²¹ At the night, Nanni di Argiliai who supposedly was in the bedroom with his lord – opened the door inside and let in his brother Pedro. He entered the place with a nude sword, went to Nicolò's bed and immediately killed the awoken *signore*.²² Thinkable that Sercambi underlined the nudity of the victim to make a symbolical parallel with words “nude sword” to emphasise the defenceless situation of the ruler, detailing the terrifying act.

laia, e datoli alcuno officio, cognoscendolo crudele et disprietatolo predicto ser Pasquale essendo a tali officii”, SERCAMBI, vol. 2, p. 308.

¹⁸ Nocera was captured by Ugolino Trinci in the first decade of the 15th century. Pope John XXIII accepted the Trinci as vicars of Nocera in 1412, so we can conclude it was a fresh property, M. SENSI, *op. cit.*, p. 187.

¹⁹ “E facto l’ essequio del dicto Ugolino, fu suplicato per alchuni di mézzo al predicto Nicolò maggiore figliuolo che li piacesse rimettere il dicto ser Pasquale e figliuoli, con melato parlare; intanto che, prima che del dicto Ugolino fusse facto il settimo, il predicto Nicolò rimisse il dicto ser Pasquale e’ figliuoli con restituire a loro mete le possessioni et beni”, SERCAMBI, vol. 2, p. 308.

²⁰ M. SENSI, *op. cit.*, p. 187.

²¹ “E apparecchiato molta vivanda da vivere con molti chani et cacciatori e con alquanta compagnia, si dirissono a Nocera, (...) pensando esser securi come in casa loro, senza alcuno suspecto dormendo”, SERCAMBI, vol. 2, p. 308.

²² “Nanni soprascripto uscio del lecto e aprio la cammera, et entrato dentro il dicto ser Pedro con una spada nuda in mano, il predicto ragassino vedendo il dicto ser Pedro colla spada nuda volse gridare. Il dicto ser Pedro quello uccise, e andatosene a letto dando a Nicolò signore, essendo nudo, più colpi, quello uccise”, SERCAMBI, vol. 2, p. 308.

The trap by the Argiliai and the revenge

After the death of Nicolò the conspirators decided to kill the two other Trinci brothers, Bartolomeo and Corrado too. They sent a letter in the name of Nicolò to Bartolomeo, to invite him to Nocera for have a nice time with the others. When he entered the Nocera gates, he was killed immediately. This is a turning point in our story: one friendly servant of Pedro, who wasn't involved the plan saw the murder and terrified by this.²³ Later when Pedro gave some orders to him, he abolished these and ran to Madonna Costanza, who was the mother of the Trinci brothers, and described the acts the murders done, and told her the conspirators plan to kill Corrado. Costanza immediately alarmed her son, who started the collect man against Nocera.²⁴

At this point a new character, Braccio da Montone involved the tale. He also heard what happened, and immediately attacked Nocera with two hundred men.²⁵ It's maybe important to say that, Corrado although planned to attack the castello, but Braccio rushed it first. The traitors, so Pedro and Nanni and few men of them died during the attack and a lot of them get imprisoned. In the last part of the chapter we can read some startling moments. A father recognized his son in the line of the imprisoned friends of the traitors, when they marched towards Foligno. How could you participate in the murder of our rulers? – He asked to him. Then the father killed his own son with a sword.²⁶ Finally the remains of Pasquale di Argiliaia had to be thrown for the dogs and mangled.²⁷ In the Middle and North Italian vendetta tales the hunting motives and the role

²³ “E vedendo uno contadino amico et parente del dicto ser Pedro, (...) Il predicto contadino, vedendo tal cosa, non sapendo la chagione, volse gridare”, SERCAMBI, vol. 2, p. 308.

²⁴ “Et narrò a madonna Gostanza madre de' dicti signori la morte loro, e che li piacesse mandare a Trievi a dire che Currado suo mezzano figliuolo si partisse et venisse a Fuligno prima che quel fante giunto fusse; però che li era scripto che andasse a Nocera e giunto sere' morto”, SERCAMBI, vol. 2, p. 308.

²⁵ “E avuto Braccio tale imbasciata, montato a chavallo &c: con.ce. cavalli, chaminò a Fuligno, avendo lassato che l' altra brigata, così da cavallo come da pie, seguisseno lui”, SERCAMBI, vol. 2, p. 308.

²⁶ “Funno i dicti. xxxm. a inpeto et romore da quelli di Nocera tagliati a pessi et morti; e più si narra che di quelli. xm. presi di quelli del castellano, essendovi uno di Nocera tra essi, come il padre lo vidde, subito tracto a lui con uno coltello, il padre uccise il figliuolo, dicendo: chome ài consentito che abbi morto il nostro signore?”, SERCAMBI, vol. 2, p. 308.

²⁷ “ditto del padre di ser Pedro che da' cani fu mangiato”, SERCAMBI, vol. 2, p. 308.

of the dogs were symbolical elements, which ones objective was to emphasise the terrible primal act and the dehumanisation of the aggressors.²⁸ At the end the Trinci men killed and sliced the inhabitants of Nocera. Sercambi said this was part of the lawful revenge. As I said, no other Tuscan chronicles wrote about the event, but we should examine the works from other regions – especially from Umbria.

The antecedents of the murders in other chronicles

In the Spoleto chronicle linked to the name Paruccio Zampaolini – as Jean-Baptist Delzant already concluded²⁹ – we can read different antecedents of the events. In this Pasquale di Rasiglia done a lot of bloody things and homicides indulge the rulers of Foligno. Zampaolini said, these could be hired assassinations.³⁰ Thus Ugolino should give offices to Pasquale to honouring these duties. The role in the *Croniche di Lucca* effect that Ugolino patronized Pasquale because the lack of intelligent but this seems to be darkens in the Spoleto chronicle. The Trinci leader as the procurer of the cruel acts is specifically a negative character in the story which leads to the dead of his sons. Above this we can read another great addition: Pedro killed Nicolò because the latter had a relation with Pedro's beautiful wife.³¹

²⁸ D. TREVOR, *Marriage and Mutilation*, "Past & Present" Noveber 1997, No. 157, pp. 3–36, 82.

²⁹ J.B. DELZANT, *op. cit.*, pp. 64–70, 72.

³⁰ "ser Pasquale da Rasiglia, lu venne tanto in gratia delli Signiuri per suoe executioni martorij, asasinamenti, homicidia et altru malfare per piacere delli Signiuri". *Frammenti degli Annali di Spoleto di Parruccio Zampaolini dal 1305 al 1425*, [in:] *Documenti storici inediti in sussidio allo studio delle memorie umbre*, ed. A. SANZI, I. FOLIGNO 1879, pp. 159–160.

³¹ "ser Pietri pigliò per moglie la figliuola de Nicola de Catagnione dalla fratta de Trievi gintil-donna et bellissima jovene, et habitavanu in Fuligne, pocu in gratia delli Signuri (...) Ecco delle cose occulte non se potè bene iudicare fo crisu per alcuni che Nicolò signiore rechedesse la dicta donna de ser Pietri de fornicatione per bellezza", *Frammenti degli Annali di Spoleto di Parruccio Zampaolini*, p. 160; J.B. DELZANT, *op. cit.*, pp. 64–70, 72.

Table 1

Elements of the story (Sercambi and the others)

Source	Pedro's wife	Pasquale's work	Nudity	Father and son	Terrified friend	The fate of Pasquale	"Lawful" vendetta
Cron. Gubbio ³²	Yes	∅	∅	∅	∅	∅	∅
Vite di Braccio Fortebracci ³³	Yes	∅	∅	∅	∅	∅	∅
Cron. Spol. ³⁴	Yes	Yes	∅	∅	∅	∅	∅
Sercambi	∅	∅	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Stor. Camer. ³⁵	Yes	∅	∅	∅		∅	∅
Cron. Fermo ³⁶	∅	∅	∅	∅	∅	Yes	∅
Cron. Urbino ³⁷	∅	∅	∅	∅	∅	∅	∅

Thus while Sercambi wrote that the conspiracy motivated by crazy unkindness, the Zampaolini-kind tale review a vendetta which indicated by the defence of personal honour. This thickens by the pages of the Gubbio chronicle.³⁸ In this the author wrote Nicolò or Bartolomeo done dishonoured things with Pedro's

³² Cronica di Ser Guerriero da Gubbio.

³³ *L'histoire et vite di Braccio Fortebracci detto da Montone et di Nicolo Piccinino perugini*, Vinegia 1571.

³⁴ Frammenti degli Annali di Spoleto di Parruccio Zampaolini, p. 160.

³⁵ *Storia di Camerino di Camillo Lili*. Parte Seconda, Libri Quinto, 1652, p. 163.

³⁶ ANTONIO DI NICOLÒ, *Cronica della città di Fermo*, edizione critica e annotazioni G. DE MINICIS, introduzione e traduzione P. PETRUZZI, Fermo 2008, pp. 176–177.

³⁷ *Cronachetta di Urbino 1404–1444*, lettura e note di G. SCUTENA, Urbino 1995, p. 26.

³⁸ *Cronica di Ser Guerriero da Gubbio*, ed. G. MAZZATINI, [in:] *Rerum Italicarum Scriptores. Raccolta degli storici italiani dal cinquecento al millecinquecento*, Ordinata da L.A. Muratori, vol. 21, part 4, Città di Castello 1902.

wife, and the husband killed them as revenge.³⁹ With further examinations we can say that other works from this region also say similar points. The Perugia chronicle, entitled *Vite di Braccio Fortebracci*⁴⁰ review that one from the three Trinci brothers tempted Pedro's wife to misconduct and the *castellano* revenged this on Nicolò. On the pages of the *Vite* we can find that the unnamed Trinci brother first started with overtures, than the words followed by acts.⁴¹

Special Perugian part that the *Vite* is the only source that suggest that the *castellano* invited the Trinci brothers for the hunting event to make the trap for them. The consciousness of the conspiracy underlined by the author when he used the word vendetta for the murder. Which suggest heavy wound in honour. On the following chart I summarized the special elements of the story in the other analysed sources.

We can see that the nudity of the *signore* and the sword, the treason of Pedro's servant, the drama of father and son and the summarize of the acts as lawful revenge only exist in Sercambi's work. Although the role of Pasquale's work, and the relation between the Trinci and Pedro's wife doesn't. I think that the special Sercambi-kind element suggests the unkindness of the Argilaia, while the skip of the others allusion that the luchese writer didn't want to write about the liability of the Trinci in the events.

The external politics of Lucca in the 14th century

Lucca had expansive foreign politics at the beginning of the 14th century. Castruccio Castracani, who elected to *signore* in 1320, threatened Florence with military expeditions.⁴² Although the sweep of Lucca successively narrowed in time. After the death of the *signore* in 1328 the city leaders made wrong

³⁹ "Nicolo et Bartolomeo Trinci signori da Fuligne et de Nociera foro morti da uno loro castelano da Nociera, cetadino da Fuligne: fo dicto l'avea facto perché uno di quelli signori usava con la moglie", *Cronica di Ser Guerriero da Gubbio*, p. 41.

⁴⁰ *L'histoire et vite di Braccio Fortebracci detto da Montone et di Nicolo Piccinino perugini*, Vinegia 1571.

⁴¹ "Erano Signori di Foligno, e di Nocera tre fratelli uno de quali andando spese molte a Nocera, e alloggiando nella Rocca, cominciò per aventura alquanto lasciamente à riguardare la moglie del Castellano, di maniera che in breve tempo si venne dalle parole a fatti", *ibidem*, p. 102.

⁴² M.E. BRATCHEL, *Medieval Lucca and the Evolution of the Renaissance State*, Oxford 2008, pp. 48–50.

decisions, which tendency caused the Pisan occupation in 1342.⁴³ Florence wanted to get the city to counteract the Pisan expansion – in this time unsuccessful, which was a sign for the future. Lucca got back the liberty in 1368 with the help of Charles IV.⁴⁴ After this, Lucca had independent politics until 1429, but demonstrably had to moderate in both internal and foreign relations.⁴⁵

The first and the primal reason was the active expansion of the Florentine Republic from the South. The Arno sided city, slowly but precisely tried to get the smaller towns beyond the luchese *contado*. Their tools were many: they gave Florentine citizenship to leader families, sent *podestà* or started military campaigns. In that time the main goal of the Florentine government was to reach the coastal area for the possibility of a naval base. They not just made pressing upon the coastal towns, but on the cities nearby this region, because of the potential danger.⁴⁶ From the end of 14th century from the Northern territories the expansion of the Visconti led cities frightened the luchese elite.⁴⁷ Although the Guinigi tried to utilize the rivals between the Visconti and Florence, but the situation didn't changed.⁴⁸ Paolo Guinigi tried to associate with the Visconti against Florence and supported the anti-Florentine movement in the coastal naval town Barga and obsessed the Florentine merchants from Motrone docks. But after the death of Giovanni Galeazzo Visconti in 1402, they lost the weight of the actions.⁴⁹ The geopolitical situation was hardened with a small Florentine enclave in North-East, while from North-West the Visconti friendly Malaspina territory caused problems.⁵⁰ MEEK and the other researchers of history of Lucca conclude that the luchese factions didn't opened towards factional strives in this time because they frightened by the potential abroad interventions.⁵¹ The political fights

⁴³ LOUIS GREEN, *Lucca under many masters. A Fourteenth-Century Italian commune in crisis (1328–1342)*, Città di Castello 1995, pp. 74–77.

⁴⁴ C. MEEK, *Il tempo di Giovanni Sercambi*, [in:] *Giovanni Sercambi e il suo tempo...*, pp. 1–33.

⁴⁵ C. MEEK, *Lucca 1369–1400. Politics and Society in an Early Renaissance City-State*, Oxford 1978, pp. 235–256.

⁴⁶ P. GUALTIERI, “*Col caldo e furore di certi Fiorentini*” *Espansione fiorentina e preminenza signorile a Prato, Pistoia e nei centri della Valdesa e del Valdarni inferior*, [in:] *Le signorie cittadine in Toscana. Esperienze di potere e forme di governo personale (secoli XIII–XV)*, ed. A. ZORZI, Roma 2013; A. MANCINI, *Storia di Lucca*, Firenze 1950, pp. 187–189.

⁴⁷ M.E. BRATCHEL, *op. cit.*, p. xxi.

⁴⁸ C. MEEK, *Lucca...*, pp. 301–332.

⁴⁹ A. MANCINI, *op. cit.*, pp. 186–188.

⁵⁰ M.E. BRATCHEL, *op. cit.*, p. xxi.

⁵¹ C. MEEK, *Lucca...*, pp. 235–260.

could make space for the aggressive neighbours to intervene in Lucca politics. This tendency shown by the fact that the Florentines wanted to give citizenship to Paolo Guinigi's son Lancilao,⁵² and after it didn't work, they led a campaign against the city in 1429 which ended the Guinigi rule.⁵³ The government of Paolo from 1400 had to face against continually hardening pressure from rival cities. The almost perpetual endemics and the starvation were made the situation wronged and caused instability in the *contado* around Lucca.⁵⁴

Although the urban elite and the Guinigi clan's goal was to strengthen the liberty of the city and its properties.⁵⁵ The political statement became harder at the end of the 1410th years. Braccio da Montone, the ruler of Perugia, one of the greatest *condottiero* of that age⁵⁶ in 1418 entered with his troops into Lucca's territory where they robbed and destroyed. As Sercambi wrote it was possible that the rush of the *contado* was happened by Florentine inspiration – Braccio's men arrived from the territories of Florence.⁵⁷ The wealth of the Lucca elite shown by the act that they collected money for Braccio and paid ransom to return with his army. The Perugino *condottiero* also gave back the robbed value to the people.⁵⁸ The hysterical step of the Guinigi was successful, but the relation between Braccio and Florence gave goal to vexation. In 1420 the pope changed up the Spini family from the papal banker position and this important status with a lot of diplomatic and political values got by the Medici family which governed Florence indirectly.⁵⁹ This event was important for Braccio da Montone too: his aim was to legitimate his *signoria* upon Perugia. The Umbrian city was in nominal papal property and the pope didn't want to recognize his rule, but with the Florentine relations the *condottiero* had hope to make the correspondence.⁶⁰ What was the strategy of Lucca in these hard times? I think it's important to examine the marriage politics of the Guinigi.

⁵² SERCAMBI, vol. 2, p. 359.

⁵³ M.E. BRATCHEL, *op. cit.*, p. 144.

⁵⁴ *Ibidem*, pp. 123–143.

⁵⁵ C. MEEK, *Lucca...*, pp. 300–332.

⁵⁶ *I capitani di ventura. Guerra e società nell'Italia centrale del Trecento. Atti del convegno I capitani di ventura. Guerra e società nell'Italia centrale del Trecento, Perugia 5 maggio 2006*, ed. S. ZUCCHINI, Perugia [2006], pp. 40–50.

⁵⁷ SERCAMBI, vol. 2, p. 271.

⁵⁸ SERCAMBI, vol. 2, p. 271.

⁵⁹ J.M. NAJEMY, *A History of Florence*, Malden–Oxford 2006, pp. 263–264.

⁶⁰ SERCAMBI, vol. 2, pp. 281–282.

We don't know the exact birth date of Paolo Guinigi, but from his status in the family and from the older brother's age we can suggest that he could be his early 30th when he got the rule over the city.⁶¹ Paolo was probably bachelor but as *signore* he had a lot of opportunities to find a perfect wife. Although he and his advisors should calculate with several options. Naturally the marriage was an obligation for him as the first man in the city. He got his first wife, Ilaria Careto after the stabilization of the new government in 1403.⁶² A Sercambi wrote in short, the choose of the wife was motivated by the advisors.⁶³ Interesting plus information that – although the chronicler didn't say it, from the length of the caput and from the fact that he didn't suggest his own part, this couldn't be Sercambi's advise. Ilaria died in 1405, so the marriage didn't last long time.⁶⁴ The importance of the marriages shown by that Lucca's ruler get his new wife almost immediately in 1407: Piagentina, the daughter of Rodolfo Varani, ruler of Camerino.⁶⁵ She was the sister of Berardo Varani, who participated in hunting event in our story. The new relation lasted longer time than the earlier, but the new marriage ended in 1419, when Piagentina died too.⁶⁶ After this tragedy the choose of the new ara was no longer than one year. Paolo got his new wife also from Umbria: married with Jacopa Trinci, daughter of Ugolino Trinci. Important to underline that she was the sister of Nicolò and Bartolomeo Trinci.⁶⁷ This step towards Foligno, didn't mean that the Guinigi neglected the relations with Camerino. Paolo's only son, Lancilao (or Ladislao) married in 1420 also, with Maria di Rodolfo Varani.⁶⁸ So from Lucca's ruler family not just Paolo but his heir too became the brother in law of Berardo Varani. The marriage politics of Paolo Guinigi, which concentrated on define regions were not special but not average too. Rodolfo Varano got wives for his son from 14 different cities, from Padova to Rome,⁶⁹ the Trinci had relation with Este, Orsini and such dynasties.⁷⁰

⁶¹ C. MEEK, *Lucca...*, p. 341.

⁶² SERCAMBI, vol. 2, p. 48.

⁶³ "il magnifico signore Paulo Guinigii senza donna, fu per alcuni amici tractato di darli per donna madonna Ylaria figluola di messer Charlo marcheze del Carretto", SERCAMBI, vol. 2, p. 48.

⁶⁴ SERCAMBI, vol. 2, p. 120.

⁶⁵ SERCAMBI, vol. 2, p. 74.

⁶⁶ SERCAMBI, vol. 2, p. 74.

⁶⁷ SERCAMBI, vol. 2, p. 292.

⁶⁸ SERCAMBI, vol. 2, p. 296.

⁶⁹ A. ESCH, *Bonifaz IX. und der Kirchenstaat*, Tübingen 1969, pp. 551–552.

⁷⁰ J.C. MAIRE VIGUEUR, *op. cit.*, p. 235.

Mancini's opinion that the marriages of the Guinigi had no political effects in use,⁷¹ but I think that we can examine the political strategy of the Guinigi purposely. For the city circumnubated by aggressive neighbours had a possibility to build relations in the rival's backside: above Florence and the Visconti. First they could build relations this way, secondly but not last, they could avoid the uncomfortable family relations with the neighbour rivals. We can observe the same motivation in Paolo's first marriage, because the links with the Genovese elite could be useful. The Varani wife in 1407 had similar goals: Lucca could get relations in the back of Florence. In Umbria not just the Guinigi but Braccio da Montone also had plans which emphasised in marriage relations. In 1420 the famous *condottiero* married with Nicola di Rodolfo Varani, sister of Berardo Varani.⁷² In the same year his son Oddo got a wife from Foligno: a daughter of the Trinci ruler.⁷³ Although Braccio had Perugia he couldn't legitimate his rule even with Florentine help either.⁷⁴

We can conclude that Braccio da Montone's – similar as Paolo Guinigi – aim was to build good relations with the cities near Perugia (with the Trinci and the Varani). This could be highly important because the leaders of Camerino and Foligno were in traditionally good relations; they were in one interest-group and in one family web. This underlined by the hunting event near Nocera: all of our sources suggest that Berardo da Camerino and Nicolò Trinci hunted together.⁷⁵

Above the goals I underlined earlier, the marriages made the opportunity for the Guinigi to build links towards the papal state. Paolo could do this because Camerino and Foligno were under nominal papal rule. These steps had the possibility to counterpoint the Florentines good papal relations. The luchese *signore* introduced in the circle which included the dangerous *condottiero* Braccio da Montone too, which had positive sense. The Lucca government wasn't in bad relations with the ruler of Perugia, this could be emphasise by Sercambi when

⁷¹ A. MANCINI, *op. cit.*, p. 187.

⁷² *Storia di Camerino*, p. 162.


⁷³ “Volle, che un figliuolo suo naturale chiamato Oddo prendesse per consorte una figliuola di Signore di Foligno, e ricetene da Ambasciatori degli Ariminesi, condescese, ch' a Roberto figliuolo di Pandolfo Malatesto si sposisse un'altro figliuola di lui parimente illegimente”, *Storia di Camerino*, pp. 161–162.

⁷⁴ SERCAMBI, vol. 2, p. 271.

⁷⁵ SERCAMBI, vol. 2, p. 308.

he wrote about the 1418 events: Braccio was typified as a person who arrived as a foe but finally done good thing for the luchese people.⁷⁶ We can read some other words about the important relations in the chapter of *Croniche* about the 1420 wedding. Sercambi wrote that on the celebration they were Nicolò Trinci, Rodolfo Varani's son and "Pietro", Pasquale de Argillaia's son, and twenty more people participated.⁷⁷ There are some additions in *Storia di Camerino*, which said that on Braccio da Montone's wedding the *signori* of Foligno, Fabriano and Matelica also appeared.⁷⁸

Relations between the *signore* families



⁷⁶ SERCAMBI, vol. 2, p. 271.

⁷⁷ "E fèsi la festa principale delle diete due spoze a di. vii. agosto in. mccccxx. In e borghi al palagio nuovo, solo di cena; alla quale cena fu lo signore Nicolò da Fulingno e uno figliuolo di Rodolfo da Chamerino e uno ser Pietro di ser Pasquale d' Argillaia, con circha. xx. in loro compagnia", SERCAMBI, vol. 2, p. 297.

⁷⁸ "Braccio si se incontro alla sposa nella chiesa di S. Maria de gl'Angioli, e quiui presenti i Signori di Foligno, di Fabriano, di Matelica, et altra nobilità di conto", *Storia di Camerino*, p. 162.

We can conclude that the participators of the Trinci murder story were not just in the some family circle, but at the primal year wedding celebrations, in 1420, they were in the same desk society. It is surprising in the case of Pedro di Argiliaia who wasn't the relative of the underlined lords, although he participated in the described chapter by Sercambi. Naturally it is possible that Giovanni Sercambi wrote him into the caput to emphasise the brutality of the later murder. The opinion of Jean-Baptist Delzant is that Sercambi didn't write about the role of Pedro's wife and Pasquale's works because these points didn't fit the advisory goals: don't trust in the enemies but in the closer friends.⁷⁹ I think by the introduced relations and strategical aims, that Delzant's publication is logically good, but the motivations of Sercambi could be find in other options.

Conclusions

Giovanni Sercambi as a chronicler had special attention on violent topics. The author of *Croniche di Lucca* did not just mention the murders, factional strives or vendetta, but he wrote in details about these. His viewpoint can be described by the literature background, the active political participations, and the advisory viewpoint of the author. He underlined the startling parts as rhetorical tools to emphasise the teaching will. This could be the basic motivation for the description of the Trinci murder.

Further context could be the political viewpoint of Giovanni Sercambi. For the researchers it's obvious that he was inner friend of the Guinigi. The reviewed parts in the *Croniche* and the audience of *Nota ai Guinigi*, and the continously repeated invocation of Paolo Guinigi also suggest that Sercambi was not just a Guinigi friendly politician but a man in the inner advisory circle. Accordingly I think that he knew the hard situation in external politics and the importance of the Foligno relations. The murders happened just after the year 1420, which was the date of big weddings. The participants of the events were in close family and fresh diplomatic relation. These points made the topic very sensible both for Lucca and Foligno. The feature of Pedro di Argiliaia in the wedding society table suggest that not just the victims of the conspiracy but the conspirators were also well known in this circle.

⁷⁹ J.B. DELZANT, *op. cit.*, pp. 73–74.

The dark works of Pasquale in the submission of Ugolino Trinci could mean such elements in the story that could be throw shadow on the fresh strategical relations with the heirs of Ugolino. The basic violent nature of Pasquale had at least two goals in the Sercambi-kind story: first the author took down the responsibility from the father of the Trinci brothers; secondly he could underline the aggressive nature of the conspirators. The motif of the cruel Pasquale and his cruel traitor son fit in the other mentions of *Croniche di Lucca*: by Sercambi the traitor mentality descend from father to the son. The violent relation of Nicolò or Bartolomeo with Pedro's wife should be an answer about the antecedents of the murder, but these skipped from the luchese chapter because of the topics sensibility.

Although the heirs of the Foligno became written as virgin and passive actors of the story. The relation of Paolo Guinigi with Corrado Trinci, the Varani and the Montone didn't made it possible to write about the important and dishonoured role of the Trinci brothers in the story.

It's also important that the events happened in 1421 and Sercambi died in 1424, so he wrote the chapter shortly immediately after the events happened. Thus he got information in person or through mediators. Jacopa Trinci and her servants could be in Lucca at the end of year 1420, so they could attend with news. We can't exclude that the Sercambi-kind story was told for the author by the Trinci wife or her servants/guardians, which unfold the distortions.

As a final conclusion I think that the three possible points, such as the special interest of Sercambi for violent topics, the political sensibility of him and the Guinigi-Trinci relations could motivated the author for the story writing this way.

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HOW MATTHIAS CORVINUS' BOMBARDS CAPTURED GŁOGÓW IN 1488

Summary. Sieges in the Middle Ages were always a difficult logistical undertaking. The most serious problems were faced during sieges of such places as fortified towns or especially large castles. In such cases, a basic difficulty was posed by a need to organise a tight blockade of the selected place, in order to cut it off from any communication with the external world. Among many known sieges in the 15th century, the siege of Głogów in 1488 stands out, carried out by Hungarian troops. The hostilities lasted from 19th May to November 1488, which was almost a half of the year. The Hungarian troops were equipped with numerous pieces of artillery, including three large bombards from Wrocław, Świdnica and Legnica. These cannons inflicted considerable damage in the town during the siege. However, two of these burst. The town surrendered only after the stores of food had run out, and not due to bombardment. The course of event at Głogów demonstrates that during sieges of large centres with the use of the heaviest artillery in the 15th century it was difficult to achieve measurable success.

Keywords: Głogów, Silesia, Matthias Corvin, Middle Ages, siege, artillery, town walls

The siege of Głogów in 1488 was an outcome of the so-called war of the Głogów succession, which was fought in the years 1476–1482. The subject of the conflict after Duke Henry XI, who died childless, was the Duchy of Głogów, and the rivals in the fight for the inheritance were Albrecht Achilles, Elector of Brandenburg and Jan II, Duke of Żagań. In the course of the fight, the Brandenburg units had managed to take control of the greater part of the Duchy of Głogów already in 1476 but, thanks to military and financial assistance from King Matthias Corvinus, Jan II removed the opponents from the disputed territory (except for Krosno Odrzańskie) in several intense military campaigns. Under the peace treaty signed in Kamieniec Ząbkowicki in 1482, Jan II obtained the

Duchy of Głogów as a lifehold, but without Krosno Odrzańskie, Lubsk and Sulechów (which remained with Brandenburg).¹

The compromise was broken already in 1485, when Matthias Corvinus presented his plans to take the Duchy of Głogów away from Jan II. He intended to offer it as dowry to his son John for the planned wedding with Bianca Sforza. In response, in 1487 Jan II led to setting up in Wrocław an anti-Corvinus arrangement, which included sons of George of Podebrady, Dukes Jan and Nicholas of Opole, Jan the White, Duke of Oleśnica, and with time also Vladislaus, King of Bohemia. At the beginning of 1488, Jan II made his daughters marry the sons of Henry of Podebrady – George and Charles. As dowry, he allegedly gave them his rights to the Duchy of Głogów. Then, he ordered the representatives of the Duchy's town councils to acknowledge the donation and, when faced with resistance, he imprisoned the opponents and appointed a new council. Due to this situation, the representative of Matthias Corvinus ordered his allies to begin preparations for war at a convention summoned in Wrocław.²

The siege of Głogów was conducted by the Hungarian army under command of Wilhelm von Tettau, who acted upon orders from King Matthias Corvinus. Around 19th May 1488, four thousand armed soldiers began works, which were to last nearly half a year. However, Głogów was quite well prepared for defence. Its strength lied mostly in well-developed town fortifications, as well as the arsenal of weaponry, including firearms. Thanks to this, Głogów was considered as the second best fortified urban centre in Silesia, after Wrocław (Fig. 1). Before the siege units arrived, Jan II had managed to bring inside the town walls Bohemian mercenary units in the force of at least 1000 armed soldiers.³

They started to build the brick defensive walls in Głogów at the end of the 13th century, replacing the earlier fortifications of wood and earth, which had been damaged after a town fire in 1291. Part of the fortifications on the Odra river and the castle were burned down then.

¹ For more information on this topic *vide*: A. KALOUS, *Matyáš Korvín (1443–1490). Uberský a Český král*, České Budějovice 2009, pp. 190–191; H. SZCZEGÓŁA, *Głogowska wojna sukcesyjna*, [in:] *Głogovia Maior, Wielki Głogów między blaskiem dziejów i cieniem ruin*, eds. B. CZECHOWICZ, M. KONOPNICKA, Głogów–Zielona Góra 2010, pp. 99–109; B. TECHMAŃSKA, *Jan II Żagański. Niespokojny książę sojusznik króla husyty (16 VI 1435 – 22 IX 1504)*, Kraków 2014, pp. 64–77.

² B. TECHMAŃSKA, *op. cit.*, pp. 82–86.

³ J. BLASCHKE, *Geschichte der Stadt Glogau und des Glogauer Landes*, Glogau 1913, pp. 141–142; B. TECHMAŃSKA, *op. cit.*, p. 86.




Fig. 1. Głogów, town map with the most important defence elements: a – castle, b – Vighaus roundel, c – Corpus Christi wicket, d – the other castle of dukes, e – probable location of the town arsenal, f – St George's Church; g – Dominican Monastery, h – Church of St Nicholas (Source: D. Adamska, *op. cit.*, Fig. 2, elaborated by P. Strzyż)

After the town's division into two parts, the older castle was extended and the Piast dukes built a new complex, located near the Hospital Gate, in the south-eastern part of town (Fig. 1). Throughout the 14th and 15th centuries, the walls were renovated and completed with new elements. The fortifications consisted principally of four gates (Fig. 1). The Odra Gate was located in the north-western part of town, between the old castle and the Franciscan Monastery. Its main function was to protect the crossing of the Odra river towards Ostrów Tumski. From the west, the walls were guarded by the Brzostów Gate. In the southern corner of the fortifications, the Hospital Gate was located, and from the east, the security of the citizens was guarded by the Polish Gate. Additional towers were often located near the gates. Besides, the defensive perimeter was equipped with a number of towers which could be used for firing at the enemy. Altogether there were

17 towers open to the inside and 9 full towers. Some of them have been preserved until today, testifying to the town's former power (Fig. 2). An important element of the town fortifications was also the castle, the construction of which started around the middle of the 13th century in the north-western corner of the town. With a massive cylindrical tower, the castle provided an important reinforcement of the protection of the Odra Gate. The town fortifications were expanded in the first half of the 15th century, when the town was enclosed in a second ring of walls. The *Zwinger* was first mentioned in 1439, and in the second half of the 15th century the sources also reference earth entrenchments. These defences were also equipped with 14 semi-circular roundels, which could be used for shooting from crossbows and handheld firearms. The most distinguished roundel among them was named *Vighaus*. It was located near the parish church of St George and the Hospital Gate (Fig. 3). In the second half of the 15th century, the town gates were also additionally fortified, by equipping them with additional gate necks or barbicans (Fig. 4). The responsibility for defending the walls during peacetime lied mainly with guild organisations, and each of them had its own allocated section, defined in instruction from 1399. The Hospital Gate was guarded by butchers, while bakers were supposed to keep watch at the Polish Gate, shoemakers and tanners – at the Mill Wicket, blacksmiths – at *Vighaus*, tailors guarded the wall section near the Corpus Christi Church, weavers, the most numerous guild, were responsible for the northern side of the fortifications near the monastery, and furriers along with innkeepers – for the fortifications near the Bishop's palace and the Franciscan monastery. With time, the responsibilities were replaced with services from armed soldiers who were paid from the guild fund.⁴ Of course, in the event of threat, the town's garrison could have been reinforced with mercenary units, which indeed took place in 1488.

⁴ T. KOZACZEWSKI, *Głogów – miasto średniowieczne*, "Kwartalnik Architektury i Urbanistyki" 1973, vol. 18/1, p. 5; L. KAJZER, S. KOŁODZIEJSKI, J. SALM, *Leksykon zamków w Polsce*, Warszawa 2001, pp. 177–179; J. DYMITYRSZYN, *Brama Odrzańska w Głogowie*, [in:] *Głogów w czasach Jagiellonów*, ed. L. LENARCZYK, Głogów 2012, pp. 67–68; G. KOCHMAN, *Zabudowa Głogowa na przełomie XV i XVI wieku*, [in:] *Głogów w czasach Jagiellonów*, ed. L. LENARCZYK, Głogów 2012, pp. 91–94; D. ADAMSKA, "...dla użytku i potrzeby ziemi naszej". *Rozwój przestrzenny lewobrzeźnego Głogowa od połowy XIII do początku XVI wieku w świetle źródeł pisanych*, [in:] *Głogów. Średniowieczne miasto nad Odrą*, ed. K. CZAPŁA, Głogów 2018, pp. 76–79, Fig. 2; D. NOWAKOWSKI, *Elementy obronne średniowiecznego miasta i broń w mieście na przykładzie Głogowa w świetle źródeł archeologicznych i pisanych*, [in:] *Głogów. Średniowieczne miasto nad Odrą*, ed. K. CZAPŁA, Głogów 2018, pp. 96–99, 102.



Fig. 2. Głogów – towers of the town fortifications and arrow slits in the town wall, photography by the author



Fig. 3. Głogów – the Vighaus roundel (Source: J. BŁASCHKE, *op. cit.*, p. 266)

During the discussed period, Głogów was well-equipped with firearms, both in the town arsenal and owned by the inhabitants. The earliest information about this dates back to the middle of the 15th century. At the time, the town was divided into two parts which belonged to two different branches of the Silesian Piasts. Unfortunately, the preserved information only concerns the Głogów-Żagań line, thus failing to offer a full picture of the town's firepower. The oldest record is divided into two parts. The first part lists 20 cannons altogether, of which 5 were terrace-guns (*tarresbochse, tarris bochse*), 8 light field cannons (*hawffenicze*), four large cannons and two more without more detailed specifications and a small iron cannon. The majority of them, 18 cannons were positioned near the Polish Gate and on the walls around it. Two more cannons were placed near the Corpus Christi Wicket and an indefinite residential tower. In the second record, 13 cannons were listed, of which 5 shot with stone balls (*steyn bochssen*), 2 large cannons placed at the Polish Gate, as well as 5 terrace-guns (*tarris bochssen*) and one unspecified cannon. The second mention is probably a little younger and perhaps it specifies only some of the cannons listed in the first record. Another register is dated to 24th June 1475. It lists 18 large cannons, a number of older *steynbuchszzen*, 14 cannons which may have been hackbuts, and a large hackbut (*hocken buchze*). The last of the registers made before the siege is dated to 21st March 1479. It revealed the possession of 25 hackbuts (including 10 copper ones) and 19 large cannons, including a new bronze cannon and a number of older *steynbuchszzen*. Additionally, the town arsenal stored defensive and offensive weaponry which could be used for equipping several tens of soldiers. The possibility of at least partial equipment of town with locally produced firearms is confirmed with documents related to the work of a bell founder named Andrzej, who may have been responsible for casting the above-mentioned copper/bronze hackbuts.⁵ It was, as stated before, only a part

⁵ H. GROTEFEND, *Aus dem Zinsbuche der Stadt Gross-Glogau*, "Zeitschrift des Vereins für Geschichte und Alterthum Schlesiens" 1874, vol. 12/1, pp. 209–211; M. GOLIŃSKI, *Uzbrojenie mieszczańskie na Śląsku od poł. XIV do końca XV w.*, "Studia i Materiały do Historii Wojskowości" 1990, vol. 33, pp. 45–47; IDEM, *Działania wojenne a modernizacja systemów obronnych na Śląsku w drugiej połowie XV wieku*, "Kwartalnik Architektury i Urbanistyki" 1995, vol. 40/1, p. 55; IDEM, *Firearms in 15th-century Silesian Military Art*, "Quaestiones Medii Aevi Nova" 2006, vol. 2, p. 209; J. SZYMCZAK, *Początki broni palnej w Polsce (1383–1533)*, Łódź 2004, p. 337; D. NOWAKOWSKI, *op. cit.*, p. 105.

of the town's arsenal – after joining the two parts of the town by Duke Jan II in 1480,⁶ its firepower could have doubled.



Fig. 4. A panorama of Głogów from the middle of the 18th century, according to an atlas by Friedrich Bernhard Werner (Source: University Library in Wrocław, Cartography Department, WERNER F.B., *Topographia Silesiae*, vol. 5)

Expecting an already inevitable attack from the Hungarian forces

the Duke, on Wednesday after the Jubilate Sunday [30 April], burned down all the houses, all the barns, all the walls and fences, and ordered to cut down all the trees

⁶ *Kaspar Borgen Rocznik głogowski do roku 1493 (Annales Glogovienses bis z. J. 1493)*, transl. W. MROZOWICZ, Głogów 2013, pp. 118–119; *Annales Glogovienses bis z. j. 1493. Nebst urkundlichen Beilagen*, [in:] *Scriptores Rerum Silesiacarum*, vol. 10, ed. H. MARKGRAF, Breslau 1877, p. 40; D. NOWAKOWSKI, *Siedziby książęce i rycerskie księstwa głogowskiego w średniowieczu*, Wrocław 2008, p. 335; B. TECHMAŃSKA, *op. cit.*, pp. 79–82.

in front of the Brzostów Gate, so that nothing was left”.⁷ Whereas, already during the siege “close to Whit Sunday [25 May 1488] a town gate was bricked up, namely the Hospital Gate, and near St Rufus’ Day [27 August 1488], the Brzostów Gate was bricked up until the end of the dispute.”⁸

Initially, the Hungarian military action focused on closing the siege line from the side of the Odra river, which the citizens were trying to prevent by shooting firearms at the attackers from the island of Ostrów Tumski and the bridge roundel of St George. Głogów Annal informs about this:

Then, on Wednesday night, it was on St Barnabas the Apostle’s day within the octave of Corpus Christi [11 June], the royal army laid siege to Ostrów Tumski at night. Then, mercenaries [of Duke Jan] were shooting very intensely from the church and school. In the morning, they built a fortification, commonly called a tower (...). Meanwhile, Duke Jan ordered to shut the town down and, having gathered a great number of burgesses and mercenaries, he left the town in the evening (...). They attacked the royal army and killed and captured several people. They took away from them two good cannons and brought them to the town, one from Wrocław and the other from Bautzen.⁹

This information is interesting insofar as it confirms not so much the elimination (jamming) of barrels as capturing the listed cannons and taking them inside the town walls. At the same time, describing them as good (*bonas*), and connecting them with the specific urban centres which provided them suggests that they were cannons of larger calibre, probably of the bombard variety. They must have been set on gun carriages, probably wheeled, which allowed the attackers to hijack them (Fig. 5).

⁷ *Kaspar Borgenii...*, p. 130; *Annales Glogovienses...*, p. 52: “Item feria quarta post Jubilate dux Joannes cremavit omnes domus, omnia horrea, omnes parietes, omnes sepes et arbores fecit abscidi ante volvam Brostenicensem, ita quod nihil remansit”.

⁸ *Kaspar Borgenii...*, p. 133; *Annales Glogovienses...*, p. 54: “Item circa Penthecostes obstructa fuit porta, scilicet das spittelthor, et circa festum Ruffi obstructum fuit das Brestinense thor usque ad finem litis”.

⁹ *Kaspar Borgenii...*, p. 131; *Annales Glogovienses...*, pp. 52–53: “Item feria quarta in nocte, hoc fuit in die s. Barnabae apostoli, infra octavas Corporis Christi, exercitus regis nocte obsedit summum. Tunc stipendarii de ecclesia et de scolastica maxime sagittabant, ipsi vero mane aedificarunt propugnaculum, proprie eine postey (...). Sed dux Joannes immediate misit claudere civitatem et congregata multitudine civium et stipendiariorum hora vesperarum ivit de civite (...). Et irruerunt super exercitum regis et paucos occiderunt et captivaverunt et duas pixides bonas eis coeperunt et at civitatem duxerunt, una de Wratislavia, alia de Budissen”.




Fig. 5. Siege artillery (bombards) on wheeled carriages. Wall painting presenting the siege of Belgrade by Turks in 1456. Church of Immaculate Conception of the Blessed Virgin Mary in Olomouc, ca. 1468 (Source: A. KALOUS, *op. cit.*, p. 38)

Perhaps a few days later “on another night, the king’s army fired at the town arrows with burning fabric, commonly named burning arrows and burning stakes, but they failed to set anything on fire”.¹⁰ Unfortunately, this interesting description is not completely clear. It is not known whether the arrows were shot from handheld weapons – bows or crossbows, or maybe rather some hurling machines were used, which seems to be confirmed with the burning stakes they launched. The possibility of using various kinds of machines for launching e.g. incendiary projectiles, stones, architectural details or even carrion is confirmed in both written sources and iconography from the period.¹¹

¹⁰ *Kaspar Borgen...*, pp. 132–133; *Annales Glogovienses...*, p. 54: “In nocte sequenti exercitus regis telas ignitas, proprie fewer pfeil und fewer staul, sagittabant ad civitatem, sed nihil incenderunt”.

¹¹ E.g. during the siege of the castle in Kuyavian Brest by the army of Teutonic Knights in 1332, apart from stone projectiles, also pots with tar and burning torches were hurled behind the embankments, in order to set fire to the buildings, *vide*: J. SZYM CZAK, *Sposoby zdobywania i obrony grodów*

Jan II too had personal experience with using such machines, as in 1480, during the siege of Głogów, he launched 219 projectiles at the castle, including containers “in which there were dogs, cats, cut up and rotting horses, faeces”.¹²

The prolonging military action and loss of two large cannons forced Matthias Corvinus to send out letters asking for reinforcements. The letters concerned mainly siege artillery. The king particularly cared for large bombards from Wrocław and Świdnica. The first letter to the city council of Wrocław was sent on 16 June 1488. The king asked “the people of Wrocław to lend him a cannon with powder and stone balls that they had promised before. Additionally, they were supposed to make available another cannon, the largest one they had and equip it with stone cannonballs”.¹³ Matthias Corvinus also wrote about the necessity of sending cannons in his letter of 27 July of the same year: “Finally he admonishes them to support Tettauer in the siege of Głogów with their cannons, two of them in particular. Any damage inflicted to these cannons will be compensated”.¹⁴ In the case of the cannon from Świdnica, the letter was sent on 13 July, and included the most important requirements:

And send them [i.e. cannons] ready to Świdnica, for the [troops fighting there] to have a prepared large cannon with equipment, protective covers and stone balls, carpenters and whatever belongs to it, because Sir Wilhelm wants it to be sent within a week, the same for Wrocław and other places. Also, kind sirs, 25 stone balls which they had promised, were used in one day, which is why I need you to think about preparing stone balls without delay.¹⁵

w Polsce w okresie rozbitcia dzielnicowego, “Studia i Materiały do Historii Wojskowości” 1979, vol. 22, p. 52. For more information on this topic *vide*: P. STRZYŻ, *Throwing Engines Versus Gunpowder Artillery in Siege Activities in the Middle Ages – an Example of the Kingdoms of Poland and Bohemia*, “Fasciculi Archaeologiae Historicae” 2020, fasc. 33, pp. 105–108, Fig. 6: 1–2.

¹² *Kaspar Borgen*..., p. 109; *Annales Glogovienses*..., p. 40.

¹³ *Politische Correspondenz Breslaus im Zeitalter des Königs Matthias Corvinus*, zweite Abtheilung: 1479–1490, *Scriptores Rerum Silesiacarum*, vol. 14, eds. B. KRONTHAL, H. WENDT, Breslau 1894, p. 145, No. 491: “möchte ihm die Breslauer die Büchse mit Pulver und Steinen, welche sie früher zugesagt hätten, leihen. Ausserdem möchten sie aber noch eine Büchse, die grösste, die sie hätten, stellen und mit Steinenn versehen”. I would like to thank prof. dr hab. Grzegorz Żabiński from the Institute of History of the Jan Długosz University of History and Natural Sciences in Częstochowa for his help with translating texts from Old German language.

¹⁴ *Politische Correspondenz*..., p. 157, No. 508: “Schliesslich ermahnt er sie, den Tettauer bei der Belagerung Glogau’s mit ihrem Geschütz, besonders mit zwei Büchsen, zu unterstützen. Jeder an der Geschützen entstehende Schaden werde ersetzt werden”; M. GOLIŃSKI, *Działania wojenne*..., p. 56.

¹⁵ *Politische Correspondenz*..., p. 152, No. 500: “Och schicket zuhant keyn der Sweydnitz, das sy dy grosse bochse fertig haben mit allir zugehorunge, schermen wnd mit steynen, pulvir zymmir-

It was only when the sieging units were strengthened with armed reinforcements,¹⁶ that made it possible to close the ring of siege, which consisted of two rows of palisades and two moats and seven earth roundels. For tightening the siege “on St Rufus’ day [27 August] the royal troops built an enclosure with a ditch around the entire town, with several watchtowers, from one side of the Odra river to the other. They worked only at nights and finished the whole thing in just eight days”.¹⁷

However, they had to wait much longer for what they needed so much – the artillery reinforcements. The cannon from Wrocław arrived first. “On St Augustin’s day [28 August], in the evening, three mounted units came to the royal troops with 18 well-loaded carts. One cart carried the cannon from Wrocław. This cart was drawn by 24 horses”.¹⁸ Less than two weeks later, unhurriedly, “on Mary’s day of birth [8 September], many a man came to the royal troops, and with them the cannon from Świdnica, on a cart drawn by 32 horses”.¹⁹

The large cannons began bombarding the town walls on 15 September and continued for two weeks. Several sources inform about it. In the Annal of the City Council of Görlitz we can read that “the said royal commander of the large cannons from Wrocław, Świdnica and Legnica, at the order from his royal highness, demanded and ordered that they be sent near Głogów,

lewthen wnd was derczu gehorth, wen her Wilhelm, das man ym yn der wochen dy schicken sol, desgleichen von Braslaw wun obiral. Och, I. h, dy XXV bochsensyteyne, dy sy zugesagt haben, weren ag eynen tag; doromme gedenkith, das man fur und fur bochsensyteyne berethet, das man domethe nicht gesewmpt sey”; *vide*: J. SZYM CZAK, *Początki...*, p. 122.

¹⁶ At the end of July, reinforcements in the form of Hungarian units under Hans von Haugwitz and Jan Trnka reached Głogów. On their way to Głogów, near Tomaszów Górny, they defeated a back-up unit of Bohemian mercenaries, organised by Jan II, *cf.* *Kaspar Borgen...*, p. 133; B. TECHMAŃSKA, *op. cit.*, p. 88.

¹⁷ *Kaspar Borgen...*, p. 134; *Annales Glogovienses...*, p. 54: “Item in die Ruffi nocte exercitus regis fecit sepem cum uno fussato per totam civitatem cum aliquibus stubis ab una parte Oderae usqua ad aliam partem Oderae, et nocte semper faciebant et perfecerunt illum sepem in brevi, ita quod canis non potuit evenire, et vix in octo noctibus totum construxerunt”. In the translation of this text from Latin, W. Mrozowicz interprets the expression “sagittabant” as firing with the use of bows. However, this verb has broader meaning and it should be assumed that the firing could have been conducted with the use of crossbows and/or handheld firearms.

¹⁸ *Kaspar Borgen...*, p. 134; *Annales Glogovienses...*, p. 54: “Item in die s. Augustini hora vespereum tres turmae magnae equestres venerunt ad exercitum regis cum 18 curribus bene oneratis, super uno curru erat una pixis Wratislaviensis, in quo curru erant 24 equi, qui eam traxerunt ad exercitum regis”.

¹⁹ *Kaspar Borgen...*, p. 135; *Annales Glogovienses...*, p. 55: “Item in die Nativitatis Mariae venit ad exercitum regis multus populus, cum eo venit pixis Sweidenicensium, in curru fuerunt 32 equi”.

and the cannons fired so many shots that the Brzostów Gate along with the tower and two houses with scales [probably the scales at the town gate] as well as the defensive wall between them were totally destroyed and knocked down”.²⁰

The Głogów Annal states that:

later, on the Monday after the feast of [the Elevation] of the Holy Cross [15 September], the royal soldiers brought many large cannons, namely from Świdnica and Legnica, and started to destroy the town walls. They bombarded them incessantly until the feast of St Michael [29 September]. One day some mercenary soldiers from the town secretly crossed the moat and forced their way between the baskets and cannons. They did great damage there, but the royal units chased them back to the town, capturing some of them and injuring many.²¹

In fear of loss or destruction of the heaviest cannons, which had been obtained with so much effort, they were withdrawn from their previous positions and moved to Ostrów Tumski: “Then, around the feast day of Saints Crispin and Crispinian [25 October 1488] the royal soldiers pulled down the pre-wall and covers and moved the great cannons to Ostrów Tumski, one of which was placed behind the castle, opposite St George’s church. They used them to shoot towards the church and there they killed several mercenaries, injuring many”.²² Thus, it was possible to resume fire from the new location only after more than three weeks, directing it at St George’s chapel, which had been turned by the citizens of Głogów into a firing point, used for covering the nearby Odra Gate along with the castle. According to a witness of these events:

²⁰ *Goerlitzter Rathsanalen*, part I, ed. J.L. HAUPT, *Scriptores Rerum Lusaticarum*, Neue Folge, vol. 2, Goerlitz 1841, p. 58: “Es hat auch der gemelte konigliche houbtmann der Bressler, Sweydnitzer, vnd Lignitzer grosse Buchssen, nach schaffunge komtat gefordert vnnnd vor Glogaw furen lassen, dorawss denn vil schosse geschehn seint, also das das Brostische thor mitsampt dem thorme doselbst vnnnd tzwee weigheuser auch dy Stadmawer dortzwischen gar sint zuschossen vnnnd nydergeleget”; M. GOLIŃSKI, *Działania wojenne...*, p. 56.

²¹ *Kaspar Borgen...*, p. 136; *Annales Glogovienses...*, p. 55: “Item feria secunda post Crucis adduxerunt plures magnas pixides, scilicet Sweidenicensem et Legnicensem et ceperunt destruere murum civitatis et continuo sagittabant et non cessaverunt usque ad festum s. Michaelis. Uno die contigit quod stipendarii de civitate secreto per fossatum transierunt et irruerunt intra sportas et pixides. Ibi magna damna fecerunt, sed exercitus regis eos ad civitatem fugaverunt, aliquos captivaverunt et multos vulneraverunt”.

²² *Kaspar Borgen...*, p. 137; *Annales Glogovienses...*, p. 56: “Item festum Crispini et Crispiniani exercitus regis destruxit sepes und die schrimen et duxerunt magnas pixides ad summum et unum retro castrum ex opposito s. Georgii, cum quibus sagittabant ad s. Georgium et ibi stipendarios aliquos interfecerunt et multos vulneraverunt”.

when the Hungarians began their storming, many shots were fired from the cannons, namely a hundred and twenty from the large cannon, excluding all the small cannons such as light field cannons and hand-held cannons. On one day the cannon from Świdnica fired seventeen shots, and the cannon which belonged to Duke Frederick of Liegnitz fired fourteen shots and burst on the same day.²³

We can read in the Annal of the Council of the Town of Görlitz that:

In front of the church of St George, which was surrounded with a ditch and turned into a roundel by Duke Jan, on the tower, the great cannon from Legnica, equal to no other in Silesia, as well as one of the medium cannons from Wrocław exploded, and the roundel could not be taken by storm.²⁴

This event was also described in the Annal of Głogów:

On Friday before St Simon and Jude [24 October], they kept shooting all day long and until the evening of the following day. Then the cannon from Legnica was torn apart and the royal soldiers attacked St George's church, went strongly towards the tower but were repulsed so that they had to retreat and did not achieve anything.²⁵

Thus, despite inflicting some damage around St George's church, the fire from the largest cannons did not bring the expected effects. Additionally, as a result of explosions, they lost the largest bombard, sent by Duke Frederick and the medium cannon from Wrocław. It should not be surprising then, that in fear of loss of more cannons, they did not decide to continue saturation firing, restricting their action to harassing the opponent and blocking the access to town.

²³ MARCUS KYNTSCH VON ZOBTEN, *Herzog Hans der Grausame von Sagan im Jahre 1488*, ed. G.A. STENZEL, *Scriptores Rerum Silesiacarum*, vol. 4, Breslau 1850, p. 16: "Da die Hungern hin stürmen giengen, geschah es, dass diesen Tag aus den Büchsen geschahen viel mancherley Schüssen, als zwanzig und hundert Schoss aus dem grossen, ohn alle kleine Büchsen, als Haufenetzigen und Handbüchsen aus der Schweidnitschen einen Tag XVII. Schoss, aus Hertzog Friedrich von Liegnitz vierzehn Schoss, diese zusprang denselben Tag". *Vide*: M. GOLIŃSKI, *Firearms...*, p. 207.

²⁴ *Goerlizter Rathsannalen...*, p. 58: "Vor sand Jorgenkirchen vffm thum dy hertzoge hans vorgraben vnnd zu einer pastey gemacht hat, sint zusprenget wurden, dy lignitsche grosse buchsse, dergleiche jn der Slezie nicht gewest ist, vnnd der Bresler mittelbuchssen eine, jdach hat man dieselbige pastey mit storme nicht gewynnen mugen".

²⁵ *Kaspar Borgenii, Rocznik głogowski...*, p. 137; *Annales Glogovienses...*, p. 56: "Et feria sexta ante Simonis et Judae per totam diem sagittabant et die sequenti usque ad vespas. Tunc pixis Legnicenses fracta est, tunc circa vespas exercitus regis impetum fecit ad ecclesiam s. Georgii: sie giengen zu sturme zu der pastey mit macht, sonder sy worden abgeschlagen, dass sy musten abziehen und richten nicht aus. Et ex utraque parte multi interfecti sunt et multi vulnerati et lesi".

At present we do not have precise information about the heaviest bombards used near Głogów in 1488. Most of what was preserved concerns the cannon from Świdnica. It was called *Świnia* [Pig], *Macióra* or *Locha* (*Sau*) [Sow]. It weighed 6,5 or 8 tonnes and was supposedly cast in Nuremberg in 1467. The balls it used allegedly weighed 3 quintals and 20 pounds, that is approximately 160 kg. It was first used near Bolków in 1468 and the latest information on its existence comes from 1635, when a projectile fired from it travelled a distance of 2667 steps (about 2 km). It was rarely used in combat, which resulted from its weight and the related problems with transport.²⁶ Perhaps the remains of these events are four cannonballs²⁷ kept in the courtyard of the castle and Archaeological-Historical Museum in Głogów.²⁸ One of them was found on Ostrów Tumski in Głogów, near the old riverbed of the Odra in 2003.²⁹ The three other ones were removed in 2010 from the wall which surrounded the former military unit in Władysława Sikorskiego Street.³⁰ The balls had the following diameters: 48,4 cm, 45,4 cm, 45,2 and 44 cm. Two of them were carved of Strzegom granite and the other two of sandstone. Owing to their size, their weight was calculated on the basis of the mean specific weight of the rock they were made of. The granite cannonballs (inventory no. MG/H/652 and MG/H/1128) weigh about 155 and 117 kg, whereas the sandstone ones – about 110 kg (inv. no. MG/H/1127 and MG/H/1129) (Fig. 6). Of course, we do not know which of the cannons they could possibly have been shot from. With the calibre of the balls within the range of 44–48 cm and their varied weight, it may be assumed that they were rather the ammunition for two different cannons. The first one would have been about 50 cm in calibre, while the other – smaller one – about 46 cm, since it is known that for smoothbore artillery, the ball had

²⁶ Formerly the time of its origin was estimated to years before 1431, *vide*: M. GOLIŃSKI, *Broń palna na Śląsku do lat 30-tych XV w. oraz jej zastosowanie przy obronie i zdobywaniu twierdz*, “Studia i Materiały do Historii Wojskowości” 1989, vol. 31, pp. 14–15; IDEM, *Działania wojenne...*, p. 54; P. STRZYŻ, *Broń palna w Europie Środkowej w XIV–XV w.*, Łódź 2014, p. 107.

²⁷ Two more cannonballs were set in the northern wall of the castle (from the side of the Odra). However, only about 1/3rd of them is visible, which makes it impossible to determine their original diameter. But certainly, their calibre predestined them for use for bombards.

²⁸ I wish to thank Mr Waldemar Has, Director of the Archaeological-Historical Museum in Głogów, and Ms Renata Matysiak and Mr Jerzy Dymytryszyn, who carried out their photographic documentation and measurements.

²⁹ Ball inv. No. MG/H/652.

³⁰ Inv. No. of balls: MG/H/1127; MG/H/1128, MG/H/1129.

to have appropriate clearance in the barrel, and the correct pressure of powder gases was obtained by using a wooden tenon.³¹



Fig. 6. Stone cannonballs from the castle courtyard – collection of the Archaeological-Historical Museum in Głogów. 1 – inv. No. MG/H/652; 2 – inv. no. MG/H/1127; 3 – inv. No. MG/H/1128; 4 – inv. No. MG/H/1129 (photo by J. DYMTRYSYN)

³¹ J. SZYMCZAK, *Początki...*, pp. 73, 75; P. STRZYŻ, *Artyleria Władysława Jagielly w wojnie z Władysławem Opolczykiem (1391–1401)*, “Acta Militaria Mediaevalia” 2007, vol. 3, pp. 89, 92.

Apart from the balls from Głogów, we should also mention two similar projectiles, which are now found near the church of the Holy Cross in Świdnica. According to measurements, their calibre is 46 and 47 cm.³² They were made of local varieties of sandstone. The sandstone, depending on its kind, was acquired from quarries located near Nowa Ruda, Kłodzko district (red sandstones), as well as the vicinity of Złotoryja and Lwówek Śląski, where light-grey Cretaceous sandstone was mined. The Strzegom granite, which was used for making two of the balls from Głogów, was mined mainly in the area of Strzeblów and Chwałków.³³

A comparison of the size of balls from Głogów and Świdnica allows for an observation of a close similarity in this respect. Therefore, it may be assumed that the artefacts from Głogów may have had some connection with the military action from 1488, without a more precise assignment of the balls to specific cannons which took part in the siege though. Meanwhile, the projectiles preserved in Świdnica may be interpreted as remains of the stock for the *Świnia* cannon mentioned in the sources.

General data concerning the size of cannons used for the siege of Głogów are also provided by source mentions on their transport. The amount of tractive force used for transporting the cannons indicates that the cannon from Świdnica was larger than the one from Wrocław by ¼th, but still the largest one was the Legnica bombard from Duke Frederick, “which was unrivalled by any other in Silesia”.

Some detailed information on the use of *Świnia* from Świdnica was provided by Ephraim Ignatius Naso, a citizen of Świdnica who included the specifications and history of the cannon in his chronicle, published in Wrocław in 1667.³⁴ It also contains an account of the events from 1488: “When the town of Głogów was besieged in 1488, the cannon from Świdnica was transported with the use of 43 horses on 9 September”. He also gives some other facts which are worth

³² S. NOWOTNY, W. ROŚKOWICZ, A. DOBKIEWICZ, “Locha” – największe na Śląsku!, http://historia-swidnica.pl/locha-najwieksze-na-slasku/?fbclid=IwAR0bI6z18xTvAXcPtQ2kKR_2aEp2A0MojLusAwX51isaHV6eDE6MV_ulSBU (access: 13 I 2021).

³³ P. STRZYŻ, P. CZUBŁA, J. WRZOSEK, *Arsenal we Wrocławiu jako miejsce przechowywania dział i kamiennej amunicji artyleryjskiej, w świetle spisu z 1547 r.*, “Acta Universitatis Lodziensis, Folia Historica” 2018, vol. 66, pp. 43–46.

³⁴ EPHRAIM IGNATIUS NASO, *Phoenix redivivus, ducatum Svidnicencis [et] Javroviensis: Der wieder – lebendige Phoenix Der Beyden Fürstenthümer Schwednitz und Jauer*, Breslau 1667.

taking note of: “In 1567, on 11 November, this large cannon was rolled on thick and strong beams beyond the Witoszów Gate. On the following day, it made such horrible rumble that houses in the town trembled and moved, which would not happen for the following 70 seventy years. The ball weighed 3 quintals and 20 pounds”. Then:

In 1653, on 2 July, the day of Visitation of the Holy Virgin Mary, the large cannon from Świdnica was moved to the Strzegom Gate, some half a quarter of mile out of town towards Strzegom. It was fired when the making of peace between his imperial and royal majesty and the Saxon Elector Duke was announced. The ball weighed more than 3 quintals and was ejected to a distance of 2667 steps after loading the cannon with a quintal of powder.³⁵

Unfortunately, this exquisite specimen of medieval artillery was recast in 1647 in order to recover materials (including silver from the alloy), which were taken away to Prague.

Some form of illustration of what *Świnia*, as well as the other cannons used near Głogów, may have looked like is provided by iconographic representations of Matthias Corvinus' large Hungarian bombard, called *Stoń* (*stark Helfandt, der helfannt*) [*the Elephant*]. It surely participated in his expeditions to Vienna. After capturing the city, it remained in its arsenal and in the early 16th century it was described during stock-taking of Maximilian I's arsenal.³⁶ Both the image of the cannon during transport was preserved (Fig. 7) and its look already in the Vienna arsenal (Fig. 8). The two representations differ quite considerably from each other. The cannon on a cart has a significantly narrower powder chamber and broader muzzle, whereas the cannon from the arsenal has a broader (reinforced?) central part of the barrel, while the bottom and muzzle are clearly narrower. Unfortunately, now it is difficult to decide which of the representations is closer to the original. However, it is important that it is not particularly different than other heaviest cannons from that time.

³⁵ Quoted after S. NOWOTNY, W. ROŚKOWICZ, A. DOBKIEWICZ, *op. cit.*

³⁶ W. BOEHEIM, *Die Zeugbücher des Kaisers Maximilian I*, “Jahrbuch der Kunsthistorischen Sammlungen des Allerhöchsten Kaiserhauses” 1894, vol. 15, p. 308; T. PÁLOSFALVI, *King Matthias' Army*, [in:] *Matthias Corvinus, the King. Tradition and Renewal in the Hungarian Royal Court 1458–1490. Exhibition catalogue*, eds. P. FARBAKY, E. SPENKER, K. SZENDE, A. VÉGH, Budapest 2008, p. 296; A. VÉGH, 8.2. *Depiction of Matthias Corvinus' so-called “Elephant” Cannon in Emperor Maximilian's book of weapon*, [in:] *Matthias Corvinus, the King...*, pp. 301–302; A. KALOUS, *op. cit.*, p. 110.



Fig. 7. Matthias Corvinus' cannon, *Der Helfant (Stor)* during transport, JÖRG KÖLDERER, *Zeugbuch der österreichischenn Lnde*, ca. 1512–1517, fol. 7 (Source: T. PÁLÓSFALVI, *King Matthias'...*, p. 296)




Fig. 8. Matthias Corvinus' cannon *Der Helfant (Stor)* in the Vienna arsenal (Source: *Zeugbuch Kaiser Maximilian I*, Bayerische Staatsbibliothek, Cod. icon. 222, fol. 86, ca. 1505)

Although both the heaviest cannons and more numerous smaller calibre artillery (such as light field cannons) were used in the siege of Głogów, the achieved results were modest at most. Neither any significant damage could be inflicted to the fortifications nor the defenders' forces could be broken by storming or artillery firing, yet two cannons were lost in one of the raids and another two as a result of explosions. However, in view of the lack of any chances of external help, the prolonged siege induced the Town Council on 16 November to make a decision to surrender, which was received by Wilhelm von Tettau two days later. But before that, Jerzy Podiebradowic, Duke Jan II's son-in-law, had managed to leave the town of Głogów. This fact indicates that the ring of siege was not too tight. After the fall of Głogów, the remaining centres such as Szprotawa, Koźuchów, Zielona Góra and Świebodzin were taken over, not without fierce fights, by the middle of January 1489. Matthias Corvinus imposed upon Jan II a peace treaty which deprived the duke of all the dominions he had had so far in the Głogów duchy, offering only some compensation in return.³⁷

The course of military action near Głogów shows that when besieging well-fortified urban centres, even with the use of the heaviest artillery, at the end of the 15th century it was still difficult to achieve measurable success. In this case, despite destroying part of the fortifications (near the Szprotawa Gate), no assault could be conducted that would bring success to the besiegers. The decision to surrender the town was influenced mainly by such factors as fatigue of the garrison, hunger and lack of chances of relief, rather than the actual destruction of fortifications. Similar examples can be quoted for Wrocław, which the Polish army tried to besiege in 1474, or the earlier siege of Malbork by the Polish-Lithuanian forces in 1410.³⁸ They indicate that although in the late 15th century it was possible for artillery to incur considerable local damage, it was often incapable of destroying the walls to such a degree that would allow infantry to take over the towns. In this respect, a clear breakthrough came only in the 16th century (a little earlier in Western Europe – along with the Italian wars of Charles VIII), when new types of cannons with long barrels, adapted for shooting iron balls, enabled better concentration of fire and more effective destruction of fortifications.

³⁷ *Kaspar Borgen*..., pp. 141–143; M. GOLIŃSKI, *Działania wojenne...*, pp. 56–57; B. TECHMAŃSKA, *op. cit.*, pp. 89–91.

³⁸ E.g. J. SZYMCZAK, *Początki...*, pp. 236–240, 264–265; P. STRZYŻ, *Broń...*, pp. 201–206, 208 – further literature there.

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EMPEROR'S GAMBIT? ON THE ROLE OF URBAN CULTURE AND FENCING FRATERNITIES IN THE MILITARY REFORM OF MAXIMILIAN I HABSBURG

Summary. This paper aims to trace potential links between the military reform undertaken by King Maximilian I Habsburg, initiated by forming the first Landsknecht regiments in 1486, and the privilege issued in 1487 by his father, Emperor Frederick III, for the first association of fencing masters in German history, the Brotherhood of St. Mark (*Marxbrüder*).

The analysis presented in this paper begins with a description of the Army of the Empire (*Reichsheer*) prior to its reform at the turn of the 15th and 16th centuries, with particular focus on the role and military potential of the ministeriales. Next, the socio-cultural contexts and outcomes of the aforementioned reform are discussed, which serves as a backdrop for tracing the evolution of social perception and functioning of professional swordfighters in Germany. Especially important from this perspective is a change in the social standing of this group – from marginalisation as *lose Leute* to integration with the urban community and achieving the status of craftsmen. This process saw its culmination in an imperial privilege issued for the *Marxbrüder* by Frederick III in 1487.

In the final part, somewhat contrary to previous studies (which have presented the aforementioned social advancement of fencers as a natural part of the formation of the urban guild culture), this paper posits that the imperial privilege for the *Marxbrüder* happened, in fact, not on Frederick's, but rather on Maximilian's initiative. Such a view seems to be supported by Maximilian's strong connections with the martial arts community of the period and his war experiences in the Netherlands, as well as his personal involvement in designing and realising a thorough military reform. In this context, it may be hypothesised that by procuring imperial privilege for urban fencers, the young monarch hoped to initiate social change within the German urban community which would facilitate incorporating burghers into the structures of the new military model.

Keywords: Maximilian I Habsburg, late-medieval warfare, urban culture, history of Germany, martial arts, martial culture

Introduction

The impulse for writing this text came from the temporal coincidence of three events which I found interesting. In 1486, as scholars believe,¹ King of the Romans Maximilian I formed the first regiments of a new type of infantry which later came to be known as the *Landsknechte*; a year later (1487), his father, Emperor Frederick III, founded the first fraternity of fencing masters in the history of the Holy Roman Empire – the Brotherhood of Saint Mark (*Marxbrüder*).² In 1488, the so-called Swabian League, a regional political and military alliance between major towns, lower nobility, and aristocracy³ was reactivated on the emperor's initiative. These events may appear unrelated, but this becomes less obvious if one takes into account that between 1477 and 1493 Maximilian I was fighting in the Netherlands, where he keenly observed a new and very efficient type of infantry formation introduced by the Swiss. Both the Netherlandish forces and the Swiss *Reisläufer* confronted by the young monarch were embedded in urban rather than knightly culture, but they nevertheless

¹ C. JÖRGENSEN *et al.*, *Fighting Techniques of the Early Modern World. Equipment, Combat Skills, and Tactics*, New York 2006, p. 11.

² B.A. TLUSTY, *Martial Identity and the Culture of the Sword in Early Modern Germany*, [in:] *Late Medieval and Early Modern Fight Books*, eds. D. JAQUET, K. VERELST, T. DAWSON, Leiden–Boston 2016, p. 555. For a broader and in-depth discussion of urban martiality: EADEM, *The Martial Ethic in Early Modern Germany. Civic Duty and the Right of Arms*, New York 2011. Essential information on development of fencing fraternities and schools in Germany still quoted in newer studies can be found in the works by HANS-PETER HILS (IDEM, *Meister Johann Liechtenauers Kunst des langen Schwertes*, Frankfurt am Main–Bern–New York 1985) and K. WASSMANNSDORFF (IDEM, *Sechs Fechtschulen (di Schau- und Preisfechten) der Marxbrüder und Federfechter aus den Jahren 1573–1614: Nürnberger Fechtschulreime v. J. 1579 und Rösener's Gedicht: Ehrentitel und Lobspruch der Fechtkunst v. J. 1589; Eine Vorarbeit zu einer Geschichte der Marxbrüder und Federfechter*, Heidelberg 1870). An interesting synthesis of the social, political, and kinaesthetic aspects of urban fencing contests in 16th-century Germany is offered by KEVIN GAJDZIŃSKI, *Mieszczkański turniej szermierczy w XVI-wiecznych Niemczech*, [in:] *Regiony – Kultura – Demokracja. Wybrane teksty z V Konferencji Młodych Naukowców 9–10.06.2011 r.*, ed. N. NIEDZIELSKA-BURDZY, Wrocław 2013, pp. 24–30. Finally, the latest comparison of these urban contests with contemporaneous knightly tournaments can be found in: M. TALAGA, *Taniec to (nie) walka. Agonistyka i antagonyzacja a choreografia na przykładzie turniejów rycerskich i mieszczańskich w Niemczech*, “Kultura Współczesna” 2020, No. 4, pp. 157–173.

³ The fundamental work on the history of the League is H. CARL, *Der Schwäbische Bund 1488–1534: Landfrieden und Genossenschaft im Übergang von Spätmittelalter zur Reformation*, Leinfelden–Echterdingen 2000. The political and social context of its formation was thoroughly discussed in: *Ibidem*, pp. 21–148.

posed a serious challenge to the feudal Army of the Empire (*Reichsheer*) and the newer troops of the “English model” at his disposal. The Swiss system was based on a mixture of foot soldiers armed with staff weapons and firearms employing a characteristic combat technique and tactics – innovations later adopted by the German Landsknechts.⁴

During my attempt at reconstructing the process which eventually led to adoption of this model in Germany at the end of the 15th century – quite late, considering the geographical and cultural proximity between Switzerland and the Habsburg domains in Swabia and Austria – I noticed this transformation’s coincidence with the foundation of the fencing fraternity of the *Marxbrüder*, an organisation showing the peculiar combination of martial profile, knightly aspirations, and a definitely urban character. Having scrutinised this coincidence – between the formation of the *Landsknechte* (1486) and the foundation of the *Marxbrüder* (1487) – I hypothesise that it was not by chance but rather reflects efforts taken by Maximilian I in order to create a strong imperial army based on the new model, in spite of resistance from German feudal aristocracy. A pivotal role in this endeavour, as I will argue, was played by the previously untapped military potential of German burghers and the hitherto-marginalised travelling master fencers who were to become the evangelists of its future success. If we consider that in order to make use of the said potential Maximilian seems to have resorted to a sort of social engineering, an indirect and risky action, it appears fit to term this plan an “emperor’s gambit.”

In closing this introduction it is necessary to explain that today’s definition of the word “fencing” does not work well in the period under discussion and may be misleading. Unlike nowadays, when we understand fencing as a sport involving subtle handling of conventionalised, “elegant” cold steel weapons, at the turn of the 15th and 16th centuries the term “fencing” (German: *schirmen* or *fechten*) encompassed all kinds of activities related to coping with a violent physical confrontation – it referred in equal measure to weapon handling, unarmed fighting and wrestling, and mounted combat.⁵ Hence, it would fit both (proto)sportive

⁴ The socio-cultural background and historical circumstances of development and reception of the “Swiss model” and other traditions has recently been investigated in a paper on the Battle of Guinegate (1479) by M.J. KRASOŃ; IDEM, *The success of the pike over the bow discussed through the battle of Guinegate, during which the Swiss type infantry clashed with the armies of Louis XI. Twilight of the English military system*, “Open Military Studies” 2020, vol. 1, No. 1, pp. 1–10.

⁵ H.P. HILS, *op. cit.*, p. 248.

or ludic forms of combat, as well as those of a purely pragmatic nature which today would be jointly called “self-defence.” In effect, such phrases as “fencing with a sword” or “with a pike” should not come as surprising in this text – in the past, they were perfectly natural.

Army of the Empire before the reform

A broader situational context is needed to understand the dynamics of the events under discussion. The first crucial step is to examine the state of the Army of the Empire as found by Maximilian I when he had to use force in defence of the Netherlandish dominion of his wife, Mary of Burgundy, threatened by the king of France. Since the reform of the army undertaken in 1422 (Diet of Nuremberg), the armed forces of the Empire relied on contingents provided by particular territorial units and the feudal lords responsible for them.⁶ In effect, in the late 15th century the mainstay of the Imperial troops was still composed of the *ministeriales*, i.e. representatives of lower knighthood for whom military service was at the same time a basic duty and the main avenue for material and social advancement.⁷ It is worth noting, however, that as a rule the *ministeriales* were not free men, but descendants of serfs (*Dienstleute*), people assigned different menial functions at the courts of German aristocracy.⁸ Nevertheless, this state of affairs gradually evolved, because the *ministeriales* were often given land, usually non-hereditary, thus becoming able to pursue professional military training and develop practical martial knowledge and skills⁹ which, in turn, would be used to justify their claims to knighthood.¹⁰

However, at the turn of the 14th and 15th centuries, the *ministeriales* started to slowly lose the assets which had previously warranted their crucial role within

⁶ Heeresmatrikel, auf dem Reichstage zu Nürnberg beschlossen. – 1422, [in:] *Quellensammlung zur Geschichte der Deutschen Reichsverfassung in Mittelalter und Neuzeit*, ed. H. TRIEPEL, Thübingen 1913, pp. 232–234.

⁷ B. ARNOLD, *German Knighthood 1050–1300*, Oxford 1985, p. 12–29.

⁸ J. KEUPP, *Ministerialität und Lehnswesen. Anmerkungen zur Frage der Dienstlehen*, [in:] *Das Lehnswesen im Hochmittelalter. Forschungskonstrukte – Quellenfunde – Deutungsrelevanz*, eds. J. DENDORFER, R. DEUTINGER, Ostfildern 2010, pp. 347–349.

⁹ *Ibidem*, p. 352.

¹⁰ B. ARNOLD, *op. cit.*, p. 69.

the Army of the Empire. In the face of the growing military strength of German towns, which proved capable of enduring sieges (e.g. Rothenburg-ob-der-Tauber in the years 1407–1408) and winning pitched battles (e.g. the Swabian League of Towns at Reutlingen in 1377), not to mention the numerous Swiss victories (e.g. Morgarten in 1315), the military monopoly, or even advantage, of the German knighthood was becoming increasingly illusory. This led to undermining the traditional model of warfare and personal martial training which was centred on horsemanship and skilful wielding of the lance. Simultaneously, growing economic pressure was put on the *ministeriales* by the towns, the latter often acting as creditors to the former, as well as by higher nobility and aristocrats who opposed admitting lower knights to the *Reichstag* and burdened them by requiring military service in numerous feudal feuds.¹¹ It caused increasing frustration among the *ministeriales*, pushing many of them into crime and robbery. It also resulted in their deeper dependence on local checks and balances, which had a negative impact on their loyalty towards the emperors.

This situation created a demand for mercenaries – mostly foreigners. It bears emphasising here that these professional combatants were recruited primarily from urban dwellers. This process entailed not only a significant increase in war costs – unlike mercenaries, the *ministeriales* did not receive pay in money but in land and spoils of war – but also a major shift in the social structure of the army.

Military reform: inspirations, challenges, and solutions

As I mentioned in the introduction, the 1470s saw Maximilian I fighting in the Netherlands to defend his wife's dowry. His main adversary was King of France, Louis XI – an experienced politician with a victorious war against the military superpower of Burgundy already under his belt. It was during this earlier conflict, i.e. the Burgundian Wars (1474–1477), that the Swiss foot mercenaries hired by the French – *Reisläufer* – shined particularly clearly and played major roles in three victories achieved by the anti-Burgundian coalition (at Grandson,

¹¹ H. ZMORA, *The Feud in Early Modern Germany*, Cambridge 2011, p. 13; the aforementioned publication offers a comprehensive analysis of violent feuds taking place in Germany at the turn of the 15th and 16th centuries and lists key bibliographical references.

Murten, and Nancy). These accomplishments strengthened the reputation of the Swiss as excellent soldiers but also initiated transformations within the defeated Burgundian army which quickly adopted the new model of warfare. In result, when King Maximilian had to fight a pitched battle with the French at Guinegate in 1479 he could count on advice from a veteran experienced in the Swiss ways, Jacques of Savoy, Count of Romont, who helped the fledgling monarch prepare his forces to fight in the new style.¹² This support, combined with the high morale of the Burgundian-German troops (mostly urban militia from Flanders), allowed Maximilian to gain a decisive, albeit hard-fought and politically unexploited,¹³ victory over the more numerous French army composed of mounted knights and mercenary English longbowmen.¹⁴ This event became the spark which started far-reaching changes in warfare in the whole region, including France and the Empire. It is particularly important for the discussed matters that it was this battle experience that is commonly held responsible for Maximilian's strong commitment to the idea of transplanting the Swiss model to Germany, which led to the emergence of the Landsknechts in the following decade.¹⁵

It has to be noted, however, that this process took time and by no means happened automatically as a kind of Hegelian "historical necessity." The Army of the Empire was not at the time a centralised organisation, and its shape was essentially the effect of decisions taken by individual feudal lords. The latter, in turn, were more interested in local feuds and conflicts than in a comprehensive military reform.¹⁶ In result, Maximilian's efforts aimed at creating a significant Landsknecht corpus were of quite a limited scope during the first years after Guinegate. It comes as no surprise, however, if one takes into account that introduction of a new formation – not only armament but also drills, patterns of cooperation between different sub-formations, and a stable recruitment base – is not a simple administrative decision but rather a complex technological, social, and political-economic process.

¹² H. DELBRUCK, *History of the Art of War. The Dawn of Modern Warfare*, vol. 4, transl. W.J. RENFROE, London 1990, p. 4.

¹³ Maximilian I was, nevertheless, eventually forced to sign the unfavourable Treaty of Arras (1482).

¹⁴ M.J. KRASOŃ, *op. cit.*, pp. 6–9.

¹⁵ *Ibidem*, p. 9.

¹⁶ For more on this, *vide*: H. ZMORA, *op. cit.*, pp. 77–111. In the quoted chapter, H. Zmora argues that "the feuding scene in the 1470s was dominated by large, wealthy, pre-eminent families", *ibidem*, pp. 92–93.

The weapon, as noted by Alfred Gell in reference to Cambodian soldiers of Pol Pot and their landmines, “makes the soldier.”¹⁷ However, it has to be added that the weapon does not fight by itself and mere change in arms does not make new soldiers – other means are also necessary, the most important of which is training. Borrowing from Gell once more, it may be stated that although armament is often a key factor deciding outcomes of battles or wars, its “agency” can, nevertheless, manifest itself only when complemented by an attuned user.¹⁸ It is especially clear in those combat methods which rely on simple technologies, when the main responsibility for weapons’ correct functioning lies with the human operator.¹⁹ Convincing examples from the period in question would be English longbowmen or the Spanish *tercios*. Both gained renown for their numerous and spectacular victories which turned them into sought-after mercenaries. The fact that their employers hired them instead of simply copying their weaponry indicates that the key value was in their training – not so easy to reproduce. Such conclusion is corroborated by bioarchaeological research conducted on remains of crew members of the ‘Mary Rose’, a flagship of Henry VIII of England. Traces on the bones, especially the structure of upper limbs and muscle attachments, witness to the crewmen’s intensive and prolonged training necessary for efficient use of the longbow.²⁰ The well-known measures taken by English monarchs to suppress other sports, such as football, which allegedly drew youth away from archery, should be interpreted as another appreciation of the importance of training.²¹ The *tercios*, on the other hand, did not possess

¹⁷ “Soldier’s weapons are parts of him which make him what he is”, A. GELL, *Art and Agency. An Anthropological Theory*, Oxford 1998, pp. 20–21.

¹⁸ To provide additional support to this thesis, one may quote Manjari Chakrabarty: “[t]he fundamental relational unit of the »agent + tool« confronts the world in a markedly different way than the non-relational unit of »the agent without the tool«” (M. CHAKRABARTY, *How stone tools shaped us: Post-phenomenology and material engagement theory*, “Philosophy & Technology” 2018, vol. 32, No. 2, p. 253). From the perspective of the discussed matters, this statement remains true even when reversed: if an agent with a tool confronts the world in a markedly different way than without, then the same tool will act differently when interacting with different actors and in yet another way when left alone.

¹⁹ An opposite example may be modern highly-advanced military technologies, such as drones, in which the weapon-user interface takes care of the lion’s share of necessary computations, safeguards against errors, and thus significantly lowers the minimal personal competences required from a soldier.

²⁰ A. STIRLAND, *The Men of the Mary Rose*, [in:] *The Social History of English Seamen 1485–1649*, ed. C.A. FURY, Woodbridge 2012, pp. 68–69.

²¹ J. MCCLELLAND, *Body and Mind: Sport in Europe from the Roman Empire to the Renaissance*, Abingdon 2007, p. 108.

any particularly unique weaponry – they largely copied solutions popularised by the Swiss *Reisläufer*. Hence, their many victories over similar formations in the Netherlands or against the German Landsknechts should be related to their higher martial proficiency – as a matter of fact, the long training required to form a unit of *tercios* was also the main reason behind their low numbers and the limited reception of their combat technique and tactics in other countries.²²

In the light of the above observations, it should come as no surprise that Maximilian decided to begin his project of implementation of the Swiss model in the Army of the Empire by acquiring what today is often termed *know-how* – in this case, both theoretical knowledge and practical skills embodied in properly trained soldiers. Initially, this *know-how* was provided by advisors and instructors from Switzerland and the Netherlands, whereas the recruits came mostly from Flanders.²³ Such a choice seems logical, if one takes into account that since the 14th century Flemish burghers enjoyed a reputation of being warlike and disciplined.²⁴ Moreover, organised urban shooting fraternities are traceable in Flanders since the 11th century, Bruges boasts the oldest currently-known fencing school in Europe (ca. 1430), and from the late 15th century onwards most of the major towns of the region had fencing guilds.²⁵ However, the first army of the new model in Germany, composed mostly of foreigners, was not formed before 1488, when Emperor Frederick III gathered the Army of the Empire to free his son from the hands of Burgundian rebels who had imprisoned him in February of that year. It is no coincidence that these new forces were funded by the Swabian League, freshly reactivated by the emperor;²⁶ the 14th century saw further progress in gradual emancipation of towns from feudal control and during this process, in exchange for legal and economic privileges and military prerogatives, the emperors obliged burghers to maintain peace of the land (*Landfrieden*) in their respective territories. Towns obviously benefitted from

²² For a detailed discussion, *vide*: F.G. DE LEÓN, “Doctors of the Military Discipline”: Technical Expertise and the Paradigm of the Spanish Soldier in the Early Modern Period, “The Sixteenth Century Journal” 1996, vol. 27, No. 1, pp. 61–85.

²³ M.J. KRASOŃ, *op. cit.*, p. 6.

²⁴ *Ibidem*.

²⁵ B. GEVAERT, R. VAN NOORT, *Evolution of Martial Tradition in the Low Countries: Fencing Guilds and Treatises*, [in:] *Late Medieval and Early Modern Fight Books*, eds. D. JAQUET, K. VERELST, T. DAWSON, Leiden–Boston 2016, pp. 379–381.

²⁶ C. JÖRGENSEN *et al.*, *op. cit.*, p. 11.

it, as it allowed them to oppose oppression from the aristocracy more efficiently and ensured safety along trade routes, which was crucial for towns' prosperity.²⁷ In effect, by the end of the 15th century burghers would have already gathered significant experience as combatants and were ready to act as a driving force of the military reform.

There were two major problems, however. While Swabian burghers could afford to pay large sums to maintain foreign mercenaries, the loyalty of such troops was fragile, as the young monarch would learn from an episode during the Austro-Hungarian war of 1490. Then, having looted Stuhlweißenburg (Székesfehérvár), a royal residence of the kings of Hungary, Maximilian's Landsknechts refused to serve any more until given their promised pay. This incident allegedly convinced Maximilian that his army had to be based on the Germans, not foreign mercenaries.²⁸ And there, as I propose, he encountered the second problem. Namely, as mentioned earlier, at that time German towns would already have a long history of armed opposition against the feudal lords and thus some sort of military tradition, but it was arguably not as developed as in the cases of Switzerland or Flanders. German burghers gained victories mostly while defending their walls (for instance, during the siege of Rothenburg in 1407²⁹) and less often in the open field. Besides that, burghers' main occupations were craftsmanship and trade, hence their level of personal combat preparation was lower in comparison to the *ministeriales*, who could dedicate much more time to training. This seems in line with the fact that, apart from shooting fraternities, martial training institutions, such as public fencing schools and contests, started to proliferate in Swabia roughly two decades later than in Flanders and Switzerland³⁰ – ca. 1480 (Tab. 1) – and enjoyed only local popularity until the beginning of the next century.³¹ It appears, therefore, safe to assume that urban martial culture in Germany differed significantly from the one which the new model army originated from. This begs the question: What changes had to occur

²⁷ H. ZMORA, *op. cit.*, p. 17.

²⁸ J. RICHARDS, *Landsknecht Soldier 1486–1560*, Oxford 2002, p. 7–8.

²⁹ J. GASSMANN, *Honour and Fighting. Social Advancement in the Early Modern Age*, "Acta Periodica Duellatorum" 2015, vol. 3, No. 1, p. 149.

³⁰ Cf. B. GEVAERT, R. VAN NOORT, *op. cit.*, and D. JAQUET, *Fighting in the Fightschools late XVth, early XVIth century*, "Acta Periodica Duellatorum" 2015, vol. 3, No. 2, pp. 47–66.

³¹ K. GAJDZIŃSKI, *op. cit.*, p. 25.

in order to turn German burghers into valuable recruits for the Landsknecht formations which, according to Maximilian's idea, were to match and counter the deadliest war machine of the period, i.e. the Swiss?

Table 1

Juxtaposition of fencing schools or contests (*Schirmschulen* or *Fechtschulen*) from German-speaking lands predating 1500 and confirmed in written sources³²

Date	Place	Fencing master(s)	Source(s)
1348	University of Prague (ban)	?	D. JAQUET, <i>op. cit.</i> , p. 56, fn. 39.
1365	University of Vienna (ban)	?	<i>Ibidem</i>
1386	University of Heidelberg (ban)	?	WABMANNSDORFF, <i>op. cit.</i> , p. 1
1392	University of Erfurt (ban)	?	D. JAQUET, <i>op. cit.</i> , p. 56, fn. 39.
1397	Frankfurt-am-Main	?	J.G.G. BÜSCHING, <i>Wöchentliche Nachrichten für Freunde der Geschichte, Kunst und Gelahrtheit des Mittelalters</i> , vol. 3, Breslau 1817, p. 305.
1444	Rothenburg	Conrad von Siebenbürgen, Hans Talhoffer (?)	O. DUPUIS, <i>A fifteenth-century fencing tournament in Strasburg</i> , "Acta Periodica Duellatorum", vol. 3, no. 2, p. 67; J.P. KLEINAU, <i>1444 Two fencing masters in Rothenburg</i> , https://talhoffer.wordpress.com/2012/12/03/1444-two-fencing-masters-in-rothenburg (access: 8 I 2021)

³² The comparison includes only the German-speaking cultural circle. Institutions similar to the Swiss fencing school seem to have emerged roughly at the same time in Flanders (*cf.* B. GEVAERT, R. VAN NOORT, *op. cit.*) and France (O. DUPUIS, *The French Fencing Traditions, from the 14th Century to 1630 through Fight Books*, [in:] *Late Medieval and Early Modern Fight Books*, eds. D. JAQUET, K. VERELST, T. DAWSON, Leiden–Boston 2016, s. 355–375). At the current state of research it is hard to decide whether it was a case of convergent evolution or cultural diffusion – the latter, if assumed, could happen either way, given the Swiss involvement in the French and Flemish military arenas in the 15th century.

Date	Place	Fencing master(s)	Source(s)
1445	Basel	?	D. JAQUET, <i>op. cit.</i> , p. 55
1454	Zürich	Hans Tachselhofer	D. JAQUET, <i>op. cit.</i> , p. 55
1459	Lucerne	?	D. JAQUET, <i>op. cit.</i> , p. 55
1463	Lucerne	?	D. JAQUET, <i>op. cit.</i> , p. 55
1470/71	Strassburg	?	DUPUIS, <i>op. cit.</i>
1477	Nuremberg	?	K.E. LOCHNER, <i>Zur Geschichte der Fechtschulen in Nürnberg</i> , https://www.schwertkampf-ochs.de/essays/Zur_Geschichte_der_Fechtschulen_in_Nuernberg.pdf (access: 8 I 2021)
1478	Nuremberg	Nicklaus Bruckner	J.P. KLEINAU, <i>1478–1523 Marxbruder Nicklaus Bruckner</i> , https://talhoffer.wordpress.com/2014/07/28/marxbruder-nicklaus-bruckner (access: 8 I 2021)
1479	Nuremberg	Nicklaus Bruckner	<i>Ibidem</i>
1479	Nuremberg	Nicklaus Bruckner	<i>Ibidem</i>
1485	Baden	Peter Switzer	D. JAQUET, <i>op. cit.</i> , p. 58–59
1487	Nuremberg	?	LOCHNER, <i>op. cit.</i>
1489	Solothurn	?	DANIEL JAQUET, personal communication
1490	Basel	Peter Switzer	F.K. MATHYS, <i>Spiel und Sport im alten Basel</i> , Basel 1954, pp. 26–27
1492	Nuremberg	Jobsten Erlheimer, Hannsen Zullen	Lochner, <i>op. cit.</i>
1492	Basel	Peter Switzer	MATHYS, <i>op. cit.</i> , p. 27
1493	Nuremberg	Ludwig Klingenstein	LOCHNER, <i>op. cit.</i>
1494	Nuremberg	Jobsten Erlheimer	<i>Ibidem</i>

Table 1 (cont.)

Date	Place	Fencing master(s)	Source(s)
1495	Nuremberg	Nicklaus Bruckner	KLEINAU, <i>Marxbruder...</i>
1497	Wrocław (Breslau)	?	S.B. KLOSE, <i>Darstellung der inneren Verhältnisse der Stadt Breslau vom Jahre 1458 bis zum Jahre 1526</i> , [in:] <i>Scriptores rerum Silesiacarum</i> , vol. 3, ed. G.A. STENZEL, Breslau 1847, p. 86.

From the left, subsequent columns indicate the time, place, names of involved fencing masters, and bibliographical references. Compiled by M. TALAGA.

Fencing masters, urban martial culture, and the military reform

Before it is possible to give a hypothetical answer to the question raised in the previous section, it is necessary to discuss one more aspect. As suggested above, the phenomenon of fencing schools and contests (*Schirm-* or *Fechtschulen*) in Germany was clearly delayed in comparison to Switzerland (Tab. 1) and Flanders. The earliest mentions from the 14th century are indirect or negative ones, since they come almost exclusively (with Frankfurt as an exception³³) from university regulations strictly forbidding students from attending fencing schools. Rothenburg is the only positive case known from Germany from before 1450, but it was rather a quarrel between two fencing masters, not a proper *Fechtschule*. All the following accounts up to 1477 come solely from Switzerland. Next, until the end of the century, the practice of *Fechtschulen* in Germany seems to have been limited almost entirely to Swabia, with Nuremberg as a clear centre. This may be interpreted as a consequence of differences in martial culture, or what Barbara Ann Tlusty calls “martial identity.”³⁴ These differences would be responsible for the fact that organised urban martial practices developed earlier in Switzerland and only then diffused to southern Germany. Without passing

³³ In Frankfurt, the fencers acted not as professional teachers or fighters but rather entertainers catering for the nobility gathered for the *Reichstag* – this information will become important later, when I reach the question of changes in the social standing of fencers in the 15th century.

³⁴ B.A. TLUSTY, *Martial Identity...*; it seems worthwhile here to clarify the distinction between “martial” and “military” culture. B.A. Tlusty uses the former to refer to bellicose aspects of early-modern masculinity and mentality which manifested themselves not only in military but also civilian contexts, in everyday life of German burghers.

judgement on this matter at the moment, it has to be admitted that this observation justifies a closer look at the social group which stood behind the development and dissemination of the *Fechtschulen* – i.e. fencing masters.

The social standing of martial arts professionals – in the oldest German sources referred to as “fighters” (*kempen*), and later as “fencers” (*schirmer* or *fechter*) – has been researched since the early 20th century. These studies were initiated by comparing professional fighters with jugglers and acrobats (*Spielleute*)³⁵ and tracking their activity in legal documents.³⁶ More recent contributions extended the investigation to urban texts, literature, and iconography.³⁷ Generalising, it may be concluded that scholars agree that little is known about the life of professional fencers prior to the sudden proliferation of the *Fechtschulen* at the turn of the 15th and 16th centuries. The available sources indicate, however, that at least until the 1400s martial arts experts offering their skills for hire were considered ‘devoid of rights’ (*rehtlos*).³⁸ By exposing their bodies to harm and providing entertainment in exchange for financial gratification, the fencers put themselves in a position analogous to prestidigitators and prostitutes, which forced them to live their lives at the outskirts of the social order, as “loose people” (*lose Leute*) or rovers (*fabrende Volk*) travelling from one patron to another.³⁹ It seems that it was this very marginalisation that resulted in almost complete absence of fencing masters in the historical record from the period.

In the face of the above, the sudden burst of the urban *Fechtschulen* in the second half of the 15th century suggests a significant shift regarding the social perception of professional fencers. The “schools” organised by them – be it contests or public teaching events – started to be tolerated by urban authorities⁴⁰ or even actively supported.⁴¹ This process was capstoned by the privilege issued

³⁵ A. SCHAER, *Die altdeutschen Fechter und Spielleute: Ein Beitrag zur Deutschen Culturgeschichte*, Bremen 1901; M. WIERSCHIN, *Meister Johann Liechtenauers Kunst des Fechtens*, München 1965.

³⁶ H.P. HILS, *op. cit.*, pp. 207–250; this publication also discusses and synthesises previous studies.

³⁷ M. COESFELD, *Lohnkempen im Spätmittelalter Soziale Außenseiter als Tragsäulen der Rechtspraxis*, “Soziologie Magazin” 2013, vol. 6, No. 2, pp. 54–66; D. JAQUET, *op. cit.*, p. 56.

³⁸ According to the “Sachsenspiegel” (I.38 §1): *Kemphen und iriu kint, spilliute und alle die eneliche geborn sint (...), die sint alle rehtlos* (“fighters, children, jugglers, and bastards (...) they have no rights”), after: D. JAQUET, *op. cit.*, p. 56.

³⁹ M. COESFELD, *op. cit.*, p. 57.

⁴⁰ O. DUPUIS, *A fifteenth-century fencing tournament...*, p. 76.

⁴¹ K. GAJDZIŃSKI, *op. cit.*, p. 26; D. JAQUET, *op. cit.*, p. 60; B.A. TLUSTY, *Martial Identity...*, p. 552.

by Emperor Frederick III in Nuremberg in 1487 which founded the Brotherhood of St. Mark (*Marxbrüder*) – the first pan-German fraternity of fencing masters.⁴² This document granted the brotherhood self-government as well as a monopoly to teach fencing for money, organise the *Fechtschulen*, and certify “masters of the sword” (*meister des swerts*).⁴³ Simultaneously, *Marxbrüder’s* internal regulations stated that before taking the master’s examination in Frankfurt-am-Main (the fraternity’s headquarters), each candidate had to pass a preliminary test under the eyes of a local master and then go through a probation period two or three years long. During this apprenticeship, the candidate was expected to participate in and organise *Fechtschulen*.⁴⁴ This *de facto* meant that the *Marxbrüder* had not only the right but also the obligation to propagate urban fencing contests.⁴⁵ This state of affairs – the necessity to travel and the right to earn money from *Fechtschulen* (by winning prizes or benefitting from admission fees collected from participants and spectators) – rendered “masters of the sword” very efficient at and vividly interested in spreading martial arts among German burghers. Moreover, for the first time since the Germanic period the social standing of professional fencers was elevated from marginalised outcasts to respected craftsmen.⁴⁶

Studies conducted so far indicate that professional fighters practiced their trade in a variety of ways. First of all, martial pageants would have been a part of different celebrations at least since the 14th century (Tab. 1: Frankfurt-am-Main). Martial arts masters may have also served as bodyguards, soldiers, assassins, or instructors at aristocratic courts⁴⁷ and in towns.⁴⁸ However, perhaps

⁴² *Ibidem*, p. 555.

⁴³ 1487 – Privileg Kaiser Friedrichs III. Für die Meister des Schwerts, Institut für Stadtgeschichte Frankfurt am Main, Rep. 7 (Ugb A 69) No. 1, compiled by W. UEBERSCHÄR, D. BURGER.

⁴⁴ B.A. TLUSTY, *Martial Identity...*, p. 550.

⁴⁵ M. TALAGA, *op. cit.*, p. 163.

⁴⁶ B.A. TLUSTY, *Martial Identity...*, p. 550.

⁴⁷ Hiring non-noble fencing masters at aristocratic courts is attested already in the 14th century. For instance, in 1385 Joseph Schirmer of Würzburg, a Jew, was employed by Archbishop Adolf von Nassau-Wiesbaden and tasked with teaching fencing for an agreed pay, *vide*: Würzburg, Staatsarchiv Mainzer Ingrossaturbücher, Band 10 StA Wü, MIB 10 fol. 332 [01]. I would like to express my gratitude to Ondřej Vodička from the Masaryk Institute and the Archives of the Czech Academy of Sciences for making this source available.

⁴⁸ A good example in this regard is provided by Peter Switzer, a fencing master whose story has been discussed in detail in D. JAQUET, *op. cit.*

the most important of their potential tasks was to train those who, due to judicial procedures, were forced to fight a duel (*duellum*) or to act as substitutes in such combat for those who could not fight in person.⁴⁹ The fact that such legally sanctioned duels were often called simply “a fight” (*kempe, kempfe*)⁵⁰ may strengthen their connection with the *kempen* (‘fighters’) mentioned in the ‘Mirror of the Saxons’ – they should then be considered professional teachers or champions specialising in judicial combat. At the current stage of research, such a view seems justified with regard to the early Middle Ages. It remains unclear, however, whether the judicial duel was still practiced in Germany in the later period. As pointed out by Arielle Elema, despite *duellum* being mentioned in subsequent updated versions of urban digests of laws, accounts about actually conducted duels cease to appear in the 13th century.⁵¹ The only exceptions in that regard are Swabia and Franconia, where cases were reported as late as the first half of the 15th century.⁵² Interestingly, in that period both regions cooperated closely on political and military levels within the so-called Southern-German League of Towns (*Süddeutsche Städtebündt*) and developed their own characteristic variations on the judicial duel. They made use of long elaborate shields and swords (Swabia) or clubs (Franconia) whose detailed depictions appeared in one of the oldest extant fencing treatises from Germany – the so-called *Fechtbuch* by Master Hans Talhoffer, a burgher from Swabia.⁵³ The above observation is significant for the hypothesis proposed here because it suggests certain distinctness of these two lands in terms of their martial culture as compared to other German provinces. If we add to it the fact that Swabia had the warlike Swiss as its direct neighbours, as well as the Czechs and the Hungarians, also often hostile, this borderland may appear as a *sui generis* “cradle of warriors.” It is also worth noting that the oldest currently known German fencing treatises come from this region, including the anonymous “Nuremberg Codex 3227a” (dated to

⁴⁹ *Ibidem*, p. 56.

⁵⁰ Which has its analogies in other languages influenced by the Germanic culture, e.g. Italian *campio*, French *champ clos*, or *campum* in Medieval Latin, cf. M. COESFELD, *op. cit.*, p. 56.

⁵¹ A. ELEMA, *Tradition, Innovation, Re-enactment: Hans Talhoffer's Unusual Weapons*, “Acta Periodica Duellatorum” 2019, vol. 7, No. 1, p. 6.

⁵² *Ibidem*, pp. 6–9.

⁵³ *Ibidem*, pp. 9–17. It is worth noting here that there are clues suggesting that Talhoffer may have been an early representative of the Brotherhood of Saint Mark, *vide*: B.A. TLUSTY, *Martial Identity...*, p. 555.

ca. 1400)⁵⁴ and several manuscripts of Hans Talhoffer (created in the years 1443–1467) and Paulus Kal (ca. 1470).⁵⁵ In this context, it would be logical that the custom of the *Fechtschulen*, perhaps adopted from the Swiss,⁵⁶ found its earliest German seedbed in Nuremberg (Tab. 1).⁵⁷ Similarly, it would become clear why this very town⁵⁸ was selected as the place of issue of the privilege (1487) for the first fraternity of fencing masters – the Brotherhood of St. Mark (*Marxbrüder*) – or why the task of assembling the first imperial army based on the Landsknechts (1488) was entrusted to the Swabian League. The already developed martial culture rendered this region an attractive recruitment base for the future reformed army, while the emperor’s support for activity of fencing masters could raise this potential even further.

Maximilian’s gambit and closing remarks

If we assume, as hinted by the above-described circumstances, that the granting of privilege to the *Marxbrüder* was a deliberate step aimed at raising the military potential of German towns in hopes of harnessing them for the reform of the Army of the Empire, then two more questions must follow. Firstly, who was behind this idea – Frederick III or Maximilian I? Many historians believe that Frederick III showed little initiative as a ruler and especially since the 1470s relied on his son in many matters, including military affairs. Albert Winkler puts it as follows:

⁵⁴ O. VODIČKA, *Origin of the Oldest German Fencing Manual Compilation (GNM Hs. 3227a)*, “Waffen- und Kostumkunde” 2019, vol. 61, No. 1, pp. 87–108.

⁵⁵ D. HAGEDORN, *German Fechtbücher from the Middle Ages to the Renaissance*, [in:] *Late Medieval and Early Modern Fight Books*, eds. D. JAQUET, K. VERELST, T. DAWSON, Leiden–Boston 2016, p. 259.

⁵⁶ Apart from the arguments given earlier, this hypothesis is additionally corroborated by the fact that one of the first captains (*hauptman*) of the Brotherhood of St. Mark, serving in the years 1498–1500, was Master Peter Switzer, an active animator of fencing culture in Switzerland, *vide*: D. JAQUET, *op. cit.*, p. 61.

⁵⁷ An analogical reasoning could explain why the fencing culture in France and the Netherlands, at least as old and well-developed as the Swiss (*cf.* B. GEVAERT, R. VAN NOORT, *op. cit.* and DUPUIS, *The French Fencing...*), did not exert such an influence – perhaps the western German lands offered an unfavourable cultural substrate for this kind of practices?

⁵⁸ The fact that the headquarters of the *Marxbrüder* was located in Frankfurt-am-Main should presumably be seen as a step aimed at facilitating expansion of the brotherhood to the rest of the Empire – situated more centrally, Frankfurt offered greater possibilities in that regard than Nuremberg.

In the 1480s Maximilian increasingly made his presence felt in Austrian politics. When his father Frederick III, always considered a weak ruler, became increasingly debilitated with age, Maximilian worked to expand Habsburg power. Problems beset the family's holdings including raids from the Turks, a feud with the Hungarian monarchy, and the fact that Bavaria was increasingly hostile. Additionally, Sigismund Habsburg tried to take the Austrian Tirol from Frederick's control in 1487. Maximilian realized he must have an active, powerful army to resist such internal and external threats.⁵⁹

Besides that, it bears mentioning briefly that Maximilian I himself was very keen on martial arts and made his personal prowess an important element of imperial propaganda.⁶⁰ *Weisskunig*, an autobiographical poem created with the direct involvement of the monarch, describes and illustrates the training he received under the tutelage of a fencing master (Fig. 1). The visual layer of this depiction references the urban fencing culture known from the *Fechtschulen* iconography (Fig. 2), whereas the literary ambitions of the emperor attested elsewhere witness his familiarity with the jargon characteristic of German fencing treatises from the 16th century and documents left by the *Marxbrüder*.⁶¹ On top of that, Albrecht Dürer, hired by the emperor to embellish this monumental work,⁶² left a draftbook (1512) full of realistic images of fencers and wrestlers as well as related descriptive notes on combat techniques which find close analogies in the corpus of pragmatic martial literature of the period.⁶³ Therefore, it seems plausible that it was Maximilian who designed and successfully implemented this quite visionary endeavour in which the knowledge and energy of the previously-marginalised social group – martial arts masters from the south-eastern borderland of the Empire – were used to promote a new “martial identity” among German burghers and, indirectly, fuel his ambitious military reform.

Finally, the second question: How did the fencing masters of urban provenance acquire the martial *know-how* previously carefully guarded by the German *ministeriales* and aristocracy?

⁵⁹ A. WINKLER, *The Swabian War of 1499: 500 years since Switzerland's last war of independence*, “Swiss-American Historical Society Review” 1999, vol. 35, No. 3, p. 6.

⁶⁰ The latest and in-depth analysis of this aspect of Maximilian's reign has been performed by NATHALIE MARGARET ANDERSON, *The Tournament and its Role in the Court Culture of Emperor Maximilian I (1459–1519)*, doctoral dissertation, Leeds 2017, pp. 236–241.

⁶¹ A. SCHULTZ, *Einleitung*, [in:] *Der Weisskunig*, ed. A. SCHULTZ, Wien 1888, p. VIII.

⁶² *Ibidem*, p. 41.

⁶³ F. DÖRNHÖFFER, *Albrecht Dürers Fechtbuch*, Wien 1910; cf. MCCLELLAND, *op. cit.*, p. 47.




Fig. 1. Young Maximilian learns how to fight with a long sword without armour (*plöß zu fechten*). Visible are blunt training swords with characteristic blades widening near the cross-guard and an instructor holding a staff and presiding over the exercise. Source: *Der Wiesskunig*, ed. A. SCHULTZ, Wien 1888, p. 100, DOI: <https://doi.org/10.11588/diglit.5732#0005>



Fig. 2. Fencing practice at the University of Tübingen. Visible are the characteristic training swords and an instructor with a staff. Source: L. DITZINGER, *Illustrissimi Wirtembergici Ducali Novi Collegii Quod Tubingae qua situm qua studia qua exercitia Accurata Delineato*, sine loco 1626, <http://diglib.hab.de/drucke/57-1-pol-3s/start.htm?image=00013> (access: 9 | 2021)

The fact that members of the *Marxbrüder* presented themselves, with no irony, as the carriers of the “knightly art of fencing” (*ritterliche kunst des fechtens*) suggests that they perceived some continuity between their own practice and the martial lore of the older military nobility which was already fading into the past at the end of the 15th century.⁶⁴ Perhaps an important clue comes from another curious coincidence – between the development of the urban martial arts movement in Germany and the emergence of the tradition of *Meistergesang*. Both phenomena unfolded as part of the urban culture but referenced the knightly and courtly past, which they tried to emulate by means of a careful reading of the manuscripts commemorating it.⁶⁵ Due to limited space, a closer examination of the last hypothesis falls beyond the scope of this paper. Similarly, reconstructing biographies of particular fencing masters and their role as mediators between aristocratic courts and urban communities promises valuable discoveries and will certainly require further inquiry.⁶⁶

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⁶⁴ M. TALAGA, *op. cit.*, pp. 167–168.

⁶⁵ An insightful study of the practice of *Meistergesang* and its ties to the earlier tradition of *Sangspruchdichtung*, as well as the role of manuscripts in transition from the one to the other, was offered by MICHAEL BALDZUHN, *The companies of Meistergesang in Germany*, [in:] *The Reach of the Republic of Letters. Literary and Learned Societies in Late Medieval and Early Modern Europe*, eds. A. VAN DIXHOORN, S.S. SUTCH, Leiden–Boston 2008.

⁶⁶ An interesting step in that direction has been made in a recent work by James ACUTT, *Swords, Science, and Society: German Martial Arts in the Middle Ages*, Glasgow 2019.

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TEREBOVLIA AS THE LOCATION FOR THE POLISH TROOPS' STAY IN 1557 AND 1558

Summary. In 1557 and 1558, Terebovlia was the place of the stay of the Polish army, whose task was to defend the Ruthenian lands of the Kingdom of Poland against the Tatar invasions. Surviving written records contain information about the Polish mercenary army staying in the town – the number, composition, armament, and commanders of the troops. According to these sources, in 1557 more than 1000 mounted soldiers passed through the town, and a similar number of troops visited the town in the following year. At that time, Terebovlia was not the only meeting place for the army that was supposed to stop the Tatar raids, but it was here that the largest number of them was gathered. In 1558, the mercenaries participated in a battle against the Crimean Tatars, who were then invading the south-eastern lands of the Kingdom of Poland. There were some military actions against the invaders, but they were not big battles – rather small skirmishes that took place in the area from Terebovlia to Bar, between the rivers Dniester and Boh. For these troops, Terebovlia was a relatively safe place in the immediate vicinity of the ongoing war.

Keywords: Trembowla, Terebovlia, Kingdom of Poland, castle, army, mercenaries, armament, 16th century

The modern-day Terebovlia (Polish: *Trembowla*; Ukrainian: *Теребовля*) is a small town in Ternopil Oblast in western Ukraine with a long and interesting history, including numerous war episodes. Such was the character of the events of 1557 and 1558, when Polish mercenary troops gathered here to defend the south-eastern borderlands of the Kingdom of Poland against Tartar raids. This paper aims to present the role of Terebovlia as a base for those troops. It also discusses their organisation and the armament of the soldiers. In addition, the author attempts to reconstruct the course of the service of the mercenaries in 1558 – both in terms geographic route they took and the events that took place that year.

Research on this topic is possible because there are surviving registers of the mercenary troops from the years 1557 and 1558, stored in the collection of the Central Archives of Historical Records in Warsaw, which have not yet been used in historical studies. They were drawn up in Terebovlia during the visitation of troops enlisted for service¹ and contain information about the number of soldiers, their armament and horses, which constituted the basis for the soldiers' pay. On the other hand, the register of horses lost by the mercenaries, which was drawn up in May 1558, contains information about the course of service of the above-mentioned troops.² The list refers to 11 rotas (cavalry units) and was also drawn up in Terebovlia. Of particular interest to us, it enumerates the towns near which the horses were lost, which makes it possible to determine where a given unit served at that time.³ This article also uses the unpublished inventory of the Terebovlia castle from 1550.⁴ These materials supplement the information about the town already known from other sources, allowing the author to present previously unknown events in the history of Terebovlia and the troops that stayed there.⁵

Archaeological research indicates that Terebovlia existed already in the 9th century.⁶ The first mentions in written records come from the *Tale of Bygone Years*, a Russian chronicle written around 1113, in which the settlement is mentioned in connection with the congress of Ruthenian princes in Lubecz in 1097. As noted by the author of the annals, the stronghold was at the time

¹ The Central Archives of Historical Records in Warsaw, Archives of the Crown Treasury; Division 85 (hereinafter: CAHR, Division 85), sign. 61, 62.

² CAHR, Division 85, sign. 62, c. 1–7v. The register was drawn up on sheets of paper folded in half and bound together which were subsequently attached to the volume after folio 88. The pages of this attachment are separately numbered (folios 1–7v) and this numbering is used in the footnotes to this paper.

³ However, this register does not contain information on lost weapons, which was usually recorded in this type of documents. There is also no information about fallen soldiers, which in turn is in line with the rules of compiling inventories of loss in that period.

⁴ The National Library of Poland, Materials concerning the castle in Terebovlia collected by Aleksander Czołowski, Manuscript, sign. 5485 IV.

⁵ The author also uses information on trade in Terebovlia included in the customs tariffs of the local starosty (administrative district), CAHR, Division LVI – Inwentarze Starostw (Inventories of starosties), sign. 291.

⁶ Р. МИСЬКА, *Долітописний Тербовль*, “Матеріали і дослідження з археології Прикарпаття і Волині” 2008, vol. 12, p. 292.

the capital of the principality ruled by Vasilko Rostislavich (c. 1066–1124/1125).⁷ The principality of Terebovlia existed until 1141, when it was incorporated into the principality of Halych by Volodymyrko Volodarovich. This state of affairs lasted until the 1340s, when the Principality of Halych (and with it Terebovlia) was conquered by the King of Poland, Casimir III the Great. After his death, the lands were occupied by Lithuanian dukes, and in 1377 by Louis of Anjou, King of Hungary. The Halych lands were returned to Poland in 1387, as a result of an expedition of Polish knights led by Queen Jadwiga of Poland, who at that time was already the wife of King Władysław Jagiełło. This operation was supported by the Lithuanian army led by Prince Vytautas. From then on, Terebovlia belonged to Poland. Only in 1772, as a result of the First Partition of Poland, it became a part of the Habsburg Monarchy.

Under Polish rule, Terebovlia retained its position as a local political, administrative, and economic centre. It seems that the years of Władysław II Jagiełło's reign were a period of prosperity for the town.⁸ In 1389, he granted German law to the settlement and elevated it to the rank of a town.⁹ Another location document (charter) was issued in the years 1418–1425, when the same king allowed for the foundation of a new settlement, which was to be situated on the other bank of the Hnizna River.¹⁰ A visible sign of Terebovlia's growing

⁷ *The Russian Primary Chronicle*, transl. and eds. S.H. CROSS, O.P. SHERBOWITZ-WETZOR, Cambridge–Massachusetts 1953, p. 187.

⁸ It is worth noting that Władysław Jagiełło visited Terebovlia several times: on 3 III 1410, 9 V 1415, between 17 V and 10 VI 1417, 27 V 1423 (A. GAŚSIOROWSKI, *Itinerarium króla Władysława Jagiełły 1386–1434*, Warszawa 2015, pp. 69, 82, 86, 99). At the same time, we know of only one visit to this town by King Casimir Jagiellon, who stayed there on 22–23 VIII 1448, G. RUTKOWSKA, *Itinerarium króla Kazimierza Jagiellończyka 1440–1492*, Warszawa 2014, p. 85.

⁹ A document known from a copy made in 1889 by A. Czołowski based on the original deed from 1765, which was then stored in the magistrate's office in Terebovlia and which confirmed the earlier rights and privileges granted to the town. According to that historian's note, the privilege of Władysław Jagiełło was issued in Sieradz on 12 March (*die sancti Gregorii*) 1389. Materials concerning the castle in Terebovlia collected by Aleksander Czołowski, The National Library in Warsaw, Manuscript sign. 5485 IV, p. 133. For more information on the chartering of towns under German law in Ruthenia, *vide*: Л.Й. БОЙКО, *Застосування магдебурзького права у галичині в складі польського королівства (1349–1569 рр.)*, "Ученые записки Таврического национального университета им. В.И. Вернадского", Серия: Юридические науки, 2008, vol. 2008, pp. 11, 13–14.

¹⁰ This was the so-called New Town, named so in contrast to the settlement located closer to the castle, which was subsequently customarily called the Old Town. The royal document does not contain

importance during Jagiełła's rule was the location of the starost's office in the town.¹¹ The royal generosity extended to the local church, which received the village of Plebanówka in 1423.¹² It is worth noting that a Dominican monastery also operated here at that time.¹³

Terebovlia was situated on an important trade route leading from Lviv to Kamieniec Podolski (Ukrainian: *Kamianets-Podilskyi*), from which one branch led to the Black Sea ports of Bilhorod and Kiliia, and the other to the Crimean Peninsula. Merchants travelling on this route traded, among other things, oxen, sheep, salt, and also pepper and saffron imported from distant lands.¹⁴

The development of Terebovlia was facilitated by the peace that prevailed in the south-eastern borderlands of the Kingdom of Poland until the mid-15th century. The situation changed in the second half of that century, when these lands became the target of invasions by the Tatars, Moldavians, and Turks. The frequency of these raids increased in the 16th century.¹⁵ Due to the wars waged against these troublesome neighbours, Polish troops were also deployed in Terebovlia and its environs to repel the enemy armies.¹⁶ Of course, all these war activities had a negative impact on the economic situation of the town, which gradually lost its importance in the region. This was manifested, among others, by the transfer in 1527 of the sessions of the local court to the then

any information on the place of its issuance, *Materiały archiwalne wyjęte głównie z metryki litewskiej od 1348 do 1607 roku*, ed. A. PROCHASKA, Lwów 1890, No. 52.

¹¹ The first mention of the starost of Terebovlia dates back to 1403. *Urzednicy województwa ruskiego XIV–XVIII wieku, (ziemie halicka, lwowska, przemyska, sanocka)*, ed. K. PRZYBOŚ, [in:] *Urzednicy dawnej Rzeczypospolitej XII–XVIII wieku. Spisy*, ed. A. GAŚSIOROWSKI, vol. 3: *Ziemie ruskie*, No. 1, Wrocław 1987, p. 96.

¹² J. TRAJDOS, *Polityka króla Władysława Jagiełły wobec Kościoła katolickiego na ziemiach ruskich Królestwa Polskiego i Wielkiego Księstwa Litewskiego*, "Zeszyty Naukowe Uniwersytetu Jagiellońskiego. Prace Historyczne" 141, 2014, No. 2, p. 324.

¹³ In 1413, brothers Piotr and Jędrzej, sons of Kacper, donated to the Dominicans a pond in the village of Drychowiec, Sz. OKOLSKI, *Russia florida rosis et liliis hoc est sanguine, praedicatione, religione et vita antea ff. Ordinis Praedicatorum peregrinatione inchoata, nunc conventuum in Russia stabilitate fundata*, Leopoli 1646, pp. 92–93.

¹⁴ The goods listed here were recorded in the starosty's inventory of 1550, in the section dedicated to customs duties collected in Terebovlia, CAHR, Division LVI, sign. 291, c. 11v–12v.

¹⁵ The first raid in this period took place in 1453, the next ones in the years 1467, 1498, 1508, 1515, 1516, 1524, 1538.

¹⁶ Larger armies were present at Terebovlia in 1497, 1531, and 1538, but less numerous troops appeared here more often; M. PLEWCZYŃSKI, *Wojny i wojskowość polska w XVI wieku*, vol. 1: *1500–1548*, Zabrze 2011, pp. 355–356.

more prosperous Buchach.¹⁷ However, Sigismund I the Old and Sigismund II Augustus, kings of Poland, tried to prevent the degradation of Terebovlia by issuing a number of privileges waiving the inhabitants' obligations to pay taxes and other duties to the state, and the money saved thanks to those decisions was to be used by the townspeople to rebuild Terebovlia.¹⁸ The economic regeneration of the town was also supported by the fairs established in 1543, which were to be held three times a year.¹⁹ It can be assumed that the efforts of the rulers were partially successful – the town did not collapse entirely.²⁰ According to the inspection carried out in 1550, there were 122 houses there. In the 1572 visitation, 248 houses were recorded. It is also worth mentioning that an operational mill was recorded in 1510.²¹

From a military point of view, the most important building in Terebovlia was the local castle. Archaeological research conducted on what is now known as Castle Hill has shown that already in the first half of the 10th century there was a stronghold surrounded by ramparts.²² In its place, a brick castle was built in the second half of the 14th century, by order of the Casimir III the Great, king of Poland. Over time, the fortress fell into decline, and was most probably destroyed by the Tatars at the beginning of the 16th century. In 1534, starost Andrzej Tęczyński undertook its reconstruction.²³ When the Polish chronicler Bernard Wapowski wrote about it, he noted that the castle was repaired very quickly.²⁴ According to the description of the fortress made in 1550, the

¹⁷ *Matricularum Regni Poloniae summaria, excussis codicibus, qui in Chartophylacio Maximo Varsoviensi asservantur*, ed. T. WIERZBOWSKI, Varsoviae 1905 (hereinafter: MRPS), part 4, No. 15096.

¹⁸ These privileges were issued in: MRPS: 1506, 1509, 1518, 1526, 1530, 1537, 1539, 1544; MRPS, part 2: No. 889; part 3, No. 11807; part 4, vol. 2, No. 11988, 14691, part 4, vol. 3: 18393, 19814, 21390, 23260.

¹⁹ Fairs in Terebovlia were to be held on the feast of St. James (25 July), Simon and Jude (28 October), and the Epiphany (the Three Kings' Day, 6 January), MRPS, part 4, vol. 3, No. 7232.

²⁰ According to the classification of the towns of the Kingdom of Poland, Terebovlia belonged to the towns of the third category, i.e., it was a centre of local importance, M. BOGUCKA, H. SAMSONOWICZ, *Miasta i mieszczaństwo w Polsce przedrozbiorowej*, Warszawa 1980, p. 118.

²¹ MRPS, part 4, vol. 1, No. 9548.

²² P. МИСЬКА, *op. cit.*, p. 313.

²³ Andrzej Tęczyński (c. 1480–1536) castellan of Krakow, starost of Terebovlia, *Urządnicy województwa ruskiego...*, p. 98.

²⁴ "Trembowlam Andreas Tencinius Cracoviensis Castellanus magno sumptu ac incredibili celeritate instauravit", *Kroniki Bernarda Wapowskiego z Radochońiec: część ostatnia czasy podługoszowskie obejmująca (1480–1535)*, ed. J. SZUJSKI, Kraków 1874, p. 250.

northern wall of the castle was made of brick, probably a remnant of a castle erected in the 14th century, while the remaining walls, including the two towers, were built of oak logs. The furnishings of most of the rooms could be described as very modest at best.²⁵ At the time of the inspection, there was a small stock of weapons in the castle, which consisted of three breechloaders, a dozen or so old handgonnes, and some pole weapons. When summarising his description of the castle, the scribe noted that it needed repairs and equipment.²⁶ These recommendations were at least partially implemented. The register, drawn up in 1551, shows that the castle was then much better equipped with firearms, gunpowder and the supply of bullets for cannons and small arms was also increased.²⁷

The usefulness of the Terebovlia castle in the war against the Tatars should be considered in the context of the tactics used by the invaders. The main goal of the raids organised by the Crimeans was looting. Besieging castles would slow down their march and facilitate the organisation of defence, expose the invaders to greater losses, and consequently limit the possibility of capturing the desired trophies – slaves (Polish: *jasyr*) or livestock. For these reasons, they rarely attacked castles, concentrating instead on plundering open settlements. Bearing this in mind, the castle in Terebovlia, despite its poor condition and rather inadequate equipment, could have been a shelter for the town's inhabitants, who could have waited out the Tartar threat behind its walls, whereas, in the case of the army, the castle could have served as a safe haven, from which the soldiers set off to meet the enemy. Thus, the castle in Terebovlia, despite all its shortcomings, could be useful for both the army and civilians.


In 1557 and 1558, the town was the meeting place where Polish troops gathered to counter the expected attack of the Crimean Tatars. The fear of the impending conflict was based on the fact that, after several relatively peaceful years, the Tatars invaded the eastern borderlands of Poland in 1556. Thus, further

²⁵ We know of Tomasz Dębowski, a royal courtier and cup-bearer (Polish: *czesnik*) of Łęczycza since 1563, *Urządnicy województw łęczyckiego i sieradzkiego XVI–XVIII wieku. Spisy*, eds E. OPALIŃSKI, H. ŻEREK-KLESZCZ, [in:] *Urządnicy dawnej Rzeczypospolitej XII–XVIII wieku. Spisy*, ed. A. GAŚSIOROWSKI, Kórnik 1983, pp. 57, 87.

²⁶ *Ibidem*, folio 8.

²⁷ A. CZOŁOWSKI, *Inwentarz zamku trembowelskiego z r. 1551*, "Ziemia Czerwińska" 1935, vol. 1, p. 99.

raids were expected. The fears proved justified, for in early 1557, the Crimeans, supported by the Turks, attacked a fortress on the island of Small Khortytsia (Polish: *Mala Chortyca*), on the Dnieper River, in the territory of Poland.²⁸ This increase in Tatar activity worried Polish king Sigismund II Augustus, who that very summer set out for Livonia (Polish: *Inflanty*) leading an army of 50 000 men. The king was aware that the military engagement of the Polish army in the north could be exploited by the Tatars, who would then attack the south-eastern lands of the Kingdom of Poland.



Map 1. The actions of the Polish mercenary army in Ruthenia in 1558

²⁸ Although this attack was unsuccessful, the Tatars struck again at Small Khortytsia and captured it in September 1557, M. PŁEWczyński, *Wojny i wojskowość polska w XVI wieku*, vol. 2: *Lata 1548–1575*, Zabrze 2012, pp. 101–102.

In order to counter the expected invasion, from August 1557 mercenary units were gathered in Ruthenia. One of the meeting places at that time was Lviv, where six cavalry units with a total of over 600 soldiers arrived.²⁹ Another two detachments of fewer than 200 horsemen arrived in Medzhybizh (Polish: *Międzybóž*).³⁰ The largest number of troops – eight cavalry units with a total of 1090 soldiers – was recorded in Terebovlia (see Table 1). With the exception of one rota, which arrived there in October, the remaining troops passed through the town in August. The largest number of soldiers – 460 according to the records – arrived on 3 August, with another 100 recorded the next day.³¹ The town was then teeming with Polish mercenaries. In total, from summer to autumn there were about 1700 Polish enlisted soldiers in Ruthenia. However, they did not see any combat, because in the summer of 1557 the Tatars were involved in the battle for Small Khortytsia and did not venture deep into Polish territory.³²

According to the custom of that period, some of the mercenaries were demobilised for the winter and the troops that remained in service were reduced in number,³³ as the Tatars rarely attacked at that time of the year, so it was unnecessary to maintain and pay soldiers. However, as early as February 1558, the enlisting started again, and the troops recruited then were in service for the following months.³⁴ In total, there were 1900 horse soldiers called to

²⁹ 19 VIII: Jan Sobieski – 100 horses, Stanisław Szafranec – 100 horses; 4 IX: Hieronim Lancoroński of Brzezic – 200 horses; 30 IX: Jan Przyrownicki – 150 horses; 4 X: Jakub Leszniewski – 150 horses; 6 X: Erazm Łochocki – 25 horses.

³⁰ Today МеДжибіж in Ukraine. 7 August: Marcin Herbut – 150 horses; 1 November: Mikołaj Sieniawski – 30 horses.

³¹ 3 VIII: rittmeister (Polish: *rotmistrz*) Jerzy Jazłowiecki, with the troops 130 horses; 3 VIII: Aleksander Sieniawski – 130 horses; 3 VIII: Mikołaj Sieniawski – 200 horses; 4 VIII: Maciej Włodek, 100 horses; 8 VIII: Stanisław Struś – 100 horses; 28 VIII: Bernard Pretwicz – 130 horses; 30 VIII: Grzegorz Makowiecki – 100 horses; 6 X – Maciej Górecki, 200 horses.

³² Terebovlia was also designated as the place of concentration of troops in 1537. It was supposed to be the gathering place for the Polish mass mobilisation of the nobility and gentry (Polish: *pospolite ruszenie*). However, the army did not reach Terebovlia, as the nobility called to arms rebelled on their way to war, and so the expedition was cancelled, M. PLEWCZYŃSKI, *op. cit.*, vol. 1, p. 394.

³³ The rota which remained on duty in the winter of 1557/1558 was Mikołaj Sieniawski's unit, CAHR, Division 85, sign. 62, c. 89.

³⁴ This is evidenced by the register of lost horses, in which the first entries are dated to 16 May and relate to the period before this list was compiled, ASK 85, vol. 62, c. 89–95v (the numbering of pages is counted continuously within the volume).

arms at that time. Of this number, 1050 mercenaries passed through Terebovlia between May and October (see Table 2). In addition, in the second half of May there were four rotas with a total of 500 horsemen in Medzhybizh,³⁵ and in June in Sharivka (Polish: *Szarawka*) two rotas with 350 horsemen.³⁶ Terebovlia was thus again the main place where Polish troops were stationed.

The description of the troops present in Terebovlia should begin with the profiles of the commanders recorded in 1557. In this group, Mikołaj Sieniawski (1489–1569), the organiser and commander of the troops mobilised in 1557, was undoubtedly the most eminent person. An excellent soldier, he started his military career by participating in the victorious battle against the Tatars at Vyshnivets/Lopuszne (Polish: *Wiśniowiec/Łopuszne*, on 28 April 1512), and in the following years participated in the defence of Ruthenian lands of the Kingdom of Poland. This was greatly appreciated by King Sigismund I the Old, who in 1539 appointed him field hetman (Polish: *hetman polny*), i.e., the commander of the army defending the south-eastern lands of the Kingdom of Poland. In 1553, he took over the office of Voivode of Ruthenia.³⁷ It was Mikołaj Sieniawski who held the position of commander-in-chief of the mercenary troops in the discussed period.

Aleksander Sieniawski (1490–1568), the next rittmeister (Polish: *rotmistrz*), was Mikołaj's younger sibling. Like his brother, he started his military service in 1512. King Sigismund II August valued his experience and in 1553 entrusted him with the post of field commander (Polish: *strażnik polny*), i.e., the commander of the troops guarding the south-eastern territories of the Kingdom of Poland (aide to the field hetman).³⁸

³⁵ These were the rotas of Mikołaj Sieniawski and Marcin Herbut, with 200 horses each, and those of Hieronim Sieniawski and Stanisław Broniewski, each with 50 horses. The registers were drawn up on 19 V 1558, ASK 85, vol. 62, c. 2, 41v, 48v, 57.

³⁶ These were the rotas commanded by B. Pretwicz (200 horses) and Stanisław Derśniak (150 horses). The registers were drawn up on 20 VI 1558, ASK 85, vol. 62, c. 67v, 76.

³⁷ M. PLEWCZYŃSKI, *Sieniawski Mikołaj*, [in:] *Polski Słownik Biograficzny* (hereinafter: PSB), vol. 37, Warszawa–Kraków 1997–1997, pp. 123–130.

³⁸ IDEM, *Sieniawski Aleksander*, PSB, vol. 37, Warszawa–Kraków 1997–1997, pp. 115–118.

Table 1

The inventory of rotas in Terebovlia in 1557

No.	Rittmeister	Lancers	Hussars	Cossacks	Henchmen	Drummers	Trumpeters	Shooters with firearms	No data	Total
1	Maciej Górecki	1	178	2	17	1	–	–	1	200
2	Jerzy Jazłowiecki	–	116	1	12	–	–	1	–	130
3	Jerzy Makowiecki	3	84	6	6	1	–	–	–	100
4	Bernard Pretwicz	–	2	126	2	–	–	–	–	130
5	Aleksander Sieniawski	–	108	14	6	1	–	1	–	130
6	Mikołaj Sieniawski	4	177	8	8	1	–	–	2	200
7	Stanisław Struś	1	78	13	7	1	–	–	–	100
8	Maciej Włodek	–	87	2	10	1	–	–	–	100
Total		9	830	172	68	6	0	2	3	1090

Source: CAHR, Division 85, sign. 61.

Another of the rittmeisters, Jerzy Jazłowiecki of the Abdank coat of arms (before 1510–1575), also is not an anonymous figure. He too was a soldier with many years of service. He was highly valued by the king, who in 1547 appointed him voivode of Kamieniec Podolski. Jerzy Jazłowiecki's high military competences are evidenced by the fact that in 1569 he assumed the highest military office in Poland – the Great Hetman of the Crown (Polish: *hetman wielki koronny*), which he held until his death.

Another individual with ties to Kamieniec Podolski was rittmeister Stanisław Struś, who held the office of the huntsman (Polish: łowczy) there, and was recorded with his unit in Terebovlia in the summer of 1557.³⁹

Also present in Terebovlia in the discussed period was rittmeister Bernard Pretwicz (c. 1500–1561), who thanks to his military exploits was a well-known figure in Poland at the time. He started his military career in 1527, as a soldier in Mikołaj Sieniawski's rota, and quickly became a commander himself, successfully fighting against the Turks and Tatars, earning the nicknames *Murus Podoliae* and *Terror tartarorum*. In 1552, he became the starost of Terebovlia, so he could feel like a host during the concentration of troops in 1557.⁴⁰

Rittmeister Maciej Włodek is another commander in this group who held an important office in the east part of the Kingdom – in 1542 he became the starost general of Podolia. He was also an experienced soldier, as he was recorded as a rittmeister already in 1526.⁴¹

Grzegorz Makowiecki, was born in Kuyavia, but moved to Rutheniain the 1540s. In 1557, he took the office of sub-judge (*subiudicus*, Polish: *podśędek*), but nothing is known about his earlier military career.⁴²

The last of the rittmeisters recorded in 1557 in Terebovlia was Maciej Górecki. He came from Greater Poland and started his career by the king's side as his courtier and secretary. At the turn of 1540s and 1550s, he appeared in Ruthenia, where he held, among other things, the function of a field scribe, i.e., an official responsible for the preparation of documents related to the service of the enlisted troops. There is no information about his appearance in written records as a rittmeister before 1557.⁴³

As mentioned above, the repeated concentration of troops at Terebovlia took place in May 1558. Records show the presence of 7 rotas on 16 May. Once again, units commanded by M. Górecki, A. Sieniawski, and S. Struś appeared on the banks of the Hnizna River. From the 9th of June comes the information about the arrival of M. Sieniawski's rota in Terebovlia. Apart from the

³⁹ In 1561, he became a starost in Kamieniec Podolski, J. BYLIŃSKI, *Struś Stanisław*, PSB, vol. 44, Warszawa 2006–2007, pp. 446–447.

⁴⁰ A. BOŁDYREW, T. GRABARCZYK, *Rota Bernarda Pretwicza z 1557 r.* [in print].

⁴¹ M. PLEWCZYŃSKI, *Wojny...*, vol. 2, p. 415.

⁴² I. KANIEWSKA, *Makowiecki Hieronim*, PSB, vol. 19, Wrocław 1974, pp. 223–224; M. PLEWCZYŃSKI, *Wojny...*, vol. 2, p. 340.

⁴³ R. ŻELEWSKI, *Górecki Maciej b. Sokola*, PSB, vol. 8, p. 399.

rittmeisters already known from the records of 1557, rotas commanded by Hieronim Lanckoroński, Michał Podfilipski, and Mikołaj Potocki also came to the town in 1558.⁴⁴

These three rittmeisters, like the commanders mentioned above, were not random persons. The first of them was Hieronim Lanckoroński of the Zadora coat of arms (d. 1569), starosta of Skala (Ukrainian: *Skala-Podilska*) at that time, who was recorded as a rittmeister in the royal service as early as 1538.⁴⁵

The second was Michał Podfilipski (Ciołek coat of arms) (d. 1562), who from 1555 held the office of the pantler (Polish: *stolnik*) of Halych. He, too, was an experienced soldier, having started his service in the mercenary army in 1535, and from then on he repeatedly took part in battles against Moldavians and Tatars. He was appointed a rittmeister for the first time in 1558.⁴⁶

The third rittmeister was Mikołaj Potocki (d. 1572), who was first recorded as an enlisted soldier in 1528, and participated, among other things, in the battle with the Moldavians at Obertyn (22 August 1531). In the 1540s, he served at the king's side as an equestrian courtier (*curiensus*). At that time, Sigismund II Augustus mandated him with various missions, which allows us to consider him the king's trusted man. In 1549, he returned to service in the mercenary army as a rittmeister. From then on, he took part in the defence of the Ruthenian lands of the Kingdom of Poland. In 1553, the king rewarded him with the office of steward (Polish: *szafarz*) in Kamieniec Podolski.⁴⁷ So he too was a very experienced commander.

Summarising the information about the rittmeisters who were in Terebovlia in 1557 and 1558, one can see that they were very experienced soldiers, with many years of military service. They were also people with ties to Ruthenia through the property they owned and offices they held, which makes it possible to place them among the broadly understood state elite, and thus as king's men.⁴⁸

⁴⁴ ASK 85, vol. 62, c. 10–41 44–48, 59v–67.

⁴⁵ M. PLEWCZYŃSKI, *Wojny...*, vol. 1, p. 385.

⁴⁶ IDEM, *Michał Podfilipski*, PSB, vol. 27, Wrocław 1983, pp. 83–84.

⁴⁷ IDEM, *Potocki Mikołaj*, PSB, vol. 28, Wrocław 1984–1985, pp. 103–105.

⁴⁸ This was the case even if the commanders holding office sometimes disagreed with the king on certain matters. One such example is the conflict between the Sieniawski family and Sigismund II Augustus over the so-called crown lands. Lands granted to knights by kings for life were often intercepted by their relatives by way of usucaption. Sigismund II Augustus made efforts to restore them to the royal domain, which was met with resistance from many noble families. This group included the Sieniawski

Another issue that needs to be addressed in this paper is the organisation and the armament of the troops gathered at Terebovlia. The structure of the units (rotas) was typical for the Polish cavalry of that period. The unit commander was a rittmeister and his rota was divided into subdivisions called *poczet* (retinue). They comprised between two and a dozen or so riders. Usually, the largest *poczet* was that of the rittmeister. The rest of the units were commanded by so-called 'companions', whose place in the hierarchy of the unit can be considered equivalent to contemporary non-commissioned officers. The most numerous group were the privates.

In terms of armament, there are three main categories of horsemen in the discussed units. The first group consisted of heavy-armed lancers, in full plate armour. This group typical for the late Middle Ages was still present in the army but constituted only a small fraction of the troops. The core of the army was the hussars. Their equipment consisted of a light lance, a breastplate or chain mail, a shield, and a *misiurka*, i.e., a light helmet in the eastern style, which consisted of a plate cover for the top of the head in the shape of a bowl with an attached aventail made of chain. The third group of horsemen were soldiers armed in the Cossack style. They were equipped with armour and a light helmet (*misiurka*), a short spear called *robatyna*, and a *sahajdak* – a bow case with a quiver. In addition to these categories of equestrians, there were also a few trumpeters and drummers. Their instruments were used to transmit orders in the form of sound signals both during marching and fighting. A rota could not function without henchmen, who performed auxiliary activities such as grooming the soldiers' horses. It should be noted that apart from the armament listed in the registers, all the mercenaries were equipped with small weapons (swords, sabres), although according to the practice of that time no information about such arms was included in the registers. In conclusion, it can be said that the troops recruited in 1557 and 1558 were a typical mercenary cavalry army of that period in terms of their organisation and armament.⁴⁹

family, who did not want to return to the king the lands received from his ancestors, arguing that they had performed military service and borne its costs.

⁴⁹ *Vide*: A. BOŁDYREW, *Przemiany uzbrojenia wojska polskiego na przełomie średniowiecza i nowożytności (1454–1572) jako przejaw (r)ewolucji militarnej*, "Roczniki Dziejów Społecznych i Gospodarczych" 2019, vol. 80, pp. 113–138; A. BOŁDYREW, K. ŁOPATECKI, *Polish Way: The Light Cossack Cavalry in the Era of Military Revolution*, "Vestnik of Saint Petersburg University. History" 2020, vol. 65, No. 3, pp. 683–709.

Table 2

The inventory of rotas registered in Terebovlia in 1558

No.	Rittmeister	Lancers	Hussars	Cossacks	Henchmen	Drummers	Trumpeters	Shooter with firearms	No data	Total
1	Maciej Górecki	–	123	12	13	1	–	1	–	150
2	Hieronim Lanckoroński	2	124	7	16	–	1	2	–	150
3	Michał Podfilipski	–	90	3	6	1	–	–	–	100
4	Mikołaj Potocki	–	122	12	12	1	1	2	–	150
5	Aleksander Sieniawski	–	119	18	11	1	–	1	–	150
6	Mikołaj Sieniawski	–	147	31	20	1	–	–	1	200
7	Stanisław Struś	–	123	11	13	1	1	1	–	150
Total		2	848	94	91	6	3	7	1	1050

Source: CAHR, Division 85, vol. 62, k. 10–41, 44–48, 59v–67.

As already mentioned above, the troops mobilised in 1557 had no opportunity to participate in combat. The situation was different in 1558, when the Tatars launched a raid that covered the voivodeships of Bratslav, Kiev, Volhynia, Podolia, and Rus.⁵⁰ Due to the lack of detailed source accounts, its course is poorly known. Some light is shed on these events by the above-mentioned list of horses lost by the enlisted troops in the period from February to May (see Table 3).⁵¹ In the inventory drawn up on 16 May in Terebovlia, 96 horses were recorded.

⁵⁰ M. PLEWCZYŃSKI, *Wojny...*, vol. 2, p. 104.

⁵¹ CAHR, Division 85, sign. 62, c. 89–95v. The mercenaries were compensated for horses lost in service. For this reason, all mounts killed in battle, fallen from disease, exhaustion, or even stolen, were meticulously recorded. These inventories later formed the basis for the payment of compensa-

Some of the horses listed in the inventory were withdrawn from service due to becoming lame or generally being in poor condition. Judging from the fact that such horses were reported (*dat in dampna*) in Lviv, which lay outside the war zone, it should be assumed that these were losses sustained during the march of troops. On the other hand, the only mention that unambiguously indicates the loss of a horse in battle is that of M. Herburth's rota, and specifically of the Cossack Bohdan who served under him and who lost two horses, including a gelding that *peryt in conflictu cum Scitis in campo*.⁵² This means that the horse was killed far away from the village or town, the name of which could serve as the location of its death. In the case of two horses, the location of their loss was not recorded.⁵³ In the remaining cases, the names of the villages or towns near where the horses were lost were listed.

Based on these changes it can be established that the rotas operated in the area from Kozliv (Polish: *Kozłów*) in the west to the line Khmilnyk (Polish: *Chmielnik*) – Bar in the east. The territory thus extended for about 180 km in the east-west direction and up to 80 km in the north-south direction and was entirely situated between the rivers Dniester and Boh. Therefore, the army guarded the land through which led the so-called Podole Trail (also called Kuchman Trail) (see map), which was often used by the Tatars during their raids on Poland.

The register in question primarily reports on the losses incurred by individual rota (Table 3). The list shows that during the three months of service the greatest damage was sustained by M. Górecki's unit, which lost 34 horses, which, considering that there were 150 horses in that unit, means that its losses amounted to almost 23% of that number. The second troop in this respect was the unit led by M. Sieniawski, which lost 15 horses, while the third was that commanded by A. Sieniawski – 11 horses. This gives respectively 7,5% and 7,3% of the total number of horses in these rotas. The rota commanded by S. Derśniak lost 9 horses – 6% of its number. In the remaining units, the number of lost horses is even smaller and does not exceed 4%.

tion to soldiers. It should be noted, however, that information about killed or wounded soldiers was not recorded in such registers.

⁵² CAHR, Division 85, sign. 62, c. 93v.

⁵³ It should be noted, however, that in both cases these entries appear after those mentioning Zinkiv, so it is possible that both horses were lost in the vicinity of this town, but the writer did not add (as he did elsewhere in his list) *decessit ibidem*, which would directly refer to the town from the previous entry.

Table 3

Losses of Polish cavalry units in 1558

No.	Rittmeister	Number of lost horses
1	Stanisław Broniewski	6
2	Stanisław Derśniak	10
3	Maciej Górecki	34
4	Marcin Herburt	4
5	Hektor Lanckoroński	1
6	Michał Podfilipski	4
7	Mikołaj Potocki	5
8	Bernad Pretwicz	4
9	Aleksander Sieniawski	11
10	Mikołaj Sieniawski	16
11	Stanisław Strus	1
Total		96

Source: CAHR, Division 85, sign. 62, k. 89–95v.

The discussed list indicates that in 1558 – apart from the rota of M. Górecki – the losses were not high, so most probably no major battle took place in that year. If such a battle had been fought, the losses would undoubtedly have been greater. However, it is possible to pinpoint sites of smaller skirmishes. One of them probably took place near Horodok (Polish: *Gródek*) on the Smotrych River, where Maciej Górecki's unit lost 18 horses,⁵⁴ while near the village of Radziejowce, the same unit lost 8 horses.⁵⁵ The soldiers of rittmeister A. Sieniawski lost 10 horses at Zinkiv (Polish: *Zinków*). Military actions probably also took place near Bar, where the soldiers of M. Herburt lost 2 horses and S. Broniewski's unit lost 6 horses. In other places, the losses were smaller, which

⁵⁴ Gródek, now Horodok (Городок), Khmelnytskyi Oblast, Ukraine.

⁵⁵ Originally the village of Wnóczkowo, today Radivtsi (Радивці) in Khmelnytskyi Oblast, Ukraine.

allows us to assume that the skirmishes that happened there might have taken place with the participation of fewer troops and might have been successful for the Polish side. We cannot rule out that some of the losses were not caused by the participation in direct combat, but rather the consequence of disease and exhaustion of the mounts during service.

Table 4

Places where horses were lost by Polish mercenaries in 1558

No.	Place	Rittmeister (<i>Rotmistrz</i>)	Number of lost horses
1	Vahrynivtsi (Багрянівці)	S. Derśniak	1
2	Balki (Балки)	A. Sieniawski	1
3	Bar (Бар)*	M. Herburt, S. Broniewski	8
4	Chemerivtsi (Чемерівці)	M. Podfilipski	2
5	Chornyi Ostriv (Чорний Острів)*	M. Sieniawski	1
6	Hlushkivtsi (Глушківці)	M. Potocki	1
7	Horbasiv (Горбасів)	M. Sieniawski	6
8	Horodok (Городок)*	M. Górecki	18
9	Khmilnik (Хмільник)*	M. Sieniawski	1
10	Kolyban' (Колибань)	B. Pretwicz	1
11	Kozliv (Козлів)	S. Derśniak	4
12	Kuzheleva (Велика Кужелева)	M. Herburt	2
13	Loshniv (Лощнів)	M. Sieniawski	2
14	Lviv (Львів)*	M. Potocki, S. Struś, S. Derśniak, M. Sieniawski, M. Górecki	15
15	Medzhybizh (Меджибіж)*	B. Pretwicz, M. Sieniawski	2
16	Novoselytsia (Новоселиця)	M. Potocki	2
17	Nyzhbirok (Нижбірок)	M. Podfilipski	1

Table 4 (cont.)

No.	Place	Rittmeister (<i>Rotmistrz</i>)	Number of lost horses
18	Peches'ky (Печеськи)	M. Sieniawski	1
19	Radivtsi (Радівці)	M. Górecki	8
20	Sharivka (Шарівка)*	B. Pretwicz	2
21	Smotrych (Смотрич)*	M. Podfilipski	1
22	Sutkivci (Сутківці)*	S. Derśniak	3
23	Velyki Birky*	M. Górecki	1
24	Zinkiv (Зіньків)*	H. Lanckoroński, A. Sieniawski	9
25	<i>in campo cum Scitis</i>	M. Herburt	1
26	no information	A. Sieniawski	2
Total			96

* - castles

Source: CAHR, Division 85, sign. 62, k. 89–95v.

Another group of information included in the inventory of losses concerns the places where they were incurred. According to that source, the twelve rotas recorded in the document lost horses in 24 different locations (see Table 4).⁵⁶ Only three: Bar, Medzhybizh, and Zinkiv, were noted as the places of stay of more than one rota, but there is no evidence that they were there at the same time. Based on this information, it can be concluded that the rotas acted largely independently, so that they could patrol the whole area, which was the right solution in view of the tactics used by the Tatars, who during the raid Tatars would send smaller detachments in different directions in order to reach as many settlements as possible to plunder and then kill or kidnap the inhabitants. Prisoners were brought to the main camp, which the Poles used to call *kosz*, which was guarded by the main forces.⁵⁷ Thus, the enlisted troops clashed mainly with these loot-seeking raiding parties, in order to limit the range of their activity

⁵⁶ The list mentions 24 villages and towns and an unspecified *campo* where a skirmish with the enemy took place.

⁵⁷ Z. GLOGER, *Encyklopedia staropolska ilustrowana*, vol. 3, Warszawa 1902, p. 90.

and minimise the losses suffered by the residents of the invaded lands. Rotas comprising 150–200 horses should be considered sufficient for such tasks.

It is worth noting that in the case of 10 out of 11 rotas, the inventory of losses confirms the presence of rotas in locations with castles.⁵⁸ These were Bar, Chornyi Ostriv, Horodok, Khmilnik, Medzhybizh, Sharivka, Smotrych, Sutkivci, Velyky Birky, and Zinkiv. In addition to the fortifications, which could serve as refuge, there were also some facilities and supplies enabling the army, for example, to buy food, repair weapons, replace horses, etc. These places served as advanced bases from which the mercenary troops set off to meet the enemy and to which they returned from the steppes to recuperate.

If one compares the places where the Polish mercenary troops suffered the greatest losses, it turns out that they run along the Kuchman Trail. This allows us to conclude that this was the area where the Tatar army moved in the spring of 1558.

In the years 1557 and 1558, Terebovlia was the main place of stay for the Polish enlisted troops. The choice of this place can be explained by the location of the town, situated on the route leading from the Black Sea into the Kingdom of Poland. From there, the troops could easily travel further east, where, as we know, they skirmished with the Tartars. This was a favourable location to control the territory between the Dniester and Boh rivers – the area of the already-mentioned Kuchman Trail,⁵⁹ which was the route used by the invaders in 1558 when they headed deep into the territories of the Kingdom of Poland. The presence of nearly 2000 mercenaries in this area was probably not enough to defeat the Tatars in an open battle, but it did make it possible to restrict their plundering raids.

While stationed in Terebovlia, soldiers could rest from the hardships of everyday service, whereas at the same time, the military administration carried out its activities – paid salaries and compensation for lost horses, and rotated or added new soldiers to the rotas. All these actions were documented by the drawing up of appropriate records by royal officials.

⁵⁸ Only in the case of S. Struś and M. Potocki's rotas we have no confirmed stay in a town or village with a castle (except for Lviv). However, this does not mean that they did not stay in such a place, but only that they did not lose any horses there.

⁵⁹ K. ŁOPATECKI, *Wykorzystanie map w działaniach strategicznych do 1586 roku w Koronie i Wielkim Księstwie Litewskim*, "Terminus" 2017, vol. 19, No. 3, pp. 538–540.

After a short stay, the units would leave the town on the Hnizna River, heading to the east. There, using local fortresses as bases, they crossed the steppes to intercept the Tatar incursions. It was these fortifications and the army operating in their vicinity that constituted the first line of defence against an attack from the east. In this system, Terebovlia acted as a direct military and economic base.

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TOWNS AS THE RECRUITMENT BASE TO MERCENARIES DURING THE REIGN OF THE LAST JAGIELLONS

Summary. The newest research of mercenary armies at the time of the Jagiellons shows among others the social-territorial structure of the these forces' soldiers. In that one knows towns were more important element in the soldiers' recruitment system than one has believed hitherto. However, from wider point of view, the enhancement of the townsfolk's participation in the army instead of the peasants did not imply the growth of the towns' standing in the state structures. The analyse of these questions leads to the conclusion that the standing of the Kingdom of Poland towns was low, what had consequences not only in the military field, but also translate to the economic and politic functioning of the state. These issues were discussed in the connection with the time of the last Jagiellons' reign, using the sources unheralded until now (registers of the Polish Crown army from the Sigismund II Augustus's reign time stored away in the Central Archives of Historical Records in Warsaw).

Keywords: late medieval/early modern history of warfare, Kingdom of Poland, mercenaries, towns, state capacity

Research into mercenary armies from the reign of Jagiellons, conducted in particular in the last decade, allows for quite a good recognition of the social and territorial composition of the military.¹ For instance, it has been found that burghesses constituted a much higher percentage of the recruited than it had been suspected. However, not all source materials based on which this phenomenon

¹ T. GRABARCZYK, *Piechota zaciężna Królestwa Polskiego w XV wieku*, Łódź 2000, pp. 67–97; M. PLEWCZYŃSKI, *Wojny i wojskowość polska w XVI wieku*, vol. 1: *Lata 1500–1548*, Zabrze 2011, pp. 69–86; IDEM, *Wojny i wojskowość polska w XVI wieku*, vol. 2: *Lata 1548–1575*, Zabrze 2012, pp. 53–76; A. BOŁDYREW, *Piechota zaciężna w Polsce w pierwszej połowie XVI wieku*, Warszawa 2011, pp. 113–194.

can be discussed have been used in the same degree. This observation concerns especially the rule of Sigismund II Augustus on the Polish throne. This study takes into consideration the sources created during the reign of the last Jagiellons, namely the following kings: Alexander (1501–1506), Sigismund I the Old (1507–1548) and Sigismund II Augustus (1530/1548–1572). The specificity of the sources used herein determines the method of presentation of the discussed problem (the quantitative method). The sources in question are records concerning treasury and military matters, which constitute a sort of inspection “protocol” for military units as they were presented to the command. These so-called inspection registers are an invaluable kind of source in historical and military research. Multi-dimensional character of the issues included in them compensate for their being fairly difficult to understand and seemingly monotonous in form.

As I have pointed out elsewhere, identification of the territorial and social background of the mercenaries is possible only to a certain degree. And so, for the cavalry, which constituted the vast majority, similarly as in the previous period, such a recognition is possible only with regard to rittmeisters and comrades, that is unit commanders and their NCOs. Owing to the fact that the inspection protocols recorded only their names and surnames, we are unable to collect any information concerning the ordinary soldiers. Instead of their names, only their horses and weaponry were recorded. It was done quite differently in the case of infantry. There, every soldier provided his name, nickname, surname and, usually, the place they came from, and in the case of burgesses, occasionally also even their profession.² Despite these inconveniences, it is possible to a certain extent to prepare a summary of territorial background of the soldiers.³

The scale of the phenomenon which I am going to discuss is not large in the absolute scale but, at the same time, it must be noted that it is not possible to take a broader approach to this issue. The overall proportion of cavalry to infantry (expressed in percentage), based on a broad selection of sources from the years 1501–1557, clearly shows that infantry constituted at most one fourth to one third of the mercenary army. Of course, there were incidental years when it was

² A. BOŁDYREW, *Horyzont geograficzny żołnierzy zaciężnych w Polsce za ostatnich Jagiellonów. Przyczynek do badań nad mobilnością grupy zawodowej*, “*Studia z Dziejów Wojskowości*” 2017, vol. 6, pp. 54–55.

³ For the first half of the 16th century, these issues were outlined in 2011, *vide*: A. BOŁDYREW, *Piechota...*, pp. 113–158.

more numerous (1502, 1507, 1509, 1514, 1519–1521), but the outlined tendency is a regularity for the remaining recruitment seasons. In other words, the article's title issue may be discussed with reference to the average of 21,62% of mercenary soldiers who served under the rule of the last Jagiellons (on the basis of direct sources). In addition, the study will include data concerning burgesses-recruits who came from crown towns. In other words, the point is to answer the question to what degree the towns of the Polish Kingdom served as a recruitment base for mercenary army.

Table 1

**The share of burgesses-soldiers in mercenary infantry
under the rule of the last Jagiellons, based on inspection registers**

	1 st quarter of the 16 th century	2 nd quarter of the 16 th century	3 rd quarter of the 16 th century	Total
Identified	–	11 750	1 186	12 936
Burgesses	–	6 043	482	6 525
%	–	51,43	40,64	50,44

Source: Central Archives of Historical Records in Warsaw, Crown Treasury Archives, Division 85, sign. 16, part V, c. 1–6; sign. 17, c. 85–93; sign. 19, c. 211v–229; sign. 20, part I, c. 1a–18; part III, c. 1–24; part IV, c. 1a–5; sign. 22, c. 128–171; sign. 24, c. 70–78v; sign. 25, c. 77v–88v; sign. 26, c. 108–123; sign. 27, c. 78–94; sign. 32, c. 3–171v; sign. 36, c. 82v–89v; sign. 39, c. 156–163v; sign. 42, c. 236–261v; sign. 51, c. 53–54; sign. 57, c. 45–47v; sign. 58, c. 107–131; sign. 61, c. 74v–76v; Division 86, sign. 12, vol. II, c. 1–6; Division III, sign. 1, c. 612–615; K. GÓRSKI, *Historia piechoty polskiej*, Kraków 1893, pp. 224–225; Z. SPIERAŁSKI, *Kampania obertyńska 1531 roku*, Warszawa 1962, pp. 237–260.

Note: all further analyses will be conducted on the basis of the above data, which is why it was decided to skip quoting the source.

The presented general data (divided into quarters of the century) show that burgesses from the crown towns constituted a significant number of recruits. While it was known with reference to the first half of the 16th century,⁴ for the years 1551–1572 it is a new finding. It is also interesting that the share oscillates around 40%, as this means that using a representative sample (at the level of nearly 1200

⁴ *Ibidem*, p. 152.

cases in the absolute scale), a clear decline in popularity of mercenary military service among crown burgesses was calculated. At the same time, throughout the period in question, crown burgesses still constituted almost a half of all infantrymen, which made it the most numerous group, thus contradicting the commonly held opinion of the plebeian (peasant) character of this type of army.

Unfortunately, the sources taken into account in the above summary do not cover the first quarter of the 16th century. It is impossible due to their temporal distribution (state of preservation), although other sources (not treasury and military in character) indicate that the share of infantry in mercenary army was at a similar level to the second and third quarters of the 16th century. Therefore, it can be assumed that the data collected for the period 1526–1572 are also, to some extent, representative of the first quarter of the century. Thus, the phenomenon of obtaining recruits from crown towns occurred regularly throughout the discussed period. It must be stressed however, that it was by no means a static phenomenon. It was based around certain dynamics, which is difficult to outline without using complex statistical methods. However, in order to avoid excessive density of description, a method was selected which allows to show the phenomenon at a certain level of generality, without losing sight of structural transformations of the process. To this end, the analysed period is divided into quarters, all the more so because it is compatible with the state of preservation of the sources and the periods of reign of individual rulers of the Jagiellon dynasty (it is especially clearly visible in the case of Sigismund II Augustus). As it was mentioned earlier, observing the transformations in two temporal cross-sections (second and third quarters of the 16th century) may provide the basis for broader conclusions.

Table 2

Temporal distribution of the preserved treasury-military sources

Ruler	Alexander (1501–1506) Sigismund I the Old (1507–1548)		Sigismund II Augustus (1548–1572)
	1 st	2 nd	3 rd
Quarter of the century			
Sources	–	1527–1547	1552–1569

The analysed data are abundant and are characterised by a broad distribution not only along the temporal scale, but also across the geographical one. Thus, it is possible to assign them to individual provinces of the Crown.

Table 3

**Percentage of burgesses-soldiers from individual provinces
in mercenary infantry during the reign of the last Jagiellons**

Province	2 nd quarter of the 16 th century		3 rd quarter of the 16 th century	
	Quantity	%	Quantity	%
Royal Prussia	48	0,79	0	0,00
Kuyavia	41	0,68	1	0,21
Greater Poland	765	12,66	30	6,22
Mazovia	428	7,08	26	5,39
Lesser Poland	3493	58,80	284	58,92
Ruthenian lands	1268	20,98	141	29,25
Total	6043	100,00	482	100,00

Source: Based on the author's own calculations.

Even a cursory examination of the presented data reveals a complete disappearance of recruits from Royal Prussia. It may only be suspected that in the first quarter of the 16th century this involvement was greater, especially in the years of the so-called “Prussian war” (1519–1521).⁵ Such a thesis may be formulated even on the basis of a simple extrapolation of data. If the number of soldiers from Royal Prussia fell to zero from the second to the third quarter, transferring the tendency to the system of first– second quarter should also reveal a decrease (thus, there should be more burgesses-soldiers from Royal Prussia in the first quarter than in the second one). A similar observation could also be

⁵ For more detail *vide*: M. BISKUP, “*Wojna pruska*” czyli wojna Polski z zakonem krzyżackim z lat 1519–1521: u źródeł sekularyzacji Prus Krzyżackich, Olsztyn 1991; J. TYSZKIEWICZ, *Ostatnia wojna z Zakonem Krzyżackim 1519–1521*, Warszawa 1991.

attributed to Kuyavia. Decreases were also observed for Greater Poland and Mazovia, although the share of burgesses-soldiers from these provinces was visible in both the second and the third quarter of the 16th century. The situation was reverse in Lesser Poland and in the Ruthenian lands of the Crown. In these two provinces the share of soldiers from towns increased, with a considerable rise for the Ruthenian lands (from approximately 20% to nearly 30%).

Thus, it is interesting to see how this growth tendency was shaped for individual voivodeships of the Lesser Poland province and the Ruthenian lands.

Table 4

Share of burgesses-soldiers from Lesser Poland and Ruthenian lands in the mercenary infantry during the reign of the last Jagiellons

Province	Voivodeship	2 nd quarter of the 16 th century		3 rd quarter of the 16 th century	
		Number	%	Number	%
Lesser Poland	Kraków	2054	33,99	191	39,63
	Sandomierz	1070	17,71	60	12,45
	Lublin	369	6,11	33	6,85
Ruthenian lands	Ruthenian	927	15,34	118	24,48
	Podole	40	0,66	6	1,24
	Bełz Land	169	2,80	9	1,87
	Chełm Land	132	2,18	8	1,66

Source: Based on the author's own calculations.

Since data for towns of the Podole Voivodeship and the Bełz and Chełm lands are relatively modest, especially with reference to the third quarter of the 16th century, the minor noted fluctuations may be erroneous. However, it is worth focusing on the towns of the Lesser Poland voivodeships and the Ruthenian Voivodeship. Significant increases are visible for the Kraków and Ruthenian voivodeships, an increasing share of towns of the Lublin Voivodeship and a lower participation of towns of the Sandomierz Voivodeship. This means that the increased involvement of Lesser Poland and Ruthenian towns in the temporal perspective was

in fact a result of outstanding role of the following voivodeships: Ruthenian, Kraków and Lublin (from 15,34 to 24,48%, from 33,99 to 39,63% and from 6,11 to 6,85%, respectively). The share of towns of the Ruthenian voivodeship is particularly important, as the increase there amounts to nearly 10%. Of course, in the absolute scale this did not translate to large numbers of soldiers, but it must be kept in mind that the degree of urbanisation and population density for Ruthenian lands and Lesser Poland were different.

The two presented perspectives (temporal and geographical) are not the only ones possible to be taken into account. A useful format for analysing the activity of towns and their inhabitants on different planes is the so-called categorisation of towns. This model was introduced into scientific literature by Henryk Samsonowicz.⁶ The basis for his theoretical assumption is the division into four categories of crown towns, where the first category is the highest and includes the biggest centres, some of them being conurbations or even – as is the case of Kraków – agglomerations. This category includes Kraków, Poznań, Lviv, Gdańsk, Elbląg and Toruń. It must be noted that a half of these towns were found in Royal Prussia, the zone which did not function as recruitment areas or centres in the discussed context.

At the same time, the largest cities were the most densely populated centres and, consequently, the lower the town's category, the more modest the recruitment potential. Meanwhile, the most numerous enlistments took place in centres of category II and III, with a slightly increased recruitment effort for those of the third category.

The share of category I towns also slightly rose. As regards category IV towns, their burgesses joined the mercenary army less frequently in the third quarter of the 16th century. This information is important inasmuch as the number of these towns was estimated to be slightly over 350, that is more than a half of all those identified and categorised.⁷ To sum up this thread, it is worth adding that the share of towns of individual categories, and in fact their citizens, in recruitment did not undergo any major changes with time. Thus, a thesis may be formulated that towns constituted a fairly stable environment as regards military enlistment.

⁶ H. SAMSONOWICZ, *Liczba i wielkość miast późnego średniowiecza Polski*, "Kwartalnik Historyczny" 1979, vol. 86, No. 4, pp. 917–931.

⁷ *Ibidem*.

Table 5

Category I-IV crown towns as recruitment centres

Town category	2 nd quarter of the 16 th century		3 rd quarter of the 16 th century	
	Number	%	Number	%
I	894	14,79	81	16,80
II	2030	33,59	155	32,16
III	1887	31,23	165	34,23
IV	1232	20,39	81	16,80
Total	6043	100,00	482	100,00

Source: Based on the author's own calculations.

These observations (in general scale) are additionally confirmed by a juxtaposition of the number of recruits coming from towns of all four categories with the estimated numbers of their inhabitants. Of course, the latter value was given only as an approximation.

Table 6

The number of burgesses-recruits in comparison with the population of towns of individual categories

Town category	Population	Percentage of town population	Recruits in the 2 nd quarter of the 16 th century (in percent)	Recruits in the 3 rd quarter of the 16 th century (in percent)
I	89 000	13,88	14,79	16,80
II	176 000	27,44	33,59	32,16
III	236 000	36,79	31,23	34,23
IV	140 400	21,89	20,39	16,80
Total	641 400	100,00	100,00	100,00

Source: Based on the author's own calculations.

The above comparison shows that the share of burgesses from towns of category I and III increased. What was different though, was that recruits from category I towns in both quarters of the century were overrepresented with respect to the percentage of these towns' population. Even an increase of the percentage of burgesses from centres of category III in the third quarter did not equalise the kind of deficit which characterised this category of towns. Despite this observation, the phenomenon can be regarded as a manifestation of a positive tendency, since these urban centres were the most densely populated in the Crown and, as a result, they might automatically constitute a broad recruitment base. It is also worth taking a look at category II burgesses, because they were overrepresented in both the second and the third quarters of the century. The index, calculated for the second quarter, remained at such a high level (33,59%) that even its decrease to 32,16% in the third quarter still meant overrepresentation of burgesses from such centres as Łęczycza, Wieluń or Łowicz.

Another interesting indicator is the share of recruits from specific urban centres. They were distinguished by selecting the towns which provided at least 100 soldiers in the second quarter of the century, and then their indicative "efficiency" was traced in the third quarter of the 16th century. Because the most efficient provinces in this respect were Lesser Poland and Ruthenian lands, the selected towns were located in these territories.

The first thing to be noticed is that the percentage of inhabitants of the selected centres is at the level of 29,22% in the second quarter of the 16th century and 28,22% in the next. This means that nearly one-third of burgesses-soldiers came from 8 crown towns (from Lesser Poland and Ruthenia). What is interesting is that their percentage was almost identical irrespective of the period taken into consideration. Thus, it could be said that these towns constituted the foundation for the infantry recruitment, by constantly providing a similar number of people for the service. Eight towns stood out as strongly against the others as Lesser Poland and Ruthenian lands against the remaining lands of the Polish Kingdom. It is worth risking the statement that, in principle, Lesser Poland and Ruthenian lands as well as the selected towns had relatively the greatest share in military actions of the Crown, as regards both the defence of the country and its aggressive foreign policy.

Table 7

The largest recruitment centres in the Polish Kingdom

Province	Town	2 nd quarter of the 16 th century		3 rd quarter of the 16 th century	
		Number	%	Number	%
Lesser Poland	Kraków	576	9,53	58	12,03
	Kazimierz	267	4,42	8	1,66
	Lublin	188	3,11	8	1,66
	Bochnia	166	2,75	24	4,98
	Tarnów	128	2,12	5	1,04
	Sandomierz	111	1,84	10	2,07
Ruthenian lands	Lviv	228	3,77	21	4,36
	Busk	102	1,69	2	0,41
Total		1766	29,22	136	28,22

Source: Based on the author's own calculations.

It must also be noted that only Kraków, Bochnia and Lviv had a larger contribution to enlistment in the third quarter of the century than in the previous discussed period. The remaining 5 towns provided fewer recruits than in the previous period. The greatest decrease took place in Kazimierz (from 4,42 to 1,66% in the scale of all burgesses-soldiers taken into account). The Kraków agglomeration alone, represented in the collected material by Kraków, Kazimierz, Stradom and Kleparz, was an area among the citizens of which 14,45% and 14,32% of infantrymen respectively were recruited. Bearing in mind that the largest recruitment centres supplied on average about 29% of infantrymen, the Kraków agglomeration provided approximately a half of this number. A slightly smaller centre of this type was Lviv along with Busk. Sandomierz and Lublin formed “separate islands” on the map of Lesser Poland.

The recruitment activity of the discussed centres cannot be presented in any way using methods included in geographical information system (GIS). The collected data, despite referring to more than 6000 individual cases, are too skimpy, and their point distribution is characterised by a huge concentration over a small area (8 towns in Lesser Poland and Ruthenia) on the one hand, and on the other, a very loose point distribution in the scale of the entire Kingdom of Poland. The methods of spatial point patterns also cannot be applied, because the significant (quantitatively) recruitment centres cannot be assigned to either point or linear regular system. An attempt at extracting a hierarchical hexagonal network (Christaller's hexagons) or a network of Thiessen's polygons also did not succeed.⁸ The only element of those discussed above which might possibly be treated as a peculiar dependency network is the Kraków agglomeration. However, this observation does not contribute anything new, as it will be true for many aspects of the functioning of this urban centre, unique in the scale of the Crown.

The possibility of regular distributing of significant locations in the geographical space (towns in this context) should indicate a certain degree of civilisational development of the region, or in a broader sense – the country. The sparse findings presented above seem to prove that the impossibility of conducting such an analysis, despite collecting extensive source material, is also significant. It might suggest that crown towns were marginally involved in the military aspect of the operation of the state. Observing more than 6000 cases in the territory of the entire country within half a century should result in more reliable results, distributed in a more regular manner in the geographical space. Meanwhile, it was proved that great involvement characterised the largest and, at the same time, few urban centres, which were located only in one zone of the country. In other words, recruiting soldiers was not based on any system and depended, essentially, on chance. Other factors, lying outside the military, must have decided about the possibility to find candidates for military service. Even taking into

⁸ Z. KOBYLIŃSKI, *Podstawowe metody analizy punktowych układów przestrzennych*, "Archeologia Polski" 1987, vol. 23, No. 1, pp. 34, 39; M. KUSTRA, *Aplikacja metody sześcioboków Christallera do refleksji nad średniowieczną Wielkopolską w kontekście roli Pobiedzisk*, "Studia Lednickie" 2010, vol. 10, pp. 90–100. *Vide*: E. SIEMIANOWSKA, *O zastosowaniu niektórych modeli teoretycznych w badaniach nad ośrodkami miejskimi w średniowieczu*, "Archaeologia Historica Polona" 2014, vol. 22, pp. 28–35.

account the fact that mercenary infantry constituted a small percentage of mercenary army, it must still be remembered that thousands of soldiers were gathered in its ranks. However, it was done in a non-systemic way, drawing upon a reservoir which was not in any way recognised and defined in quantitative categories by the authorities. Consequently, in the face of a sudden potential change of the extra-military factors which influenced its “efficiency”, a crisis would have emerged, the threat of which was either nonconscious or its obviation remained beyond the power of the authorities. Spontaneous treatment of certain supplies, including human resources, as unlimited or at least always excessive in relation to current needs, does not put the organisational system of the army in the best light.

Of course, such conclusions may be regarded as too far-reaching, and the source base as too limited to decide on the general condition of the military potential of the Crown under the rule of the last Jagiellons. However, the quantitative data discussed in brief may provide the grounds for another observation. As it is known, some of the soldiers followed a given rittmeister during successive enlistments. In some cases, such relations have already been proven, while enlisting recruits from a given land, voivodeship or even town, which the rittmeister came from can be traced in specific cases.⁹ Therefore, the statement that there was a certain correspondence between the place where the rittmeister came from (in fact the place he lived in) and the origin of the recruits is not without a good reason.

Based on the data presented above and the information concerning the place of activity of specific rittmeisters, an attempt can be made at estimating the recruitment activity in towns of individual lands in the first quarter of the 16th century (with particular emphasis on Lesser Poland and Ruthenian lands), for which there is no sufficient direct information. This line of thought assumes that a known origin of a rittmeister from a given land might have attracted veterans who also lived there to his unit (in the discussed context, inhabitants of towns in this land).

⁹ A. BÓLDYREW, *Mikołaj Iskrzycki et consortes*, [in:] *Na wojnie i w szlacheckim dworku. Studia i materiały*, eds. K. MAKSYMUK, D. WĘREDA, R. ROGUSKI, Siedlce 2016, pp. 53–65.

Table 8

Relation between rittmeisters and soldiers coming from the same land

	Rittmeisters from Lesser Poland and Ruthenian lands	:	Burgesses-soldiers from Lesser Poland and Ruthenian lands	=	Ratio
1 st quarter of the century	40,32%	:	29,86%	=	1,35
2 nd quarter of the century	78,78%	:	61,02%	=	1,29
3 rd quarter of the century	88,87%	:	63,64%	=	1,40

Source: Based on the author's own calculations.

The above pattern takes into account the percentage of burgesses-soldiers from Lesser Poland and Ruthenian lands, precisely determined for the years 1527–1569, that is for the second and third quarters of the century, as well as information on the place of residence for a total of 315 rittmeisters who served in infantry in the years 1501–1569.¹⁰ Interestingly, the biggest number of rittmeister services was recorded in the first quarter of the 16th century – as many as 186, but only 65,59% (122 cases) were identified as regards the place of residence of specific commanders. Several rittmeisters must be deducted from this number: one who was active in the territory of the Grand Duchy of Lithuania (Witański, who served in 1509¹¹), one Moravian (Jan Žirotinski from Žirotin and Stražnica, who served in 1520¹²) and two inhabitants of Silesia, who took five terms of service altogether (Maciej Bublo from Oświęcim, who served in 1519¹³ and 1520,¹⁴

¹⁰ Based on “Indeks rotmistrzów koronnych z lat 1506–1573”, *vide*: M. PLEWCZYŃSKI, *op. cit.*, vol. 2, pp. 320–360.

¹¹ *Matricularum Regni Poloniae summaria, excussis codicibus, qui in Chartophylacio Maximo Varsoviensi asservantur*, part 4, ed. T. WIERZBOWSKI, Varsoviae 1910–1917, No. 8858; M. PLEWCZYŃSKI, *op. cit.*, vol. 2, p. 357.

¹² *Matricularum...*, part 4, No. 3302, 3325, 3362; M. PLEWCZYŃSKI, *op. cit.*, vol. 2, p. 359.

¹³ Central Archives of Historical Records in Warsaw, Crown Treasury Archives, Division 86, sign. 8, c. 11; *Matricularum...*, part 4, No. 3104; M. PLEWCZYŃSKI, *op. cit.*, vol. 2, p. 322.

¹⁴ *Matricularum...*, part 4, No. 3247, 3336, 3363; M. PLEWCZYŃSKI, *op. cit.*, vol. 2, p. 322.

Noskowski, who served in 1509¹⁵). The remaining 115 cases of crown rittmeister services constitute 61,83% of the 186 analysed services. At the same time, 29,57% of services were done by rittmeisters living in Lesser Poland, whereas another 10,75% by those from Ruthenian lands. Rittmeister services from the two lands constituted 40,32%.

The proportion of rittmeister services from Lesser Poland and Ruthenian lands (expressed in percentage) to the percentage of burgesses-soldiers from these lands in the second and third quarters of the century was 1,29 and 1,40 respectively. Therefore, I assume that this proportion for the first quarter of the 16th century remained at a similar level (their arithmetic mean is 1,35). By applying the reversal principle (dividing the rittmeister services (40,32%) by the estimated ratio index (1,35)), it is possible to estimate the percentage share of burgesses-soldiers from Lesser Poland and Ruthenian lands in the years 1501–1525. The result of this operation is the value of 29,86% (in bold type in the table). This retrogressive extrapolation of a certain dependency offers merely a general idea of the involvement of towns from individual provinces in the recruitment process, but it may be an indirect argument in favour of the thesis of the initially increasing and finally definite predominance of towns from southern and south-eastern Crown as regards military enlistment.¹⁶ Another interesting fact is that the position of Lesser Poland was special in this respect also in the earlier period. Suffice it to quote Tadeusz Grabarczyk who wrote that “it is rather surprising that Lesser Poland should be the first among the most important recruitment areas”¹⁷ and added: “The second most important recruitment area was Greater Poland”.¹⁸ Of course, the words concern recruitment areas within the borders of the Polish Kingdom in the 15th century. Therefore, it is possible to propose a thesis that the role of the Lesser Poland province was predominant, whereas at the end of the 15th century and in the

¹⁵ M. PŁEWczyński, *op. cit.*, vol. 2, pp. 342–343.


¹⁶ Applying the retrogressive method here does not involve the risk of incorrect projection of findings concerning the latter period (second and third quarters of the 16th century) onto the former one (first quarter of the 16th century), because the very phenomenon of recruitment from towns and recruitment in general is obvious and additionally certified in sources, only in a form which does not allow for direct estimation of statistical indicators. For more information on the retrogressive method (the chronological version of the comparative method) *vide*: J. TOPÓLSKI, *Metodologia historii*, Warszawa 1984, pp. 397–399 (particularly pp. 398–399 and footnote 42).

¹⁷ T. GRABARCZYK, *op. cit.*, p. 75.

¹⁸ *Ibidem*, p. 76.

first quarter of the 16th century, the role of the second most active district in recruitment was taken over from Greater Poland by the Ruthenian lands, which would correspond with the gradual reorientation of the Polish foreign policy, and in particular the policy practiced through war, towards the southern and eastern directions. This is illustrated by a partial comparison of data (for the three listed provinces) presented in diagram 1. It must also be noted that the data on which the diagram was based for the first quarter of the 16th century (with the lack of preserved sources) are estimated (extrapolation of mean values, calculated on the basis of data for the fourth quarter of the 15th and the second quarter of the 16th century).

**The share of burgesses from selected provinces
in recruitment for mercenary infantry in the years 1471–1569**



Source: Division 85, sign. 57, c. 45–47v; sign. 58, c. 107–131; sign. 61, c. 74v–76v; Division III, sign. 1, c. 612–615; T. GRABARCZYK, *Piechota zaciężna Królestwa Polskiego w XV wieku*, Łódź 2000, p. 82, diagram 3; A. BOŁDYREW, *Piechota zaciężna w Polsce w pierwszej połowie XVI wieku*, Warszawa 2011, p. 149, table 51).

Of course, this still concerns infantry. On the basis of the previously discussed dependency between the background of rittmeisters and that of the soldiers, a similar verification may be conducted for cavalry. A comparison of the

places of origin of crown cavalry rittmeisters who participated in great military campaigns (the Gwoździec–Obertyn campaign in 1531 and the Khotyn campaign in 1538) clearly indicates that they coincide with those concerning infantry. Cavalry rittmeisters from Lesser Poland and Ruthenian lands who served under Jan Tarnowski in 1531 (21 services) constituted 76,19% of all the cavalry commanders enlisted at the time, whereas in 1538 the group was 79,25% (53 services). Thus, it may be assumed with great probability that the data calculated on the basis of sources concerning infantry turn out to be representative to a certain degree also for the broader context.

Summing up, it is worth stressing once again not only the poor involvement of burgesses with the country's defence system, but also the "intuitive" utilisation of recruitment resources of crown towns by the rulers. Because, according to current knowledge, there never was a shortage of recruits from towns, it was most probably assumed that towns as such supplied and, more importantly, would continue to supply sufficient numbers of potential soldiers. In a broader perspective, the relatively low participation of towns in the mobilisation action of the Crown resulted indirectly from their marginal position in the country. Meanwhile, as was proven in 2013 by Kivanç K. Karaman and Şevket Pamuk, the urbanisation level (as one of the components of the economic structure of the state) forms, in combination with political structure and military action, a specific triangle of relations which have the biggest influence on constituting the structure of modern state (in both temporal and qualitative sense).¹⁹ Thus it may be assumed that the low involvement of crown towns with the war was a manifestation of the scarce possibilities in this area which, in turn, were a consequence of the fairly low level of urbanisation, which had an unfavourable impact on the potential to form the modern structure of the country.²⁰ The nobility, who dominated the Crown in political and economic terms, set themselves completely different goals, which was visible in such things as maintaining economic and political backwardness of towns. Although such a state of affairs

¹⁹ K.K. KARAMAN, Ş. PAMUK, *Different Path to the Modern State in Europe. The Interaction Between Warfare, Economic Structure, and Political Regime*, "American Political Science Review" 2013, vol. 107, No. 3, p. 603.

²⁰ H. SAMSONOWICZ, *op. cit.*, pp. 930–931: the statement "weakness of the bourgeoisie, particularly in southern and eastern Poland", which, combined with the observation that "on the map of European towns, only Prussia in the borders of the Republic of Poland belonged to strongly urbanised areas. Other Polish lands belonged to much less developed" distinctly confirms the presented thesis.

was in a way favourable for the so-called domestic elite, its maintenance did not support the agency of the state apparatus (for instance an efficient tax collection system, especially in the face of the threat of war) and indirectly also the state itself.²¹ Data on the power of the authority and the ruler and the degree of sophistication of durable and multidimensional economy, analysed by Charles Tilly, leaves no doubt as to the position of the Crown among seven other European countries. Poland, as the only one of the analysed countries, moved away from this path.²² On the basis of Lewis Mumford's findings,²³ Tilly also developed a model of the growth of urbanisation, in which the crucial role is played by two factors: concentration of production and concentration of political influences.²⁴ As regards the level of concentration of production, it must be noted that large scale research, which covered almost four centuries (13th–16th centuries²⁵), revealed higher productivity and proliferation of urban armaments industry than it had been assumed previously (tremendously important in the face of military threat, that is in the event of one of three fundamental factors distinguished by Karaman and Pamuk). Therefore, while we can argue about the level of the former of the crucial factors, the latter one – concentration of political influences – was practically non-existent within the context of crown towns. The group of factors listed (relatively low participation of crown towns in the military action, being a manifestation of a low level of urbanisation, lack of possibilities for political interactions, and monocultural orientation of farming, which impaired the economic structure of the country) seems to form the correct context for the analysed issue. All the presented statistical comparisons are arguments in favour of the researchers' theses of the state's capacity for rebuilding its own structure in order to take effective decisions and actions in the field of both internal and foreign policy in the reality of the transition from the Middle Ages to Early modern period, that is in the period of transformation of the state structure from medieval into modern.

²¹ T. ERTMAN, *Birth of the Leviathan. Building States and Regimes in Medieval and Early Modern Europe*, Cambridge 1997, pp. 293–300, 319, 324.

²² CH. TILLY, *Coercion, Capital, and European States, AD 990–1992*, Oxford 1992, p. 60, Fig. 2.7.

²³ L. MUMFORD, *The Myth of the Machine. The Pentagon of Power*, New York 1970.

²⁴ CH. TILLY, *op. cit.*, p. 13, Fig. 1.2.

²⁵ J. SZYMCAK, *Produkcja i koszty uzbrojenia rycerskiego w Polsce XIII–XV w.*, Łódź 1989; IDEM, *Początki broni palnej w Polsce (1383–1533)*, Łódź 2004; A. BOŁDYREW, *Produkcja i koszty uzbrojenia w Polsce XVI wieku*, Warszawa 2005.

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HUNGARIAN TOWNS AGAINST THE OTTOMAN ADVANCE IN THE MIDDLE AGES: THE CASES OF PÉCS, SZEGED AND TEMESVÁR

Summary. The study aims to demonstrate the geographical, legal and political status of three southern Hungarian towns and the role that these towns played in the wars against the Ottomans from the late 14th to the early 16th century. Pécs, located in the Transdanubian part of the realm was a rich episcopal city, while Szeged lying at the confluence of the Rivers Tisza and Maros was a thriving royal free town of the Great Hungarian Plain. The third town, Temesvár (today Timișoara, Romania) located on the eastern fringe of the Great Hungarian Plain was a royal seigneurial town, the seat of the powerful counts of Temes which served as the gateway of the realm to the Balkans. The study consists of three chapters: the first analyses the development and characteristics of the towns under scrutiny in the Middle Ages, the second outlines Ottoman – Hungarian relations between the late 14th and the mid-16th century, while the third examines the role that these towns played in the anti-Ottoman wars.

Keywords: Hungary, towns, Ottomans, 14th–16th century, Pécs, Szeged, Temesvár, war

The towns

Szeged

Szeged was one of the most important towns of southern Hungary in the Middle Ages. It emerged at the confluence of the Rivers Tisza and Maros. The town was established on three larger and several smaller islands, among which there were both permanent and temporary backwaters as well as wetlands. The marshy land,

the temporary and permanent river branches and the stagnant waters provided a natural protection to the town in the Middle Ages.¹

Although a watchtower stood there in Roman times, and different nomadic peoples (e.g. Huns, Avars) also frequented this region no urban-type settlement existed there before the arrival of the Magyars in the late 9th century. Both archaeological findings and documentary evidence support the contention that Szeged evolved in the 11th and 12th centuries as a Hungarian town. Due to its favourable geographical location all regions of the kingdom could be reached easily from Szeged. While the River Maros connected Szeged with Transylvania, the River Tisza created a link with the southern and northern parts of the realm. Moreover, from Szeged, with its very busy ford, important land routes led to the western and northwestern localities of the kingdom.²

The name of Szeged appeared in written sources as early as 1183, but mention was for the first time made of the *hospites* (guests) of Szeged only in 1247. The appearance of the *hospites* who, in all probability were ethnic Hungarians, demonstrated that the transformation of pre-urban Szeged into a real town took place after the Mongol invasion of 1241–1242. In contrast with other parts of the kingdom no foreign ethnic groups seemed to have played a role in this process. The influx of the Romance speaking Latin guests to Hungary took place mainly prior to the 13th century and even then they avoided settling down in the localities of the Great Plain. The situation was the same with the Germans who succeeded the Latin guests. Depending on their occupation both the Latin and the German settlers preferred administrative centres, primarily royal and ecclesiastical seats, and the mountainous regions of the kingdom to the Great Plain. The lack of toponyms such as Olaszi, Szászi, Németi etc. (meaning Italian, Saxon and German in Hungarian) in the territory of the Great Plain confirms the above statement.³

¹ L. BLAZOVICH, *The Historical Topography of Szeged. From the Beginnings to the End of the Middle Ages*, [in:] *Hungarian Atlas of Historic Towns*, vol. 3: *Szeged*, Szeged 2014, pp. 5–12; C. SZALONTAI, *Szeged születése – Megtelepedés a szegedi tájban a város kialakulásáig*, Budapest 2020.

² *Szeged története*, vol. 1: *A kezdetektől 1686-ig*, ed. G. KRISTÓ, Szeged 1983. The relevant parts were written by L. SZEKFŰ, I. PETROVICS, P. KULCSÁR and F. SZAKÁLY; B. KÜRTI, I. PETROVICS, *Szeged*, [in:] *Korai Magyar Történeti Lexikon*, eds. G. KRISTÓ, P. ENGEL, F. MAKK, Budapest–Szeged 1994, pp. 621–622.

³ *Codex diplomaticus et epistolaris Slovaciae*, ed. R. MARSINA, vol. 1, Bratislavae 1970, p. 90; J. REIZNER, *Szeged története*, vol. 4, Szeged 1900, p. 3; also cf. I. PETROVICS, *Foreign Ethnic*



Fig. 1. Szeged in the 16th century. (Source: M. KRATOCHWILL on the basis of Z. MÁTÉ'S reconstruction - L. BLAZOVICH: *Városok az Alföldön...*, The map is between pages 60 and 61)

Groups in the Towns of Southern Hungary, [in:] Segregation – Integration – Assimilation. Religious and Ethnic Groups in the Medieval Towns of Central and Eastern Europe, eds. D. KEENE, B. NAGY, K. SZENDE, Ashgate 2009, pp. 67–88.

The first mention of Szeged in the sources that can be analysed from a demographic and ethnic point of view was in the tithe-list from the year 1522. This important document enumerated 1644 mostly independent families in Szeged and according to scholars who made their estimation on the basis of this tithe-list the number of inhabitants of the town might have reached 8000 at that time.⁴ This shows that Szeged was one of the most populous towns of the medieval Hungarian Kingdom in the Late Middle Ages. For the sake of comparison let me mention that Buda, the medieval “capital” of the realm had 12 000–15 000, while Pest, the second largest town had 10 000 inhabitants at the end of the 15th century.⁵ The other conclusion of great significance that can be drawn from the data of the tithe-list is that Szeged could preserve its Hungarian character even in the first half of the 16th century.

It is equally important to stress that Szeged was not only a town with a large number of inhabitants, but also a thriving commercial centre, the bases of which were provided by the large-scale cattle- and horse-breeding, and the wine-production in the Szerémség (present-day Srem), a region located between the Rivers Danube and Száva/Sava.⁶ Also from the earliest times a royal salt deposit was operated in the town of Szeged, which served as another factor of its development. In accordance with the general Hungarian situation, commerce played a more important role than craft industry in the economic life of the town. Consequently, Szeged had the privilege of holding three weekly markets in the 15th century, and from 1499 onwards an annual fair.

From an ecclesiastical point of view Szeged was the centre of an archdeaconry, whence the *archidiaconus Segediensis* moved, probably in the 13th century, to Bács (today Bač in Serbia) where the archbishops of Kalocsa had one of their seats. Two parish churches, one dedicated to St. George, the other to St. Demetrius, two hospitals, and four monasteries (two belonging to the Franciscan order, one Dominican and one Premonstratensian) stood in the town in the Late Middle Ages. These church institutions did not threaten or restrict the autonomy

⁴ J. REIZNER, *op. cit.*, pp. 97–128; S. BÁLINT, *Az 1522. évi tizedlajstrom szegedi vezetéknevei*, “A Magyar Nyelvtudományi Társaság kiadványai” 1963, No. 105, Budapest 1963. Cf. *Szeged története...*, pp. 448–460; P. KULCSÁR, *Az 1522-es szegedi tizedjegyzék mint történeti forrás*, “Tanulmányok Csongrád megye történetéből” 1984, vol. 8, pp. 5–27. According to András Kubinyi the number of the inhabitants of Szeged in 1522 might have reached 9500. Cf. A. KUBINYI, *A Magyar Királyság népeisége a 15. század végén*, “Történelmi Szemle” 1996, vol. 38, No. 2–3, pp. 149–150.

⁵ G. GRANASZTÓI, *A középkori magyar város*, Budapest 1980, p. 157.

⁶ Today Srem is divided between Serbia and Croatia with the major part belonging to Serbia.

of Szeged, which pertained to the king for nearly the whole of the Middle Ages. This favourable legal position and the economic level the town had reached by the late 15th century led to King Wladislas II declaring Szeged to be a royal free town in 1498. Moreover the law of 1514 decreed that Szeged, along with other royal properties and revenues, is not to be pledged to anyone.⁷

The category of royal free towns comprised approximately 30 localities from the whole territory of the Hungarian Kingdom. Among them were the 8 tavernical towns Buda, Pest (from 1481 onwards), Sopron, Pozsony, Nagyszombat, Kassa, Bártfa and Eperjes (present-day Bratislava, Trnava, Košice, Bardejov and Prešov – all in Slovakia), then those which could appeal to the judicial bench of the *personalis* (Óbuda, Székesfehérvár, Esztergom, Szeged, Lőcse, Szokolca and Kiszseben (present-day Levoča, Skalica and Sabinov – all in Slovakia), as well as the mining towns, and the Saxon towns of Transylvania. Finally, the city of Zagreb on Mount Grič in Slavonia also has to be added to the royal free towns.⁸ The fact that Szeged occupied such a distinguished place in the urban network of Hungary is also confirmed by its cultural achievements. From this point of view it should be remembered that between 1444 and 1526 Szeged “sent” more than 100 students (i.e. nearly three dozens less than Buda) to the universities of Vienna and Kraków.⁹

Soon after the battle of Mohács in 1526 this flourishing town was ravaged by the Ottomans who finally occupied it in 1543. Though the Ottoman rule blocked further development, and was very brutal for the inhabitants of Szeged, most of the burghers remained in the town after its fall. In this respect 1552 proved to be the real turning point, when it became evident that the Hungarians who were insufficiently supported by the troops of King Ferdinand of Habsburg, were not able to liberate Szeged. After 1552 the richest burghers left Szeged

⁷ *Szeged története...*, pp. 278–476; L. BLAZOVICH, *Városok az Alföldön a 14–16. században*, Szeged 2002, pp. 117–144. For the law of 1514 *vide*: J.M. BAK, P. BANYÓ, M. RADY, *The Laws of the Medieval Kingdom of Hungary. Decreta Regni Mediaevalis Hungariae*, vol. 4: 1490–1526, Idyllwild CA 2012, (hereinafter: DRMH) p. 179.

⁸ *Tavernical* – from Latin *sedes tavernicalis* (tavernical bench). It was the master of the treasury (Latin: *magister tavernicorum*), a high royal dignitary who presided over the common court of appeal of the “seven” (in practice eight) tavernical or free royal towns. Similarly, the other high royal dignitary, the *personalis* (*personalis praesentia regiae in iudiciis locumtenens* – later simply *personalis*) presided over another common court of appeal (*sedes personalitia*) of royal free towns. The office of the *personalis* was created in 1464 as a result of King Matthias’ judicial reform.

⁹ *Szeged története...*, pp. 419–420, 476–480; A. KUBINYI, *Városfejlődés és vásárhálózat a középkori Alföldön és az Alföld szélén*, Szeged 2000, p. 7.

and moved to the towns of Upper Hungary, where especially Kassa (Košice) and Nagyszombat (Trnava) received refugees from Szeged. After its fall, Szeged gradually became a Moslem town. This process accelerated particularly after 1552, paralleled by its economic decline, especially for foreign trade and the forced relocation of the burghers who lived in the part of the town called Palánk (Palisades). Their place was taken by Moslems and Serbians. Upper Szeged also lost nearly the whole of its population, but Lower Szeged survived as the dwelling place of the Hungarians. The inhabitants of Lower Szeged dealt mostly with agriculture and animal husbandry.¹⁰

The above mentioned facts also demonstrate that the settlement structure of late medieval Szeged was spatially divided: the fortress and, to the south of it, the *suburbium* (Hungarian: Alszeged, which received the name Palánk in the Ottoman era) emerged on the largest island. Farther south, within the boundaries of present-day Alsóváros/Lower Szeged, a new town nucleus had come into being by the late 15th century, with an observant Franciscan convent in its centre. North of the fortress, on a larger and several smaller islands, another settlement had evolved. It was Felszeged/Fesőváros (English: Upper Szeged/Town), which also had a suburbium character. The three settlements were legally united around 1469. Nevertheless the legal unification did not create a topographically unified town at once, and Szeged preserved its spatial fragmentation for a long time even after 1469.

Temesvár

The medieval history of Temesvár, a settlement that emerged on the bank of the River Temes, can be studied with the help of written sources from the 1150s. The first document in which Temesvár appears is the mid-twelfth century description by Idrísí, the famous Sicilian Arab geographer. He proclaims Temesvár (“T.n.y.s.b.r.”) to be a splendid town located south of the River Tisza, and abounding in great richness. The attention of the Hungarian kings first turned towards Temesvár, medieval precursor of present-day Timișoara in Romania, in the early fourteenth century. Although Charles I of Anjou spent shorter and longer periods in Buda around the 1310s, the rather unfriendly attitude of the

¹⁰ *Szeged története...*, pp. 508–534, 552–570; cf. I. PETROVICS, *Dél-dunántúli és dél-alföldi városok kapcsolata Felső-Magyarországgal a középkorban*, Budapest 2005, pp. 147–148.

citizenry of Buda, the series of his armed conflicts with Matthew (Hungarian: Máté) Csák, the most powerful oligarch in the north-western part of the kingdom, and the fact that virtually the entire realm was controlled by the “little kings” led the monarch to seek a temporary residence there.¹¹ Charles paid his first visit to Temesvár, in all probability, in 1315, and had his royal residence there until 1323.

Since Temesvár did not have the advantage of a central geographical location, the royal court moved to Visegrád, in the middle of the realm, soon after the death of the most powerful oligarch, Matthew Csák, in 1321. This took place in fact in 1323, when the last of the “little kings”, John (Hungarian: János) Babonić, was subdued by Charles I. The departure of the royal court evidently did not favour the further development of Temesvár.

A new situation emerged in the 1360s, when Louis I (the Great) of Anjou launched a very active Balkans policy. This clearly increased the role of the count of Temes (*comes Temesiensis*) and the importance of Temesvár, the favourable geographical location of which led to its serving as the “gateway” to the Balkans. Louis I occupied Vidin in Bulgaria in 1365 and appointed a ban (*banus*) there to administer the affairs of the newly created *Bulgarian banate of Vidin*.¹² It is important to stress that the jurisdiction of the *ban of Vidin* extended not only over Vidin, but also over those Hungarian castles which were located next to the banate of Vidin. These castles, among which Temesvár was perhaps the most significant, provided military protection for the banate of Vidin. This political arrangement proved to be merely temporary since the *banate of Vidin* ceased to exist in 1369. After 1369, the king transferred the authority of the former *ban of Vidin* to the *comes Temesiensis*, who thereby became one of the most powerful dignitaries of the realm.

¹¹ G. KRISTÓ, *I. Károly harcai a tartományurak ellen (1310–1323)*, “Századok” 2003, vol. 137, No. 2, p. 301, 306, 308; I. PETROVICS, *The Fading Glory of a Former Royal Seat: the Case of Medieval Temesvár*, [in:] *The Man of Many Devices, Who Wandered Full Many Ways. Festschrift in Honor of János M. Bak*, eds. B. NAGY, M. SEBÖK, Budapest 1999, pp. 529–530. Vide: I. PETROVICS, *A középkori Temesvár. Fejezetek a Bega-parti város 1552 előtti történetéből*, Szeged 2008, pp. 31–32; Z. KOPECZNY, *The Medieval Castle and Town of Temeswar: Archaeological Research Versus Historical Testimonies*, [in:] *Castrum Bene*, vol. 12: *The Castle as Social Space*, ed. K. PREDOVNIK, Ljubljana 2014, pp. 277–288.

¹² R. KOSTOVA, *Vidin, Siege of*, [in:] *The Oxford Encyclopedia of Medieval Warfare and Military Technology*, ed. C.J. ROGERS, vol. 3, Oxford 2010, (hereinafter: MWMT), vol. 3, pp. 496–497. Cf. I. PETROVICS, *A középkori Temesvár...*, p. 101.




Fig. 2. Temesvár in the 18th century. (Map by G.M. SEUTTER, source: T.C. LOTTER – J. ÁRPÁD, *Temesvár nyomtatott térképei*, "Műszaki Szemle" 2012, vol. 57, p. 6)

The greatest obstacle to the development of the town was that the overwhelming Turkish victory at Nicopolis in 1396 resulted in Temesvár and the region around it becoming the permanent target of Ottoman onslaughts. Consequently, by the early 15th century, Temesvár assumed the role of a *border castle*. This evidently hindered its urban development, despite the fact that Pipo Ozorai (Italian: Filippo Scolari) and John (Hungarian: János) Hunyadi as counts of Temes (*comites comitatus Temesiensis*) initiated significant building operations there. Since these construction works primarily focused on fortifying the castle and the town, they did not essentially promote urban development. At the same time, the administrative functions of Temesvár were broadened, since the salt deposit at Keve (today Kovin in Serbia) was managed by Pipo Ozorai in Temesvár. This change was accomplished in order to make the southern

defence system more effective, since Ozorai, for a while, simultaneously held the offices of *comes Temesiensis* and *comes camerarum salium regalium*.¹³

The town of Temesvár is referred to in mediaeval charters as *villa*, *oppidum* and *civitas*. Documents that contain lists of the franchises of the *hospites/cives* of Temesvár do not appear to have survived from the medieval period. However, indirect evidence clearly reveals that the town enjoyed the right to hold weekly fairs, and the daily life of Temesvár was directed by the town council, consisting of the *judge* (Latin: *iudex*, Hungarian: *bíró*) and the *aldermen* (Latin: *iurati cives*, Hungarian: *esküdt polgárok*). The first *iudex* is mentioned in written documents in 1390, and is named *Mychael dictus Poztos*. His Hungarian name, Posztós, refers to a person who was engaged either in the production or the selling of cloth. At present, only two charters are known to have been issued by the town council prior to 1552, one in 1498, and the other in 1523.

Temesvár cannot be regarded as a royal free town since its autonomy was seriously restricted by the *comes* and the *vicecomes Temesiensis* who had their seats in the town. From the point of view of urban autonomy, the most disadvantageous features were that in 1369 the authority of the ban of Vidin was transferred to the *comes Temesiensis*, and that from the late 14th century on the Ottoman advance led to the authority of the *comes Temesiensis* being significantly strengthened. In the early fifteenth century, for instance, Pipo Ozorai as *comes Temesiensis* also exercised jurisdiction over the counties of Csanád, Arad, Keve, Krassó, Zaránd and Csongrád, and 15 to 20 royal castles were under his control.¹⁴

The citizens of Temesvár are referred to in medieval charters as *cives et hospites*. The guests of Temesvár (*hospites de Themeswar*) are mentioned first in written documents in 1341. Unfortunately, there are only sporadic data as to the names and professions of the citizens and the social structure and ethnic composition of the town. The scattered personal names preserved in documentary evidence, various data concerning urban administration, and the geographical location of the town, convincingly suggest that the *hospites*, and indeed the inhabitants of Temesvár, were preponderantly Hungarians until the mid-sixteenth

¹³ I. PETROVICS, *The Fading Glory...*, p. 533.

¹⁴ IDEM, *Foreign ethnic groups...*, p. 79; IDEM, *A temesi ispánság és a déli határvédelem a 15. században és a 16. század elején*, [in:] *Aktualitások a magyar középkorkutatásban*, eds. M. FONT, T. FEDELES, G. KISS, Pécs 2010, pp. 264–266.

century. In contrast with most other towns in the Hungarian kingdom, therefore, “Latin” and German guests did not play an important role in the development of medieval Temesvár. This is supported by the fact that a similar situation can be observed in the case of the nearby town of Szeged.¹⁵

However, a major shift occurred in the ethnic composition of the population of the Temes region as a result of the regular Ottoman onslaughts that began in the late fourteenth century, and the migration and settlement of new inhabitants following the Ottoman devastation. Many of those Hungarians who had survived the brutal Ottoman raids migrated to the central parts of the realm, and, from the early 15th century on, a large number of Serbs and Romanians arrived to replace them. The immigrants continued to use the original Hungarian place-names in this area, but obviously adapted them to their own language, as is shown by an analysis of the Turkish state-tax returns from the late 16th century. The above changes that took place in the region between the Rivers Danube, Tisza and Maros in the Late Middle Ages also had an impact on the ethnic make-up of the town of Temesvár itself. Nevertheless, the first Turkish state-tax return (*defter*) produced in 1554 proves that the Hungarians still constituted the majority of the inhabitants of the town (numbering around 4000 at that time) even two years after its fall to the Turks.¹⁶ The *defters* preserved the memory of 15 streets of Temesvár that was composed of the castle and the town itself and of two suburbs (Nagy Palánk and Kis Palánk). Similarly to Szeged, the castle and the town as well as the suburbs were surrounded by river branches, marshes and swamps.

Pécs

The city of Pécs is located in the south western part of modern Hungary close to the Croatian border. Pécs’s historical importance as a regional centre began in Roman times. A Celtic settlement, which the Romans re-named Sopianae and developed, stood within what are now the boundaries of the city. It rose to prominence in the late third century A.D. when the Province of Pannonia

¹⁵ IDEM, *Foreign ethnic groups...*, p. 80.

¹⁶ J. HÓVÁRI, *A török Temesvár*, “Élet és Tudomány” 1992, vol. 47, No. 26, p. 745; P. ENGEL, *A temesvári és moldovai szandzsák törökkori települései (1554–1579)*, Szeged 1996; I. PETROVICS, *A középkori Temesvár...*, p. 114; IDEM, *Foreign ethnic groups...*, pp. 83–84.

was divided into four parts and Sopianae became the administrative centre of Pannonia Valeria. Sopianae survived the end of the Western Roman Empire (476 A.D.), but the centre of the locality, during the Great Migration of the Peoples, was displaced from the Roman town to the territory of the early Christian cemetery, lying north to the former. Although many scholars assert otherwise, it is quite unlikely that in the Carolingian period the town belonged to the Frankish Empire, for the simple reason that its eastern border did not reach the Danube.¹⁷

Pécs continued to be the key town in this region in the Middle Ages. This successor to the ancient *Sopianae* was named *Quinqueecclesiae* in Hungarian documents written in Latin, *Fünfskirchen* in German, and *Pécs* in the vernacular. Medieval Pécs was the seat of one of the wealthiest bishoprics of the Kingdom of Hungary. The diocese of Pécs was established by King Saint Stephen in 1009 and can be regarded as one of the oldest bishoprics of the Hungarian Kingdom.¹⁸

The city of Pécs also housed a cathedral and a collegiate chapter house which functioned as famous places of authentication. Furthermore, one hospital and three convents belonging to various mendicant orders (those of the Franciscans, Dominicans and Our Lady of Mount Carmel) were also to be found within the walls of the medieval town in the Later Middle Ages, together with three parish churches that took care of the religious life of the inhabitants of Pécs. In addition to the afore-mentioned ecclesiastical institutions, a parish church and a convent belonging to the Dominican nuns were to be found in the suburb of Pécs, named *vicus Malomséd/Malomszeg*, that was located next to the north-eastern part of the town walls. The Augustinian hermits also appeared in Pécs and had a convent there which also stood *extra muros*, and was very close to the convent of the Dominican nuns in the *Malomséd/Malomszeg vicus*.

¹⁷ Therefore it is hardly probable that the name *Quinque Basilicae*, that appears in the *Conversio Bagoariorum et Carantanorum*, refers to Pécs. *Vide*: I. PETROVICS, *Medieval Pécs and the monetary reforms of Charles I*, [in:] “*In my Spirit and Thought I Remained a European of Hungarian Origin*.” *Medieval Historical Studies in Memory of Zoltan J. Kosztolnyik*, eds. I. PETROVICS, S.L. TÓTH, E. CONGDON, Szeged 2010, pp. 123–124.

¹⁸ For the medieval history of the Diocese of Pécs *vide*: *A pécsi egyházmegye története*, vol. 1: *A középkor évszázadai (1009–1543)*, eds. T. FEDELES, G. SARBAK, J. SÜMEGI, Pécs 2009. *Vide*: also L. KOSZTA, T. FEDELES, *Pécs (Fünfskirchen): das Bistum und die Bischofsstadt im Mittelalter*, Wien 2011.




Fig. 3. Pécs. The bishops's castle and the city in the 15th century
(Source: B. NAGY – I. PETROVICS, *A város története*, p. 177)

One of the most outstanding bishops of Pécs, William of Koppenbach (1361–1374), gained his fame because, in 1367, together with Louis I of Anjou, King of Hungary (1342–1382), he founded the first university of the realm. He then served as the first chancellor of this *studium generale* until his death in 1374. Since the university was financially supported exclusively by the bishops of Pécs, it is quite evident that its activity declined after the death of its founder. Although its second chancellor, Valentine of Alsán, Bishop of Pécs (1374–1408) did his best in order to cover the expenses of the operation of the university, there is no documentary evidence informing us about the activity of the *studium generale* of Pécs after the early 15th century.¹⁹

¹⁹ Concerning the university, which actually had only two faculties (those of law and arts), it should be pointed out that in Pécs an excellent chapter school had existed already before the foundation of the *studium generale*, and the cathedral chapter provided an adequate “library background” for the university. It is also important to note that Pécs, following from its geographical location, fitted well into the south and south-western oriented foreign policy of King Louis I. For the university of Pécs *vide*: L.G. ASTRIK, *The Mediaeval Universities of Pécs and Pozsony. Commemoration of the*

The structure, the morphological and topographical development of the medieval city of Pécs was determined by several factors, among which the most important are: its geographical location along the southern slopes of the Mecsek mountain and the fact that it was an episcopal see. Furthermore, some elements of the Roman heritage (e.g. *cella septihora*) also contributed to the peculiarities of this city.

The city consisted of two main components: the ecclesiastical and the 'civilian' town. The former was made up of two parts: the bishop's castle that comprised primarily the cathedral itself and the bishop's palace, and the quarter that belonged to the cathedral and the collegiate chapter house. The bishop's castle, in its present form, was built after the Mongol invasion of 1241/42. The castle went through a profound modernization in the late 15th century. It was Bishop Sigmund Ernuszt who ordered the building of gate towers which significantly increased the castle's defensive facilities. At the same time the castle walls were also strengthened, and a ditch was dug around them. Nevertheless, the "barbakans" at the southwestern and southeastern corner of the fortress were, in all probability, constructed in the first decades of the 16th century. The walls of the city were erected in the late 14th and early 15th century, right after the rebellious Horváti brothers destroyed the city in 1387. The bishop's castle occupied the north-western part of the city, and since it was built together with the city walls, it served as an organic part of the city's bulwark. The quarter that belonged to the chapter house (in Hungarian: *káptalani város*) emerged in the 13th century, after the common way of life (*vita communis*) of the canons had come to an end, and the canons had moved to independent dwelling houses.²⁰

The 'civilian' town that in the Late Middle Ages occupied the whole southern and north-eastern part of the modern city centre, also emerged as a result of a long development. Originally smaller settlements came into being within

500th and 600th Anniversary of their Foundation 1367–1467–1967, Frankfurt am Main 1969; I. PETROVICS, *A középkori pécsi egyetem és alapítója*, "Aetas" 2005, vol. 20, No. 4, pp. 29–39. *Vide*: also T. FEDELES, "in dicta civitate *Quinque Ecclesiensi de cetero sit studium generale*" – *Short History of the University of Pécs*, [in:] *University and Universality: the Place and Role of the University of Pécs in Europe from the Middle Ages to Present Day*, eds. A. FISCHER-DÁRDAL, I. LENGVÁRI, E. SCHMELCZER-POHÁNKA, Éva, Pécs 2017, pp. 75–106; M. FONT, *Hope of Success and Causes of the Failure: Founding Universities in Medieval Hungary*, [in:] *University and Universality...*, pp. 49–73.

²⁰ This quarter, the medieval *káptalani város*, was bordered by the modern streets: Káptalan–Hunyadi–Janus Pannonius, and the main square of modern Pécs, the Széchenyi square.

the later town walls, which, as a result of subsequent expansion, were built together, and finally occupied nearly the whole territory of the modern downtown. The centres of the original settlements (later the different quarters of the city) were the parish churches and the convents of the mendicant orders. The territory encircled by the city walls was far less densely built up: part of the area lying south of the bishop's castle, for strategic reasons, was more or less vacant. In other cases, documentary evidence reveals that extensive gardens, vineyards and orchards belonged to the dwelling houses. The city's main streets were an east-west axis and a north-south artery that intersected at the centrally located market place (Hungarian: *piactér*). The city had four gates at the opposite ends of the east-west axis and the north-south artery. Unfortunately, it is not known how many streets the city had exactly. Medieval sources, to be more precise charters issued prior to 1526, reveal the names of 7 streets, plus one from 1542. Furthermore, the Turkish defters from 1546 and 1554, name another 7 streets. Most of the streets were paved with stone, and for the most part the dwelling houses were also built of stone.²¹

Extra muros, i.e. outside the city walls, two suburbs existed, of which the Malomséd/Malomszeg *vicus*, lying to the northeast of the city walls, was the more significant. The other suburb came into being around the western gate of the city (Szigeti kapu), close to the Fransiscan convent.

Although Pécs and its burghers were legally subject to the bishop and the cathedral chapter, their privileges were relatively extensive. Consequently, Pécs was not only a significant ecclesiastical seat, but also was a thriving commercial centre during the Middle Ages, even though it could never become a royal free town. The *hospites* of the city are first mentioned in a charter issued in 1181. They were 'Latins' having come from around the area of the medieval German-French language border. The influx of 'Latins' was followed by that of Germans around the 1330s. Unfortunately, the number of the Latin and German guests living in medieval Pécs cannot be estimated. Nevertheless, documentary evidence clearly shows that the Germans soon outnumbered the Latin guests of the town and came to form the largest foreign ethnic group

²¹ For the medieval streets *vide*: I. PETROVICS, *A középkori Pécs utcái*, [in:] *A 2001–2004 között megrendezett "Előadások Pécs történetéből" című konferenciák válogatott előadásai*, eds. M. PILKHOFER, J. VONYÓ, "Tanulmányok Pécs történetéből" 2005, vol. 18, pp. 43–60; T. FEDELES, "Eztán Pécs tűnik szemünkbe." *A város középkori története 1009–1526*, Pécs 2011, pp. 41–76.

in Pécs. The trading activity of the German burghers of Pécs, clustered in all probability in a particular street, flourished until the town fell to the Ottomans in 1543. Nearly two dozen German burghers are known by their name from the late medieval period, among them two judges. Some burghers even enjoyed dual citizenship, being citizens of both Pécs and Vienna, while others had family contacts with burghers living in Pozsony/Bratislava, Sopron and Buda. Besides the 'Latins' and the Germans, Croats also lived in the medieval city of Pécs. Nevertheless, in the Middle Ages the overwhelming majority of the townsfolk consisted of Hungarians, who lived partly within the city walls, partly in the suburbs, mostly in the Malomséd/Malomszeg *vicus*. Pécs's Hungarian merchants and those who belonged to the strong German and 'Latin' community of the city traded not only with Hungarian towns, but with those of Italy and Austria, mainly with Venice and Vienna. They traded mostly cattle and wine. In addition, the craft industry also flourished in the city.²²

Ottoman – Hungarian Relations

The Ottoman expansion reached Hungary after the battle of Kosovo (1389). The Serbs were heavily defeated by the Ottomans in this military clash that resulted in the fall of the medieval Serbian state. From that time on the Kingdom of Hungary was compelled to adopt an effective defensive policy to counter the Ottoman menace. Since 1389 until the battle of Mohács in 1526 (which marks the end of the independent Hungarian Kingdom) the realm had lived almost without interruption under the constant menace of Ottoman raids and invasions.

Relations between the Hungarian Kingdom and the Ottoman Empire can be divided into three main periods, of which primarily the first is relevant to our topic. According to some scholars it started in 1375 with the earliest documented direct military conflict between Hungarian and Ottoman forces in Wallachia (present-day Romania), while others regard the battle of Kosovo as the beginning

²² For the medieval history of the city of Pécs *vide*: I. PETROVICS, *Foreign ethnic groups...*, pp. 73–75; IDEM, *The Cities and Towns of Medieval Hungary as Economic and Cultural Centres and Places of Coexistence. The Case of Pécs*, "Colloquia. Journal for Central European History" 2011, vol. 18, pp. 5–26; IDEM, *A város története a 14. század közepétől 1526-ig*, [in:] *Pécs története*, vol. 2: *A püspökség alapításától a török hódításig*, ed. M. FONT, Pécs 2015, pp. 173–267, 276–288, 323–344.

of the period in question. The end of this stage, however, is not debated: it is claimed to last until the Battle of Mohács (1526) in which the Hungarian royal army was completely annihilated by the Ottoman military. This period was characterized by gradual Ottoman expansion in the Balkans, to the south of the medieval Kingdom of Hungary, as well as by Hungarian attempts to halt the Ottoman advance by extending Hungarian influence in the Balkans. In addition, King Sigismund decided to build an anti-Ottoman defence system along the southern borders of the realm. Nevertheless, with the collapse of this defence system by the early 1520s, the road to Hungary and central Europe was open for the Ottomans.²³

The afore-mentioned Hungarian defence system was built in fact in the 15th century. After his disastrous defeat against the Ottomans at the battle of Nicopolis (1396), King Sigismund of Luxembourg reorganized his country's defence system. When in 1397 he called a diet to the centre of the southern defence, Temesvár, his aims were to stabilise royal authority and to reform

²³ The second phase of Hungarian-Ottoman relations started with the Battle of Mohács, which also marked the beginning of a long period of Habsburg-Ottoman military confrontation in central Europe. The Habsburgs – with the election of Ferdinand I, the fallen king's brother-in-law as monarch of Hungary – ruled the northern and western parts of the realm from 1526, while with the occupation of Buda in 1541, central Hungary was incorporated into the Ottoman Empire. Eastern Hungary together with Transylvania originally became a “new national monarchy” under the rule of John Szapolyai and his son, John Sigismund. After the fall of Buda and when the experimentation with this kingdom failed around 1570, Transylvania took the path of an autonomous principality under the suzerainty of the Ottoman Empire. The trisection of the medieval kingdom was a very unfortunate situation for Hungary, since the country became the major battlefield for 150 years in the Habsburg-Ottoman rivalry in central Europe. The second period ended with the peace treaty of Karlowitz (today Sremski Karlovci in Serbia) in 1699 that marks the end of the Liberation Wars. These wars resulted in the expulsion of the Ottomans out of nearly the whole of Historic Hungary. The third period lasted from 1699 until the collapse of the Ottoman and Austro-Hungarian Empires in World War I. The most important characteristic feature of the third phase is that the Ottomans lost Hungary to the Habsburgs and withdrew to the Balkans. *Vide*: F. SZAKÁLY, *Phases of Turco-Hungarian warfare before the battle of Mohács (1365–1526)*, “Acta Orientalia Academiae Scientiarum Hungaricae” 1979, vol. 33, pp. 72–85; *Ottomans, Hungarians and Habsburgs in Central Europe: The Military Confines in the Era of Ottoman Conquest*, eds. G. DÁVID, P. FODOR, Leiden 2000; G. ÁGOSTON, *Hungary*, [in:] *Encyclopedia of the Ottoman Empire*, eds. G. ÁGOSTON, B. MASTERS, New York 2009, pp. 255–258. See also the different entries on Hungarian-Ottoman warfare in MWMT, *passim*. *Vide*: I. PETROVICS, *A temesi ispánság*, pp. 262–263; *IDEM*, *From Slavery to Freedom: the Fate of Margaret Himfi*, “Transylvanian Review” 2017, vol. 26, Supplement No. 1, pp. 105–118; G. ÁGOSTON, *Ottoman expansion and military power, 1300–1453*, [in:] *The Cambridge History of War*, eds. A. CURRY, D.A. GRAFF, Cambridge 2020, pp. 449–469.

the defence of the realm. In the first place the decrees of the diet ordered the introduction of the institution of *militia portalis*.²⁴ The monarch also proclaimed that:

all clergy give and render half of their income for the defense of the frontiers, but only during the above mentioned war against the pagans; and our gentlemen of the realm should give half of the tithe from their tenant peasants not to the clergy but should deliver it to those who will be selected by our majesty, together with the barons and the nobles of our kingdom, to collect and deliver the half of the ecclesiastical revenues and incomes, and these revenues should not be used for any other purpose but for the defense of our kingdom, and we should not force those appointed men to give or to use the said incomes for any other purpose.²⁵

The establishment of a new defence system that was further developed under his successors also can be associated with the person of King Sigismund and the diet of 1397. The new multi-layered defense system consisted of buffer or vassal states; the *banates*,²⁶ two parallel lines of border forts situated along the southern borders of the country; and the Hungarian field army, as a last resort in case the Ottomans broke through the first three layers of defense.

Sigismund used Wallachia, Serbia and Bosnia as buffer states against the Ottomans. The arrangement worked best with Serbia. Its rulers cooperated with Hungary, and until Serbia's final Ottoman conquest (1439 and 1459) they halted Ottoman advance. Bosnia and Wallachia were more reluctant to accept Hungarian suzerainty, and often sided with the Ottomans. Sigismund managed to secure Nándorfehérvár (present-day Belgrade, Serbia) through the agreement of Tata with despot Stephen Lazarević of Serbia. The monarch took possession of it in 1427 and did his best in order to fortify the stronghold.²⁷ Nándorfehérvár

²⁴ Vide: F. SEBŐK, *Militia portalis*, MWMT, vol. 3, pp. 9–10.

²⁵ DRMH, vol. 2, pp. 26–27.

²⁶ For the banates vide: I. PETROVICS, *Banate*, MWMT, vol. 1, pp. 116–117.

²⁷ The text of the agreement of Tata concluded in 1426 is published in *Codex diplomaticus Hungariae ecclesiasticus ac civilis*, ed. G. FEJÉR, Budae 1844, vol. 10, part 6, pp. 809–813. In his charter, issued on 7 November 1427, King Sigismund requested the town of Sopron to send two construction workers, together with their families, to Nándorfehérvár. They were to settle in Nándorfehérvár and support the fortification of the stronghold. The charter is published in J. HÁZI, *Sopron szabad királyi város története*, Sopron 1923, series 1, vol. 2, pp. 342–343. Vide: A. KRSTIĆ, *Beogradsko pismo kralja Žigmunda građanima Šoprona (7. novembar 1427. godine)*, “Mešovita grada – Miscellanea” 2012, vol. 33, pp. 21–36.

became the key fort of the Hungarian southern border defence line until its Ottoman conquest on 29 August 1521 and successfully withstood two major Ottoman sieges: in 1440 and 1456.²⁸ With Galambóc (today Golubac in Serbia), another castle of great strategic significance Sigismund was less successful. Its Serbian castellan refused to hand over the fortress to King Sigismund, who was unable to occupy it with his army in 1428.²⁹



Fig. 4. The fortresses of the southern defence line of the Kingdom of Hungary in the 15th century (Source: *Magyar Kódex*, vol. 2: *Lovagkor és reneszánsz*, ed. G. STEMLER, Budapest 1999, p. 41)

Sigismund also granted extended military authority over the garrison soldiers serving in the counties of the Temesköz and the *banate* of Mačva to the count (*comes*) of Temes county and the *ban* of Mačva, respectively. To the west, the two *bans* of Croatia and Slavonia had been given similar military authority.

²⁸ P. SZABÓ, *Nándorfehérvár első oszmán-török ostroma és előzményei*, Szeged 2015; G. ÁGOSTON, *Nándorfehérvár (Belgrade), Siege of*, MWMT, vol. 3, pp. 45–46.

²⁹ I. PETROVICS, *Galambóc ostroma*, [in:] *1000 év a hadak útján. Nagy képes millenniumi hadtörténet*, ed. Á. RÁCZ, Budapest 2000, p. 64.

Many of the soldiers of the border forts were refugees from Serbia, and served as light *bussars*, boatmen or peasant soldiers (*vojniki*).

In the 1470s King Matthias (Hungarian: Mátyás) Hunyadi reorganized the border from the Adriatic through the Eastern Carpathians under three military officials and integrated the garrison forces with the noble troops of the counties (*banderia*) under the command of these officials. The offices of the *bans* of Croatia-Dalmatia and Slavonia were united in one person, and this *ban* commanded all the military forces of the counties up to the Lower Danube. To direct the defences of the Lower Danube region, King Matthias created the office of the captain-general of the Lower Parts of Hungary, held usually by the *comes* of Temes, who commanded the garrisons and military forces of 15 counties, including those between the Drava and Sava rivers. The easternmost territories were under the command of the voivode of Transylvania, with similar authority.

The border forts under the command of these three military officials formed two parallel lines. The southern chain of forts stretched from Klis in the Adriatic through Knin, Jajce, Srebrenik, Šabac, Zimony/Zemun, Nándorfehérvár/Belgrade, Szentlászlóvár/Pescari, Orsova/Orşova to Szörényvár/Turnu Severin; the northern one from Zengg/Senj on the Dalmatian coast to Bihać, Krupa, Pétervárad/Petrovaradin, Temesvár/Timişoara, Lugos/Lugoş, Karánsebes/Căransebeş. This defence line and their garrisons successfully halted the Ottomans until it collapsed in the 1520s, and the Hungarian army was crushed at the battle of Mohács (1526), which led to Hungary's Ottoman occupation in 1541.

Pécs, Szeged, Temesvár and the anti-Ottoman struggle

Since the settlements under scrutiny were located in the southern parts of the Hungarian Kingdom, the Ottoman advance had reached them by the late 14th and early 15th century, affecting mostly the town of Temesvár and its vicinity. Initially the counts of Temes successfully fought the raiding Ottoman troops and defeated them several times. It was Pipo Ozorai who in the first half of the 15th century not only counteracted the marauding Ottoman troops, but also led campaigns against them even to Wallachia. As count of Temes (1404–1426) and royal official in charge of the military organization of southern Hungary, Pipo Ozorai, following Italian practice, greatly improved the fortifications


of the southern border of the realm by modernizing the old strongholds and erecting new ones. In doing so he contributed significantly to the establishment of the two lines of fortifications that were built from the Lower Danube to the Dalmatian coast. John (Hungarian: János) Hunyadi, another illustrious count of Temes, appeared first in this capacity in 1441. Although after Hunyadi's election as governor of the realm in 1446, there was no mention of him as the count of Temes, it is beyond doubt that he had, in fact, control over this important county. There seems to have been a vacancy in the county of Temes between 1453 and 1455, but in 1455 and 1456 John Hunyadi appears again in the documents as count there.³⁰ After Hunyadi's death on 11 August 1456, it was his son, Ladislás (Hungarian: László) who obtained the dignity of the count of Temes. John Hunyadi, undoubtedly, recognized pretty soon the strategic importance of the county of Temes and the town of Temesvár. Earlier research has established that after 1443 John Hunyadi rebuilt and fortified the castle of Temesvár, and brought his family there from Kolozsvár (today Cluj in Romania) in 1447.³¹ Hunyadi preferred to stay in the castle of Temesvár, which evidently served as one of his favourite residences, from where he launched several campaigns in different directions. On 22 June 1456, he issued his last charter in Temesvár, in which – for the second time – he called the Transylvanian Saxons to arms against the Ottomans. Soon afterwards he left with his troops for Belgrade.³²

Reference also should be made to Paul (Hungarian: Pál) Kinizsi who as count of Temes (1479–1494) and captain general of the southern parts of Hungary was one of the most talented and outstanding generals of anti-Ottoman wars in the second half of the 15th century. For the sake of illustration, it is suffice here to mention only two cases. First: on 13 October 1479, Kinizsi, together with Stephen Bátori, voivode of Transylvania, annihilated at Kenyérmező (today Câmpul Pâinii, Romania) the biggest Ottoman army that invaded Hungary during the reign of King Matthias (1458–1490). Second: in 1481, he launched a campaign against the Ottomans and penetrated deep into Serbia, as far as Kruševac.

³⁰ I. PETROVICS, *John Hunyadi, Defender of the Southern Borders of the Medieval Kingdom of Hungary*, "Banatica" 2010, vol. 20, No. 2, pp. 71–72.

³¹ J. SZENTKLÁRAY, *Temesvár város története*, [in:] *Temes vármegye és Temesvár (Magyarország vármegyéi és városai)*, ed. S. BOROVSKY, Budapest [1914], pp. 20, 26; A.A. RUSU, *Arad és Temes megye középkori erődítményei*, [in:] *A középkori Dél-Alföld és Szer*, ed. T. KOLLÁR, Szeged 2000, pp. 579–581.

³² I. PETROVICS, *John Hunyadi...*, p. 72.



After KMTI, p. 95. Early Hungarian Historical Lexicon, Bp. 1994.

Fig. 5. Major settlements and routes in late medieval Hungary
(Source: R. SZÁNTÓ, on the basis of the map published in: *Korai magyar történeti lexikon...*, p. 95)

After his triumphant expedition Kinizsi brought some 50 000 Serbians to Hungary upon his return, whom he settled around Temesvár (perhaps in the suburbs of the town). After the battle of Mohács the counts of Temes frequently switched sides and served either King Ferdinand or John Szapolyai. The last count of Temes, Stephen (Hungarian: István) Losonczy successfully resisted to the Ottoman siege of Temesvár in the fall of 1551, but in the summer of 1552 Temesvár finally fell to the Ottomans. The occupation of Temesvár shows that the Ottomans also recognised the strategic location of the town, which, after its fall, became the centre of the second Ottoman province in Hungary.

Szeged, the only royal free town of southern Hungary, was in a more lucky situation. Lying some 90 kms northwest to Temesvár, the town had not been endangered by major Ottoman military offensives for a long time. Following from its geographical and economic position Szeged served as a major station of logistics and the starting point of anti-Ottoman expeditions. The burghers of Szeged supported the anti-Ottoman campaigns primarily with foodstuff, handicraft products (among them weapons) and manpower. Equally important was their financial contribution to the warfare, since Szeged, as one of the most prosperous towns of the realm, paid a large amount of money, in the form of tax, to the royal treasury. In addition, Szeged was a suitable place for meetings of diplomats and for holding diets. It was there that in 1444 the envoys of Sultan Murad II negotiated with King Vladislas I and his barons about a peace treaty. As a result of the discussions the famous Hungaro-Ottoman 'false' peace was signed that undermined the cause of the crusade and led to the disastrous defeat of the christian army at the battle of Varna in 1444.³³ The diet, i.e. the supreme legislative organ of the realm, was convened here twice: first in the winter of 1458 and 1459 and then in 1495. The former was called by King Matthias in order to discuss the defense of the realm, the recovery of the Holy Crown, and negotiations with King Stephen Thomas of Bosnia.³⁴

Saint John of Capestrano and the papal legate, Juan Carvajal also visited Szeged. The former preached here for the first time in 1455, and returned to Szeged

³³ Negotiations took place in Szeged, however the peace was signed, in fact, at Várad (today: Oradea, Romania). *Vide*: P. ENGEL, *The Realm of St Stephen. A History of Medieval Hungary, 895–1526*, London–New York 2001, pp. 286–287.

³⁴ DRMH, vol. 3, pp. 10–14.

in the summer of the next year. In 1456 he not only preached to the crowd but recruited even crusaders against the Ottomans.³⁵

Since Pécs was located at the southwestern part of the realm, it was on the road leading to Bosnia. When the Hungarian monarchs launched campaigns against Bosnia or the Ottoman troops stationing there, they frequently traversed the city of Pécs. It holds true especially to King Sigismund of Luxembourg. Due to its geographical position, Pécs had not been affected by serious Ottoman onslaughts until the early 16th century. It is also to be noted that Pécs was an episcopal city with many well-educated bishops. Most of them studied at foreign, mainly Italian universities and had an extensive social network. This enabled them to act as acknowledged diplomats. In 1465 Janus Pannonius, bishop of Pécs and head of the Hungarian embassy to Rome, for instance, successfully obtained from Pope Paul II a significant amount of money as financial aid against the Ottoman menace. The same holds true for Philip More (Hungarian: Csulai Móré Fülöp) who, before serving as bishop of Pécs, between 1505 and 1521 constantly stayed in Venice as ambassador of the Hungarian king. Due to his activity the Signoria disbursed a remarkable financial aid to Hungary in order to promote the realm's anti-Ottoman wars.³⁶

On the other hand, prelates also had military duties. The bishop of Pécs, for instance, was obliged by the law of 1498 to raise a banderium that was constituted by 400 armed men, while the chapter here had to raise 200 cavalry.³⁷ Philip More, Bishop of Pécs (1522–1526) fought with his banderium in the battle of Mohács and, along with several Hungarian prelates, met his death there.³⁸

Two of the settlements under scrutiny, Pécs and Szeged, were occupied by the Ottomans in 1543, while the third fell to them in 1552. The fact that Pécs and Szeged came under Ottoman rule nearly a decade earlier than Temesvár is explained by the situation that the strategy of the Ottoman military leadership had changed. From 1541 on they strove for the constant occupation of Hungary. In addition, these towns, especially Pécs, were to be found on the roads that led to Buda and Vienna, respectively.

³⁵ *Szeged története...*, p. 441.

³⁶ I. PETROVICS, *A város története...*, pp. 194–195.

³⁷ DRMH, vol. 4, p. 101.

³⁸ S. VARGA, *A püspök városa vagy az Oszmán Birodalom előretolt helyőrsége? 1526–1543*, [in:] *Pécs története...*, vol. 2, p. 290.

It is to be noted that all three settlements housed a fortress. The least important stood in the town of Szeged. Although it was erected, in all probability, in the second half of the 13th century, until the 1540s it did not have real strategic significance. Before 1543 the main role of the fortress, standing on the right bank of the River Tisza, was to control the ford and to protect the salt deposit. Only one inscription suggests that a stone wall was erected at a certain part of the town in 1524.³⁹ The rest of the town was surrounded, in fact, only with palisades and ditches. More significant was the fortress of Temesvár which was remodelled several times. For the last time in the mid 16th century, shortly before its fall. The town, similarly to Szeged, was protected only with palisades and the branches of the River Temes. Nevertheless, documentary evidence suggests that the northern and the western part of the town was strengthened with stone walls and rondellas in the mid-16th century.⁴⁰

Only one of the afore-mentioned settlements, Pécs, was surrounded by stone walls in the Middle Ages. Nevertheless, its walls were built in the late 14th and early 15th century, that is in a period that preceded the appearance of firearms. The city walls were, in fact, weak and did not mean a real obstacle to the Ottoman military that easily occupied the city both in 1526 and 1543. Nevertheless, it should be stressed that in 1526 the Ottomans did not besiege the fortress, while in 1543 the terrified defenders and the burghers, who hoped to find shelter inside the stronghold, had left the fortress right before the Ottomans could have fired the cannons.⁴¹

To sum up the above: the regular Ottoman incursions and devastations that lasted for more than a century and a half had weakened the medieval Kingdom of Hungary to that extent that the southern parts of the realm, including once flourishing towns, easily fell prey to the Ottomans. The disastrous defeat of the royal army at Mohács in 1526 and the subsequent election of two kings, along with the internal strife, further aggravated the situation that led to the trisection of the Kingdom of Hungary.

³⁹ F. HORVÁTH, *The Szeged Castle*, [in:] *Hungarian Atlas of Historic Towns*, vol. 3: Szeged, ed. L. BLAZOVICH. Szeged 2014, pp. 61–63.

⁴⁰ I. PETROVICS, *A középkori Temesvár...*, pp. 32, 38; Z. KOPECZNY, *Volt-e Temesvárnak védőfala*, [in:] *Urbs, Civitas, Universitas. Ünnepi tanulmányok Petrovics István 65. születésnapja tiszteletére*, eds. S. PAPP, Z. KORDÉ, S.L. TÓTH, Szeged 2018, pp. 168–174.

⁴¹ I. PETROVICS, *A város története...*, pp. 173–179; S. VARGA, *op. cit.*, pp. 302–303.

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EXCAVATIONS FROM THE MEDIEVAL CITY OF CARANSEBEȘ

Summary. Systematic archaeological research in the fortified medieval city of Caransebeș/Sebeș began in 2017. The fortified medieval city, attested for the first time in historical records in 1290 during the reign of Ladislaus IV of Hungary, belonged to an area of Byzantine influence in the 12th century, and later (most probably between 1186 and 1231-1232) fell under the influence of the second Vlach-Bulgarian Tsardom. Around 1231-1232 the discussed region (together with Caransebeș) became part of the Kingdom of Hungary. Both the city and the surrounding region had a predominantly Vlach population.

For archaeological research we had at our disposal several plans of the city dated to the 17th-18th centuries. Some time after the 1718 peace treaty signed in Požarevac (Passarowitz) between the Ottoman Empire and the Habsburg Monarchy, the Caransebeș fortress was destroyed. Currently, only a few fragments of the fortifications are preserved in its northern area, but further archaeological excavations are needed to establish their precise dating and context.

In the context of tensions between the Ottoman Empire and the Habsburg Monarchy, the border city underwent rapid transformations over short periods of time during the 17th-18th centuries. After 1551-1552, the region and implicitly the city of Caransebeș came under the authority of the Transylvanian princes. It was conquered by the Turks in 1658 and occupied by the Austrians in 1688, who proceeded to rearrange the Italian-style fortifications. The works were not completed, however, because the Ottoman Empire regained possession of the fortress in 1696 and held it until 1718.

Over the course of three research seasons, we identified remains of three fragments of structures and a fragment of a ravelin on the north side, two fragments of the stone-paved road that crossed the city, and two fragments of the inner city walls. In the central area west of the road, both medieval and modern houses, fragments of iron processing workshops, and a possible pharmacy or spice shop were partially excavated. Moreover, on the surface of the ground inside the inner fortification, traces of walls were discovered, while on its outside – human osteological remains, indicating the presence of a church, especially when we consider that the plans of the fortress dated to the end of the 17th century, and that a Polish coin issued in 1627 during the reign of Sigismund III Vasa (1587-1632), most likely resulting from a destroyed grave, was discovered *in situ*.

Overall, we can say that we were able to correlate cartographic, historical, and archaeological information in order to clarify the stages of the spatial development of the city, especially during the 16th–18th centuries. Based on historical sources, we were able to find out more about who its inhabitants were, their religions, and the transformations that took place from a religious and administrative point of view.

Keywords: fortification, town, workshop, tower, iron, cemetery, Romania, Caransebeș

The medieval city Caransebeș/Sebeș (Pl. 1), first attested in 1290, can be traced back to the 13th century.¹ Archaeological discoveries, however, have shown that previous settlements and necropolises existed on its territory dating to the 11th and 12th centuries (Pl. 2)² and even earlier.³

The area was under Byzantine influence (until 1186)⁴ and later under the influence of the second Vlach-Bulgarian Tsardom.⁵ Artefacts from necropolises in the area show a strong Balkan influence of Byzantine tradition in terms of funerary inventory items (Pl. 2/2–4).⁶

¹ *Documente privind Istoria României. Veacul 13, C. Transilvania, vol. 2: 1251–1300*, București 1952, doc. 359, p. 316.

² E. IAROSLAUSCHI, *O villa rustica la Caransebeș*, “Banatica” 1975, vol. 3, pp. 355–363; P. BONA, *Biserica medievală din Caransebeș*, Caransebeș 1993, p. 93; S. OȚA, A. ARDEȚ, *Câteva observații privind necropola de la Caransebeș-Centru, faza timpurie (secolele XI–XII)*, “Cercetări Arheologice” 2018, vol. 25, pp. 205–214.

³ A. ARDEȚ, *Dim colecția Muzeului Județean de Etnografie și al Regimentului de Graniță Caransebeș. Noi descoperiri arheologice*, “Tibiscum” 1993, vol. 8, pp. 339, 345, Pl. II/2.

⁴ *Vide: S. OȚA, Piese de orfevrărie de tradiție bizantină în spațiul nord-dunărean (secolul al XI-lea – începutul secolului al XIII-lea)*, [in:] *Între stepă și Imperiu. Studii în onoarea lui Radu Harhoiu*, eds. A. MĂGUREANU, E. GĂLL, București 2010, pp. 401–433; S. OȚA, *Rings Decorated with Anthropomorphic Representations (11th–12th centuries)*, [in:] *Representations, Signs and Symbols. Proceedings of the Symposium on Religion and Magic*, eds. I.V. FERENCZ, N.C. RIȘCUȚA, O. TUTILĂ BĂRBAȚ, Deva 2015, pp. 345–356; S. OȚA, *Brățări bizantine și post bizantine din metal și sticlă descoperite la nordul Dunării de Jos. Context, modele, cronologie (secolele XI–XII/începutul secolului al XIII-lea)*, “Cercetări Arheologice” 2019, vol. 26, pp. 219–242.

⁵ V. ACHIM, *O formațiune medievală de graniță în sud-estul Banatului: Craina*, [in:] *Banatul în evul mediu*, ed. V. Achim, București 2000, pp. 161–176.

⁶ S. OȚA, *Necropolele din orizontul sud-dunărean–2 de pe teritoriul Banatului (sfârșitul sec. al XI-lea sec. al XIII-lea)*, [in:] *Relații interetnice în Transilvania (secolele VI–XIII)*, eds. K.Z. PINTER, I.M. ȚIPLIC, M.E. ȚIPLIC, Sibiu 2005, pp. 171–215; S. OȚA, *The Mortuary Archaeology of the Medieval Banat (10th–14th Centuries)*, [in:] *East Central and Eastern Europe in the Middle Ages*, vol. 26, ed. FL. CURTA, Brill, Leiden/Boston 2014, pp. 191–192, 345, Pl. 113; S. OȚA, A. ARDEȚ, D. NEGREI, *Medieval cemeteries from the territory of the present-day city of Caransebeș*, [in:] *Life and death in medieval and early modern times. Proceedings of the 5th International Scientific Conference*

The area of Caransebeș (Sebeș), as a part of the Severin Banate,⁷ was first mentioned in documents in 1233 after the wars between the Hungarians and Vlach-Bulgarians (1231–1232). Since its creation in 1233, the borders of the Severin Banate changed several times during the Middle Ages – the discussed territory was controlled either by the Hungarian Kingdom⁸ or the rulers from Wallachia – and in the 16th century its part became the Banate of Lugoj–Caransebeș.

Since the 10th century, a pre-state political formation ruled by Duke Glad had existed between the Mureș, Tisza, and Danube rivers west of the Southern Carpathian mountains.⁹ The early 11th century ruler Achtum came into conflict with King Stephen I of Hungary (1000–1038) when Achtum began expanding northwards to the Criș River.¹⁰ Following several battles, the territory of Achtum's political formation (but very probably only the plains area) was absorbed by the Kingdom of Hungary,¹¹ but the population remained mostly Vlach, especially in its eastern part, and over time received many privileges from the kings of Hungary¹² due to military services rendered in relation to the defence of the southern borders of the Kingdom against the Ottoman Empire.¹³

of Mediaeval Archaeology of the Institute of Archaeology, Zagreb, 6th and 7th June 2018, eds. S. KRZMAR, T.S. IVANČAN, J. BELAJ, T. TKALČEC, Zbornik Instituta za Arheologiju, Zagreb 2020, vol. 14, pp. 153–166 (154–157).

⁷ I would like to specify that what I shall hereinafter refer to the discussed region (covering parts of the present-day Romania, Serbia, and Hungary) as “Banat” – a name coined by the Austrians in the 18th century, as proposed by Eugene of Savoy (C. FENEȘAN, *Administrație și fiscalitate în Banatul Imperial 1716–1778*, Timișoara 1997, p. 16), to distinguish it from the names “Banat” or “Banate” referring to the geographical and historical region that changed its borders many times in the Middle Ages and in the early Modern Period.

⁸ M. HOLBAN, *Despre Țara Severinului și banatul de Severin în secolul al XIII-lea*, [in:] *Din cronica relațiilor româno-ungare în secolele XIII–XIV*, ed. M. HOLBAN, București 1981, pp. 49–89; V. ACHIM, *O formațiune medievală de graniță...*, pp. 174, 176.


⁹ I.A. POP, *Românii și maghiarii în secolele IX–XIV. Geneza statului medieval în Transilvania*, Bibliotheca Rerum Transilvaniae, vol. 10, Cluj–Napoca 1996, pp. 112–120.

¹⁰ A. MADGEARU, *Contribuții privind datarea conflictului dintre ducele bănățean Achtum și regele Ștefan I al Ungariei*, “Banatica” 1993, vol. 12, II, pp. 5–12.

¹¹ S. OȚA, *Particularități funerare în zona graniței sudice a Regatului Ungariei în epoca bizantină (secolele XI–XIII). Studiu de caz: sudul Banatului și Vojvodina*, [in:] *Arheologia mileniului I p. Chr., IV, Autohtoni și migratori în mileniul I p. Chr.*, ed. B. CIUPERCĂ, Brăila 2015, pp. 525–553.

¹² C. FENEȘAN, *Despre privilegiile Caransebeșului până la mijlocul secolului al XVI-lea*, “Banatica” 1973, vol. 2, pp. 157–163; A. MAGINA, *Reconfirmarea privilegiilor Caransebeșului în anul 1597*, “Revista Arhivelor” 2009, vol. 86, No. 1, pp. 100–105.

¹³ ȘT. PASCU, *Voievodatul Transilvaniei*, vol. 4, Cluj–Napoca 1989, pp. 40–62.



Pl. 1. Caransebeș town and the town's seal from the year 1503

At the same time, the hilly and mountainous eastern part of the discussed region belonged to the Vlach-Bulgarian Tsardom from 1186 until 1231–1232 (when the Banate of Severin was established), until its conquest by the Hungarian kingdom.¹⁴ For this reason, the material culture of the area remained of Byzantine and Balkan tradition (including, among other things, the Orthodox Church, customs, pottery, decorative art, the surviving Vlach legislation) for at least another four centuries.¹⁵



Until the 16th century, the area around modern-day Caransebeș is known to have been populated by Vlachs,¹⁶ and the city that emerged there was one of two cities in Hungary that belonged to the Vlach nobles.¹⁷

¹⁴ S. OȚA, *Elite locale și centre de putere în Banat (sfârșitul secolului al IX-lea-începutul secolului al XI-lea)*, "Acta Musei Porolissensis" 2016, vol. 38, p. 436.

¹⁵ The whole area was still known at that time as the *Cisalpine Wallachia*.

¹⁶ *Călători străini despre Țările Române*, eds. M. HOLBAN, M.M. ALEXANDRESCU-DERSCA BULGARU, P. CERNOVODEANU, vol. 3, București 1971, p. 78.


¹⁷ *Călători străini despre Țările Române*, eds. M. HOLBAN, M.M. ALEXANDRESCU-DERSCA BULGARU, P. CERNOVODEANU, vol. 2, București 1970, p. 557. For the list of noble families from Caransebeș in late middle ages *vide*: S. OȚA, A. ARDEȚ, D. NEGREI, *Medieval cemeteries...*, p. 153 and S. OȚA, A. ARDEȚ, D. NEGREI, *Archaeological research in the city of Caransebeș (2017 campaign)*.



PI. 2. 1. Cemeteries with Byzantine jewelleries from the Caransebeș town territory (capture Google Earth); 2/a-b, 3/a-d. bracelets from Caransebeș-Centru cemetery (according to Oța, Ardeț, Negrei 2020); 4. blue glass bracelet from Caransebeș-Măhala cemetery (according to Iaroslavschi 1975)



1



2

PI. 3. 1. Fragment from the fortification wall inside the medieval town;
2. the map of Caransebeș town from the 17th century (according to Groza 1993)



3

Pl. 3. 3. fragment of the street arranged in the middle of the 16th century

Almost without exception,¹⁸ available historical information is in agreement on this point, regardless of by whom it was written – monks (Antonio Possevino),¹⁹ soldiers (Giovan Andrea Gromo),²⁰ or politicians (G.P. Campani, Jesuit monk and politician,²¹ Ferrante Capecci,²² Franco Sivori²³), of various ethnicities, whether in the service of the Catholic Church, the Habsburg Monarchy, or the Ottoman Empire.

Preliminary observations, [in:] *Volume of the International Conference Politics and Society in the Central and South-Eastern Europe (13th–16th Centuries)*, (Timișoara, România, 25th–27th, October 2017), ed. Z. IUSZTIN, Cluj–Napoca 2019, pp. 12–13.

¹⁸ *Călători străini despre Țările Române*, eds. M.M. ALEXANDRESCU-DERSCA BULGARU, M.A. MEHMET, vol. 6, București 1976, p. 534.

¹⁹ *Călători străini...*, vol. 3, p. 121.

²⁰ *Călători străini...*; MARCUS KYNTSCH VON ZOBTEN, *Herzog Hans der Grausame von Sagan im Jahre 1488*, ed. A. STENZEL, *Scriptores Rerum Silesiacarum*, vol. 4, Breslau 1850, p. 321.

²¹ *Călători străini...*, vol. 3, pp. 76–77.

²² *Călători străini...*, vol. 3, pp. 91–94.

²³ *Ibidem*, pp. 1–5.

From available cartographic and documentary information (Pl. 3/2),²⁴ we know that initially there was probably a small fortress, around which the city developed, surrounded by walls (three rows) and defence towers (six). Around the fortifications of the city there were also suburbs with Orthodox²⁵ and Catholic churches,²⁶ and churches of various monastic orders²⁷ and orthodox priests.²⁸

At that time (in 1551–1552 – for two years), the area between the River Mureș, Tisza, Danube, and the Southern Carpathians was systematically destroyed by the Ottoman armies under the leadership of Pasha Mehmed Sokolu/Sokolević.²⁹ The area of the plain and the hills from the west of the Semenic Mountains became the newly established Timișoara's pashalik. In the 16th century, given the transformation of Hungary into a pashalik,³⁰ the area of Caransebeș together with a part of the former Severin Banate (now under the new name – the Lugoj-Caransebeș Banate) was taken over by the Transylvanian

²⁴ P. BONA, N. GUMĂ, L. GROZA, *Caransebeș. 700 de ani de atestare documentară. Contribuții monografice*, Caransebeș 1990, pp. 31, 32; L. GROZA, *Cetatea Caransebeș – Câteva precizări cronologice*, "Banatica" 1993, vol. 12, II, p. 91, Fig. 2.

²⁵ S. OȚA, A. ARDEȚ, D. NEGREI, *The medieval cemeteries from the territory...*, p. 158; A. GHIDU, I. BĂLAN, *Monografia orașului Caransebeș*, Caransebeș 1909, pp. 22, 23, 32–33, concerning the Vlach churches (St. John the Baptist and St. George) and a Serb church (1579; D.L. ȚIGĂU, *Familia nobililor Peica de Caransebeș în secolele XVI–XVII*, "Banatica" 2005, vol. 17, p. 326).

²⁶ A. GHIDU, I. BĂLAN, *Monografia orașului...*, pp. 91–93; D. ȚEICU, *Geografia ecleziastică a Banatului medieval*, Cluj–Napoca 2007, pp. 150–151.

²⁷ V. ACHIM, *Ordinul Franciscan în Țările Române în secolele XIV–XV. Aspecte teritoriale*, "Revista Istorică" 1996, vol. 7, nr. 5–6, pp. 398, 399, 400; R. POPA, *Caransebeș și districtul său românesc în secolele X–XIV*, "SCIV(A)" 1989, vol. 40, 4, pp. 353–370; R. LOVASZ, *Conventul franciscan din Caransebeș în lumina unor documente inedite de sec. XVIII (1)*, "Studii de istorie ecleziastică" 2018, vol. 1, pp. 39–58; C. FENEȘAN, *Franciscanii din Banatul de Munte la sfârșitul celei de-a doua jumătăți și la începutul celei de-a treia stăpâniri habsburgice (1695–1701, 1716–1738)*, "Banatica" 2013, vol. 23, pp. 649–679; D. ȚEICU, *Geografia ecleziastică a Banatului...*, p. 151 (about Calvinist); A. GHIDU, I. BĂLAN, *Monografia orașului...*, pp. 93–94; for Protestants *vide: ibidem*, p. 94; for Jesuits *vide: ibidem*, p. 94, 95; A. MAGINA, *Legislație și toleranță. Statutul juridic al catolicilor din Caransebeș în prima jumătate a secolului al XVII-lea*, [in:] *Istoria culturii. Cultura istoriei. Omagiu profesorului Doru Radosav la 60 de ani*, eds. I. COSTEA, O. GHITTA, V. ORGA, I. POP, Cluj–Napoca 2010, p. 109 and P. BONA, *Biserica medievală...*, p. 27; S. OȚA, *Identificarea necropolelor și bisericilor medievale și moderne din orașul Caransebeș (secolele XI–XVIII)*, Sibiu [in print].

²⁸ *Călători străini...*, vol. 3, p. 120.

²⁹ CR. FENEȘAN, *Constituirea Principatului autonom Transilvaniei*, București 1997, pp. 147–151.

³⁰ D.L. ȚIGĂU, *Banii de Caransebeș și Lugoj. Considerații asupra atribuțiilor și competențelor acestora (II)*, "Studii și Materiale de Istorie Medievală" 1999, vol. 17, p. 243.

Principality (until 1658),³¹ and later for 30 years constituted a part of the Timișoara Pashalik administered by the Ottoman Empire.³²

After 1688³³ Caransebeș came under the Austrian rule until 1696,³⁴ when it was regained by the Turks until 1718 when it was transferred to the Austrians³⁵ under the peace treaty signed in Požarevac (Passarowitz) between the Ottoman and the Habsburg empires).³⁶ It should be noted that according to the Požarevac peace terms, the fortifications of the city were to be completely destroyed;³⁷ however, the demolition was neither immediately nor completely carried out.³⁸

The plans of the city, although late (the oldest is most likely from the time of the Ottoman presence in the area), provide us with an idea of its size and shape from the previous period, at least from the 16th century. The city had an almost rectangular shape and was surrounded by external defensive walls with six towers (one of which was semicircular). A road ran through the city from the north, where the Transylvania gate was, to the south, where the Orșova gate was. The street passed near the small round fortress located in the centre of the town (Pl. 3/1–2), with another shorter road connecting the main street with the inner fortress, leading into its centre on a 30-step staircase.³⁹ After the occupation of the city by the Austrians, the entire Caransebeș fortress was

³¹ C. FENEȘAN, *Despre privilegiile Caransebeșului pînă la mijlocul secolului al XVI-lea*, "Banatica" 1973, vol. 2, p. 160; L. BOLDEA, *O familie nobilă română a Banatului Montan în Epoca principatului: Mătnicenii de Ohaba-Mătnic*, [in:] *Itinerarii istoriografice. Studii în onoarea istoricului Costin Feneșan*, eds. D. ȚEICU, R. GRĂF, Cluj–Napoca 2011, p. 267.

³² C. FENEȘAN, *Despre privilegiile Caransebeșului...*, p. 160; V.V. MUNTEAN, *Contribuții la istoria Banatului, Timișoara*, 1990, p. 112; C. FENEȘAN 1993, *Viața cotidiană la botarul osmano-transilvănean în secolul al XVII-lea – câteva documente inedite*, "Banatica" 1990, vol. 12, II, p. 78; D.L. ȚIGĂU, *Banii de Caransebeș și Lugoj. Considerații asupra atribuțiilor și competențelor acestora (I)*, "Studii și Materiale de Istorie Medievală" 1998, vol. 16, p. 227; C. FENEȘAN, *Diplomatarium Banaticum*, vol. 1, Cluj–Napoca 2016, p. 9.

³³ L. GROZA, *Cetatea Caransebeș...*, p. 92.

³⁴ An Austrian coin, issued in 1696, was found on the construction level of a building from the fortified town. Excavations from 2019.

³⁵ P. BONA, N. GUMĂ, L. GROZA, *Caransebeș. 700 de ani de atestare documentară...*, p. 52.

³⁶ C. FENEȘAN, *Administrație și fiscalitate...*, pp.14–15.

³⁷ L. GROZA, *Cetatea Caransebeș...*, p. 97.

³⁸ Between the years 1699 (the treaty of Karlowitz) and 1718 (the treaty of Passarowitz) there were various provisions in peace treaties for the destruction of the Caransebeș fortress.

³⁹ *Călători străini...*, vol. 6, pp. 534–535, 690–691.

completely rebuilt and reorganized (Pl. 8/1, 4),⁴⁰ acquiring the appearance of an Italian-type fortress. However, the reconstruction works seem to have never been fully completed due to the short time (1688–1696, and after 1718 the situation was unclear, because the problem of demolishing the fortifications was raised).⁴¹

Systematic archaeological research in the city began in 2017 at the initiative of the National Museum of Romanian History.⁴² As much of the fortified city is covered by modern houses, research excavations were necessarily limited to the central western part of the medieval city, west of the small inner fortification.

The archaeological research and the field survey have revealed several important aspects. First of all, the research team found the main road indicated by the earliest surviving map of the city from during the Ottoman presence in Caransebeș (Pl. 3/3, Pl. 4/1–6).⁴³ This road was most likely created in 1552, when the Italian architect Alessandro Cavalini da Urbino⁴⁴ was sent to the city

⁴⁰ GH. SEBESTYEN, *Unele cetăți ale Banatului și desenele lui L.F. Marsigli*, "Revista Muzeelor și Monumentelor. Monumente istorice și de Artă" 1984, vol. 15, 1, pp. 41–44; L. GROZA, *Cetatea Caransebeș...*, pp. 89–99.

⁴¹ It can be noticed in the archaeological research carried out in the years 2017, 2018, and 2019 and the field survey that showed that the restoration works remained unfinished by the Austrians (for example, the Author's team found a ravelin only in the eastern part of the city). Moreover, the Josephine maps show that the fortress was demolished and the area was subsequently occupied by private houses and land after the middle of 18th century.

⁴² The research was carried out by a team composed of Silviu Oța (MNIR), Adrian Ardeș and Dimitrie Negrei (MJERG Caransebeș), in 2017, 2018 and 2019. S. OȚA, A. ARDEȘ, D. NEGREI, 7. *Caransebeș, jud. Caraș-Severin*, [in:] *Cronica Cercetărilor Arheologice din România, Campania 2017, A LII-a Sesiune Națională de Rapoarte Arheologice, Cluj-Napoca, 15–17 noiembrie*, eds. F. MATEI-POPESCU, I.C. OPRÎȘ, O. ȚENȚEA, București 2018b, pp. 23–24; S. OȚA, A. ARDEȘ, D. NEGREI, 11. *Caransebeș, jud. Caraș-Severin, Cronica Cercetărilor Arheologice din România, Campania 2018, A LIII-a Sesiune Națională de Rapoarte Arheologice, Sibiu, 13–15 septembrie*, eds. I.C. OPRÎȘ, O. ȚENȚEA, București 2019, pp. 34–35; S. OȚA, A. ARDEȘ, D. NEGREI, 12. *Caransebeș, jud. Caraș-Severin, Cronica Cercetărilor Arheologice din România, Campania 2018, A LIV-a Sesiune Națională de Rapoarte Arheologice, Buzău, 25–27 noiembrie 2020*, eds. I. CÂNDEA, V. COTIUGĂ, F. DRAȘOVEAN, I.C. OPRÎȘ, M. ȚIPLIC, București 2020, p. 69.

⁴³ S. OȚA, *O stradă din Caransebeșul medieval (secolele XVI–XVII). Primele cercetări arheologice*, [in:] *Miscellanea Historica et Archaeologica in honorem Professoris Ionel Căndea septuagenarii*, ed. C. CROITORU, București–Brăila 2019, pp. 277–292. The map is not currently dated, but two mosques can be seen on it. This means that it was most likely made between 1658 and 1968.

⁴⁴ D.L. ȚIGĂU, *Banii de Caransebeș și Lugoj. Considerații... (I)*, p. 235; *Călători străini despre Țările Române*, ed. M. HOLBAN, M.M. ALEXANDRESCU-DERSCA BULGARU, P. CERNOVODEANU, vol. 2, București 1970, p. 317.

from Sibiu by the imperial general Gian Battista Castaldo to strengthen the city against the Ottoman threat. This road was paved with stone, had a sidewalk to the west, and a ditch for draining water (Pl. 4/2). The houses of the city dwellers lined the western side.⁴⁵

Blacksmith workshops⁴⁶ and probably a pharmacy⁴⁷ or a spice shop have been identified nearby. From this area were recovered a scale weight (Pl. 6/7), a porcelain cup (possibly of a Chinese origin, Pl. 5/2),⁴⁸ fragments of small ceramic jars (Pl. 5/3, 4, 9, 10), two arrowheads (Pl. 6/4), and various ceramic fragments and fragments of tiles. A fragment of an exploded 17th-century grenade (Pl. 6/5) was also found in front of where a house once used to stand. After the said house (possibly from the second half of the 17th c., pre- 1688, dating yet to be confirmed) was demolished, its remains (probably with all the artefacts mixed up with the rubble from its destruction) were thrown on the surface of a disused medieval street (which was in use until 1688) to be levelled by the Austrians during the redevelopment of the fortress.

In the blacksmith workshops more installations were identified (Pl. 7/3; Pl. 7/4), with several hearths and fireplaces, indicating different types of iron processing/smelting performed at the said site, proof that the area had been used for this activity since at least the fourteenth century. The research excavations were carried out to a depth of almost two meters (Pl. 7/3), and in almost every level fragments of cast iron in different quantities were found (Pl. 7/1–2).

To the north of the small inner fortress there was a mosque⁴⁹ which most likely had been a Christian church that was later transformed. Similarly, outside the city walls there was another structure, probably originally a Christian church, then transformed into a mosque, and later reverted back into a church.⁵⁰

⁴⁵ S. OȚA, *O stradă în Caransebeșul medieval...*, p. 281.

⁴⁶ The archaeological research carried out during the 2017–2019 campaigns has shown the existence of blacksmith workshops located west of the road that crossed the Caransebeș fortress from north to south. These were identified on most ground levels, from the 14th–18th century. The archaeological material is currently being processed at the National Museum of Romanian History.

⁴⁷ S. OȚA, A. ARDEȚ, D. NEGREI, *Cercetări arheologice în orașul medieval fortificat Caransebeș, campaniile 2017–2019 (observații preliminare)*, “Tibiscvm” 2019, vol. 9, p. 133.


⁴⁸ N. DINU, *Ceramica de import*, [in:] *Timișoara în amurgul Evului mediu. Rezultatele cercetărilor arheologice preventive din centrul istoric*, ed. F. DRAȘOVEAN, Timișoara 2007, p. 139, Fig. 84, p. 140, Fig. 85, p. 141.

⁴⁹ The presence of a mosque can be seen on the oldest map of the city. L. GROZA, *Cetatea Caransebeș...*, p. 91, Fig. 2.

⁵⁰ FR. PESTY, *A Szörényi bánság és Szörény vármegye története*, vol. 2, Budapest 1878, p. 211; L. GROZA 1993, *Cetatea Caransebeș...*, p. 93.



Street (detail), S. 1/2017, middle of 16th Century (1551?), width 4,80 m



Channel, S. 1/2017



Cass. 2/2019

Pl. 4. 1-3. Stone sidewalk from the middle of the 16th century (1551?)



Cass. 1/2019



Cass. 1/2018



Cass. 2/2017

Pl. 4. 4–6. Stone sidewalk from the middle of the 16th century (1551?)



Pl. 5. 1. Fragments of a glass rod; 2. Chinese cup; 3, 4, 9, 10. fragments from small recipes; 5–6. serrated blades from clasp-knives; 7–8. footwear heel fittings; 11/a-b. Polish coin issued in 1627, during the reign of Sigismund III Vasa (1587–1632)

None of these structures – blacksmith workshops or places of worship – are currently preserved. In the small fortress where the commander of the Ottoman garrison resided during 1658–1688, a church functioned, which was most likely either destroyed or converted into a military or civil building. Remains of the foundation are still preserved on the surface of the ground, and outside the small fortress were found remains of human skeletons⁵¹ and one Polish coin (Pl. 5/11a-b) issued in 1627 during the reign of Sigismund III Vasa (1587–1632).⁵²

The buildings along the road were demolished by the Austrians during the redevelopment of Caransebeș in 1688–1696, as the medieval fortified town was outdated and not fit for military purposes of the 17th-century army. Caransebeș residents were partially relocated to the suburbs and most of the historic structures destroyed to create a modern Italian-style fortification. However, the Austrians preserved the main road itself (at least part of it was disused and was no longer visible after 1688), over which they scattered rubble from the demolished houses, in order to create a straight base to arrange the various necessary buildings, most probably the garrison.⁵³ The plan proposed by General Friedrich von Veterani (Pl. 8/2, 3) led to the change in the location of the place of access to the Transylvania gate. The place of access was moved a few meters to the west, where a ravelin was also built.⁵⁴ The old road, which came from the north, from outside the city, and which led to the medieval gate, was abandoned. Another one was arranged further west, outside the walls, which bypassed the newly built ravelin and led to the gate tower of the old fortress (Pl. 8/4). The old gate tower, namely the medieval one, was preserved (if we consider the Austrian maps), but its importance was considerably diminished (Pl. 8/4).⁵⁵


⁵¹ S. OȚA, A. ARDEȚ, D. NEGREI, *Cercetări arheologice în orașul medieval...*, pp. 132, 138, Pl. 4/5.a, 5.b.

⁵² Thank you to our colleague Tudor Martin for identifying the coin.

⁵³ When we compare the earliest surviving map of the city, probably from 1655–1688 (because we have two mosques represented on it) with maps from the end of the 17th century (after 1690 or later), it can be seen that the city underwent major changes both in terms of the defence walls and in terms of organization of the interior buildings.

⁵⁴ S. OȚA, A. ARDEȚ, D. NEGREI, *Archaeological research in the fortification of Caransebeș*, presentation held at International Conference *Relații Interetnice în Transilvania. Patrimoniul medieval și istoria Europei centrale și sud-estice*, Sibiu, 18th–21st October 2018; S. OȚA, A. ARDEȚ, *Câteva date asupra fortificațiilor de la Caransebeș*, presentation held at International Conference *Pontica, Ediția 52: Istorie și Arheologie în Spațiul Vest-Pontic*, Constanța, 2nd–4th October 2019.


⁵⁵ This is due to the change of the route of the road that reached the fortress from the north. Near the fortified city, it had a changed route and was bifurcated, thus having a new route to the west bypassing the ravelin, then passing behind it and returning to the old entrance. The old road led directly to this tower.



Pl. 6. 1. Silver plate (?); 2-3. nails



Pl. 6. 4. arrowhead; 5. fragment of grenade; 6. buckle; 7. weight; 8. Jew's harp




Pl. 7. 1. Iron fragments; 2. scoria/dross fragments



Pl. 7. 3. Cass. (trench) 2/2017, western profile;
4. fireplace (I and II) with iron fragments from S. 2/2018



the old medieval tower



the new road from the west of ravelin



ravelin fragment



Pl. 8. 1. The new road from the end of 17th Century (according to Olimpia Onci, https://issuu.com/piaonci/docs/podrumul_lui_homolka; access: 16 V 2019); 2. the general Friedrich von Veterani; 3. map of Caransebeș (1690 or 1710, according to Olimpia Onci, https://issuu.com/piaonci/docs/podrumul_lui_homolka; access: 16 V 2019); 4. ravelin fragment near fortification wall (No. 3); 5. reconstruction plan proposed by general Friedrich von Veterani (1689)

The new road providing access to Transylvania gate and few fragments from the walls from north and a fragment of a stone ravelin are presently the only parts of the whole fortress observable on the surface of the ground. Some remnants of earthen ravelins were discovered on the eastern side of the fortified town. The ravelin from north (Pl. 8/5) was connected with the fortress with a footbridge, while another road paved with stone was arranged below it, Pl. 8/1, passing by the old northern precincts of the city and leading to the Transylvania gate.

Weapons and artillery items mentioned in documents from the 16th–17th centuries were used for defence, including various types of cannons and firearms. Two such cannons are still preserved in one of the existing houses, built into the wall as a protection of the gate pillars against possible accidents caused by the entry of carts in the yard.

We can say that from the middle of the 16th century to the beginning of the 18th century, the city was undergoing continuous urban and administrative transformation, which culminated with the almost total destruction of the medieval fortress, and later with the destruction of the Italian-type fortress.

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ARMS AND ARMOUR OF KRAKÓW GUILDS IN LIGHT OF THE 1683 REGISTER

Summary. The question of the armament of city arsenals in early modern Poland has so far been overlooked by researchers. The issues of defence architecture, sieges, and occupation have been discussed much more often. Meanwhile, it should be remembered that from the Middle Ages to the end of the existence of the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth, city militias, mostly composed of guilds, played a fundamental role in city defence. Therefore, both the training and arming of city militias was very important, as proven by the defence of Kraków during the Habsburg siege in 1587 and later during the Swedish siege in 1655.

The mid-17th century marked the beginning of the decline of this thriving royal city. Looted and destroyed during the two-year Swedish occupation in 1655-1657, it needed time to rebuild its defence system. The Sejm constitutions of 1658 and 1659 referred to this, but it was not until 1670 that a commission, chaired by Bishop Andrzej Trzebicki, met on this matter.

Another external threat soon appeared, this time from Turkey. In 1683, the possibility of a siege of Kraków by Ottoman troops or their vassals was seriously considered. The solution was the alliance of the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth with Austria, which, among other things, assumed mutual assistance in the event of a siege of either capital - Vienna or Kraków.

When the Turkish army launched a siege of the Austrian capital on July 14, 1683, elected councillors in Kraków inspected their own city's defences. As a result of the undertaken inspection, the *Revisia Baszt w Krakowie* (*The Review of Towers in Kraków*) (Ms 423, p. 6, 25-34, held in The Scientific Library of the PAAS and the PAS in Kraków) was written, which, apart from the description of the state of preservation of the fortifications, contains a previously unpublished register of weapons for individual guilds. This source allows us to largely know the combat readiness of the then-defenders of Kraków. The inventory presented shows a serious armament shortage that could have sufficed for fewer than 500 people.

Keywords: Kraków, arms and armour, city defence, early modern history, the Ottoman threat

City arsenals in Poland during the Middle Ages are better known¹ than those of the early modern period.² Until now, researchers of military history from the 16th to the 18th century have dealt mainly with issues of fortifications,³ ignoring the subject of arming municipal troops. Marek Wagner has recently drawn attention to this problem, describing the state of research on military history in the times of Jan III Sobieski.⁴ The problem, of course, does not concern only that particular period, but the entire 17th century – or even more broadly, the early modern period in general.

¹ J. SZYMCZAK, *Zasoby uzbrojenia*, [in:] *Uzbrojenie w Polsce średniowiecznej 1450–1500*, ed. A. NOWAKOWSKI, Toruń 2003, pp. 292–306; IDEM, *Zasoby uzbrojenia*, [in:] *Uzbrojenie w Polsce średniowiecznej 1350–1450*, ed. A. NADOLSKI, Łódź 1990, pp. 383–411; M. GŁOSEK, *Średniowieczne uzbrojenie plebejskie w świetle odkryć archeologicznych, źródeł ikonograficznych i pisanych na ziemiach polskich*, “Acta Universitatis Lodziensis. Folia Archeologica” 2004, vol. 24, pp. 237–247; Z. WILK-WOŚ, *Broń i oporządzenie jeździeckie w inwentarzach mieszczan krakowskich z drugiej połowy XV wieku*, “Acta Universitatis Lodziensis. Folia Historica” 2001, vol. 72, pp. 63–81; S. FIRSZT, *Uzbrojenie oddziałów miejskich w średniowieczu na przykładzie miast śląskich*, “Archaeologia Historica Polona” 1998, vol. 7, pp. 181–196.

² An interesting example of urban armament from the end of the Middle Ages and the Renaissance on the example of the border, Hungarian Bardejov *vide*: T. GRABARCZYK, *Uzbrojenie mieszczan bardiowskich w świetle spisów z lat 1493, 1521 i 1536*, “Archaeologia Historica” 2007, vol. 32, pp. 465–475; on the participation of cities in military undertakings in Poland *vide*: M. MIKUŁA, *Obowiązki wojskowe miast w przywilejach Jagiellonów*, [in:] *Verus amicus rara avis est. Studia poświęcone pamięci Wojciecha Organiściaka*, ed. A. LITYŃSKI *et al.*, Katowice 2020, pp. 594–602; J. T. KAŁUŻNY, *Miejskie wozy wojenne z ziem łęczyckiej i sieradzkiej w składzie armii Królestwa Polskiego w XVI–XVII wieku*, “Acta Universitatis Lodziensis. Folia Historica” 2017, vol. 99, pp. 125–147.

³ For the 17th century *vide*: B. DYBAŚ, *Fortece Rzeczypospolitej. Studium z dziejów budowy fortyfikacji stałych w państwie polsko-litewskim w XVII wieku*, Toruń 2018; IDEM, *Miasto jako twierdza: garnizon w miastach Rzeczypospolitej polsko-litewskiej w XVII wieku*, “Czasy Nowożytne” 2002, vol. 13, pp. 125–135; Z. PILARCZYK, *Fortyfikacje na ziemiach koronnych Rzeczypospolitej w XVII wieku*, Poznań 1997; IDEM, *Obronność Poznania w latach 1253–1793*, Warszawa 1988 [on armament, *vide*: pp. 230–233].

⁴ M. WAGNER, *Perspektywy badań historyczno-wojskowych czasów Jana III Sobieskiego*, “Zeszyty Naukowe Uniwersytetu Jagiellońskiego” Prace Historyczne, 146, 2019, No. 2, p. 467. Similarly to the issue of military garrisons, the issue of the functioning of arsenals (royal, municipal, private) also did not find much interest among the historians of Sobieski’s time. The achievements of researchers in relation to the history of cekhauzes and magnate armories are much better presented.

The situation is similar in the case of research in relation to the history of Kraków. So far, defence architecture,⁵ sieges,⁶ and the occupations of the city⁷ are the topics that have mainly been discussed, and there is little research about the organization of defence itself⁸ and even less about weapons, and if at all, only in the context of production⁹ rather than city arsenals.¹⁰ It should be remembered that the defence of the city walls, not only in the Middle Ages but also in early modern times, rested primarily on the municipal guilds. These guilds were entrusted with specific fragments of walls, gates, and towers, the names of which usually indicated specific guilds. Therefore, both the training and

⁵ H. ROJKOWSKA, W. NIEWALDA, *Mury obronne Krakowa do czasu ich wyburzenia*, [in:] *Kraków. Nowe studia nad rozwojem miasta*, ed. J. WYROZUMSKI, Kraków 2007, pp. 493–527 [there is a summary of previous research].

⁶ J. STOLICKI, *Oblężenie Krakowa przez Jerzego Lubomirskiego w latach 1656–1657*, “Studia i Materiały do Historii Wojskowości” 2003, vol. 40, pp. 87–117; T.M. NOWAK, *Operacja krakowska króla Karola X Gustawa 17 IX–10 X 1655 r.*, [in:] *Wojna polsko-szwedzka 1655–1660*, ed. J. WIMMER, Warszawa 1973, pp. 207–258; IDEM, *Obrona Krakowa przez Stefana Czarnieckiego w roku 1655*, “Studia i Materiały do Historii Wojskowości” 1963, vol. 9/1, pp. 59–124; K. LEPSZY, *Oblężenie Krakowa przez arcyksięcia Maksymiliana (1587)*, Kraków 1929.

⁷ J. ZINKIEWICZ, *Attitudes of the inhabitants of Kraków towards the Swedish occupation of the city in the years 1655–1657* [in print]; A. HARATYM, *Kraków z miastami Kazimierzem i Kleparzem oraz przedmieściami i najbliższą okolicą*, [in:] M. NAGIELSKI et al., *Zniszczenia szwedzkie na terenach Korony w okresie potopu 1655–1660*, Warszawa 2015, pp. 325–373; H. LANDBERG, *Finansowanie wojny i zaopatrywanie garnizonów. Szwedzki zarząd okupacyjny w Krakowie i Toruniu podczas wojny polskiej Karola X Gustawa*, “Studia i Materiały do Historii Wojskowości” 1973, vol. 19/2, pp. 171–216; L. SIKORA, *Szwedzi i Siedmiogrodzianie w Krakowie od 1655 do 1657 roku*, Kraków 1908.

⁸ J. DOBRZYCKI, *Dawne warownie Krakowa*, Kraków 1956; J. PACHOŃSKI, *Dawne mury floriańskie. Zarys historyczny fortyfikacji i organizacji obrony miasta oraz przewodnik po wystawie “Dawne warownie Krakowa”*, Kraków 1956; J. MUCZKOWSKI, *Dawne warownie krakowskie*, “Rocznik Krakowski” 1911, vol. 13, pp. 1–48.

⁹ A. BOLDYREW, *Produkcja i koszty uzbrojenia w Polsce XVI wieku*, Warszawa 2005, *passim*; A. SWARYCZEWSKI, *Płatnerze krakowscy*, Warszawa–Kraków 1987; IDEM, *Granat – sztuka mistrzowska stradomskiego cechu mieczników*, “Studia do Dziejów Dawnego Uzbrojenia i Ubioru Wojskowego” 1982, vol. 8, pp. 35–48; F. KIRYK, *Cechowe rzemiosło metalowe. Zarys dziejów do 1939 r.*, Warszawa 1972, *passim*; Z. BOCHEŃSKI, *Krakowski cech mieczników*, Kraków 1937; IDEM, *Uwagi o płatnerzach krakowskich*, “Broń i Barwa” 1937, vol. 4/3, pp. 49–54.

¹⁰ The guild armament according to the revision of the Kraków gates and towers from 1606 and 1626 was exceptionally noted by M. TOBIASZ (*Fortyfikacje dawnego Krakowa*, Kraków 1973); on artillery *vide*: T. NOWAK, *Polska technika wojenna XVI–XVIII w.*, Warszawa 1970, pp. 228–236.

arming of the city militia was very important, as evidenced by the defence of the city during the first Habsburg siege in 1587, and then the Swedish siege in 1655.

The location of Kraków near the southern border of the country and its distinction as the capital city (formally until the end of the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth) was significant in the perspective of external threats. The northern part of the walls was most vulnerable to attack. The remaining sides were largely protected by natural defences (the river, watercourses, wetlands, and ponds). Therefore, the northern part of the fortifications especially was expanded from time to time to strengthen it. At the end of the 15th century, the Barbican was built in the face of the looming Turkish threat. During the next two centuries, the city's fortifications were tested twice by enemy attacks. In the meantime, there have been recurring calls to repair and modernise the defence system.

The mid-17th century marked the beginning of the decline of this thriving royal city. Looted and destroyed during the Swedish occupation (1655–1657), and depopulated as a result of the plague (1651–1652 and 1677–1680), it needed time to rebuild the defence system. The parliamentary constitutions of 1658 and 1659 refer to the repair of the city's defences.¹¹ However, it was not until 1670 that a commission, chaired by Bishop Andrzej Trzebicki, met on the matter.¹²

In the meantime, another external danger appeared. In 1682, war with the Ottoman Empire seemed imminent, but there was uncertainty as to the direction of the Turkish attack. Alarming news came from Hungary that Imre Thököly had surrendered to Turkish protection; in nearby Slovakia, Hungarian insurgents took over Košice and allied Turkish troops murdered the local crew, survivors fleeing as far as Kraków. Later, Thököly's troops invaded the area of Spisz (Spiš), which belonged to Poland.¹³ Jan III Sobieski wrote about the real threat to Kraków in November 1682 in the instructions for the pre-Sejm sejmiks (the Sejm itself was planned for January 23, 1683).¹⁴ In December, he went to

¹¹ *Volumina Legum*, ed. J. OHRYZKO, vol. 4, Petersburg 1860, pp. 256 [1658], 289 [1659].

¹² The Scientific Library of the PAAS and the PAS in Kraków (hereinafter: B. PAU and PAN), MS 423, c. 1–5.

¹³ J. WIMMER, *Wiedeń 1683. Dzieje kampanii i bitwy*, Warszawa 1983, p. 129.

¹⁴ "Sąsiedzką od Krakowa rewolucją, która quo proximior, eo nocentior. Już tamtemu Państwu to supremum zostawa, ut videat, cum qua gente cadat; iuż pod inszym panem żyjąc oczekiwania fati sui legem, rychło ten nowy pan barzo na tę resztę Węgier przydusi. Dłaczego JoKrMć wszystkim umiłowaniem królewskim zalecać raczy stolic Chrześcianańskich Panów y Monarchów aemulam urbem Kraków, który, gdy widzi proxime ardentem, obrony y ostrożności iako nymocniejszey potrzebuie;

Lviv to inspect the fortifications there. The king ordered their construction to be completed, which he himself supervised for some time.¹⁵ Meanwhile, the fortification of Kraków was undertaken by bishop Jan Małachowski, probably with some support of the clergy.¹⁶

On March 17, 1683, the Turkish Çavuş arrived in Warsaw. However, he was refused an audience with the king, and Stanisław Jabłonowski, voivode of Ruthenia, received him instead. The Turkish envoy demanded that Tatar troops be transferred to Silesia *et reliquas Germaniae partes* through the territory of the Republic of Poland, and that all outstanding “gifts” be paid to the khan. If the Poles did not agree to the conditions, the messenger threatened that part of the Turkish army would march to Vienna, and the other part, together with Imre Thököly’s Hungarians, would attack Poland from Podolia. The legation was considered an intelligence operation, and therefore the Çavuş was detained and imprisoned.¹⁷

When in the spring of 1683 the Sublime Porte was preparing very intensively for the troops to march out, fears of an attack on Kraków were still growing in Poland, as expressed in the Sejm script *ad archivum* of April 17, writing about an enemy who “is again trying to wrest Poland from Kraków” (*znowu się Polskę woiować od Krakowa zabiera*).¹⁸ The answer was the alliance with Austria concluded on April 1 (backdated to March 31 due to April Fool’s Day) of 1683, which, among other things, assumed mutual assistance in the event of a siege of either of the capitals – Vienna or Kraków.¹⁹ At the end of April, the king

którego miasta, iako powszechny curie wszystkich Stanow Rzptey JoKrMć, tak peculiari affectui y respectui Wdztwa Krakowskiego intumuie. In capite Instructiey swoiey podawać y to raczy JoKrMć pod najwyższą uwagę donosząc, iako całemu Chrześcijaństwu portentosus nieprzyjaciel znowu na woynę arma virosque parat, bez tego przygotowaną przez pięć lat potęgą dawno podeyrzany. Kiedy ogłoszone w Adrianopolu primi capitatis tamtego państwa zimowanie, et vicariae potestatis iego w Belgradzie, w Węgrzech; jakież insze te wiadomości inducere consequentie mogą, tylko żałosne, aby z iednej a Taurica Chersoneso et Pontu Euxino, od Wołoch y Kamieńca, a potem z drugiej strony od Węgier vallata armis et periculis miła Oyczyzna, okrażona od nieprzyjaciół, potęgi rozerwaney curam, et belli brała przed się medicamenta”. *Akta do dziejów króla Jana III-go sprawy roku 1683, a osobliwie wyprawy wiedeńskiej wyjaśniające*, ed. F. KLUCZYCKI, Kraków 1883, pp. 6–7; according to JAN WIMMER (*op. cit.*, p. 132) – Sobieski did not treat the Turkish threat as a propaganda bogeyman, but a real perspective.

¹⁵ K. KONARSKI, *Polska przed odsieczą wiedeńską r. 1683*, Warszawa 1914, p. 203.

¹⁶ *Akta do dziejów króla Jana III-go sprawy roku 1683*, p. 90.

¹⁷ K. KONARSKI, *op. cit.*, p. 199.

¹⁸ *Akta do dziejów króla Jana III-go sprawy roku 1683*, p. 80; K. KONARSKI, *op. cit.*, p. 200.

¹⁹ *Akta do dziejów króla Jana III-go sprawy roku 1683*, p. 68.

wrote to the city authorities to be careful when letting strangers into the city.²⁰ Meanwhile, foreign correspondents spread contradictory information about the intentions of the Turks.²¹

Taking into account every possible scenario, specific preparations had to be made to repel the attack. On April 24th, the city council ordered the appointed commission to carry out an inventory of weapons belonging to the Kraków guilds and to inspect the towers. All weapons stored in the houses of the guild members were to be delivered to the walls.²² The aforementioned bishop of Kraków, Jan Małachowski, in addition to restoring the fortifications, declared he would send a crew of 600 soldiers to defend the city, recruited from peasants from his estates.²³

A month later, the king informed the inhabitants of Kraków that he entrusted the castellan of Vilnius and general-lieutenant of the crown forces, Ernest Denhoff, with the command of the city. A regiment of the royal guard was to accompany Denhoff to Kraków;²⁴ this regiment later went with the royal army to Vienna.

²⁰ K. KONARSKI, *op. cit.*, p. 203.

²¹ Cf. J. WIMMER, *op. cit.*, p. 150; K. KONARSKI, *op. cit.*, p. 198.

²² "Senatus consultum de armis contuberniorum consignandis (...) Iidem cupiendo bonum ordinem constituere, conuocatis omnibus senioribus contuberniorum, diligentem sclopetorum et bombardarum variarum, ad propugnacula ciuitatis spectantium, faciendo animaduersionem et indagationem, serio iisdem, quatenus omnes ad sua contubernia die crastina conueniant ibidemque arma, qualiacumque ad communem ciuitatis defensam habent, diligenter conscribant, vtpote, wiele w którym, cechu hakownic, smigownic, zbroi, muszkietów, halabard, prochów, ac eorum conscripta registra spectabili magistratui porrigant; qui autem suprascriptum apparatus bellicum, ad contubernium spectantem, in domibus suis tenent, vt eundem sine mora ad lapideas contubernas comportare faciant, serio et sub paenis iniunxerunt, reuisionemque turrium nobilibus et spectabilibus dd. Zacherla et Druzynski collegis suis commiserunt faciendam", *Prawa, przywileje i statuta miasta Krakowa (1507–1795)*, vol. 2: *1587–1696*, part 1, ed. F. PIEKOSIŃSKI, Kraków 1890, p. 537.

²³ J. WIMMER, *op. cit.*, p. 159.

²⁴ The king wrote to the councilors: "Po szczęśliwie skończonym seymie biorąc w osobliwą consideratią nasze caley rzeczypospolitey bezpieczenstwo, które w opatrzaniu stołecznego miasta naszego Krakowa zostaie, kiedy w tak bliskim sąsiedztwie zbliża się cum hostilitate do panstw węgierskich metuenda y naszemu pograniczowi tak straszna ab oriente potentia, ex consilio pp. Rad przy boku naszym zostawiających, na commendę miasta Krakowa wielmożnego kasztelana wilńskiego, generalleytnanta woysk naszych cudzoziemskich cum plena potestate et praerogatiua commendantom fortec służących, z regimentem gwardiey naszej do tamtey ordinuiemy fortece: którego ordinansu aby wszelaka od Wiern. WW. tak do poprawy fortificatyei, naznaczenia porządnego (s) consistentiey gwardizonowi iako y opatrzania porządnego mieysca tamtego była assistentia, od pospółstwa zas wszelakie

On July 6, the city council issued a resolution *de munitionibus urbis inspiciendis reficiendisue ac armis instructendis*. Once again, a commission was appointed from among its members to check the city's combat readiness.²⁵ As a result of the undertaken inspection, the "Revisia Baszt w Krakowie" ("The Review of Towers in Kraków") was written, which, apart from the description of the state of preservation of the fortifications, contains a previously unpublished register of armaments of individual guilds. This source largely allows us to know the combat readiness of Kraków's defenders a quarter of a century after the devastation of the Swedish "Deluge" and in the face of the war with Turkey. While this revision was underway, on July 14th, 1683, the powerful Ottoman army laid siege to Vienna.

So what was the armament of the Kraków guilds like at that time? According to the revision, it was located in 26 out of the 47 towers²⁶ and belonged to the arsenals of 25 craftsmen, merchants, and barterers' guilds.²⁷

Western part of the walls:

Baszta Murarzy – Stonemasons' Tower: 4 hackbuts, a crossbow;²⁸

Baszta Rymarzy, Kotlarzy i Szychterzy (Ślusarzy) – Saddlers', Boilers', Locksmiths' Tower: 3 hackbuts and 4 cannons, including 2 smaller ones

posluszenstwo, władzą naszą królewską roskazuujemy, znosząc się iednak in ocurrentiis z wielmożnym kanclerzem koronnym, starostą naszym krakowskim", *Prawa, przywileje i statuta...*, p. 539.

²⁵ "Nobiles et spectabiles domini praeconsul et consules ciuitatis Cracouiae, per schaedulas eo in negotio conuocati et congregati existentes, consultando ex parte fortificationis ciuitatis, ut ea quam diligenter per laborantes circa fossionem vallorum expediatur, pro attendentia e medio sui nobiles et spectabiles dominos Venturam Briganti, Bonifacium Kantelli, Ioannem Krokier, Adamum Druzynski deputauerunt, eisdemque, vt alternatim circumeundo loca ciuitatis pericula spirantia, vbi necessitas postulauerit munire, muros ciuiles reparare, baterias in locis commodis aedificare studeant, propugnacula inter contubernales diuisa vtrum sufficienti custodia tam nocturna, quam diurna munita sunt, ac bombardas ibidem spectantes tum munitiones circumspiciant, commiserunt", *ibidem*, p. 541.

²⁶ Cf. H. ROJKOWSKA, W. NIEWALDA, *op. cit.*, p. 513. The authors wrongly concluded that the maximum number of towers defending the city is given in the register from 1634, according to which they numbered 45 (including the gate towers).

²⁷ Not all of the towers were subject to the guilds. On the other hand, some were subordinate to 2 or even 3 corporations. However, shoemakers were responsible for two towers and one gate.

²⁸ B. PAU and PAN, MS 423, c. 28.

– a “serpentine” cannon and a field cannon “torn off right from the top at the colubryn, but if it were cut off, one could shoot from it” (*urwane z wierzchu u samego colubrynu, ale urznowszy go, może z niego strzelać*);²⁹

Baszta Malarzy – Painters’ Tower: 4 hackbuts without locks;³⁰

Brama Wiślna (Baszta Ślusarzy i Zegarmistrzów) – Vistula Gate (Locksmiths’ and Watchmakers’ Tower): 5 hackbuts, 3 cannons: a quarter-kartouwe, a three-pound cannon, a 1,5-pounder cannon, “no shovel nor ramrod;”³¹

Baszta Cyrulików – Barbers’ Tower: at first Stefan Mechoni wrote that there was no armament in the tower itself, but it turned out that it was kept by John, the elder of the guild. The first survey recorded a hackbut, a target rifle, 2 “kopy” [= 120 pieces] of bullets and a stone [= 12,96 kg] of gunpowder.³² A subsequent entry lists a hackbut and 1,5 stone of gunpowder;³³

Baszta Miechowników – Bellows-menders’ Tower: 3 hackbuts, one-pounder bronze cannon;³⁴

Brama Szewska – Shoemakers’ Gate: 2 semi-kartouwe, 2 “smaller” cannons.³⁵

Northern part of the walls:

Baszta Szewska I – Shoemakers’ Tower I: 2 small cannons;³⁶

Baszta Szewska I – Shoemakers’ Tower II: a small cannon “on wheels”;³⁷

Brama Sławkowska – Sławkowska Gate (Tailors’ Tower): 2 small cannons were recorded in the tower itself;³⁸ additionally, it was recorded that “in some house of the tailors’ guild” (*w kamienicy pewney cechsu krawieckiego*) there were 60 muskets, 5 hackbuts, 15 suits of armour with close helmets, a “serpentine,”

²⁹ B. PAU and PAN, MS 423, c. 29v.

³⁰ B. PAU and PAN, MS 423, c. 28v.

³¹ B. PAU and PAN, MS 423, c. 28v.

³² B. PAU and PAN, MS 423, c. 26v.

³³ B. PAU and PAN, MS 423, c. 28v.

³⁴ B. PAU and PAN, MS 423, c. 28v.

³⁵ B. PAU and PAN, MS 423, c. 29.

³⁶ B. PAU and PAN, MS 423, c. 29.

³⁷ B. PAU and PAN, MS 423, c. 29.

³⁸ B. PAU and PAN, MS 423, c. 29–29v.

a sword, large “old-fashioned” crossbows [an unspecified number], and 2,5 stones [= 32,4 kg] of gunpowder;³⁹

Baszta Mieczników – Swordsmiths’ and Soap-makers’ Tower: 4 “operable” hackbuts and 2 “properly prepared” muskets; a lack of gunpowder, crutches, and fuses was noted, which councillor Stanisław Krauz ordered should be obtained immediately;⁴⁰

Baszta Cieśli – Carpenters’ Tower (*next to the city arsenal*): 2 large guns, 2 smaller guns;⁴¹

Baszta Stolarska – Joiners’ Tower: 3 hackbuts;⁴²

Brama Floriańska – St. Florian’s Gate (Furriers’ Tower): “two furriers’ shops,” 9 hackbuts “in good order” (*z dobrym porządkiem*), 5 hackbuts, 39 muskets, “all in order” (*porządek wszelaki*), including 2 stones [= 25,92 kg] of gunpowder;⁴³

Baszta Pasamoników – Haberdashers’ Tower: 2 fuse muskets, half a stone [= 6,48 kg] of gunpowder;⁴⁴

Baszta Karczmarzy – Innkeepers’ Tower: 11 hackbuts, 36 muskets, one stone [= 12,96 kg] of gunpowder.⁴⁵

Eastern part of the walls:

Baszta Przekupniów – Barterers’ Tower: 2 hackbuts;⁴⁶

Baszta Czapników – Hatmakers’ Tower: Jan Zaleski noted that “they do not have any shotguns in the tower, neither hackbuts nor small [good? *drobne* or *dobrze*] rifles because they lost them during the Swedish [occupation];⁴⁷ according to another note, 5 “good” muskets;⁴⁸

³⁹ B. PAU and PAN, MS 423, c. 30.

⁴⁰ B. PAU and PAN, MS 423, c. 25.

⁴¹ B. PAU and PAN, MS 423, c. 29v.

⁴² B. PAU and PAN, MS 423, c. 29v.

⁴³ B. PAU and PAN, MS 423, c. 29v.

⁴⁴ B. PAU and PAN, MS 423, c. 29v.

⁴⁵ B. PAU and PAN, MS 423, c. 30.

⁴⁶ B. PAU and PAN, MS 423, c. 30.

⁴⁷ B. PAU and PAN, MS 423, c. 33.

⁴⁸ B. PAU and PAN, MS 423, c. 30.

Brama Mikołajska (Baszta Rzeźników) – St. Nicholas’ Gate (Butchers’ Tower): 39 hackbuts, four rusty muskets, three iron [combat] flails, great cannon, 15-span [approx. 300 cm] field cannon;⁴⁹

Baszta Kurdybaników – Goatskin-workers’ Tower: 3 hackbuts, one-pound bronze cannon;⁵⁰

After the revision, a note from July 20 (*Informatia od Baszty PP Kurdybanikow*) was added: 3 hackbuts with stocks and with fuse locks, 2 “good” wall guns (matchlock muskets), one stone [12,96 kg] of gunpowder, one stone [12,96 kg] of lead balls, a falconet [Polish: śmigownica], a “good” one-pounder cannon without tools for loading;⁵¹

Baszta Prochowa III (Przekupniów) – Gunpowder (Barterers’) Tower III: a “serpentine”;⁵²

Brama Nowa (Piekarzy) – New Gate (Bakers’ Gate): 3 bronze cannons: a semi-kartouwe and 2 “smaller” field cannons;⁵³

Baszta Piekarzy – Bakers’ Tower: 5 hackbuts, 20 fuse muskets, 2 crossbows, half a stone [6,48 kg] of musket powder;⁵⁴

Baszta Kowali – Blacksmiths’ Tower: a one-pound bronze cannon, a hackbut;⁵⁵

Baszta Siodlarzy – Saddlers’ Tower: a one-pound bronze cannon without a carriage, a bronze cannon, an iron cannon;⁵⁶

Brama Grodzka (Złotników) – Grodzka (Goldsmiths’) Gate: 2 small bronze cannons.⁵⁷

In addition, in the Carmelite monastery there were 3 bronze cannons, in the Jesuit house there were “large urban cannons without wheels” (*działka duże mieyskie bez kół*), and in Tenczyński’s manor there was one bronze and one iron cannon.⁵⁸

⁴⁹ B. PAU and PAN, MS 423, c. 27.

⁵⁰ B. PAU and PAN, MS 423, c. 27.

⁵¹ B. PAU and PAN, MS 423, c. 34v.

⁵² B. PAU and PAN, MS 423, c. 29v.

⁵³ B. PAU and PAN, MS 423, c. 27–27v.

⁵⁴ B. PAU and PAN, MS 423, c. 27v.

⁵⁵ B. PAU and PAN, MS 423, c. 27v.

⁵⁶ B. PAU and PAN, MS 423, c. 27v.

⁵⁷ B. PAU and PAN, MS 423, c. 28.

⁵⁸ B. PAU and PAN, MS 423, c. 27v–28.

It should be assumed that some, probably a small, part of the guild's armament was not revealed during the inspection. It is worth mentioning here an interesting note about Kraków tinsmiths, about which the controlling councillor Adam Drużyński noted that "if they had firearms, it was impossible to check because they did not want to come. However, I sent a servant to them" (*jeżeli strzelbę mają non constat bo nie chcieli przyjść. Lubom ich obsyłał przez pacholka*).⁵⁹ Thus, apart from the weapons listed, some could have still remained among the townspeople, as mentioned in the notes.

In some cases, even with weapons in stock, sometimes there was a lack of proper training among the craftsmen. During the revision of the Sword-makers' and the Soap-makers' Tower, Stanisław Krauz noticed that "there are people who can fight, but who are not fit to use firearms, as they need training" (*niesposobnych do strzelby potrzebują ćwiczenia*).⁶⁰ Meanwhile, when inspecting the Cutlers' Tower, we read: "They are asking for firearms and gunpowder, of which they have none" (*Strzelby nie mają nic ani prochów, o które upraszają*).⁶¹ There were many more such cases.

Therefore, summing up the presented list of guild weapons, serious shortages should be stated. As for artillery, there were 38 cannons in 15 towers and gates.⁶² As many as 15 of the cannons were located on the eastern section of the walls between St. Nicholas' Gate and Grodzka Gate, i.e. at the site of the Swedish storms in 1655. From the north, which was the best fortified side, there were 10 cannons located from Szewska Gate to the Carpenter's Tower. In the south-eastern section, there were 8 cannons (i.e. relatively many compared to other sections of the defence system), whereas the least cannons were located from the side of the Garbary district – there were only 4 cannons, all placed in Szewska Gate.

When it comes to handguns, in the northern section of the walls, there were 39 hackbuts and 139 muskets, of which Sławkowska Gate (which belonged to the tailors) was best equipped, with 60 muskets and 5 hackbuts. In the eastern section there were 53 hackbuts and 31 muskets; in the southern section there were 21 hackbuts and a target shotgun (which was omitted in the next note).

⁵⁹ B. PAU and PAN, MS 423, c. 6.

⁶⁰ B. PAU and PAN, MS 423, c. 25.

⁶¹ B. PAU and PAN, MS 423, c. 25.

⁶² For comparison, during the Swedish siege the city had approximately 100 cannons. Cf. T.M. NOWAK, *Operacja krakowska króla Karola X Gustawa 17 IX–10 X 1655 r.*, p. 210; J. PACHOŃSKI, *op. cit.*, p. 32–37, 46.



Gates and towers in Kraków in the 17th century**Western part of the walls:**

1. Brama Poboczna – Side Gate
2. Baszta Murarzy – Stonemasons' Tower
3. Baszta Rymarzy – Saddlers' Tower
4. Baszta Prochowa I – Gunpowder Tower I
5. Baszta Iglarzy – Needlemakers' Tower
6. Baszta Malarzy – Painters' Tower
7. Brama Wiślina (Ślusarzy i Zegarmistrzów) – Vistula Gate (Locksmiths' and Watchmakers' Tower)
8. Baszta Rymarzy, Kotlarzy i Szychtarzy (Ślusarzy) – Saddlers'/Tinkers'/Locksmiths' Tower
9. Baszta Cyrulików – Barbers' Tower
10. Baszta Miechowników – Bellows-menders' Tower
11. Baszta Kaletników – Leatherworkers' Tower
12. Baszta Blacharzy – Metalworkers' Tower
13. Baszta Rusznikarzy – Gunsmiths' Tower
14. Baszta Nożowników – Cutler's Tower
15. Brama Szewska – Shoemakers' Gate
16. Baszta Czerwonnych Garbarzy – Red Tanners' Tower
17. Baszta Garnarzy – Potters' Tower
18. Baszta Paśników, Szychtarzy i Szmuklerzy – Beltmakers'/Locksmiths'/Haberdashers'/ Tower
19. Baszta Introligatorów i Stelmachów – Bookbinders'/Coach-builders' Tower
20. Baszta Krupników, Śledziarzy i Łaziebników – Barley Merchants'/Salted Fish Merchants'/Bathkeepers' Tower
21. Baszta Katowska (w której tenze mieszka) – Executioner's Tower

Northern part of the walls:

22. Baszta Katowska II (w której sie chowa *Executor Justitiae*) – Executioner's Tower
23. Baszta Szewska I – Shoemakers' Tower
24. Baszta Szewska II – Shoemakers' Tower II
25. Brama Sławkowska (Krawców) – Sławkowska Gate (Tailors')
26. Baszta Mieczników i Mydlarzy – Swordsmiths' and Soapmakers' Tower
27. Baszta Ciesielska – Carpenters' Tower
28. Baszta Stolarska – Joiners' Tower
29. Baszta Kotlarzy – Tinkers' Tower
30. Brama Floriańska (Kusnierzy) – St. Florian's Gate (Furriers' Tower)
31. Baszta Pasamoniaków – Haberdashers' Tower
32. Baszta Czeladzi Karczmarzkiej – Innkeeper-journeyman's Tower
33. Baszta Karczmarzy – Innkeepers' Tower

Eastern part of the walls:

34. Baszta Prochowa II – Gunpowder Tower II
35. Baszta Grzebieniarzy, Kartowników i Tokarzy – Combmakers'/Card-makers'/Turners' Tower
36. Baszta Przekupniów – Barterers' Tower
37. Baszta Barchaników – Fustian-makers' Tower
38. Baszta Czapników – Hatmakers' Tower
39. Brama Mikołajska – St Nicholas' Gate (Butchers' Tower)
40. Baszta Kurdybaników – Goatskin-workers' Tower
41. Baszta Prochowa III – Gunpowder (Barterers') Tower III
42. Brama Nowa (Piekarzy) – New (Bakers') Gate
43. Baszta Kowali – Blacksmiths' Tower
44. Baszta Siodlarzy – Saddlers' Tower
45. Baszta Ryngmacherów – Ringmakers' Tower
46. Baszta Bednarzy – Coopers' Tower
47. Brama Grodzka (Złotników) – Grodzka (Goldsmiths') Gate

Interestingly, no handguns were recorded at all in the western part of the walls. The amount of gunpowder was also very small (10 stones, i.e. 129,6 kg). The same applied to ammunition (only one stone, i.e. 12,96 kg, and 2 “kopy”, i.e. 120 pieces).

In three guild arsenals, at least 5 crossbows were registered, and in one there were 3 iron flails (an effective weapon to repel enemy attacks on the walls). The protective equipment was only used by the tailors’ guild, i.e. at the Sławkowska Gate.

In total, the presented armament should have been enough for about 470 people. Meanwhile – as Tadeusz Nowak once calculated⁶³ – about 50 people were needed to properly defend one gate, and about 20 people to defend one tower. Therefore, about 1400 people would have been needed to fill in the entire wall, with an additional 1000 between the main wall and the rampart, totalling about 2400 armed men. We must also not forget about 1000 servants.⁶⁴ Before the “Swedish Deluge” of 1655–1660, Kraków was able to provide approximately 1600 townspeople to defend the city. In later years, however, Kraków was much less fortunate. Both the war and the plague had decimated the local townspeople, and a significant part of the guilds had fallen into decline.

Even if we add to the presented list of armaments the arsenal of the crown artillery (located next to the Grodzka Gate, where 53 cannons and ammunition were stored in 1654),⁶⁵ the aforementioned regiment of the royal guard, support from the bishop of Kraków, and a municipal garrison of 200 men, it should be recognized that the preparation of the defence of Kraków looked very modest. Therefore, it is not surprising that the king and the Sejm chose to fight the Turks and their supporters outside the borders of the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth.

⁶³ T.M. NOWAK, *Obrona Krakowa przez Stefana Czarnieckiego w roku 1655*, pp. 63–64.

⁶⁴ *Ibidem*.

⁶⁵ T.M. NOWAK, *Polska artyleria koronna przed wojną 1655–1660 i podczas jej trwania*, [in:] *Wojna polsko-szwedzka 1655–1660*, ed. JAN WIMMER, Warszawa 1973, p. 118; IDEM, *Polska technika wojenna XVI–XVIII w.*, p. 233. It must be remembered that the cannons from the royal arsenal were not taken away by the Swedes.

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AUTOMOTIVE SERVICES IN “FESTUNG KRAKAU” DURING WORLD WAR I

Summary. Since antiquity, the army has been the driving force behind technological development, including the development of motorisation. While the first mechanical vehicle was constructed in 1769, the turning point in motorisation was the construction of the first diesel-powered vehicle. The Austro-Hungarian armed forces were among those interested in the possibility of using mechanical vehicles. The first tests of a military lorry intended for the Austro-Hungarian army initiated a series of various mechanical vehicle tests. As a part of such tests, the first lorries appeared on the streets of Kraków in 1903. With the outbreak of the Great War, the number of military vehicles in Kraków considerably increased. The armed forces also commandeered several facilities in the city to function as workshops, fuel storehouses, and parking lots for their vehicles. In 1916, the first genuine military vehicle maintenance barracks and workshop complex was built in the Kraków Stronghold.

Keywords: army, Austro-Hungarian Empire, Kraków Stronghold, motorisation, World War I

The history of military motorisation (and motorisation in general) began in 1769, when the French army engineer Joseph Cugnot (1725–1804) constructed the first heavy artillery tractor.¹ It was a wooden, three-wheeled vehicle powered by a steam engine with a huge boiler located in front of the tractor. Despite a crash during its trial run in 1770, the seed of motorisation had been sown. The breakthrough in the development of motorisation was made at the end of the 19th century, when a diesel engine was successfully used to power a mechanical vehicle. This feat was independently made by two German engine designers, Karl Benz and Gottlieb Daimler.²

¹ A. ROSTOCKI, T. SOKOŁOWSKI, *Świat starych samochodów*, Warszawa 1972, pp. 20–21.

² A.M. ROSTOCKI, *Historia starych samochodów*, Warszawa 1981, pp. 63–69.

It is not well known that the first working diesel vehicle was constructed in Vienna in 1875³ by another German designer, Siegfried Marcus. However, this invention, despite the designer's efforts, did not arouse the interest of potential clientele. Nevertheless, this fact is recognised by historians as the birth of motorisation in the Austrian Empire. Twenty years later, in 1895, the Gräf brothers started the first mass-production of automobiles in Austria.⁴

Austrian army circles were also interested in using automobiles for military purposes. The first tests were carried out in 1896 with a Daimler automobile,⁵ and two years later, the first Austro-Hungarian Army trials with a lorry took place. The vehicle was produced by an Austrian company Bierenz, Fischer & Cie.⁶ At the same time, a special military commission to carry out trials with vehicles and assess their results⁷ was established. Gradual development of the Austro-Hungarian Army motor transport base⁸ can be thus dated back to that moment. In 1909, the Austro-Hungarian Army automotive units organisation principles in peacetime⁹ were defined, stating that automobiles are indispensable in a modern army. The principles established at that time remained binding until the outbreak of the Great War. According to these guidelines, in peacetime the army could own only as many cars as were necessary to service individual military units, and in case of war additional vehicles were to be requisitioned from institutions and civilians. A significant element of the entire organisational system was the voluntary automobile and motorcycle corps, established in 1906 and 1907, respectively.¹⁰ They were to provide the army with a suitable number of passenger vehicles and motorcycles, and at the same time, by regular participation of the corps members in manoeuvres and military exercises, ensure an appropriate training level of the voluntary personnel. The issue of providing a suitable supply of lorries to be requisitioned in case of war was solved

³ R. GAWEL, *Galician automobilism*, "Galicja. Studia i Materiały" 2020, vol. 6, p. 350.

⁴ *Ibidem*.

⁵ W.J. SPIELBERGER, *Kraftfahrzeuge und Panzer des österreichischen Heeres 1896 bis heute*, Stuttgart 1976, p. 12.

⁶ *Ibidem*, p. 13.

⁷ J. AUGUSTOWSKI, *Wojska samochodowe w Austrii, Niemczech i Rosji podczas wojny światowej*, "Bellona" 1932, Annual set 14, vol. 40, p. 169.

⁸ Motor transport base should be meant as army motor vehicles, its personnel and related facilities arranged within an organisational framework.

⁹ J. AUGUSTOWSKI, *op. cit.*, p. 170.

¹⁰ *Ibidem*.

in a different way. Just as in Germany,¹¹ a system of subventions was introduced for private persons purchasing domestic lorries.¹² The general idea behind it was to encourage citizens to purchase domestic lorries of technical parameters clearly defined by the army. On purchase, the buyers were partially reimbursed for the purchase cost on the condition that they maintained the vehicle in proper technical condition, had it professionally serviced, and supplied the lorry for a fee for military exercises in peacetime.¹³

In Kraków, the first military automobiles – two lorries – appeared in 1903.¹⁴ These vehicles aroused the interest of both the local residents and the local press. The Kraków "Czas" daily reported on one of the lorries passing through the centre of the city:

Cars for military purposes. Local army supply depot has introduced the use of automobiles. These are large, grey-painted wagons, having an apparatus [engine] in front of their front wheels. Today, such a vehicle drove past the local post office in the morning. A non-commissioned officer from the pioneers was driving the car. The automobile itself seems to be a heavy machine, to be used only on highways and very good quality roads.¹⁵

An image of one of these Daimler-Militär-Lastwagen 12/14 HP vehicles,¹⁶ only that it was used by the artillery depot in Kraków, can be found in an illustration published in the Austrian automotive journal "Allgemeine Automobil-Zeitung" of 1904.¹⁷

In 1906,¹⁸ the lorries were given the first two registration numbers from the pool allocated to Kraków. According to the vehicle register preserved in the

¹¹ *Ibidem*, p. 177.

¹² *Ibidem*, p. 171.

¹³ *Subwencyonowanie automobilów ciężarowych, przydatnych do użytku w razie wojny*, "Głos Rzeszowski" 1914, Annual set 18, No. 8, pp. 1–2.

¹⁴ A. BOGUNIA-PACZYŃSKI, *Mój Benz, moja Mercedes*, Kraków 1992, pp. 9–10.

¹⁵ *Samochody do celów wojskowych*, "Czas" 1903, Annual set 56, No. 211 (evening issue), p. 2.

¹⁶ *Oesterr. Daimler-Motorengesellschaft*, "Allgemeine Automobil-Zeitung" 1904, Annual set 5, No. 18, p. 15.

¹⁷ *Ibidem*, p. 17.

¹⁸ Starting in 1906, the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy assigned registration numbers to mechanical vehicles to be displayed as number plates. This was, however, introduced separately for both parts of the Dual Monarchy. In the Austrian part of the monarchy the regulations were issued as an "Order of the Ministry of Home Affairs with Approval of the Minister of Treasury of 27th September 1905".

National Archives, we know that the vehicle used by the supply depot (*k.u.k. Militär-Verpflegs-Magazin in Krakau*) was given the number¹⁹ S.911²⁰ and the vehicle used by the artillery depot (*k.u.k. Artillerie-Zeugs-Depot in Krakau*) was number S.912.²¹ It also appears from the registers that, in accordance with the 1909 guidelines, not many military vehicles were registered in Kraków.



Fig. 1. One of the two Daimler 12/14 HP military lorries which appeared in the streets of Kraków in 1903. (Source: "Allgemeine Automobil-Zeitung" 1904, No. 18, p. 17)

¹⁹ Pursuant to regulations issued in 1905, registration numbers in Austria were composed of an identification letter (displayed as a capital letter on the number plates) and a register number separated from the letter with a dot. Identification letters were assigned for individual federal states. Galicia was assigned with letter S. Moreover, a top-down assignment of register number was binding for individual administrative regions under the same assigned identification letter. In Galicia, numbers were assigned to consecutive districts (*powiaty*) placed in the alphabetical order and additionally to Kraków and Lviv as separate cities. If the assigned range of numbers proved insufficient, the identification letter was expanded by adding a Roman numeral, starting from I, to the capital letter.

²⁰ National Archives in Kraków (hereinafter: ANK), C.K. Dyrekcja Policji w Krakowie 1848–1919 (hereinafter: DPKr.), file No. DPKr 177, Rejestr dla samochodów prowadzony po myśli §. 29 rozporządzenia ministerstwa spraw wewnętrznych w porozumieniu z Min. skarbu z dnia 27 września 1905 l.156 d.p.p., p. 17.

²¹ ANK, DPKr., file No. DPKr 177, Rejestr dla samochodów prowadzony po myśli §. 29 rozporządzenia ministerstwa spraw wewnętrznych w porozumieniu z Min. skarbu z dnia 27 września 1905 l.156 d.p.p., p. 17.

As in the entire Austro-Hungarian Monarchy, Kraków drivers also joined the ranks of k.u.k. voluntary automobile corps. The ranks were joined mainly by members of the Galician Automobile Club, thus fulfilling one of the statutory activities of this association.²² In January 1912, Wilhelm Ripper, the main organiser of this voluntary unit, was appointed the commander of the Kraków voluntary unit by order of the Ministry of War. As early as 9th June 1912, representatives of the unit participated in a parade of automotive voluntary units in Vienna.²³ The salute was taken by the Emperor Franz Joseph I himself, and six cars and one motorcycle travelled from Kraków to attend the parade. The cars were driven by: Wilhelm Ripper (commander), Wojciech Kossak, Jerzy Kossak, Count Egon Starzyński, Emil Wekluk (engineer), Andrzej Gulkowski, while the name and the status of the motorcyclist, listed as "Kusma" by "Ilustrowany Kuryer Codzienny",²⁴ is unclear, as there is no evidence for the establishment of any separate voluntary motorcycle unit in Kraków. A. Bogunia-Paczyński claims the man was Stanisław Kusina,²⁵ however, he does not clarify the inconsistency between the name cited by him and the one provided in "Ilustrowany Kuryer Codzienny" daily, which Bogunia-Paczyński also refers to. Bogunia-Paczyński was probably guided by an entry in the motorcycle register kept by the Kraków Police Directorate, where a "Stanisław Kusina" is entered as the owner of Puch motorcycle,²⁶ while there is no entry for the name "Kusma." It is obviously possible that the paper misspelt the name, but other explanations are plausible. First of all, it should be considered that by reason of no evidence for existence of a voluntary motorcycle unit in Kraków, the delegation was supplemented with a motorcyclist who was not a citizen of Kraków. Another possible explanation is that the motorcycle belonging to Mr. Kusma had non-Kraków number plates. It would not have been an isolated case after all. One piece of evidence showing that such vehicles existed in Kraków is a picture from

²² A. BOGUNIA-PACZYŃSKI, *Samochodowcy, wyścigowcy, automobilery albo diabły i diabllice w daimlerowskich landach*, Kraków 1998, p. 15.

²³ *Ibidem*, p. 73.

²⁴ *Defilada samochodowa przed cesarzem*, "Ilustrowany Kuryer Codzienny" 1912, Annual set 3, No. 130, p. 5.

²⁵ A. BOGUNIA-PACZYŃSKI, *op. cit.*, p. 73.

²⁶ ANK, DPKr., file No. DPKr 177, *Rejestr dla motocykli prowadzony po myśli §. 29 rozporządzenia Ministerstwa spraw wewnętrznych, w porozumieniu z Min. Skarbu z dnia 27 września 1905 d.p.p. L. 156*, p. 55.

the collection of the Museum of Kraków²⁷ showing an automobile with Vienna number plates in front of the Kraków railway station. Another example is the case of Jan Włodek, who joined the Polish Legions with an automobile with Vienna number plates.²⁸ The possibility that the vehicle simply had no number plates should not be taken into account, although such cases did occur, as evidenced by letters addressed to the Police Directorate in Kraków.




Fig. 2. Interior of Na Stawach Square Benz-Garage, taken over by the army during the war. Benz 16/40 HP automobile (registration No. S.235), second from left, commandeered by the army and earlier belonging to Rudolf Peterseim. (Source: autor's collection)

With the outbreak of the war and announcing mobilisation, the automotive base in Kraków changed significantly. The army took over the civilian Austro-Daimler-Garage on Smoleńsk Street, the Benz-Garage in Na Stawach Square, and city workshops in Lelewela Street, forming them into the “Kraków

²⁷ Museum of Kraków (hereinafter: MHK), No. MHK-8423/N; *Album fotografii dawnego Krakowa z atelier Ignacego Kriegera*, Kraków 1989, unpublished.

²⁸ J.M. WŁODEK, *Jan Włodek legionista, dyplomata, uczonec*, Kraków 2009, s. 42; ANK, Naczelny Komitet Narodowy (hereinafter: NKN), file No. 29/530/0/2.16/384, p. 37.

Workshops" (*k.u.k. Werkstätte Krakau*), later renamed the "Kraków Auxiliary Automobile Workshops" (*k.u.k. Behelfskraftwagenwerkstätte Krakau*).²⁹

Fuel depots constituted a vital element of the automotive base. After all, vehicles were useless without fuel. In the Festung Krakau (Kraków Stronghold), the main depot was located near Dąbie-Piaski railway station (*k.u.k. Benzin Depot Dabie-Piaski*).³⁰ It provided a petrol supply both for mechanical vehicles from the entire stronghold and for airplanes based at the nearby airfield in Rakowice. The proximity of the railway line was essential inasmuch as fuel was at that time supplied by tank cars, and then packaged in steel barrels. These barrels were used to store the fuel and to transport it to individual units. It was also from the barrels that vehicles were fuelled, most often by using manual pumps.

With the front line approaching Kraków, civilian vehicle traffic, with few exceptions, ceased, as vehicles were requisitioned by the military authorities.³¹ The automobiles with their owners constituting voluntary personnel of the Kraków automotive unit were incorporated into an automobile column of the 1st Corps constituting a part of the 1st k.u.k. Army. Rittmeister Wojciech Kossak was appointed the commanding officer of the unit,³² whose main task was to dispatch delivery and service.³³

The Kraków automotive base of the Polish Legions had its separate story.³⁴ The first automobiles, still not organised in a unit, left for the Kingdom of Poland with the Rifleman Society units in August 1914. Upon establishing the Supreme National Committee (SNC), the Army Department subordinate to SNC formed an automotive unit equipped, among others, with automobiles belonging to its volunteers. The aforementioned Jan Włodek was an example of such a case. The vehicles of the automotive unit were on duty for the SNC Presidium, its Army Department, the Organisation Department, and administration and supply management. In October 1914, the unit included around

²⁹ W. SCHIMON, *Österreich-Ungarns Kraftformationen im Weltkrieg 1914–1918*, Lubljana/Lai-bach 2007, p. 100.

³⁰ Jagiellonian Library (hereinafter: BUJ), file No. 144473 III, vol. 1, p. 222, *Ausgegeben mit FskmdoBef. Nr. 296 vom 22. Oktober 1915*.

³¹ A. BOGUNIA-PACZYŃSKI, *op. cit.*, p. 101.

³² *Ibidem*.

³³ J. AUGUSTOWSKI, *op. cit.*, p. 173.

³⁴ ANK, NKN, file No. 29/530/0/2.16/384, p. 72.

25 automobiles and 60 volunteers (drivers and mechanics). The unit had its own garages in Kraków and a workshop on 1 Ariańska Street. In September, some of the automobiles, along with the Command of the Polish Legions, moved to the Carpathian Mountains. In November 1914, the Legions' automotive unit left Kraków, going to Třinec near Jablunkov in Silesia.

An important step in development of the military automotive base in Kraków was providing mechanical vehicles for the Festung Fire Brigade (*Festungsfeuerwehr*). It was established by the Festung Command at the beginning of September 1914.³⁵ Based on the Municipal Fire Brigade of Kraków, it also comprised the Municipal Fire Brigade of Podgórze³⁶ and the Voluntary Fire Brigades from Krowodrza, Zwierzyniec and Płaszów.³⁷ Jan Nowotny, the commandant of the Kraków Fire Brigade, was appointed the commanding officer of the Festung Fire Brigade. He was an ardent supporter of replacing the horse-drawn vehicles of the Fire Brigade with automobiles. As early as 1907, he trialled using a mechanical vehicle with the Fire Brigade in Kraków,³⁸ though regrettably the trial ended with an automobile crash. Being appointed the commandant of the Festung Fire Brigade, he convinced the Festung command that to provide better safety it was essential to equip the brigade with automobiles. Along with the purchase of vehicles, the fire station in Potockiego Street was improved, having its stables converted to garages.³⁹ The new position of driver was created, and the first two vehicles reached Kraków in October 1914.⁴⁰ On 29th November 1914, the vehicles first took part in firefighting action at a residential house on Krzywa Street.⁴¹ In total the army purchased five vehicles for the Fire Brigade, all Austro-Daimler: two equipment cars, three fire engines equipped with pumps, and one passenger car. Towards the end of 1915, the municipality purchased

³⁵ ANK, Akta Miasta Pogorza, file No. P-63, *Instruction für die Festungsfeuerwehr*, pp. 2127–2130.

³⁶ Podgórze is currently one of the right-bank districts of Kraków, but in 1914 it was still an independent city.

³⁷ Three of Kraków's districts, prior to being absorbed by Kraków in the early 20th century, were independent communes which had their own Voluntary Fire Brigades in 1914.

³⁸ *Automobil w usługach straży pożarnej*, "Nowości Ilustrowane" 1907, Annual set 4, No. 40, p.15.

³⁹ *Jubileuszowa księga krakowskich straży pożarnych 1873–1925 1865–1925*, Kraków 1925, p. 14.

⁴⁰ *Straż pożarna krakowska* (...), "Nowa Reforma" 1914, Annual set 33, No. 471, p. 2.

⁴¹ *Pożar*, "Nowa Reforma" 1914, Annual set 33, No. 528, p. 2.

another fire engine,⁴² also Austro-Daimler.⁴³ The base for the Festung Fire Brigade automotive column was generally the City Fire Station in Potockiego Street, which was converted for the purpose. There is, however, a photograph⁴⁴ showing one of those automobiles with its crew at the yard of the City Fire Station in Mickiewiczza Street in Podgórze. The author personally knows of two copies of that photograph, each of them sent as a postcard by Jan Nikiel, who was one of the drivers of Kraków fire engines.⁴⁵ Therefore, we can acknowledge that the automotive fire brigade also used to be stationed at Podgórze. An interesting fact related to the question of the Festung Krakau automotive base is a note on the reverse of both postcards, reading: "Nikiel k.u.k. Festungs Fäuerwehr Abteilung 1. Mickiewiczgasse No 39. Podgusz." Despite obvious spelling mistakes, it is clear that the 1st Festung Fire Brigade Unit had its seat at 39 Mickiewiczza Street in Podgórze, and Jan Nikiel served there.

In Kraków during the Great War, besides the strictly automotive workshop base, there also existed workshops of other branches of service that repaired and/or possessed their own vehicles. One such example is two artillery workshops, one of which was established in November 1914 in the largest factory in Kraków, viz. Zieleniewski Factory.⁴⁶ In addition to cannons, also automobiles and steamrollers were repaired there.⁴⁷ From photographs of the time the author is familiar with, it is clear that vehicles to be repaired were placed outdoors at the factory yard.⁴⁸ The location of army workshops in this factory is one of more spectacular examples of destruction made by war in Kraków. It was explicitly expressed by W. Saryusz-Zaleski in his history of the factory:

⁴² *Zakupno automobilu strażackiego*, "Dziennik rozporządzeń dla stoł. król. miasta Krakowa" Kraków 1916, Annual set 36, p. 93.

⁴³ *Der Krakauer Austro=Daimler=Feuerwehruzug*, "Allgemeine automobil-Zeitung" 1916, No. 26, p. 30.

⁴⁴ Author's collection (hereinafter: a.c.), vehicle of the Festung Krakau Fire Brigade at the City Fire Station yard in Podgórze.

⁴⁵ On both photographs, the sender marked himself sitting behind the steering wheel.

⁴⁶ W. SARYUSZ-ZALESKI, *Dzieje przemysłu w b. Galicji 1804–1929*, Kraków 1930, p. 231.

⁴⁷ *Ibidem*, p. 232.

⁴⁸ W. SARYUSZ-ZALESKI, *Ibidem*, p. 55; National Digital Archives, file No. 1-H-26-3, *Reflektor przeciwlotniczy zamontowany na ciężarówce* – it is noteworthy that the photograph was incorrectly described as "Austrian military equipment in Wieliczka." Facilities that can be seen in the background clearly indicate that the picture was taken at the Zieleniewski Factory yard in Kraków.

Its mother plant – the Kraków Factory – has never been directly affected by military activities. However, as soon as autumn 1914 it could be deemed immobilised. Evacuation of the city, conscription of the majority of the employees and lack of raw materials led to the fact that this October the factory has only a dozen or so workers busy with small commissions for the army (...) Even after the military authorities moved out from the factory, for a long time it was not possible to restore normal operation, as the yard was full of uncleared materials, and parts of already started commissioned items were scattered in total disorder, rusting in the rain, if not “confiscated” at all for military purposes.⁴⁹



Fig. 3. One of the Festung Krakau Fire Brigade vehicles. Photograph taken at the City Fire Station yard in Podgórze, a seat of the 1st Festung Fire Brigade Unit. Jan Nikiel behind the steering wheel. (Source: author's collection)

The second site was the artillery workshops in the Podgórze district of Kraków.⁵⁰ At the turn of 1917, at the back of the still-existing artillery workshop building (*k.u.k. Artillerie-Brigade-Werkstätte*) at the junction of Wielicka Street and Płaszowska Street, a new workshop hall was built.⁵¹ The exact range of

⁴⁹ W. SARYUSZ-ZALESKI, *op. cit.*, pp. 231–232.

⁵⁰ In 1915, Podgórze ceased its existence as an independent city, and upon merging with Kraków it became its XXII district.

⁵¹ ANK, Zakład Instalacyjny Adam Bieniarz w Krakowie, file No. 29/1408/0/-/758, p. 1, *Plan na z kanalizowanie Realności L.or.1/sp.41. w Dz. XXII przy ul. Wielickiej w “Artiellerie-Brig-Werks”*.

operation of those workshops remains unknown. However, it is certain that the workshops had at least two lorries of their own. A photograph taken in March 1918 shows two lorries in front of the workshop hall with k.u.k. soldiers (most probably the personnel of the workshops) standing around them or sitting in their cabs.



Fig. 4. A. Fross-Büssing lorry and R.A.F. lorry (left to right) in front of the artillery workshops in the Podgórze district of Kraków (*k.u.k. Artillerie-Brigade-Werkstätte*) located at the junction of Wielicka Street and Płaszowska Street in a photograph from March 1918 (Source: author's collection)

During the war, a few automotive base units were stationed in the Festung Krakau, including the automobile workshops of the 1st Army (*k.u.k. Armewerkstätte IV*), which occupied the facilities and garden leased by the army from the Kraków Rifleman Society (*Bractwo Kurkowe*, Brotherhood of the Rooster), in the immediate vicinity of the Kraków railway station. Workshop machines were installed in the Dancing Hall of the Celestat,⁵² an indoor shooting range

⁵² Celestat is a customary name of a stately building located in the Rifleman Park and a seat of the Kraków Rifleman Society, currently a seat of one of the Museum of Kraków branches.

was converted into a smithy, while the park was used to place damaged or repaired automobiles. It is well depicted on a series of photographs from the album "Im Etappenraum der I. Armee."⁵³ The most surprising of these photos show machine tools placed at the windows of the ballroom, where you can see the main drive shaft above them propelling individual machines via transmission belts. The other photograph shows a huge hole made in the outer wall linking the smithy (in the shooting range) and the workshop hall (in the ballroom). When the workshops left the facilities in November 1915, the Celestat ballroom was converted into a tyre storehouse, an extension was used as a storehouse for kerosene, petrol, and lubricating oil, while the park served as a fuel depot, where fuel barrels were placed in pits covered with planks.⁵⁴

At the beginning of the war, the number of lorries available for military purposes was limited. First, the army obtained subsidised vehicles, then those from state civilian offices. Some of them were individually assigned to army units and others were formed into only a few automobile columns. Next, private automobiles were requisitioned. Somewhat later, new vehicles were purchased from factories. Due to such activities, rearrangement of transport columns was possible. The number of columns was increased to several dozen and the number of vehicles in each column was decreased, making them more efficient to use.⁵⁵

Currently, it is hard to say when the Kraków Automobile Column (*k.u.k. Kraftwagenkolonne Krakau*) was formed.⁵⁶ Its name suggests its relation with Kraków, but soldiers of various nationalities served in its ranks.⁵⁷ It is also known that it was a transport column composed of lorries,⁵⁸ which was assigned as a transport unit to the 2nd Army.⁵⁹

⁵³ *Im Etappenraum der I. Armee*, Vienna 1915/16, unpublished.

⁵⁴ ANK, Towarzystwo Strzeleckie w Krakowie, file No. TSK 94, p. 3.

⁵⁵ J. Augustowski, *op. cit.*, p. 173.

⁵⁶ Later renamed No. 151 Automotive Column (Kraftwagenkolonne Nr 151) *vide*: W. SCHIMON, *Österreich-Ungarns Kraftformationen im Weltkrieg 1914–1918*, Ljubljana/Laibach 2007, p. 134.

⁵⁷ W. SCHIMON, *Österreich-Ungarns Kraftformationen im Weltkrieg 1914–1918*, Ljubljana/Laibach 2007, p. 134.

⁵⁸ *Ibidem*, p. 282.

⁵⁹ *Ibidem*, p. 296.



Fig. 5. Passenger car belonging to the Kraków Automobile Column (*Kraftwagenkolonne Krakau*). Transport trailers in the background. Date and location unknown (Source: author's collection)

Interestingly, the Festung Krakau Command had the Innsbruck Automobile Column⁶⁰ (*k.u.k. Autokolonne Innsbruck*), formed at the end of August 1914 in Austrian Tirol under its orders. The Column was transferred to Kraków by railway. It reached Kraków late at night on 7th September. Captain Ernst von Handel-Mazzetti⁶¹ was the unit commander. At that time his vehicles were stationed outdoors, in the yard of cavalry pioneers' (*Pionieren*) barracks in Kamienna Street. Lorries were repaired there, while passenger cars were repaired in the Smoleńsk Street workshops.⁶² The yard also functioned as parking lot for vehicles from other units.⁶³ The column finally left Kraków after almost 10 months.⁶⁴

⁶⁰ *Ibidem*, p. 275.

⁶¹ I.I. BEKIRCHER, *Tiroler Autopioniere im Ersten Weltkrieg*, Innsbruck–Vienna 2015, p. 53.

⁶² *Ibidem*, p. 80.

⁶³ *Ibidem*, pp. 68–69.

⁶⁴ BUJ, file No. 144473 III, vol. 3, p. 588, *ArtRes. Nr. 2887 Autokolonne Innsbruck-Belobung*.

There is no information about the use of post vehicles in Kraków during the war; however, there are photographs showing such vehicles in all probability at the Kraków railway station.⁶⁵ It is unlikely that during the war such a popular means of transport was not used to carry letters and parcels in Kraków.

During the Great War, motorised medical transport was a field that developed quite rapidly. Ambulances were present in every army, at the front line and at the back. On one hand, they symbolised modernity, but on the other hand their crews witnessed unprecedented force of destruction brought by warfare. Inside the Festung Krakau, military vehicles marked with the red cross appeared as well.

The 15th Garrison Hospital had its medical transport service. In the Museum of Krakow collection we can find a photograph showing an ambulance with a proprietary inscription indicating the affiliation of the vehicle to the aforementioned hospital.⁶⁶ The inscription painted on the side of the vehicle comprises an abbreviated name of the unit the vehicle belonged to and the vehicle number – “GARN.SPITAL.15. AUTO. N^o 10.” Therefore, it is obvious that the photograph shows the tenth automobile of those used by the hospital. Thus, the automotive column of the 15th Garrison Hospital had to be composed of at least ten ambulances and they had to be garaged somewhere. In case of larger vehicles, they were most frequently parked outdoors, although efforts were made to house smaller vehicles in garages. Here, the ambulances were probably garaged in the wooden sheds seen in photographs. It should be kept in mind that at the time the hospital was designed, i.e. at the beginning of the 20th century,⁶⁷ motorisation, including military motorisation, was still in its infancy and the need to keep automobiles in such facilities was not taken into account. It is noteworthy that the question of adaptation of old cities, like Kraków, to the needs of quickly developing motorisation is older than we could generally think. It appeared at the very beginning of motorisation, when the first automobile, horse-drawn vehicle and pedestrian collisions occurred in the city streets, where roadways were not strictly outlined. Another problem was visibility at intersections, which were

⁶⁵ *Im Etappenraum der I. Armee*, Vienna 1915/16, n.p.

⁶⁶ MHK, file No. MHK Fs13946-9/325, *Auto szpitalne*.

⁶⁷ Buildings of the 15th Military Garrison Hospital were built in 1907–1911 acc. to a design by an Austrian military engineer M. Hoffman. The works on implementation of the design of this new hospital were commenced by the Austrian military authorities in 1905, [in:] *5 wojskowy Szpital Kliniczny z Polikliniką. Historia szpitala*, <http://5wszk.com.pl/historia-szpitala> (access: 5 I 2021).

made for slow horse and pedestrian traffic. Finally, the question of storage of automobiles appeared. After all, the courtyards of the old city tenement houses were not designed for such a purpose.

The Railway Dressing Station,⁶⁸ established as a result of efforts by the Kraków Red Cross Branch Administration with its president, Count Paweł Sapieha, also had automobiles at their disposal. The Station's task was to provide first aid for the wounded and ill who were transported from the front line to Kraków railway station by train. The Station was equipped both with horse-drawn ambulances and with automobiles. Three of the latter were donated by the Red Cross Central Board in Vienna.⁶⁹ In photographs from the collection of the Sisters of the Order of Preachers we can see a large passenger car, an ambulance, and a small passenger omnibus,⁷⁰ which belonged to the transport section of the Station, managed by Włodzimierz Miarczyński and manned by 36 volunteers.

Another automobile adapted to fulfil medical transport duties was garaged in the Salt Factory Barracks (*k.u.k. Salinenkaserne*) located in Podgórze near the III Bridge on the Vistula.⁷¹ The automobile was a patient transport bus that could carry 18, belonging to the Festung Ambulance Service (*k.u.k. Festungs Sanitär Dienst*).⁷² A similar bus used for patient transport was at the disposal of the No. 1 Military Epidemic Hospital⁷³ (*k.u.k. Militär Epidemie Spital Nr. 1*) located in Łagiewniki near Kraków, within the convent of the Congregation of the Sisters of Our Lady of Mercy.

In 1917, a large, specialist barracks complex for automobile units (*k.u.k. Kraftfahrersatzdepot*)⁷⁴ was built in the Dąbie suburb of Kraków. This complex consisted of a dozen or so buildings housing among others a guardroom, together

⁶⁸ *Dworcowa Stacja Opatrunkowa w Krakowie*, <http://pck.malopolska.pl/dworcowa-stacja-opatrunkowa-w-krakowie> (access: 5 I 2021).

⁶⁹ *Ibidem*.

⁷⁰ *Ibidem*.

⁷¹ *Salinenkaserne* is a colloquial name, nota bene to be seen on an official plaque hung on the facility. The full German name of the barracks was *Salinenkaserne Podgórze III Most, Nazwy koszar*, [in:] *Polska Komenda Wojskowa w Krakowie. Rozkaz Nr. 11*, Kraków 1918, p. 4.

⁷² BUJ, file No. 144473 III, vol. 1, p. 24, Nr. 1348. *Autobus für Krankentransporte*.

⁷³ *Szpital epidemiologiczny (dawny), Przyjęcie chorego*, <https://polska-org.pl/8562931,foto.html?idEntity=8462805> (access: 5 I 2021).

⁷⁴ ANK, Archiwum Budownictwa Miejskiego, file No. ABM Kosynierów 4 f.422, p. 1, *Linear Skizze des Kraftfahrersatzdepot in Dąbie-Piaski*; a plan of those barracks was incorrectly filed among the documents pertaining to the other barracks complex in Kraków's district of Dąbie.

with a jail, near the main gate, the barracks headquarters, residential barracks, workshop halls, fire station, and storehouses. A residential building for officers was located slightly farther from the complex centre. All the facilities were well linked with an extended road network. Moreover, the barracks had their own siding with a loading ramp, and a railway track led to main workshop halls. An automobile track for training drivers was also built. A portion of the fenced area remained undeveloped, leaving space for possible complex expansion. The complex construction was the last action undertaken by the Austrian military authorities within the scope of expanding the stronghold automotive base.

On 30th October 1918, i.e. 12 days before the end of the Great War, Kraków was the scene of a campaign aiming at liberation of the city from foreign authority. Troops led by Antoni Stawarz and Franciszek Pustelnik with a group of conspirators first took over military facilities in Podgórze, the right-bank district of Kraków, and then marched to the city centre.⁷⁵ On 31st October 1918, the Poles regained power in Kraków and the Austrians handed over their authority to the Polish Liquidation Committee. The Committee, in turn, handed over the Military Command in Galicia to Colonel Roja on 1st November 1918.⁷⁶

However, before power was officially transferred, the Austrian Festung Krakau automotive base played one last part. Despite the ongoing negotiations and arrangements between the military authorities and the Polish Liquidation Committee, on 30th October and during the night from 30th to 31st October, army vehicles were used to carry huge amounts of food from Kraków in a westward direction.⁷⁷ No one exactly knows the range of this action; however, it is certain that the vehicles never returned to Kraków.

Among the numerous actions undertaken by the Polish military authorities related to taking command over military units in Kraków, there were also those pertaining to the automotive base. The Kraków Military Command issued a series of orders corresponding to such actions. The first of them (issued as early as 4th November) organised the issue of the allotment of vehicles taken over from the Austrians. With this order, Roja reserved for himself and his deputy the exclusive right to administer these vehicles.⁷⁸ Reading the following order issued

⁷⁵ *Podgórze. Przewodnik*, ed. D. Rywczak, Kraków 2020, p. 63.

⁷⁶ *Polska Komenda wojskowa w Krakowie, Rozkaz Nr. 1*, Kraków 1918.

⁷⁷ *Układy swoją drogą, a wojsko żywność wywozi!*, "Goniec Krakowski" 1918, No. 122, p. 3.

⁷⁸ *Polska Komenda Wojskowa w Krakowie. Rozkaz Nr. 4*, Kraków 1918, p. 2.

by the Polish Military Command (PMC) four days later, we learn that in November 1918 the Commandant of the automobile column in Kraków was lieutenant Piotrowski.⁷⁹ Another step taken by the PMC was an effort to inventory all the vehicles found in Kraków. With this end in view, an appropriate order was issued and a form specimen was distributed to be filled in and sent back immediately.⁸⁰ People were asked to report the vehicles themselves, divided into passenger cars and lorries, as well as the number and inventory of inner tubes and tyres, as those were in extremely short supply at that time.

In order to ensure proper operation of the automotive base it was essential to form an appropriate corps. Therefore, they commanded every soldier of the former Austrian automotive corps (*k.u.k. Autotruppe*), in particular "drivers and metal processing professionals" residing in Kraków and those arriving in Kraków, to report to "the command of the auxiliary automotive corps in Dąbie-Grzegórzki near Kraków."⁸¹

On 23rd November, changes were made to the staffing of the commanding posts of the automotive units in Kraków. Captain Franciszek Schneider of the second heavy artillery regiment replaced Łucyan Myciński in the post of the auxiliary automotive corps commandant. At the same time, Captain Kazimierz Kristmann-Dobrzański of the second heavy artillery regiment⁸² became the commander of automotive units and the automobile officer with the Military Command.

Automobile traffic in the city certainly constituted a problem in respect of the threat posed by automobiles, as can be proven by orders issued by the military authorities. The first regulations concerned the traffic of all military vehicles, including those drawn by horses. Military vehicles were to keep to the left side of the roadway. Lorries were not to exceed 10 km/h⁸³ within the city. However, lorries still posed a threat, and the following order reduced the speed limit to 6 km/h.⁸⁴ This order also reminded drivers about left-hand traffic and passing the opposite direction traffic on the left, while overtaking on the right.

⁷⁹ *Polska Komenda Wojskowa w Krakowie. Rozkaz Nr. 6*, Kraków 1918, p. 3.

⁸⁰ *Polska Komenda Wojskowa w Krakowie. Rozkaz Nr. 9*, Kraków 1918, p. 3.

⁸¹ *Polska Komenda Wojskowa w Krakowie. Rozkaz Nr. 10*, Kraków 1918, p. 4.

⁸² *Komenda Wojskowa w Krakowie. Rozkaz Nr. 13*, Kraków 1918, pp. 3–4.

⁸³ *Ibidem*, p. 4.

⁸⁴ *Dowództwo Generalnego Okręgu w Krakowie. Rozkaz Nr. 22*, Kraków 1918, p. 7.

The order also stated to “severely punish drivers who do not obey the regulations or wilfully exceed the speed limit.”

On 30th December 1918, the following order was issued:

In order to control the traffic and check the ownership of automobiles that belonged to the former military authorities and currently are at the disposal of Polish army units and commands, we hereby order as follows:

The aforementioned vehicles, i.e. passenger cars, lorries and special vehicles, together with those whose assignment is not clear, shall be reported to the General District Headquarters in Kraków (Division V.) until 15th January 1919 at the latest.

Brand, police register number, type, power, wheel rim size, owner’s and driver’s names shall be provided. Vehicles whose rightful ownership and assignment would be established, and those acknowledged necessary to be kept in operation at present, shall be provided with appropriate cards at the General District Headquarters in Kraków. Vehicles that do not receive the card by the deadline stated above shall not be allowed in traffic and will be stopped and confiscated by appointed bodies.⁸⁵

Earlier, posters with the same content⁸⁶ addressed to civilians were displayed in the city and undersigned by Z. Lasocki, the head of the administrative department of the Polish Liquidation Committee.⁸⁷ Those restrictions remained binding in Poland virtually until the end of hostilities during the Polish-Soviet War in 1920.

⁸⁵ *Dowództwo Generalnego Okręgu w Krakowie. Rozkaz Nr. 28*, Kraków 1918, p. 4.

⁸⁶ Unfortunately the poster lacks the date of the order issuance, it only holds information about commandeering of automobiles not reported until “the 26th day of the current month.” In Lviv, similar posters issued by the Supreme Command of the Polish Armed Forces were dated 15th November 1915.

⁸⁷ National Library, file No. DŹS IA 6 Cim., *Obwieszczenie!*

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SZEGED AS HINTERLAND BETWEEN 1915–1917

Summary. The article discusses six aspects, which identified the stability of hinterland. Beside the sparse bibliographical sources, it mostly uses primary archival sources like mayor documents of Szeged, council documents of Szeged and lord lieutenant documents of Szeged. Additionally, it uses Délmagyarország newspaper from the four daily newspapers of Szeged, which has more than 70 articles about the theme, that can reflect the daily life of during the period. It handles all topics properly in proportion and in importance. It describes in the ways of catering provisions of grain, flour, meat and eggs. In the theme of military aid takes a look to the value of sacrifice on this the donate skills in the city. It discusses another important topic as well, the situation of women and children who went to the factories after the men marched into the army and specifically what happened with the factories. The second major part of the article are the finance, the public security and the health care. The finance and the public security are good evidence of the well managed background of the city's needs. Inside of the health care is really important factor the ordinary health situation, defense against epidemics and activity of the field hospitals. As attachments and imagery, I tried to insert the archival documents, posters, pictures of the Móra Ferenc Museum which are connected with this theme and term.

Keywords: Hinterland, Szeged, Hungary, First World War, local history

Introduction

A person may assume, that we know almost everything about the First World War and it's an old topic, which we should close, as we can't find anything new. The centenary of the world war has shown us, that we had little knowledge from this time. Topic of the hinterland was one of the most popular. In Hungary every city started to research about their town during the Great War. Thanks to this, the microhistory started to be important again and help us to show, that

nothing was black or white during this wartime, the regions, different cities could react differently, especially the capital city. I started my research in this topic in 2016, as a competition work. At the time I thought I could do a complex study, but the hinterland topic showed, that it is broader and more difficult than just for quick research. Now I would like to present a part of this work and show how was the life in Szeged during this time and which difficulties they battled.



Fig. 1. Dr. Szilveszter Somogyi mayor of Szeged. (Source: Móra Ferenc Museum, Szeged)

The chronological boundary of the study is 1915–1917. It begins with 1915, because the end of 1914 brought the most serious loss of lives. From then the obituaries also multiplied in Szeged. This time the lack of men in families and in workplaces became visible, and the first questions appeared between people about how the hinterland could last, but even with the knowledge that how they could persevere. There are several events that are part of the starting date. Szeged was declared an operational area from January 22nd, 1915 due to the war in Serbia, and the 46th Infantry Regiment of k.u.k. Szeged became part of the horrors of the front, first serving in Ukraine and Serbia, and later from June 1915 till 1917 they were in the Italian, Isonzo front line. On January 30th,

1915, the mayor György Lázár passed away and was succeeded by Dr. Szilveszter Somogyi (Fig. 1). For the closing date, I chose the importance of the military and emergency hospitals and reopened schools. In my opinion, the years 1915–1917 during the war were the most important stage in the adaptability of the hinterland to new challenges. Also, at that time the institutes and methods of the emergency situation started to form and work.

As sources, I used the mayoral and council documents of the Archives of Szeged and the articles from *Délmagyarország* newspaper. Since archival

sources are in some places incompleting I filled the gaps with relevant information from the press. Interesting cultural history addition: the lack of resources is due to the lack of paper in the 1950s, which forced archives to destroy documents by the political leadership.

Purveyance

We can say that food and its supply were the main tasks that a city's town hall had to provide. This is a cardinal issue that had an impact on all segments of life, similar to the issue of public security or the social situation.

The supply of grain, flour and bread, along with their production and transport, was the biggest task of the city. The supplies were very incomplete, as the soldiers had to be supplied by the (Hungarian) hinterland, as well as allied Germany and our partner Austria. From the beginning of December 1914, started the setting of food prices by the office, the requisition of grain, share flour and bread vouchers to keep normal life on level. The first major grain requisition was between April 15th–17th, 1915, ordered by the Ministry.¹ To oversee this, the police department had made a draft about the stock of grain in households. But the requisition wasn't just for the households, but for mills and breweries as well.² In this period the requisitions get permanent and hit mostly the egg barley makers, but they could get back some flour from the Ministry, because it was the main source for them. The requisitioned crops by the city were milled by Back Bernát and Sons mill.³ The Back mill was the most important mill in the area during the war, and most of the purchased crops were ground by them, making a great profit, making them one of the companies that became rich during the war. The data of the first major requisition: 1746 q wheat, 300 q rye, 100 q barley.⁴ The importance of the city is also shown by the spread of crops, which was seized by the National Economic Committee across the country. Szeged received 1662 q wheat and 383 q rye, more than some counties, such as Temes

¹ Hungarian National Archive – Csongrád-Csanád County Archive, Szeged: Mayor's documents (hereinafter: HNA-CCCA, Szeged: MD), sign. IV.B.1407; 8210/1915.

² HNA-CCCA, Szeged: MD, IV.B.1407; 1525/1915.

³ HNA-CCCA, Szeged: MD, IV.B.1407; 1730/1915.

⁴ HNA-CCCA, Szeged: MD, IV.B.1407; 3356/1915.

and Torontál counties, where Temes got 500 q wheat and 700 q rye and Torontál got 500 q wheat and 200 q rye.⁵

These data also shows that Szeged's food supply was better than in other cities and counties. Of course, this wasn't satisfying at the local level, compared to the prewar situation, which was shown by the citizens, who were sowing various vegetables in Rákóczi Square (Fig. 2, 3), which was an empty square at that time. Still, the situation was better than in most areas of the country.

This is confirmed by the decision issued by Dr. Szilveszter Somogyi on November 6, 1915, reducing the daily amount of flour to 2 kg per family (exceptions for egg barley makers). Soldiers were not allowed to shop, unless they are local citizens and buying for their families, thus preventing the inhabitants and stationed Czech soldiers here (k.u.k. 28th Infantry Regiment in Prague) from sending the rest of their rations to their relatives and families in other parts of the monarchy.⁶ This decision wasn't popular between the local military command. We know from the letters between the command and the town hall that the command didn't support the decision, because most of the soldiers didn't receive food, but got vouchers from the military treasury to redeem it for flour or bread. The mayor's office alluded to, that from August 15, 1915 purchased 910 wagons of wheat from the Ministry of Interior and the Ministry of Commerce and Agriculture for one year, which should have been enough for the inhabitants. Till November, the city had received 510 wagons, which was barely the end of the month. The remaining 400 wagons of wheat would have been supplied by Warcrops Co., promising to deliver 60 wagons per month, but only 40 of them arrived, purposed only for the citizens, because the military was supplied by the military treasury. Despite this, the mayor's office and the local military command have agreed that the city will choose some bakeries for soldiers where they can redeem their vouchers for food rations, until the military treasury can take further action.⁷

The city set up a victualling office, for this a factory and later for them a professional council. These functioned until the end of the war, trying to supply the city. The local prices of the food were set by the victualling office.

⁵ HNA-CCCA, Szeged: MD, IV.B.1407; 4808/1915.

⁶ HNA-CCCA, Szeged: MD, IV.B.1407; 10376/ 1915.

⁷ HNA-CCCA, Szeged: MD, IV.B.1407; 11180/1915; 11541/ 1915



Fig. 2. Rákóczi square. (Source: Móra Ferenc Museum, Szeged)



Fig. 3. Rákóczi square. (Source: Móra Ferenc Museum, Szeged)

From the beginning of the office it was making losses, and its real meaningful activity was only to insure the food supply and setting its price, which was generally close to the ministry's price setting.⁸

Maximising or even lowering food prices has caused serious problems for the city. Battle against the expensiveness during that period was tilting at windmills. Several attempts and ideas were made to stop prices, but all of these ended unsuccessfully. It was thought that if Szeged and its agriculture area were to be commercially locked down, food wouldn't flow out, the city would no longer be in need of such imports, could be almost self-supplying. But an area like this couldn't be taken under control (Fig. 4).⁹

For food saving, the flour and bread rationing has been introduced country-wide to everyone who has access to basic food (Fig. 5). In Szeged, the rationing was introduced on April 1st, 1915. It can be a success that till April 17th, bread prices were able to be lowered by 44 pennies. Of course, this decrease was only temporary, but at least during the Great War the price of bread did not increase as greatly as that other products did. The perfectionize of the system was permanent,¹⁰ and from September 16th, 1915 was almost perfect, entered the flour and bread booklet as a voucher. Every family in Szeged, who needed public care (most of the citizens) was able to get a booklet. All families in need were assigned to a flour merchant or a bakery, where the booklet was addressed. That's the only place where they could redeem the ticket, not anywhere else. On the cover of the booklet there was recorded the name of the head of the family, his residence, the number of family members, the amount of food they were entitled to each day, the assigned shop and the booklet identification number. If the booklet was lost, it had to be reported, its ID number was deleted and then they got a new booklet with a new number. The booklet had 12 sheets (like months) and 30 or 31 lines were drawn on each page – depending on how many days were in the month – the daily dose was written, as on the front page. If the family redeemed a daily quantity, the merchant ripped the note out of it. It was like a raffle ticket.

⁸ HNA-CCCA, Szeged: Council's documents: IV.B.1406; 10127/1917; "Délmagyarország" 1916, January 16th, pp. 5–6; January 19th, pp. 3–4; January 20th, pp. 3–4; March 3rd, p. 3; March 10th, pp. 4–5; March 14th, p. 3.

⁹ "Délmagyarország" 1915, June 10th, p. 4; June 11th, p. 6; June 16th, p. 4; June 17th, pp. 3–4; August 20th, pp. 6–7; September 26th, p. 3; September 29th, p. 5.

¹⁰ "Délmagyarország" 1915, April 17th, p. 4.




Fig. 4. Map of Szeged free royal city. The city and the agriculture area
(Source: Móra Ferenc Museum, Szeged)



Fig. 5. Bread-line in front of the victualling office
(Source: Móra Ferenc Museum, Szeged)

The redemption was not mandatory daily, it could have happened every week or every half-month, as families had money. The booklet could be transferred if a family no longer needed flour or had no money to redeem more. In this case, the remaining daily doses could be given to a family that needed additional doses.¹¹ The price of bread on July 30th, 1914 was 34 pennies, on July 2nd, 1916 it was 1 crown, by February 9th, 1917 it had already reached more than 1 crown 80 pennies. In more than 2,5 years, the price of bread has increased by 5,3 times.¹² Also made problem in food supplying the prisoners of war, who were deported to the city and the refugees from the other parts of the monarchy. So the city should supply for 130 000 people (10 000 refugees + 120 000 inhabitants).¹³

The consumption of meat in wartime was not as standard as the grain. That's why, it is not surprising that during the Great War the consumption of meat has fallen sharply. This is partly due to the greater need for meat on the front line and partly the restrictions of meat consumption in the hinterland and the increase of the price of meat. From July 8th, 1915, two days a week, Tuesdays and Fridays banned the consumption of meat.¹⁴ Later, from September 22nd, 1916, this regulation was supplemented by the ban on slaughtering two days a week, Tuesdays and Thursdays, and the use of meals, serving to shops and restaurants on Mondays, which requires the use of fat.¹⁵ Interesting that people move from the consumption of pork to sheep and lamb. It could be, because the pork was cheaper and it was profitable to get it to the front. This is also shown by the 1915's slaughterhouse count of Szeged's Meat and Market Co., which is compared to the 1914s data.¹⁶

If the third-year slaughter data of 1916 is compared to a third-year slaughter average of 1915, it can be accurately observed that the cuts have more than halved or even decreased by a quarter.

¹¹ HNA-CCCA, Szeged: Council's documents: IV.B.1406; 41355/ 1916.

¹² HNA-CCCA, Szeged: Council's documents: IV.B.1406; 13552/1916; "Délmagyarország" 1914, July 30th, p. 3; 1916, September 30th, p. 3; 1917, February 9th, p. 5.

¹³ "Délmagyarország" 1917, October 3rd, p. 3.

¹⁴ "Délmagyarország" 1915, July 6th, p. 5.

¹⁵ "Délmagyarország" 1916, September 22nd, p. 5.

¹⁶ HNA-CCCA, Szeged: Council's documents: IV.B.1406; 14180/1916.

Table 1

Slaughterhouse accounting, 1915 (in piece)

Year	Beef	Veal	Sheep, lamb	Pork
1914	9757	7110	29 755	39 874
1915	10 052	4277	32 248	24 815

The slaughterhouse data from April to July 1916 also shows the same.¹⁷

Table 2

Third-year slaughter data, 1916 (in piece)

1916	Beef	Veal	Sheep, lamb	Pork
April	476	435	2575	912
May	289	185	1785	652
June	221	303	958	762
July	221	359	615	932
Sum	1207	1282	5933	3258

Emergency support, aid

The aid was one of the most important during the war. It helped ease, eased the extra burden of war, inflation, and expensiveness. The level of support was determined by the Ministry of Interior and the Hungarian Royal Directorate of Finance. Dr. Szilveszter Somogyi didn't like the system considered good by the government. From his letter to the Finance Directorate on January 7th, 1915, we can read that he is critical of the time when the aid is scattered and referred. He thought that the citizens's aid and the most important they don't receive it in time. The mayor has requested that the city should determine the level of aid. This letter has been left unanswered.¹⁸

¹⁷ "Délmagyarország" 1916, August 3rd, p. 3.

¹⁸ HNA-CCCA, Szeged: MD, IV.B.1407; 816/1915; 1997/1916.

We know the amount of the support, in June, 1915 the basic amount was 78 pennies per day, per person. Our most accurate data is on the second aid for administrative personnel. This was for one year from November 1st, 1916, and the Ministry of Interior decided the amounts according to the category of people, divided into 4 groups.

- Close administrative staff: this included tax and publicans or customs. Their aid rate was between 308 and 840 crown per year.
- Administrative staff not closely involved: this includes, for example, registrar, librarian, music teacher, coachman, machinist, gardener, etc. Their aid was from 300 to 1320 crown a year. The 1320 crown was awarded to István Tömörkény, director of museums and libraries, more than the mayor got
- Administrative officials: this shall mean officials, doctors, councillors, messengers, prosecutors, office servants, the mayor, the police chief, the auxiliary and treating staff. They received between 200 and 1280 crown a year.
- Per diems: this is where each per diems is taken. They received 300 crowns a year uniformly. We know that one person received about 1–3 crowns a day, so this allowance is about half their salary.

Not everyone was satisfied with this, especially the per diems, who submitted applications for increase of their support, which resulted that their daily allowance being extended by 1 crown, giving them 2–4 crowns at least a day.¹⁹

Public support

In every important city, like in Wien, Bratislava, Székesfehérvár, Sieben, Budapest and also in Szeged had stood a statue of a soldier, which have tried to symbolize the service of human sacrifice, public subscription. These statues were made of wood or iron. Their goal was to encourage charity, to help the civilian population, to care for the widows and orphans of soldiers, who had gone to war. Anyone, who threw any donation into a box in front of the statues, as exchange for help could beat a metal scale into the wooden soldier. The movement was so successful that the wooden soldiers were completely covered by

¹⁹ HNA-CCCA, Szeged: Council's documents: IV.B.1406; 42826/1916.

the metal scales. The wooden soldier of Szegeď was the third statue in the monarchy, after Wien and Bratislava. The wooden soldier of Szegeď had stood publicly, in Széchenyi Square on September 8th, 1915. It was successful, the statue was/is almost fully covered.²⁰ (Fig. 6, 7)




Fig. 6. The wooden soldier and his maker, István Szentgyörgyi
(Source: Móra Ferenc Museum, Szegeď)

²⁰ D. SZABÓ, *A nemzeti áldozatkészség szobra. (Avagy fából vaskatona)*, “Budapesti Negyed” 1994, vol. 3, pp. 59–84.



Fig. 7. The wooden soldier on the Széchenyi square
(Source: Móra Ferenc Museum, Szeged)

Women, children, factories

At first, it may be strange that these three things are connected to each other, but they are closely connected. As a result of the war, most of the war-age men had been sent to the front. The Witch-Island (Boszorkánysziget) street was the first place in Szeged, where had to lose all its male inhabitants.²¹ According to the ministry's decision, the leadership of the city called all the factories in Szeged, like Bugyi's and Soós's iron foundry, Pálffy brothers' paprika factory, Back Bernát and Sons mill, that they can't stop the production in order to support the war effort, so that they can keep the fronts and the economy alive.²² This was very difficult to implement, so much so that in October–November 1917, several factories were forced to shut down due to the coal shortages.²³ While all the men were on front, the factories had given permission to invite the wives of the fighting workers to work instead of their husbands, or even hire female workers to keep the continuity of production. The women were needed not only in factories, also in military and emergency hospitals.²⁴ Unfortunately, this situation has the fact, that women were not at home in the household, leaving children alone. Children became more susceptible for street vagrancy and debauchery, which had integrated into their daily routines. The situation has been aggravated by two things. The first was, that children under the age of 15 were not allowed to go to the cinema without permission, so a kind of cinema ban has been placed.²⁵ It was explained by trying to protect them from the harmful side effects of watching movies, that they would not be able to react well to certain life situations, instead of finding a solution, they would only create panic. They were also banned from going to the pubs and smoking cigarettes.²⁶

The second was the expansion of military and emergency hospitals to heal the injured soldiers from the front. On the grounds of this expansion, the schools had to close to earn more space for the hospitals. There was a unified school, but

²¹ "Délmagyarország" 1916, February 22nd, p. 3.

²² HNA-CCCA, Szeged: Council's documents: IV.B.1406; 25279/1916.

²³ "Délmagyarország" 1917, November 8th, p. 3.

²⁴ "Délmagyarország" 1917, December 3rd, p. 3.

²⁵ "Délmagyarország" 1916, February 16th, p. 4.

²⁶ HNA-CCCA, Szeged: Council's documents: IV.B.1406; 11114/1916; "Délmagyarország" 1916, February 6th, p. 4.

it could take only limited number of children. Thus, children not only in the afternoons, but all day long were in the streets. These factors are followed by the juvenile delinquency increase. Against the crime the city organized children police.²⁷ Until January 1917, approximately 1200 youngsters had been brought to the justice. After all the struggles the city ordered to close the emergency hospitals and reopen the schools.²⁸

Public safety

Public safety was the third-most important factor in the life of the hinterland. The city administration also knew that if they could provide food and supply the citizens, they could keep public safety in order. It is important to mention that it was forbidden for the press to spread bad or scaremongering news, which could distress panic. We can say that the number of crimes has not risen as much as before the war. From the monthly reports of Police Chief József Szalay, we can see that the number of burglaries, thefts and murders during the war was among the same values as before. The juvenile delinquency were higher than in pre-war times. The abuse of food was of course an understandable behaviour. More people wanted to have cheaper food or flour merchants and bakeries wanted to sell their remaining flour illegally.²⁹ During the war, political leaders across the country, such as in Szeged, were worried about the danger of workers and socialists rebelling against power to starting a revolution (as it happened October, 1918). The Interior Ministry requested the lord lieutenant in the country to observe socialist party members, industrial and railway workers, socialist party leaders and to check the post of these people. József Szalay reports that there was no sign of any agitation. However, socialist leaders and their posts are still being monitored. The postmaster also has been informed about this matter, and if there is any emergency, they are prepared to take immediate action against them.³⁰ During the war, there wasn't any precedent, everybody focused on the common problems.

²⁷ I. TÓTH, *Gyermekszociális gondoskodás Szegeden a századelőn (1914–1918)*, "A Móra Ferenc Múzeum Évkönyve. Studia Historica" 2000, No. 3, pp. 127–149.

²⁸ "Délmagyarország" 1917; January 4th, p. 3.

²⁹ HNA-CCCA, Szeged: MD, IV.B.1407; 5007/1915; 9786/1915.

³⁰ HNA-CCCA, Szeged: Lord lieutenant's documents: IV.B.1401; 268/1915.

Health



Fig. 8. Emergency hospital at School of Rókus (Saint Roch)
(Source: Móra Ferenc Museum, Szeged)

The importance of health care is also indisputable. During the war the living standard decreased, which may have led to a rise in diseases, epidemics. The city council warned doctors to take extra care for illnesses, if necessary, start taking precautions. Thanks to the extra care, the diseases, like scarlet fever, rubeola, respiratory disease, brain and spinal cord inflammation, typhus couldn't spread that much to create an epidemic in the city.³¹ The number of births fell significantly during the war. The first observation on this can be found in the mayor's monthly report of April 1915, when the number of births fell sharply compared to March. Of course, because the war started exactly 9 months earlier.³² These numbers didn't get better this period, because later even more men went to the fronts. Also, the war and emergency hospitals played a big role in the life

³¹ HNA-CCCA, Szeged: MD, IV.B.1407; 2693/1915; 5007/1915; 9164/1915; "Délmagyarország" 1915, October 8th, p. 4.

³² HNA-CCCA, Szeged: MD, IV.B.1407; 5007/1915.

of Szeged, changing in several ways the everyday life of the city. For example, the Red Cross, Catholic Woman Society, Jewish Woman Society, Freemasons operated emergency hospitals. The citizens, as much as they could, tried to help to donate to these hospitals.³³ In Szeged approximately 23 hospitals worked during the Great War (Fig. 8, 9). But we must not forget the downsides of the hospitals. As I mentioned earlier, most of the emergency hospitals were placed instead of schools. That's why the schools got closed, the children were in the streets and the juvenile delinquency increased. For this reason, after January, 1917 the emergency hospitals closed and schools reopened. We can say, that in these two years these emergency hospitals performed really well, but the rest of the wartime only the war and military hospitals were at work.³⁴



Fig. 9. Emergency hospital in the Black house
(Source: Móra Ferenc Museum, Szeged)

³³ "Délmagyarország" 1914, November 8th, p. 3.

³⁴ "Délmagyarország" 1917, January 4th, p. 3.

Conclusion

We can say that Szeged has done well to supply the hinterland. The common goal was to keep the people at home calm and to stabilize their life prospects, to survive the trial of the wartime, the leaders of the city and the citizens worked together well, they have managed to avoid collapse. The previously calm rhythm of life was broken and they were able to adapt their life to the ongoing situation. The growing social tensions also were regulated by the city, that tried to find a solution for it. We can't say that the life was easy and perfect that time, but with sacrifices they could survive the bad, hard, though times with smaller problems and less chaos than the other parts of the country.

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THE REACTION OF THE UNDERGROUND PRESS TO THE DISPLACEMENT OF POLISH CHILDREN FROM THE ZAMOŚĆ REGION TO SIEDLCE IN 1943*

Summary. During World War II, the Germans committed many crimes against Poles, whom they forcibly displaced from the Zamość region. After the Poles had been driven out of their homes, they were placed in transit camps, which included the German transit camp in Zamość (UWZ-Lager Zamosc). In the Zamość camp, the Germans conducted racial tests and separated children from their mothers. After a few days or several weeks, children who were “racially worthless” (and therefore unfit for Germanization) were transported under severe freezing conditions in crowded cattle carriages, without water or food. The Germans sent six “death transports” from Zamość to a town in the eastern part of the Warsaw district. One of these transports carrying children and old people displaced from the Zamość region reached the train station in Siedlce. Many of the children were in disastrous health. The inhabitants of Siedlce and the surrounding area rushed to help, organizing a quick action to save the lives and health of the children.

The mass murder of Polish children from the Zamość region caused terror, widespread indignation, and protest of the Polish population in the occupied Polish territory. On February 3rd, 1943, a silent demonstration took place in Siedlce during a mass funeral for displaced persons, both children and adults, who died during the transport and right after the transport had arrived in the city. These events were reflected in the pages of underground magazines.

Keywords: transit camp in Zamość, UWZ-Lager Zamość, Underground Press, Displacement of Polish Children, Siedlce, World War II, Germans, Children of Zamojszczyzna, extermination

The displacement of the Polish population in the Zamość region, initiated by the Germans in the fall of 1941, was associated with the expulsion of the Poles from their homes and their placement in a transit camp in Zamość (UWZ-Lager

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Zamosc).¹ At first the displacement was conducted as a dry run, but after November 27th, 1942 the displacement was conducted on a grand scale. The farms of the displaced Poles were occupied by German settlers. These events found a voice in the pages of underground magazines.² The fate of children (and old people) deported in the “death transports” to the eastern part of the Warsaw district did not go unnoticed. One of six such transports left Zamość on January 30th, 1943, and reached the Siedlce railway station the next day. This transport included prisoners – mainly children and the elderly – of the German transit camp in Zamość. Some of the children were accompanied by their mothers, grandparents, or older relatives who were left with their children during the racial selection to which all Poles forcibly displaced from the Zamość region were subjected to. In the camp, the population was subjected to racial selection and, based on the Nordic race pattern (fair hair, blue eyes, appropriate facial contours, etc.), were assigned to one of four groups. Children were classified on the basis of their conformance to German racial criteria and Nordic characteristics, including blue eyes and blond hair. Group I was composed of Poles of German extraction. Group II was made up of persons deemed suitable for Germanization. Group III consisted of persons destined for forced labour in the Third Reich. Group IV, the final group, was composed of persons destined for KL Auschwitz II – Birkenau, as well as children younger than 14 years of age and adults older than 60. In order to keep the segregated groups apart, each was assigned its own barracks. Children younger than 15 years of age were placed in the worst barracks, known as the “horse barracks.” These

¹ The displacement and settlement action carried out in the Zamość region is the most tragic episode of the criminal activity of the German occupier, unprecedented in all of occupied Europe (except for the Final Solution of the Jewish and Roma questions). The displacement action covered approximately 110 000 Poles in the Zamość region, including about 30 000–35 000 children (about 10 000 lost or died). The deportations lasted until mid-August 1943 (with breaks). In the first months of the Poles’ displacement, they were placed in a transit camp in Zamość (UWZ-Lager Zamosc). Cz. MAJĄCZYK, *Polityka okupanta wobec narodu polskiego w okresie II wojny światowej*, [in:] *Problemy wojny i okupacji 1939–1944*, eds. W. GÓRA and J. GOŁĘBIOWSKI, Warszawa 1969, p. 60; Z. TOKARZ, *Dzieci w obozach hitlerowskich na ziemiach polskich w latach 1939–1945*, [in:] *Zbrodnie i sprawy. Ludobójstwo hitlerowskie przed sądem ludzkości i historii*, ed. C. PILICHOWSKI, Warszawa 1980, p. 574; J. MARKIEWICZ, *Chłopi Zamojszczyzny wobec polityki okupanta*, [in:] *Chłopi w obronie Zamojszczyzny*, eds. J. GMITRUK and Z. MAŃKOWSKI, Warszawa 1985, p. 48.

² Vide: J. WOŁOSZYN, *Reakcja prasy konspiracyjnej na wydarzenia w Zamojskiem z lat 1942–1943*, “Pamięć i Sprawiedliwość” 2002, No. 2, pp. 95–120.

children were left to the care of the elderly, who were often not competent and in need of care themselves.³

Prisoners were also segregated in the transit camp in Zamość according to their suitability for forced labour in the Reich. Children (up to 14 years of age) whose parents were deported to the Reich for forced labour and children deemed “racially worthless,” and therefore unfit for Germanization, suffered especially. They were forcibly separated from their parents.⁴ The Germans did not even pay attention to newborns or breastfed infants.⁵ Children were placed in the worst of the so-called “horse barracks” and deprived of the most basic survival equipment/supplies (stoves, beds, mattresses, dishes and cutlery, etc.). The children were crammed into wooden bunks, but there was not room for all of the children on the bunks. Some had to linger on the floor, often in mud and water. One of the former prisoners remembered a picture of such a barrack: “I saw a long corridor in front of me, on both sides there were the so-called halls. I was brought to the first room by the door, there were bunk beds made of planks, and there were many children sitting and laying on them. I was shown a place by the wall at the bottom. I looked around this room, the planks making up the wall were tight, and there was some kind of sealant in the cracks. I looked more closely and there were live bedbugs.”⁶ There was no free access to drinking water in the camp, nor water in which to bathe or wash, for example, one’s underwear. The displaced persons were kept in the same clothes all the time (day and night). This meant that vermin (lice, bedbugs, etc.) multiplied in great numbers. For this reason, infectious diseases spread in the camp and decimated the prisoners.

In these inhumane conditions, the death rate in the camp was enormous, especially among the youngest prisoners. The children suffered mainly from lung diseases (e.g. due to drafts in barracks, leaks in the roofs and walls) and infectious

³ Archives of the Institute of National Remembrance (hereinafter: A IPNW), Główna Komisja Badania Zbrodni Hitlerowskich w Polsce, file No. 162/663, folio 61–62, Telex No. 197 663 dated 31 X 1942, Ewakuacja Polaków z Dystryktu Lubelskiego (Zamość) dla zrobienia miejsca dla osiedlenia Volksdeutscheów.

⁴ J. MARSZAŁEK, *Hitlerowskie więzienia i obozy w Zamościu*, Zamość 1980, p. 7.

⁵ A IPNW, file No. BU 2535/45, part 1, folio 122, *Protokół przesłuchania świadka Feliksy W.*, Zamość 13 VII 1946.

⁶ A. BOCZKOWSKI, *Niepublikowane wspomnienia z lat okupacji niemieckiej – pacyfikacji Zamojszczyzny*, https://tpg-grabowiec.pl/articles.php?article_id=49 (access: 3 XII 2020).

diseases (e.g. cholera, typhoid fever, typhus). In December 1942, a measles epidemic broke out.⁷ It is worth emphasizing that there was no medical care in the camp, even during the period of mass evictions and overcrowding of the barracks. The doctor recruited from among the displaced persons could not provide help to those in need due to a lack of even basic medicine.⁸ Children died of starvation in the camp. Daily food rations per person consisted of a portion of bread (140 grams) and black, bitter black coffee (for breakfast and dinner), as well as turnip soup (once a day), described by former prisoners as “spit-soup” or “quasi-soup.” The children commonly had diarrhoea and anaemia. They also had abdominal swelling – the children swelled from hunger and died. In such inhumane conditions, prisoners had to wait weeks for the formation of transports and removal from the camp to their final destination. However, not all lived to see the opening of the camp gate and deportation.

The first transports with children were sent by the Germans from the transit camp in Zamość in December 1942. There were three transports with children and elderly persons, totalling 2 213 people.⁹ These people were transported to the Garwolin powiat (eastern part of the Warsaw district) and left at the mercy of the local community. In this district, in the eastern counties, the Germans intended to create so-called pension villages (“Rentendörfer”), to deport children, old people, the sick or disabled, and those incapable of work from the transit camp in Zamość.¹⁰ At the beginning of December 1942, the SS and police commander in Warsaw appointed Siedlce (for 350 families) and Łosice (to accommodate 150 families), among other cities and towns. However, the project to create “Rentendörfer” was not implemented.¹¹ Wherever the “death transports”

⁷ J.M., *Nie wierzyliśmy we własne szczęście...*, [in:] *Nie było kiedy płakać. Losy rodzin polskich wysiedlonych z Zamojszczyzny 1942–1943*, introduction and ed. B. KOZACZYŃSKA, Siedlce 2014, p. 95; T. MADEJ, *Wspomnienia “Dziecka Zamojszczyzny”*, [in:] H. KAJTEL, *Hitlerowski obóz przesiedleńczy w Zamościu UWZ Lager Zamość*, Biłgoraj 2003, p. 93.

⁸ A IPNW, file No. BU 2535/45, part 1, folio 153, Pismo Władysława D. do Sądu Okręgowego w Zamościu, (31 July 1946).

⁹ Central Archives of Modern Records in Warsaw, Rada Główna Opiekuńcza. Biuro Centrali w Krakowie 1940–1945), file No. 777, folio 10; *ibidem*, file No. 687, folio 220.

¹⁰ A IPNW, Główna Komisja Badania Zbrodni Hitlerowskich w Polsce, file No. 162/663, folio 93 – Order I. 10 Wyszalenie ludności polskiej z terenu osiedleńczego “Z”.

¹¹ Objections against the creation of pension villages in this area were raised by the occupation authorities of the Warsaw district. Dr. F. Seemann, the starost of the Siedlce powiat, even sent a report on this matter to the governor, L. Fischer, describing the creation of pension villages as an “inhuman

with displaced people from the Zamość region reached their destination, the local population rushed to their aid, taking them under their roof.

The stay in the transit camp in Zamość left an indelible mark on the health and life of the displaced Poles, especially children. When the transport reached the railway station in Siedlce (January 31st, 1943), it was directed to a sidetrack on orders from the Germans. There were 998 people in the transport, mainly children (86 children under age 4; 236 children ages 4–10) and the elderly.¹² Half-frozen and poorly dressed, displaced persons started to come out of the wagons, asking in panic if they would “go back to the camp.”¹³ After unloading the carriages, the Germans ordered a record of the newcomers to be made, and that they be placed in Jewish apartments in the city. The Jewish population had been forced to leave by the Germans several months earlier, as a result of deportation for extermination to the death camp in Treblinka (the Jewish ghetto in the city had been liquidated in August 1942). These flats were completely unusable. They were in poor structural condition and did not have the necessary basic equipment. There was also a shortage of food and clothes for the new arrivals. Some of the displaced persons had only scraps of clothing and many children were dressed inadequately for the winter. In this situation, it was necessary to organize help as soon as possible and provide the displaced with the most necessary things. The Polish Welfare Committee in Siedlce, being the coordinator of the aid action, immediately initiated a fundraiser “for the victims of the Zamość region.”¹⁴ In mid-February 1943, the underground “Biuletyn Informacyjny” reported on the unfavourable attitude of the German authorities towards this action.¹⁵

In the pages of underground magazines, in particular “Agencja Informacyjna »Więś«”, “Głos Pracy”, and “Biuletyn Informacyjny”, a lot of space was devoted to the reaction of the inhabitants of Siedlce to the news that transport with children from the Zamość region had reached the city. The warm and fraternal acceptance of these children by the local people to their homes was emphasized. The inhabitants of Siedlce reacted immediately to the orphaned fate of

undertaking”. B. KOZACZYŃSKA, *Losy dzieci z Zamojszczyzny wysiedlonych do powiatu siedleckiego w latach 1943–1945*, Siedlce 2006, p. 41.

¹² *Ibidem*, p. 60.

¹³ *Ibidem*, p. 49.

¹⁴ *Dzieci z Zamojszczyzny w Siedlcach*, “Biuletyn Informacyjny” 1943, No. 66, p. 6.

¹⁵ *Ibidem*.

the children. These children made up the majority in the transport. Their health was catastrophic as a result of several weeks' stay in inhumane conditions in a transit camp in Zamość. We read the following about the aid operation for orphans from the Zamość region:

The news about children from the Zamość region spread like wildfire across the city. (...) The society reacted spontaneously to the sight of the national disaster. (...) Hundreds of Polish mothers reacted keenly to the misfortune of little ones. (...) Healthier children were immediately dispersed to private homes, several dozen seriously ill, with frostbitten legs and hands, were sent to the hospital. No one was lacking among those willing to come to the aid of the unfortunate, because even the caretaker, even a hard-working labourer, took the discarded chick from the family nest. What we saw was a touching image, proof of national solidarity in a time of misfortune. Indeed, my heart rejoiced at the sight of those Polish mothers who willingly assumed the additional duty of care and upbringing of these unfortunate orphans.¹⁶

The inhabitants of Siedlce, who were rushing with food for the newcomers, were informed about the general sacrifice. Among others, horse-drawn carriages from Siedlce joined the action by transporting food.¹⁷ The situation of children in Siedlce was noted in the "Information Bulletin": "Poor orphans have finally found a roof over their heads and the tender, good hearts of the Siedlce society!"¹⁸

It is worth noting that the reaction of the inhabitants of Siedlce after the arrival of the transport to this city with the displaced persons from the Zamość region was compared to the attitude of the population of Warsaw in early January 1943. For example, it was written that the children were snapped up in the same haste as Warsaw had done.¹⁹ Indeed, the upheaval of Polish society in Warsaw was impressive. For several days in January 1943, the displaced children were searched for, mainly at Warsaw stations and railway stops (even duty hours were organized). It was a reaction to the appearance in Warsaw of rumours about children from the Zamość region, frozen and unattended, seen

¹⁶ *U grobu ofiar barbarzyństwa niemieckiego. Żałobny reportaż z Podlasia*, "Głos Pracy" 1943, No. 8, p. 1.

¹⁷ *Dodatkowe wiadomości o wysiedlonych z Zamojszczyzny w Siedlcach*, "Agencja Informacyjna »Więć«" 1943, No. 4, p. 6.

¹⁸ *Dzieci z Zamojszczyzny w Siedlcach*, "Biuletyn Informacyjny" 1943, No. 66, p. 6.

¹⁹ *Manifestacja w Siedlcach*, "Głos Polski" 1943, No. 3, p. 5.

in the occupied capital, in sealed freight cars. These children were to be taken by the Germans in an unknown direction (to be exterminated or Germanized).²⁰ In Warsaw, the situation really began to boil. Local RGO units received over 40 000 applications from people who wanted to take care of children and even adopt them.²¹ The inhabitants of Warsaw played a great role in the action of saving Polish children from the Zamość region, but this is a separate page in the history of the occupied Polish capital.²²

The underground press also wrote about a public demonstration in Siedlce during the mass funeral of displaced persons from the Zamość region, organized on February 3rd, 1943. On that day, people gathered in crowds in front of the church of Saint Stanislaus, waiting for the funeral ceremony of displaced persons who had died in transport and just after arrival in Siedlce. When unloading the wagons, it turned out that nine people had not survived the hardships of transport, and 14 more died in the following hours. The funeral of the displaced persons took place on February 3, 1943, with the participation of several thousand people, mainly inhabitants of Siedlce and its vicinity. As reported by the underground “Głos Pracy”:

With the ringing of bells and the participation of thousands in the crowd, they set out for a solemn service. 22 coffins were buried in the local cemetery. At the sight of this terrible procession of death, a mournful sob shook the crowd. The tears of national mourning ran down the faces of young and old. (...) But this huge crowd of people walking in a funeral procession and standing over a common, fraternal grave, it was really the Polish nation in miniature, a nation aware that it had grown out of one tree stump, had one blood in its veins, and that on that day misfortune comes out of the underground again full of its national consciousness and pride. 22 coffins were taken by the Podlasie region. The tomb sheltering 22 victims of Nazi barbarity will be forever a symbol of national heroism, a monument to the cruel and shameful Nazi occupation in our land.²³

²⁰ L. LANDAU, *Kronika lat wojny i okupacji*, Warszawa 1962, vol. 2, pp. 91, 93–94; A. BARAŃSKI, *Gorące serce Warszawy*, “Zamojski Kwartalnik Kulturalny” 2012, No. 4, pp. 33–37.

²¹ J. JASIŃSKI, *Z dziejów polskiej spółdzielczości spóżywców podczas II wojny światowej*, Warszawa 1965, p. 219.

²² *Vide*: B. KOZACZYŃSKA, *Spoleczeństwo Warszawy na ratunek dzieciom wysiedlonym z Zamojszczyzny do dystryktu warszawskiego w latach 1942–1943*, [in:] *Bezpieczeństwo i edukacja dla bezpieczeństwa w zmieniającej się przestrzeni społecznej i kulturowej*, ed. R. ROSA, Siedlce 2012, pp. 289–302.

²³ *U grobu ofiar...*, p. 408. The number of buried people was incorrectly stated.

Information about the demonstration funeral was also published in the "Information Bulletin": "The collective funeral of the unfortunate took place on February 2 with the massive participation of several thousand people in Siedlce."²⁴ In one of the issues of the "Information Bulletin" there is a photograph showing the corpses of the children who died during their transport to Siedlce.²⁵

Echoes of the silent demonstration that took place in Siedlce on February 3rd, 1943 continued for weeks. On March 15th, 1943, the underground "Samoobrona" [magazine] noted:

On February 3 this year, Siedlce witnessed a powerful demonstration that took place in connection with the mass funeral of people who died in the transport of displaced persons from the Zamość region. The funeral was attended by over 5000 people, so that the procession stretched for 1 km and, with the ringing of bells, stretched through the entire city, to the cemetery at ul. Cmentarna. (...) Among the crowd there were Gestapo men in plain clothes, who stopped people from taking photos of the procession. In the days that followed, people were still looking for funeral photos at local photo shops.²⁶

In turn, one of the issues of the underground "Głos Pracy" contains extensive information about the fate of adult displaced persons deported to Siedlce. Some of them stayed in the transit camp in Zamość for six weeks, others for as much as nine weeks. One of the farmers (a farmer on 20 morga of land – morgon is a unit of land measurement), when asked about the reasons for his displacement to the camp, stated that there had been an attempt to persuade him to sign the so-called Volksliste (German nationality list), which he refused. Besides, he paid taxes and gave away the entire assigned contingent to the Germans, and yet he was expelled from his home and his land confiscated. At that time, the farmer did not know the real reasons for the displacement and ill-treatment of tens of thousands of inhabitants in the Zamość region. At the end of November 1942, the Germans began an attempt to implement the General Plan for the East ("Generalplan Ost"), a long-term plan for German settlement in the East.

²⁴ *Niedola wysiedleńców*, "Biuletyn Informacyjny" 1943, No. 6, p. 7. The date of the funeral was incorrectly given.

²⁵ "Biuletyn Informacyjny" 1943, No. 8, p. 8.

²⁶ "Samoobrona" 1943, No. 3, p. 5.

It was connected with the displacement of people from the Zamość region and the settlement of German colonists in this area.²⁷

The aforementioned interlocutor, cited by the author of the above-mentioned article, also pointed to the terrible conditions in which he stayed in the camp in Zamość: "It was terrible in the "camp". Dirt, hunger, lice, neither lie down nor sit down. For 14 people, they gave 2 kg of bread per day and once a day a watery soup (*lura*). If not for the help "from behind the barbed wire fence", none of us would have survived."²⁸ At the end, the interlocutor stated: "Here [in Siedlce] we feel like in paradise."²⁹

The attitude of the society of Siedlce and the Siedlce powiat, as well as Garwolin and others,³⁰ to which transports with displaced children from the Zamość region arrived in the late fall and winter of 1942/1943, was defined as exemplary, and the generosity and helpfulness of the population were recognized as being common in the activities in the aid section (donating food, clothing, admitting children to foster families, etc.).³¹

The information provided in the underground magazines was not always in agreement with reality. As I wrote earlier, there were mistakes in the date of the funeral and the number of dead displaced persons from Zamość. There were also inaccuracies regarding the transport travel time and the fate of the displaced after their arrival in Siedlce.³² In one of the issues of the "Information

²⁷ CZ. MADAJCZYK, *Generalna Gubernia w planach hitlerowskich. Studia*, Warszawa 1961, pp. 109, 115–117.

²⁸ *U grobu ofiar...*, pp. 407–408.

²⁹ *Ibidem*, p. 408.

³⁰ A little earlier, the underground journals wrote about transports with displaced persons from the first phase of displacement in the Zamość region, sent in December 1942 from the transit camp in Zamość to the Garwolin powiat. Most of these transports were of children. For example, their situation was reported at the end of January 1943: "There is a mass outbreak of measles among the children, they have a cold, and the mortality rate is high among the youngest. (...) The displaced are without money and food, and the children are very badly dressed. Healthier old men and some mothers are begging in nearby villages", *Wysiedleni z Zamojskiego w Garwolińskim*, "Agencja Informacyjna »Więś«" 1943, No. 1, p. 4.

³¹ *Niedola wysiedleńców*, "Biuletyn Informacyjny" 1943, No. 6, p. 7.

³² It was incorrectly stated that the transport took three days. The date of the funeral was also incorrect and wrongly stated about the number of people who died in Siedlce during transport and just after their arrival. *Ibidem*.

Agency »Wieść« it was incorrectly stated that the displaced persons from the transport (including children) had ended up in Siedlce “behind the wires” and the Gestapo in Siedlce did not allow the children to be taken by local families at first; and the population was forced to give them food through a barbed wire fence. Later in the article there was incorrect information about the intervention of the mayor and the County Welfare Council,³³ as a result of which the Germans agreed that the Poles would take the children to their homes.³⁴ It is completely incomprehensible that the third issue of the “Information Bulletin”, dated January 21st, 1943, contained false information about the deportation of children and old people to the Siedlce and Sokołów powiats.³⁵ The Germans never sent a transport with displaced persons from the Zamość region to the Sokołów powiat (although they had planned to); the first transport to the Siedlce powiat (whose ultimate destination was Siedlce) arrived on January 31st, 1943, and another arrived in the town of Mordy in the Siedlce powiat on February 2nd, 1943.³⁶

When writing about the aid operation for children displaced from the Zamość region, it was emphasized that wherever transports with these children appeared, the population immediately began to spontaneously rescue them. The sacrificial help given to thousands of children displaced from the Zamość region, as was noted on the pages of the underground papers, could not provide a sense of a well-fulfilled duty in the situation, as much more difficult tasks were to be expected in the future. The necessity of full readiness and mobilization of Poles for possible action was indicated.³⁷

It is noteworthy that the issue of the deportation of Polish children from the Zamość region was also widely echoed both during the German occupation (also in the émigré Press)³⁸ and after the end of World War II.³⁹

³³ It was the Polish Welfare Committee in Siedlce (Polish: Polski Komitet Opiekuńczy w Siedlcach).

³⁴ *Dodatkowe wiadomości...*, p. 6.

³⁵ *Los dzieci z Zamojszczyzny*, “Biuletyn Informacyjny” 1943, No. 3, p. 6.

³⁶ B. KOZACZYŃSKA, *Losy dzieci z Zamojszczyzny...*, pp. 48, 145.

³⁷ *O byt polskości, Polaków i Polski*, “Państwo Polskie” 1943, No. 6, p. 4.

³⁸ For example: M. BRZESKA, *Polska – żywymi oczami. Życie ulicy*, “Polska Walcząca – Żołnierz Polski na Obczyźnie”, 1944, Ann. 6, No. 7, p. 3; EADEM, *Polska – żywymi oczami. Dziecko i matka*, “Polska Walcząca – Żołnierz Polski na Obczyźnie” 1944, Ann. 6, No. 10, p. 3.

³⁹ For example: *Sprawa skradzionych dzieci polskich*, “Głos Pomorza” 1946, Ann. 2, No. 35, p. 2; *Zbrodnie, jakich świat nie widział*, “Nowiny Opolskie” 1946, Ann. 30, No. 10, p. 3; Z. TRZCIŃSKA KAMIŃSKA, *Dzieci Zamojszczyzny (walka o dziecko)*, “Dziś i Jutro” 1946, No. 6, pp. 4–5.

The ordeal that happened to Polish children displaced from the Zamość region found an immediate response in the pages of underground magazines. The public was immediately informed about their tragic fate. Attention was paid primarily to the disastrous health of the displaced persons, especially the children who had been forcibly separated from their parents in the transit camp in Zamość. Their hopeless situation was connected with a several-week stay in this camp. A separate place was occupied by the attitude of the Siedlce populace towards the fate of defenceless children and saving their lives and health. The local population gathered in crowds during the mass funeral in silence, and calmly expressed opposition to the extermination of the Polish population in the Zamość region, in particular the helpless and innocent children.

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The Auschwitz-Birkenau State Museum in Oświęcim



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RELATIONS OF THE KL AUSCHWITZ STAFF WITH THE CIVILIANS OF OŚWIĘCIM AND THE SURROUNDING AREA IN THE YEARS 1940–1945

Summary. The town of Oświęcim (German: *Auschwitz*) is invariably associated with the concentration and extermination camp that operated in its vicinity in the years 1940–1945. For many people, it comes as a surprise that during the war, in the shadow of the camp, a small garrison town functioned quite normally. It was an unusual town, considering that its original inhabitants – Poles and Jews – had been displaced, and the army that was stationed here was the SS garrison from KL Auschwitz. This paper aims to present the mutual relations between the civilian population (the remaining Poles, the settlers from the Reich, and the *Volksdeutsche*) and the SS men. How did they interact with each other? What restrictions and rules applied to their mutual relations? Why were the SS men not allowed to visit certain establishments? And why did the commandants devote so much attention in their orders to women? I have tried to find answers to the above-mentioned questions (and many more) in this paper. As my source base, I have predominantly used the orders of the commandant's office (*Kommandanturbefehle*), the orders of the garrison commander (*Standortbefehle*), and the statements of civilians and former prisoners of the Auschwitz camp, all of which can be found in the Archives of the Auschwitz-Birkenau State Museum in Oświęcim.

Keywords: KL Auschwitz, SS, civilians, Oświęcim, World War II

In Polish and Jewish history, Oświęcim/Auschwitz is associated with some of the darkest events in the history of modern Europe. Between 1940 and 1945, a concentration and extermination camp operated near the town, where over a million people lost their lives.¹ Today, the Memorial and Museum Auschwitz-Birkenau

¹ It is estimated that in the years 1940–1945 between 1 and 1,5 million people died in the entire Auschwitz camp complex, of whom between 1 and 1,35 million were Jews.

is the most often visited museum institution in Poland, and the number of visitors from all over the world exceeds two million every year.² The vast majority of these people have never actually visited the town, nor the castle, market square or the synagogue, nor the famous Haberfeld Vodka Museum, nor the park Planty on the bank of the Soła river. Probably many of them do not even know that there is a town outside the museum. It was the same during World War II – apart from KL Auschwitz, there was also the town of Oświęcim, which lived its own life, and about which little is thought today. In wartime Oświęcim, the civilian population lived like people in any garrison town, with all the pros and cons of such a situation. It was not, however, a typical urban centre with a permanent military presence – the garrison consisted of SS members from the nearby concentration camp, and the indigenous population was mostly expelled. It is also worth noting that the case of Oświęcim perfectly fitted into two elements of the National Socialist (Nazi) ideology. It was here, in one place, that the extermination of the Jews was taking place in a simultaneous attempt to Germanise the East and implement the idea of *Lebensraum*.³

This text attempts to show the relations between the SS staff and the civilian population of Oświęcim and its surroundings in the years 1940–1945. The first part of the article presents a short history of the town and the circumstances in which the camp was established. Next, the paper characterises groups of the civilian population that the SS men from KL Auschwitz came into contact with while on duty and in their free time. The groups in question were Poles, *Reichsdeutsche* and *Volksdeutsche*, and civilian workers and women belonging to the above-mentioned spheres. The text is based predominantly on documents from the Archives of the Auschwitz-Birkenau State Museum.⁴ The most important sources used by the author were the orders of the commandant's office

² This is a number more than fifty times greater than the population of the town.

³ S. STEINBACHER, *Auschwitz, A History*, Munich 2004, p. 3.

⁴ At this point, it should be noted that the above-mentioned documents certainly do not constitute all of the sources in which information about the SS men's contacts with civilians can be found. This is mainly because we currently have only about seven percent of the original records that were created during the existence of the camp. Most of the documents were destroyed or taken to the West by the SS men. A large part of the documents fell into the hands of the Russians and to this day are kept in the Moscow archives. Some documents (for instance, letters from the perpetrators to their families) probably remain in the possession of the families or were destroyed long ago.

(*Kommandanturbefehle*) and the orders of the garrison commander (garrison orders, *Standortbefehle*). A lot of interesting information was found in the memoirs and statements of former prisoners, civilian workers employed by companies involved in the development of the camp, and young women sent by the *Arbeitsamt* to work as domestic workers for SS families. It was also worth looking into the personal files of the SS men, as they also proved to be a good source of information for this text. The introductory part, the history of Oświęcim, was based on several publications describing the history of the town, its inhabitants, and the camp.⁵

Oświęcim (German: *Auschwitz*⁶) was founded under German law in 1270, and within thirty years had become an important town in the eastern part of the Duchy of Cieszyn (Polish: *Księstwo Cieszyńskie*, German: *Herzogtum Teschen*). Thanks to the profits gained from the staple right for salt and lead, and the right to collect tolls from bridges on the Vistula and the Soła river, it was able to develop economically at the end of the 13th century and the beginning of the 14th century. In 1327, it was incorporated into the German Reich.⁷ In 1457, Oświęcim returned to Poland and remained under Polish rule until the first Partition of Poland in 1772, when it was annexed by the Habsburg Empire and remained part of it until 1918.⁸ After the end of World War I, it was incorporated into the territory of the Second Polish Republic.

After its incorporation into the Kraków Voivodship (1564), Oświęcim underwent complete Polonisation. In the mid-15th century, Jews began to settle in the town, contributing to the development of a local enterprising middle class.⁹ One of the best-known industrialists in Oświęcim was Jakob Habermeld, founder of a distillery that from 1804 produced high quality vodkas and liqueurs.¹⁰ Despite historic upheavals and the fact that the town passed under different rules several times, the Jewish community in Oświęcim grew over the years, and by the interwar period the Jewish population exceeded the Polish population by far. At the brink of the outbreak of World War II, more than seven thousand

⁵ All titles are listed in the bibliography published at the end of the paper.

⁶ The names Oświęcim and Auschwitz will be used interchangeably in the text.

⁷ D. DWORK, R.J. VAN PELT, *Auschwitz. Historia miasta i obozu*, Warszawa 2020, pp. 27–28.

⁸ S. STEINBACHER, *op. cit.*, p. 6.

⁹ D. DWORK, R.J. VAN PELT, *op. cit.*, p. 33.

¹⁰ There is now a Jakob Habermeld Vodka Museum in Oświęcim and a shop selling products based on the historical recipe.

Jews lived in Oświęcim (out of a population of 12 000).¹¹ As for the German minority in Oświęcim, it was very small at the time. According to the census of December 1931, only three per cent of the local population identified themselves as German. There were no German schools, socio-cultural organisations, churches, or newspapers published in German – the influence of this particular minority on life and the town's politics was minimal.¹²

World War II was felt in Oświęcim as early as 1 September 1939. At dawn, Luftwaffe planes appeared over the town and bombed the military barracks and buildings on Kościelna Street. On the third of September, in the village of Rajsko, Polish soldiers clashed with the Germans. The retreating Poles blew up the bridge over the Soła river, which connected two parts of the town located on the left and right banks of the river.¹³ However, the efforts of the Poles were futile – on 4 September the Wehrmacht had captured and occupied Oświęcim, a week later the market square was renamed Adolf-Hitler-Platz, and the town was renamed Auschwitz.¹⁴ The warfare caused many residents to leave the town, heading for the East. However, when it became clear that the Germans were also heading in that direction, and in addition, when the Soviets attacked Poland on 17 September, many of the inhabitants of Oświęcim returned to their homes.¹⁵

When the local warfare was concluded and the authorities in Berlin had carved up the occupied Polish state, Oświęcim found itself among the territories formally incorporated into the Reich. Unlike territories located to the west of the town or in the *Wartheland* (Polish: *Kraj Warty*), Auschwitz was defined as “difficult to Germanise.” This was because the majority of the inhabitants of the town and the surrounding area were Poles and Jews. For Auschwitz to become “truly German” it first had to be cleansed of “racially undesirable elements.”¹⁶ Measures to achieve this objective were taken as early as September 1939, and their pace and intensity were sped up by the decision to establish a concentration camp in the area.

¹¹ L. FILIP, *Żydzi w Oświęcimiu 1918–1941*, Oświęcim 2003, p. 40.

¹² S. STEINBACHER, *op. cit.*, p. 10.

¹³ L. FILIP, *op. cit.*, pp. 151–152.

¹⁴ S. STEINBACHER, *op. cit.*, p. 16.

¹⁵ L. FILIP, *op. cit.*, p. 152.

¹⁶ S. STEINBACHER, *op. cit.*, pp. 19–20.



Fig. 1. SS men on the bridge in Oświęcim
(Source: AABSM photographic collection, negative No. 21983/71)

The idea of establishing a concentration camp in the vicinity of Auschwitz was debated by SS and SD representatives as early as the beginning of 1940. Until April, the area was visited several times and the advantages and disadvantages of this location were discussed. Eventually, following the completion of negotiations with the Wehrmacht, which administered the selected site, the former Polish artillery barracks (the same barracks that had been bombed in September 1939) were taken over.¹⁷ Thus, a few brick-built blocks became the nucleus of the future Auschwitz concentration camp. The first SS men arrived at the site on 30th April 1940. Among them was the first camp commandant, Rudolf Höss (who was officially appointed on 4th May 1940). On 20th May the first prisoners – thirty criminals from Sachsenhausen, who were to serve as *Kapos* and block elders – arrived in Oświęcim along with more SS men.¹⁸ The “official” opening

¹⁷ The history of the barracks dates back to the time of the Partitions of Poland when Oświęcim was a border town, a transit place for numerous economic migrants. The buildings of the future barracks, and later of the Auschwitz camp, were initially intended for those awaiting permission to emigrate from Galicia, D. DWORK, R.J. VAN PELT, *op. cit.* p. 59.

¹⁸ D. CZECH, *Kalendarium wydarzeń w KL Auschwitz*, Oświęcim 1992, pp. 9–12.

date of KL Auschwitz was established as 14th June 1940 – the day of the arrival of 728 prisoners from the so-called first Tarnów transport.

It is estimated that in the period from April 1940 to January 1945 over eight thousand SS men staffed KL Auschwitz. They were both members of the camp administration and the security guard corps (*SS-Totenkopfverbände*, *SS-Totenkopfstandarte*). In May 1940, about 300 SS men served as the personnel of KL Auschwitz. However, in January 1945, there were over 4400 SS men in the entire Auschwitz camp complex.¹⁹ The Auschwitz Garrison consisted of the town of Oświęcim, the camp area and, until 18th January 1941, the village of Neuberun (*Nowy Bieruń*).²⁰

We could say that from May 1940, Oświęcim became a *sui generis* garrison town (whose garrison consisted of SS men from the nearby concentration camp), with all the advantages and disadvantages of this situation. Until April 1941, the SS men were not allowed to visit the nearby urban centre. In this way, Commandant Höss wanted to “shield” his men from contacts with the Jews, who constituted over 50 percent of the town’s population. An order from the commandant’s office dated 18th April 1941 states that Auschwitz had become a *judenrein* town (a town free of Jews) and that SS men were thus allowed to visit it.²¹ At this point it is worth noting that the commandant’s aim was to completely isolate his subordinates from any contact with the Jewish population.²²

¹⁹ Data after: SS garrison, <http://www.auschwitz.org/historia/zaloga-ss/> (access: 20 I 2021). Statistical data on concentration camp staff: A. LASIK, *Sztafety Ochronne w systemie niemieckich obozów koncentracyjnych*, Oświęcim 2007, p. 543.

²⁰ Archives of the Auschwitz-Birkenau State Museum (hereinafter: AABSM), Standortbefehle, garrison order No. 8/41 of 18 XII 1941.

²¹ AABSM, Kommandanturbefehle, order No. 5/41 of 18 IV 1941.

²² From September 1939 onwards, Oświęcim residents of Jewish descent were systematically and effectively pushed to the margins of society. At the end of September, the Great Synagogue was burned down. On 26th February 1941, Reichsführer SS Heinrich Himmler ordered the deportation of all Jews from Oświęcim and the surrounding area. The deportation action began on 9th March 1941. Between the 2nd and 7th April, around five thousand Jewish residents of Oświęcim were displaced. They were sent to the ghettos in Sosnowiec, Będzin, and Chrzanów. The fate of these people is easy to guess: between April 1942 and August 1943, the above-mentioned ghettos were liquidated and their inhabitants transported to Birkenau, where most of them died in the gas chambers. After the war, of the seven thousand original Jewish inhabitants, only a few returned to Oświęcim. Most of those survivors emigrated in the 1960s. The last Jewish resident of Oświęcim (officially admitting his origins), Szymon Kluger, died on 26th May 2000. More about the Jews of Oświęcim can be found in the already-cited book by L. Filip.

Bans on visiting the town or restaurants were commonplace. Moreover, Höss forbade the SS men to greet Jews or even to accept greetings from them.²³

The Polish population was also resettled. However, these evictions were not as drastic and systematic as in the case of the Jews. For obvious reasons, Poles living in the immediate vicinity of the former Polish Army barracks (and later also those who lived near the Auschwitz II-Birkenau camp established in the village of Brzezinka) had to leave their homes. Many of these buildings were given to the SS men and their families as their new quarters. The Poles, at least in theory, had the right to appeal against the ordered evictions. At certain office hours, they had the possibility to speak to Commandant Höss or the head of the political department (the camp's Gestapo) SS-Untersturmführer Maximilian Grabner.²⁴

The displacement of a part of the Polish population and all the Jews meant that Auschwitz and the surrounding area was ready for Germanisation. Apart from the SS men and their families, civilians from the Reich and beyond began to arrive in the town.²⁵ Many farms which had previously belonged to Poles were occupied by ethnic Germans brought from the East (i.e., from the USSR and from the Soviet sphere of influence in the Balkans).²⁶ Representatives of the Main Trustee Office for the East (*Haupttreuhandstelle Ost*) arrived in the town and took over the management of former Jewish enterprises.²⁷ Due to the expansion of the camp and the establishment of a synthetic rubber factory under the auspices of I.G. Farben (Buna), many architects (the most famous being Hans Stosberg),²⁸ specialists employed by the chemical industry giant, and ordinary

²³ AABSM, Kommandantursonderbefehle, special order of 7 I 1941.

²⁴ AABSM, Kommandanturbefehle, order No. 4/40 of 22 VI 1940. That was, at least, the theory. In reality, Polish residents of Oświęcim whose houses were attractive to the SS had no choice but to relinquish their property. Many times the evictions took place in brutal and unexpected ways. D. CZECH, *op. cit.*, p. 20.

²⁵ Under agreements made between Berlin and Moscow, Stalin consented that the ethnically German population, which as a result of the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact found itself in the Soviet zone, could emigrate to areas that belonged to the Third Reich. The agreement applied not only to the territory of the USSR but also to other areas that remained in the Soviet sphere of influence.

²⁶ AABSM, Zespół Oświadczenia, vol. 85, J. Krawczyk, p. 131.

²⁷ For example, the famous Haberfeld's Vodka and Liquor Factory was taken over by German National Herr Handelsmann, L. FILIP, *op. cit.*, p. 157.

²⁸ Civilian architects competed for influence over the redevelopment of Oświęcim with architects from the *Zentralbauleitung der Waffen-SS und Polizei* (the Central Building Office of the Waffen SS and Police). Ultimately, the spheres of influence were divided in the following manner: civilian

foremen and workers came to Oświęcim. Many of them brought their families to Auschwitz.²⁹ In addition, a group of Poles declared German national origin by signing the so-called *Volksliste*.³⁰ In summary, the SS men from the Auschwitz garrison were supposed to have contacts with the following groups of the civilians: their own families living in the camp area, the remaining non-displaced civilian population (mainly of Polish origin), *Volksdeutsche*, *Reichsdeutsche* (mainly civilian workers who were sent to “Germanize the East”), and women from SS auxiliary services (secretaries, telephone operators, and SS supervisors).³¹

The residents of Oświęcim who were not evicted and the settlers arriving in the town soon had the opportunity to see the first SS men. In early June 1940, the first patrols, consisting of a non-commissioned officer and two privates, appeared in the vicinity of the nascent camp and the railway station.³² From this point on, interactions between members of the KL Auschwitz garrison and civilians from the nearby area became increasingly frequent and often had to be regulated by the camp commandant and the garrison commander. These regulations, contained in orders from the camp’s commandant and the garrison commander, principally concerned the SS men. However, in the camp

architects were to rebuild the town, while the SS architects were to develop the area around the camp and the camp itself.

²⁹ In the summer of 1943, the influx of people from the Reich to Oświęcim and the surrounding area increased considerably due to increasing Allied bombing. S. Steinbagger, p. 74. At that time, many SS men also tried to bring their families to Auschwitz from the Reich to ensure their safety. *Vide*: AABSM, personal file of the SS man Gerhard Effinger.

³⁰ The reasons for this decision cannot be stated unequivocally. Some of those who decided to sign the *Volksliste* were spouses of German nationals and did not want to leave their partners. Others, because of their ancestral heritage felt themselves to be Germans and wanted to belong to the German nation. There were cases of people who were left with no choice: either they would sign the *Volksliste* or they would be sent to a concentration camp (signing the *Volksliste* could be a way to be released from the camp, of course, only in the case of prisoners who met the relevant racial criteria and had the right “origin”). A significant number of the *Volksdeutsche* pinned their hopes of social advancement and career on signing the list. These are only the most popular reasons for signing the *Volksliste*, but each case should be considered individually.

³¹ SS supervisors (German: *SS-Aufseherinnen*) were not members of this formation. Only men could serve in the organisation commanded by Heinrich Himmler. Female supervisors, as well as telephonists and stenographers, belonged to the SS auxiliary service (*SS-Gefolge*). They signed a contract with the SS and were subject to SS jurisdiction, but they did not have the status of soldiers or SS service ranks.

³² AABSM, Kommandanturbefehle, order No. 1/40 of 6 VI 1940.

and the surrounding area (*Interessengebiet des KZ Auschwitz*), the law was made by the commandant and the civilian population entering the area had to obey him unconditionally.

According to Reichsführer SS Himmler, the members of his organisation were to constitute the elite of the new German nation. After the glorious victory over Bolshevism, they were supposed to have the honour of colonising and Germanising the East. The SS men were required not only to be “racially pure,” to be of good repute, and to obey their superiors unconditionally, but also to set an example to the ordinary citizens of the new Germanic empire. However, the new National Socialist “elite” misunderstood their task, as evidenced by the orders issued by the commanders of KL Auschwitz and even by Himmler himself. The most famous action, whose originator was the Reichsführer himself, was the “More kindness” campaign, which reminded the SS men of the need to adopt an impeccable moral attitude and well-mannered conduct in their relations with civilians.³³ The commandants, Rudolf Höss in particular, very often reminded their subordinates of seemingly basic rules of social conduct. The SS men were instructed on how to behave on trains³⁴ and were reminded how to greet women from the SS auxiliary service and members of the *Hitler-Jugend*.³⁵ It was also very important to show an “SS attitude” in their contacts with the civilian population.³⁶ As an example to the public, the SS men could not smoke in public spaces while in uniform³⁷ (the appearance and elements of which were strictly regulated)³⁸ or smoke while riding a bicycle, nor could they talk to civilians while on guard duty.³⁹ Drinking alcohol while on duty was also strictly

³³ AABSM, Kommandanturbefehle, order No. 8/42 of 29 IV 1942.

³⁴ AABSM, Kommandanturbefehle, order No. 15/42 of 20 VIII 1942.

³⁵ AABSM, Kommandanturbefehle, order No. 11/42 of 30 VI 1942.

³⁶ *Vide*: AABSM, Kommandanturbefehle, order No. 5/44 of 8 III 1944.

³⁷ AABSM, Kommandanturbefehle, order No. 2/42 of 22 I 1942.

³⁸ The commandants of KL Auschwitz paid much attention to the appearance of their subordinates, as evidenced by the number of orders and admonitions concerning the proper way of wearing the uniform. The fullest description of what elements should be included in the statutory uniform and how the uniform should be worn can be found in the AABSM, Kommandanturbefehle, order No. 4/42 of 26 II 1942. Information on the uniform can also be found in, *inter alia*: AABSM, Kommandanturbefehle, order No. 7/41 of 30 IV 1941, order No. 10/41 of 28 V 1941 or order No. 1/42 of 3 I 1942.

³⁹ AABSM, Kommandanturbefehle, order No. 1/43 of 2 XII 1943.

forbidden.⁴⁰ There were numerous separate regulations included in the orders, which referred to contact with women. These issues will be discussed later in the text.

The first civilians that the SS men encountered in Oświęcim were members of their own families.⁴¹ Professional members of the SS had the option to live with their relatives in the houses confiscated from the evicted Poles, even in the immediate vicinity of the camp.⁴² Of course, the SS families were directly subordinated to the commandant's orders and by-laws and had to comply with them unconditionally. This meant, among other things, that they were banned from entering the camp without a special pass, even in the company of an SS member. The SS men's wives and fiancés were forbidden to meet with their companions in the camp canteen.⁴³ The only exception to this rule were the so-called *Kameradschaftsabend* (camaraderie evenings), to which the SS men could bring their female partners with the commandant's permission and on his invitation.⁴⁴ Another opportunity to spend time together were concerts of the prisoner orchestra organised by the commandants on sunny Sundays. These took place outside, on a special platform erected between Commandant Höss's villa and crematorium I in the main camp.⁴⁵ The SS men's families, like other members of the garrison, were not permitted to trade with or buy food from Poles. All purchases had to be made in *Haus 7* – a shop intended for the SS men and their families, which also contained a café for social gatherings.⁴⁶ This building (which, *nota bene*, still exists and is used as a private house) was off-limits to civilians other than the SS families.⁴⁷ Employees of *Haus 7* were civilians, especially young German and Polish women assigned to work there by the *Arbeitsamt* (Employment Office).⁴⁸

⁴⁰ AABSM, Kommandanturbefehle, order No. 3/44 of 28 I 1944.

⁴¹ SS men who were not allowed to live with their families had to obtain special permission for their relatives to visit from the commandant. AABSM, Standortbefehle, garrison order No. 9/43 of 10 IV 1943.

⁴² For example, the house (still standing today) where Rapportführer Gerhardt Palitzsch and his family lived is less than 500 metres from the area of the former camp.

⁴³ AABSM, Kommandanturbefehle, order No. 4/40 of 22 VI 1940.

⁴⁴ The first such meeting in which the wives and fiancées of the SS men were allowed to participate took place on 16th August 1940, AABSM, Kommandanturbefehle, order No. 6/40 of 16 VIII 1940.

⁴⁵ AABSM, Zespół Oświadczenia, vol. 55, J. Antonowicz, p. 120.

⁴⁶ AABSM, Sonderbefehl, special order No. 2/41 of 22 IV 1941.

⁴⁷ AABSM, Kommandantursonderbefehle, special order of 7 VIII 1941.

⁴⁸ AABSM, Zespół Oświadczenia, vol. 85, H. Szpakowa, p. 160.



Fig. 2. SS-Hauptscharführer Gerhardt Palitzsch (right) with his wife, daughter, a dog and an unknown Wehrmacht soldier. (Source: AABSM, negative No. 419)

The SS men were “exposed” to encounters with Polish women and men not only in *Haus 7* or in the canteen managed by the Kluge company⁴⁹ (the company was directed to expand the camp and employed Polish workers).⁵⁰ For this reason, already in the very first weeks of the camp’s existence, Rudolf Höss issued a series of guidelines on contacts with the Polish population, which were subsequently reiterated from time to time in the orders of the commandant’s office. At a time when Oświęcim was not yet *judenrein*, it was absolutely forbidden to visit any restaurants or other establishments in the town. Only the *Deutsches Haus* (later renamed *Haus der Waffen-SS*) situated near the railway station was available to the SS men.⁵¹ No conversations in Polish were permitted, except in official situations.⁵² The fact that this order was necessary meant that many

⁴⁹ AABSM, Zespół Oświadczenia, vol. 85, J. Krawczyk, p. 131. The SS men were very quickly prohibited from visiting this canteen by Commandant Höss due to the risk of being in contact with Poles.

⁵⁰ A very interesting topic is contact between Polish workers working on the expansion of the camp or in the camp itself and the camp’s prisoners. Often these workers were the only link to the outside world, providers of food and medicine, and sometimes helped in escapes.

⁵¹ AABSM, Kommandanturbefehle, order No. 1/40 of 6 VI 1940.

⁵² AABSM, Kommandanturbefehle, order No. 6/40 of 16 VIII 1940.

of the SS men of the KL Auschwitz garrison came from territories that had recently been incorporated into the Reich, and Polish was their second (perhaps first?) language.⁵³ From April 1941, the SS men were allowed to visit the town and local establishments, but the list of these permitted premises was constantly changing. Apart from the *Deutsches Haus*, a casino and a cinema were usually accessible and “racially safe.” However, the ban on contact with Poles was still in force and its violation had to be immediately reported to the commandant.⁵⁴ At the same time, the SS men visiting Auschwitz in their free time were not exempt from the usual discipline. All excesses involving members of the staff were punished and made public. As early as 28th April 1941, the commandant warned that any further behaviour detrimental to the “image of the SS” would result in a ban on visiting the town. The SS men were required to leave the premises 15 minutes before curfew⁵⁵ (which was exactly the time it took to walk back to the barracks from the centre of Oświęcim). Höss’s warning worked, since the only time when the ban on visiting the town and restrictions concerning movement were in force in the camp was during the typhus epidemic.⁵⁶

When analysing the commandant’s office, garrison, and special orders, we see clearly that at the very beginning of the camp’s operation, its first commandant, Rudolf Höss, had to use his authority and power to work out rules for coexistence between his subordinates and the civilians living in Oświęcim and its surroundings, regardless of their national or ethnic origin. Such regulations also appeared in the later years of the camp’s existence, though with less intensity. One may wonder whether this was due to Höss’s character, as his ambition was to manage an ideal camp and to head a disciplined garrison, or whether it was a matter of the SS men and civilians getting used to their mutual presence

⁵³ Among the staff of KL Auschwitz served many SS men who knew Polish and Polish *Volksdeutsche*. The best known of them were Klaus Dylewski, Richard Perschel, Edward Lubusch or Artur Breitwieser.

⁵⁴ AABSM, Kommandanturbefehle, order No. 5/41 of 18 IV 1941.

⁵⁵ AABSM, Kommandantursonderbefehle, order of 28 IV 1941.

⁵⁶ AABSM, Sonderbefehle, special order No. 2/42 of 18 I 1942. The warning that worked for Auschwitz did not work for Stary Bieruń and Nowy Bieruń, to which only the SS men with families living in these towns were allowed to go. AABSM, Sonderbefehle, order No. 5/41 of 12 VIII 1941 and order No. 6/41 of 25 VIII 1941. A list of the establishments that the SS men were allowed to visit from April 1944 can be found in AABSM, Standortbefehle, garrison order No. 11/44 of 4 IV 1944.

and developing a kind of *modus vivendi*. Or, perhaps, were there other problems for Höss's successors and a general decline in SS morale in the latter years of the camp's operation?

An interesting group of Poles with whom the SS men from the KL Auschwitz garrison had contact were the young Polish girls sent by the *Arbeitsamt* to work for SS families. In the collections of the Archives of the Auschwitz-Birkenau State Museum, there are several statements made after the war by women who were employed in this way as teenagers. Their accounts are sometimes surprising, especially in the context of the SS men known for their cruelty towards prisoners in the camp (for instance, Gerhardt Palitzsch, Otto Moll, or Wilhelm Emmerich). Many of them were indifferent to their domestic help, and sometimes even friendly.⁵⁷ There were cases when the girls received presents of food from them or other small gifts.⁵⁸ Behaviour towards the help and their own families clearly shows that many SS men separated their professional life (which was the service in the camp) from their private life. While the prisoners were for them a nameless crowd, even enemies who ought to be eliminated, a young girl known by name would become almost a member of their household, with individual traits and behaviour, being seen as more "human" to the SS men and their families.⁵⁹

Another group of people with whom the SS men came into daily contact were Polish and German civilian workers. They worked for the above-mentioned companies Kluge or I.G. Farben, but also in local workshops, bakeries, the power station, etc. As stated above, civilian workers were not allowed to shop in *Haus 7* or enter the SS canteens. The ban also worked the other way around – SS men were not allowed to go to places intended for civilians. Furthermore, civilian workers who wanted or needed to move around the camp area were required to have special passes, which were carefully monitored by the guards.⁶⁰ This

⁵⁷ For example, Helena Kłys could not believe that SS-Hauptscharführer Palitzsch was the terror of KL Auschwitz who executed prisoners and civilians in the courtyard of Block 11 with a smile. AABSM, Zespół Oświadczenia, vol. 82, H. Kłys, pp. 159–162.

⁵⁸ AABSM, Zespół Oświadczenia, vol. 85, Maria Gołębiowska, p. 5.

⁵⁹ However, this was not always the rule – for example, Lagerführer Karl Fritzsch was feared by both his wife and Emilia Żelazny, who worked in his house. AABSM, Zespół Oświadczenia, vol. 82, Emilia Żelazna, pp. 144–149.

⁶⁰ AABSM, Kommandanturbefehle, order No. 9/42 of 19 V 1942, the appearance of a security pass: Kommandanturbefehle, order No. 6/44 of 22 IV 1944.

applied to both Poles and Germans.⁶¹ It sometimes happened that Polish workers were employed in the camp itself and were under the direct authority of the SS men, and therefore had contact with prisoners.⁶² However, much more frequent encounters with civilians (from the SS men's point of view) took place outside the camp. Usually, the posts (SS sentry) escorted the prisoner labour groups (*Kommando*) to work outside the camp, and there, while on duty, they met civilian workers or foremen.⁶³ This kind of contact took place not only in the vicinity of the camp but also in the numerous branches of KL Auschwitz. It sometimes happened that the German foremen who supervised prisoner workers came into conflict with the SS men because they did not like the fact that the guards abused the prisoners.⁶⁴

The civilian population of Polish origin did not have (and rather did not want to have) the chance to make close acquaintances or socialise with the SS men from the KL Auschwitz garrison. There were, however, such situations – which we could call extreme, because they involved aiding a member of the SS, usually a *Volksdeutsch*, to defect. We know of two cases of SS men – Kohl and Stradomski (both from Lithuania) – who deserted in 1941 and 1943 respectively. Both of them benefited from the help of local people who were involved in helping KL Auschwitz prisoners. Unfortunately for Kohl, this attempt ended tragically, as he was soon caught and shot for desertion; Stradomski's fate is unknown.⁶⁵

The above-mentioned cases of contact between the SS men and Polish civilians are worth mentioning because they are the exception, rather than the rule. Any assistance to KL Auschwitz prisoners by civilians was usually severely punished, including by imprisonment in the camp.

The group of civilians who could enjoy special benefits from the camp's SS were, of course, the *Reichs-* and *Volksdeutsche*. Apart from formal restrictions – the division into civilian and military premises, the security passes necessary to move around the camp and its surroundings, and the holiday passes for the

⁶¹ As one holder of such a pass, Stanisław Krępa-Trojacki, recalls, it entitled him not only to stay in the camp but also to stay outside the house after curfew (from 7 pm to 6 am), AABSM, Zespół Oświadczenia, vol. 22, S. Krępa-Trojacki, p. 1.

⁶² AABSM, Zespół Oświadczenia, vol. 55, R. Grzybowski, pp. 125–128.

⁶³ For example, Wiesław Kielar mentions an SS man from Silesia who, together with a German foreman, fed the prisoners. W. KIELAR, *Anus mundi*, Oświęcim 2017, pp. 29–31.

⁶⁴ AABSM, Zespół Oświadczenia, vol. 55, Cz. Niżnik, p. 183.

⁶⁵ AABSM, Zespół Oświadczenia, vol. 22, J. Kajtoch, pp. 91–92.

SS men – getting into contact with this population group was completely permitted. There were even marriages between the SS men from the KL Auschwitz garrison and local women. A noteworthy example of one such union is Oberscharführer Baumgartner, commandant of the KL Auschwitz sub-camp in Libiąż. He married a Polish *Volksdeutsch*, who nurtured her ties to Polishness and forced her husband to treat the Polish prisoners well.⁶⁶ Of course, from the SS point of view, such a marriage could only be contracted if the candidate met all the requirements regarding race and origin set out in the marriage order of 31st December 1931.

I have singled out the last group of civilians rather artificially, but since many orders issued by the commandants and KL Auschwitz garrison commanders pay special attention to this group, I decided that it should be discussed separately. This group is women. The KL Auschwitz garrison included many young people, for whom such service was, on one hand, an escape from the front, and on the other, the reality in which they had to spend their youth. In Oświęcim, as in any garrison town, the civilian population had to bear with the presence of soldiers, with all the pros and cons of this state of affairs. In this context, particularly interesting seems to be Heinrich Himmler's order No. III/121/42g of 6 April 1942, addressed to all members of the SS and the police. It was entitled *Protection of Female Youth* and concerned the proper conduct of the SS men and policemen towards young female citizens of the Reich. In his own style, the Reichsführer SS spoke about the honour of young women and the protection they deserved. He admonished his men to be serious about their relationships with women. Himmler's whole argument was that the SS men and policemen should not abandon young, unmarried pregnant women whose children they fathered.⁶⁷ Also, marital infidelity, in which one party was an SS man and the other a wife of a Wehrmacht soldier stationed at the front, was condemned.⁶⁸

In the above-mentioned orders, one can repeatedly find information about the prohibition on bringing women into the camp and the canteens⁶⁹ (the same restrictions applied to the presence of children in the camp).⁷⁰ The SS men were

⁶⁶ AABSM, Zespół Oświadczenia, vol. 22, Z. Sz wajca, p. 50.

⁶⁷ AABSM, Kommandanturbefehle, order No. 8/42 of 29 IV 1942.

⁶⁸ AABSM, Standortbefehle, garrison order No. 6/44 of 7 II 1944.

⁶⁹ Women were also not allowed to walk near the posts. AABSM, Kommandanturbefehle, order No. 25/43 of 11 VI 1943.

⁷⁰ AABSM, Standortbefehle, garrison order No. 25/43 of 1(2) VII 1943.

forbidden to visit female telephonists, stenographers, or SS female supervisors in their quarters in the *Stabsgebäude* or to invite them to their own quarters.⁷¹ It was necessary and essential to remind the SS men that the women employed by the SS ought to be addressed with respect, and the bare minimum was greeting the female supervisors, telephonists, and nurses.⁷²

On the other hand, there was a list of brothels in the Oświęcim area that the SS men were allowed to visit.⁷³ All the time, there was information in the orders about “houses of ill repute” where members of the KL Auschwitz garrison were not allowed to go because there was a “risk” that they would meet unsuitable women (for example, Polish women, prostitutes who had not been tested for STDs, etc.).⁷⁴ It is worth noting here that Himmler paid great attention to the health of his SS men,⁷⁵ which was a purely pragmatic attitude: not only could an SS man with an STD infect his wife, but would be unable to father children as a result of these infections. The problem of the growth of the Aryan race was one of the SS Reichsführer’s main concerns.

As can be seen, relationships between the SS men from the KL Auschwitz garrison and local civilians varied, depending on the different groups of the civilian population involved in such contact. However, there was one prohibition that applied at all times, no matter with whom the SS man in question spent his time: the obligation to keep official secrets, i.e., what happened behind the barbed wire of the entire Auschwitz camp complex.⁷⁶ Maintaining silence was particularly insisted upon in the case of the SS men who were directly involved in the extermination and those who worked in the camp administration. Interestingly, the penalties for failure to observe professional secrecy were by no means draconian. SS-Sturmmann Ludwig Damm experienced this when,

⁷¹ AABSM, Standortbefehle, garrison order No. 3/44 of 19 I 1944; garrison order No. 19/44 of 14 VI 1944.

⁷² AABSM, Standortbefehle, garrison order No. 17/44 of 9 VI 1944.

⁷³ AABSM, Standortbefehle, garrison order No. 14/44 of 8 V 1944.

⁷⁴ For example, the ban on visiting houses at No. 5 and 7 Gartenstraße, AABSM, Kommandanturbefehle, order No. 3/42 of 5 II 1942, and on Schlossstraße, Standortbefehle, garrison order No. 7/42 of 11 II 1942.

⁷⁵ Every SS man’s personal file contains a statement that in the case of contracting an STD through extramarital sexual contacts, he will submit to suitable treatment. For example, AABSM, personal file of Georg Engelschall, p. 2. Engelschall contracted an STD from a local girl while still serving in KL Dachau and following his transfer to Auschwitz had to return to Bavaria to explain the incident, p. 82.

⁷⁶ AABSM, Kommandanturbefehle, order No. 2/43 of 20 XII 1943.

while on leave in December 1942, he discussed his work and the “Jewish matter” with members of the NSDAP and Wehrmacht soldiers. He received only a reprimand.⁷⁷




Fig. 3. Information about the reprimand given to SS-Sturmann L. Damm for talking to outsiders about his work in KL Auschwitz (Source: AABSM, SS men's personal files: Ludwig Damm, case file D-Aul-1/43)

The non-indigenous civilians began to leave Oświęcim in October 1944. These were mainly women and children – families of I.G. Farben workers and the SS men. In mid-January 1945, male civilians were evacuated⁷⁸ and the evacuation of KL Auschwitz began. The SS men from the camp garrison headed west alongside the groups of prisoners.

⁷⁷ AABSM, personal file of Ludwig Damm, p. 53.

⁷⁸ S. STEINBACHER, *op. cit.*, p. 129.

This text is by no means exhaustive. My aim was to signal a research problem that in my opinion is quite interesting and to present source material that is little used. In spite of this, one can try to make a few general remarks and draw some final conclusions. As mentioned earlier, in the years 1940–1945, Oświęcim did not cease to be a garrison town; rather, it was the character of the garrison that changed. In the shadow of the concentration and extermination camp, a fairly normal social life, characteristic of a small town, went on. The original inhabitants (Jews and many Poles) were expelled and replaced by settlers and people whose task was to make the area more German (both in terms of population lists and in the character of the town buildings). Instead of Polish soldiers, SS men were stationed in Auschwitz to serve in the main camp and its branches.⁷⁹ Outside of work, these people led quite normal family and social lives. For the most part, they were perfectly able to separate their work in the camp from their role as loving fathers and husbands. Many of them, especially the young, were looking for love and wanted to start families. When analysing the orders of the commandant's office and the garrison commander, we see that the problems caused by the SS men for their superiors were not fundamentally different from the issues faced by commanders of more "traditional" garrisons. Paradoxically, on this basis, one may draw a rather depressing conclusion, which puts humans in a rather bad light. In this case, it would not be a truism to repeat after Christopher Browning that, like the policemen who took part in the extermination of the Jews, the SS men from Auschwitz were also "ordinary people" to whom history had given the opportunity to test their humanity.

⁷⁹ Stationed in the vicinity of Auschwitz were also air defence units (Chelmek). Also, many soldiers of the Wehrmacht passed through the town (either coming from the area or on their way to and from the front).

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QANA – A TOWN OF TWO TRAGEDIES

Summary. Qana is a town located in the south of Lebanon, 14 km from Tyre, inhabited mostly by Shi'ite Muslims and a small number of Christians. According to the research of Lebanese historian Dr. Youssef El Hourany, Qana is known to have been the place where Jesus turned water into wine.

However, for most Lebanese, Qana is associated with human suffering, martyrdom, and a symbol of resistance to Israel's military aggression. In 1996, 106 people were killed in the town as a result of shelling by Israeli artillery. Ten years later, Israel attacked Qana again in an airstrike that resulted in the deaths of 27 more. Sixteen years after the tragedy, it is more and more difficult to find the causes, the course of events and generally – what exactly happened in Qana. As a participant and witness of those events, it is the author's aim to revive the memory of the tragic fate of the inhabitants of that small town in southern Lebanon.

Keywords: Hezbollah, Qana, Lebanon, Grapes of Wrath, Second Lebanon War

Qana – history

Qana is a town located in southern Lebanon, on the route from Tyre to Tebnine. In Tyre, a town inscribed on the World Heritage List, there are many monuments dating back to long before the birth of Christ. In its vicinity, as well as in the vicinity of Saida (Sidon), located slightly to the north, one can find places that testify to the rich history of these lands, such as the ancient city of Sarepta. Qana, located 95 km from Beirut, as a commune (*baladijjat*) currently (according to the 2007 census) has a population of 20 000 and is a part of the administrative unit of the district (*kada*) of Tyre. Along with other municipalities, it forms the Federation of Tyre (Arabic: *Sour*) District

Municipalities. The Commune Council consists of eighteen representatives of the local community, led by the mayor.¹

In the past, due to its proximity to Tyre, Qana was within the Lebanese Phoenician Trail. Qana, sometimes called “Qana El-Jalil” (*Jalil* – Arabic term for Galilee) is primarily associated with one of the miracles performed by Jesus – turning water into wine during a wedding. This view, based on the accounts of Eusebius of Caesarea, a theologian and Christian historian, was promulgated by a researcher of the Coptic Church in Egypt, Martiniano Pellegrino Roncaglia, in his study *In the Footsteps of Jesus, the Messiah, in Phenicia/Lebanon* published by The Arab Institute for East and West Studies Beirut,² as well as by Dr. Youssef El Hourany, Lebanese historian and archaeologist, in his study *Cana of Galilee in South Lebanon*.³ According to Dr. Hourany, the evidence for the connection of this place with the biblical event are 13 statues carved in the rock (Hourany claims that they represent Christ and his twelve disciples), a cave where the first persecuted Christians are believed to have sheltered, and three stone vats discovered there in the 1960s. In 1972 Hourany collected documentation that supported his theory. However, further research became impossible due to the outbreak of civil war.⁴

After the civil war, the prominent Lebanese politician Nabih Berii (a Shi‘ite Muslim, member of Amalm and long-time chairman of the Chamber of Deputies) became involved in popularizing this place as important not only to Christians, but to the entire community of Lebanon. The results of the research of Lebanese archaeologists were also presented at the Vatican⁵ at the end of 1993. However, these activities were not accepted by the Shi‘ite majority living in Qana and its surroundings. Pope John Paul II, after taking into consideration the importance that the cities of Lebanon had in the Holy Bible (Tyre and Saida), proclaimed

¹ *Qana*, libandata, 7th December 2017, <https://www.libandata.org/en/towns/qana> (access: 10 XI 2020).

² M.P. RONCAGLIA, *In The Footsteps of Jesus, The Messiah, In Phenicia/Lebanon*, Beirut 2004.

³ Y. HOURANY, *Cana of Galilee in South Lebanon*, [http://youssefhourany.com/cana-of-galilee.html#prettyPhoto\[portfolio\]/24](http://youssefhourany.com/cana-of-galilee.html#prettyPhoto[portfolio]/24) (access: 10 XI 2020).

⁴ *Ibidem*.

⁵ M. RASCHKA, *Postscript: Lebanese Site Claimed for Biblical Miracle: A professor disputes the traditional belief that Israel was where Jesus turned water into wine. Today, tourist dollars are at stake*, “Los Angeles Times”, <https://www.latimes.com/archives/la-xpm-1994-02-01-wr-17668-story.html> (access: 10 XI 2020).

Lebanon “The Holy Land”⁶ as early as in May 1987. South Lebanon, therefore, is a part of “The Holy Land” – the land where Jesus lived, preached, performed miracles, and taught. The testimony of his presence in this region comes from the Gospel of Matthew (Mt 15–21)⁷ and the Gospel of Mark (Mk 7–24).⁸

The recognition of Qana as a holy place for Christians was objected to primarily by radical clergymen associated with pro-Iranian militias operating in Southern Lebanon. In South Lebanon at that time, there were already well-organized and well-functioning organizational structures of the Party of God (Hezbollah). The radical clergy associated with this organization threatened to build a mosque on this site.⁹ However, thanks to the involvement of, among others, Nabih Berri, founder of the National Heritage Council of South Lebanon, the place was saved from destruction and the idea was never implemented. Nowadays, information about Qana can be found in Lebanese tourist guides. Furthermore, the majority of the Shi‘ite community living in the area have changed their attitude towards the place and, together with the Greek Catholic minority, are working to popularize not only Qana but the entire region. An expression of this social activity was the foundation of The Cana Youth Association.¹⁰

South Lebanon

After the First Israeli-Arab War (the War of Independence 1948–1949), many Palestinians were forced to leave their land (*nakba*). Most of the Palestinian refugees took refuge in Lebanon, where the authorities helped them. Palestinians, supported by the governments of some Arab states, took advantage of the favourable political conditions in Lebanon and took military action against

⁶ M.P. RONCAGLIA, *op. cit.*, p. 93.

⁷ *Ewangelia wg św. Mateusza*, [in:] *Nowy Testament, Biblia Tysiąclecia Online*, Poznań 2003, <https://biblia.deon.pl/rozdzial.php?id=254> (access: 10 XI 2020).

⁸ *Ibidem*.

⁹ M. RASCHKA, *Postscript: Lebanese Site Claimed for Biblical Miracle: A professor disputes the traditional belief that Israel was where Jesus turned water into wine. Today, tourist dollars are at stake*, “Los Angeles Times”, <https://www.latimes.com/archives/la-xpm-1994-02-01-wr-17668-story.html> (access: 10 XI 2020).

¹⁰ Z. ANTONIOS, *Cana, miraculous and resistant*, “L’Orient Today”, <https://today.lorientlejour.com/article/1179064/cana-miraculous-and-resistant.html> (access: 10 XI 2020).

Israel. The military activity of the Palestinian Liberation Organization (PLO) in the south of Lebanon led to the creation of a proverbial state within a state in this area (known as *Fatah Land*). In 1975 the situation in the entire country worsened as a result of the outbreak of civil war, which caused chaos in the state and loss of control over its territory. The problem affected the south of Lebanon too, which, dominated by Palestinian militants, became an arena of confrontation between PLO militants and the Israeli army.

On March 15, 1978, the Israeli Defense Forces (IDF) crossed the borders of Lebanon and took action to liquidate the bases of the Palestinian Liberation Organization.¹¹ As a part of the Operation Litani carried out by Israel, Israel's troops entered the territory of Lebanon as far as 25 km inwards, up to the Litani River. The zone occupied by Israel included Qana. Israeli authorities were forced to end the operation by the UN Security Council, which implemented Resolutions 425 and 426. In addition to calling for respecting Lebanon's territorial integrity, sovereignty, and political independence, and an immediate cessation of military operations, Israeli forces were ordered to retreat from South Lebanon and a decision was made to establish the United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL).¹² As part of the created forces, more than 5900 United Nations soldiers from ten countries, including Fiji, came to Lebanon. The main base of the Fijian contingent, which in September 1978 had 500 soldiers, was located in Qana.¹³ The headquarters of the UN peacekeeping forces, on the other hand, were located in Naqoura, a town near the border with Israel.¹⁴

The South Lebanon Army (SLA), formed with the support of Israel and led by major Saad Hadd, took power in the so-called "security zone" created by Israel. The borders of the "security zone" were not established and it included, among others, areas inhabited by Christians. Most of the members of the SLA

¹¹ The operation was a response to a massacre perpetrated by Palestinians in South Lebanon three days earlier. Upon reaching Israeli territory by sea, they hijacked a bus traveling along the coast near Tel Aviv. 37 people, including 17 children, were killed in the attack. *Coastal Road Massacre Takes Place*, CIE Center For Israel Education, <https://israeled.org/coastal-road-massacre> (access: 10 XI 2020).

¹² *Resolution 425 (1978) of 19 March 1978; Resolution 426 (1978) of 19 March 1978, United Nations*, [https://undocs.org/S/RES/425\(1978\)](https://undocs.org/S/RES/425(1978)) (access: 10 XI 2020).

¹³ *Report of The Secretary-General on The United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon (for the period of 19 March to 13 September 1973)*, United Nations, <https://www.un.org/unispal/document/auto-insert-209970> (access: 10 XI 2020).

¹⁴ *Ibidem*.

were recruited from Christians inhabiting the south of Lebanon.¹⁵ Despite that and the creation of a buffer zone, as well as the deployment of UN troops, the situation changed little. Suffering from the Palestinian-Israeli conflict, some of the Shi'ite Muslim population left the south of Lebanon *en masse* and settled on the outskirts of Beirut. These Shi'ite refugees saw Israel as responsible for such a turn of events. On June 6, 1982, Israel carried out another operation in Lebanon, called Operation Peace for Galilee. This invasion of Lebanon was a response to reoccurring terrorist attacks carried out from Lebanon's territory, as well as to the assassination carried out in Great Britain on the Israeli ambassador.¹⁶

During that period, members of the radical fraction of the Amal Movement's Shi'ite militia (*Afwaj al-Muqawamah al-Lubnaniyah*) took a series of actions aimed at both the Israeli troops stationed in South Lebanon (November 11th, 1982 – Tyre)¹⁷ and the American troops in Beirut (on 18th April 1983, 63 people died (of whom 32 were Lebanese workers of U.S. embassy; 17 were Americans – journalists or members of CIA); on October 23rd 1983, 241 American soldiers and 58 French soldiers died).¹⁸ The establishment of the Party of God (which originated from Amal) in 1985 was a result of the efforts of its radical members to create a religious state similar to Iran. Moreover, it was a response to the Israeli invasion of Lebanon in 1978, the occupation of its southern part and the subsequent Operation Peace for Galilee. Undeniably, the support provided by Iran and Syria, which remained in conflict with Israel, were also of great importance.

In Lebanon itself, the situation led to radicalization among some of the Shi'ites. Local authorities ceased to function in the war-torn country. Qana, which had approximately 8000 inhabitants before the outbreak of the war (15% Christian and 85% Shi'ite Muslim), was deprived not only of authorities, but also of subsidies from the state. It should be emphasized that this situation continued long after the end of the war,¹⁹ which contributed to the growth of the authority of Shi'ite organizations, who organized charity collections and provided

¹⁵ M. BRYLEW, *Problemy i wyzwania współczesnego Libanu*, Toruń 2017, p. 35.

¹⁶ *Shlomo Argov, Israel Ministry of Foreign Affairs*, <https://mfa.gov.il/MFA/MFA-Archive/2003/Pages/Shlomo%20Argov.aspx> (access: 12 XI 2020).

¹⁷ The attack on the eight-story building in Tyre, which killed 91 people (soldiers and workers) on November 11th, 1982 was attributed to Shi'ite Ahmed Kasir, who was declared a martyr and was the first suicide bomber. A.S. GHORAYEB, *Hizbu'llab. Politics and Religion*, London 2002, p. 13.

¹⁸ H. JABER, *Hezbollah*, Warszawa 2001, p. 69.

¹⁹ L. VOLK, *Memorial and Martyrs in Modern Lebanon*, Bloomington 2010, p. 122.

help to residents in need. Two such organizations played a special role – Amal and the Party of God (Hezbollah), established in 1985, which treated South Lebanon as an area of struggle for influence and exempt from state control.




Fig. 1. Location of the United Nations Interim Forces in Lebanon and the zone controlled by the Israel Defense Forces and the South Lebanon Army (1994)

Source: *Report of The Secretary-general on The United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon (for the period 21 July 1993 – 20 January 1994)*, Security Council, Distr. General, S / 1994/62, 20th January 1994, <https://undocs.org/pdf?symbol=en/S/1994/62> (access: 12 XI 2020)

Other conditions, including the ongoing civil war in Lebanon, were conducive to the extensive activities of Hezbollah, which, after the evacuation of members of the Palestinian Liberation Organization from Lebanon, took over its military role. In addition, those who were previously displaced to the north (of Beirut), mostly Shi'ites, began to return to South Lebanon. Initially of low intensity, the conflict between Israel and the armed wing of the Party of God grew stronger over time. The situation was worsened by the presence of Israeli soldiers who regularly patrolled the UN-controlled zone, created roadblocks, searched homes, and made arrests among the local community.

Israel maintained permanent military posts in the so-called security zone, the number of which was flexible.

The growing hostility of the southern inhabitants towards Israel and the South Lebanon Army was reported regularly by the UNIFIL peacekeeping command in reports to the UN Secretary General.²⁰ The Southerners' violent reactions of opposition to the actions of the occupant, resulted in, above all, arrests. One of the places where demonstrations took place frequently was Qana, where the headquarters of the Fijian peacekeeping battalion was located. In February 1984, during protests in Qana expressing opposition to antecedent arrests, one person was killed and two others were arrested.²¹ In June 1985, about 2000 people came to Qana in search of temporary shelter, escaping from the villages of Kafra and Jatar, which had been regularly attacked by the troops of the South Lebanese Army.²²

The reports prepared by UNIFIL on the security situation in South Lebanon indicated increased activity of armed resistance groups targeting Israeli and South Lebanese troops but rarely targeting UN soldiers. Firing and attacks were carried out with the use of small arms, grenade launchers, mortars, and Katyusha rockets. The combat strategy also included roadside improvised explosive devices and suicide bombings. In the second half of July 1986 alone, UN forces recorded about 11 such attacks in their area of responsibility; in August they recorded 20; in September, 21; and in November, 10.²³

An important topic raised in the reports on the situation in South Lebanon, a zone supervised by the United Nations Peacekeeping Forces, was the issue of shelling civilian buildings by the Israel Defence Forces and the South Lebanese Army, as well as firing at bases and facilities belonging to UNIFIL.

²⁰ *Report of The Secretary-General On The United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon (for period from 13 October to 9 April 1984)*, Security Council, Distr. General, S/16472, 9th April 1984, <https://undocs.org/pdf?symbol=en/S/16472> (access: 13 XI 2020).

²¹ *Ibidem*.

²² *Report of The Secretary-General On The United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon (for period from 12 April to 10 October 1985)*, Security Council, Distr. General, S/17557, 25th October 1985, <https://digitallibrary.un.org/record/105850> (access: 13 XI 2020).

²³ *Report of The Secretary-General On The United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon (for period from 11 July 1986 to 11 January 1987)*, Security Council, Distr. General, S/1851, 12th January 1987, <https://digitallibrary.un.org/record/126360> (access: 13 XI 2020).

In a short period from the establishment of the United Nations Interim Forces in Lebanon until 1988, 153 people had been killed and 220 people had been injured from shelling, mines, and explosives.²⁴ In 1992 the number of casualties increased to 186 and wounded to 280.²⁵ Some of the IDF and SLA attacks on UNIFIL facilities and vehicles were provoked by armed groups attacking or firing in the immediate vicinity of UN posts. Such arguments were also used by the command of the Israel Defence Forces when explaining the armed incidents. Meanwhile, the command of the South Lebanon Army accused the UN peacekeeping forces of allowing such attacks.²⁶

It is worth noting that there was a 128-soldier unit of the Lebanese Army within the UN forces in southern Lebanon. Most of these soldiers were stationed in Tyre, Al Yatun, and Qana.²⁷ Lebanese soldiers conducted independent patrols and also accompanied the UN forces during their tasks. In the following years, the cooperation of the UN with the Lebanese Army was expanded, which resulted in the gradual transfer of control over certain sectors supervised by UNIFIL. However, this did not apply to those zones located within the so-called “Israeli-controlled zone,” which were designated by IDF posts (whose number fluctuated). This did not include Qana, which, as part of the UNIFIL operational zone, was under the protection of a Fijian battalion.²⁸ Nevertheless, close contacts were maintained with the local community and the Lebanese military police, which maintained their posts in Qana, Tebnine, and Jwaya.

²⁴ *Report of The Secretary-General On The United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon (for period from 23 January to 25 July 1988)*, Security Council, Distr. General, S/20053, 25th July 1988, <https://digitallibrary.un.org/record/42943> (access: 13 XI 2020).

²⁵ *Report of The Secretary-General On The United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon (for the period 22 January 1992 to 21 July 1992)*, Security Council, Distr. General, S/24341, 21st July 1992, <https://digitallibrary.un.org/record/147305> (access: 13 XI 2020).

²⁶ *Report of The Secretary-General On The United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon (for period from 11 July 1986 to 11 January 1987)*, Security Council, Distr. General, S/1851, 12th January 1987, <https://digitallibrary.un.org/record/126360> (access: 13 XI 2020).

²⁷ *Report of The Secretary-General On The United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon (for period from 23 January to 25 July 1988)*, Security Council, Distr. General, S/20053, 25th July 1988, <https://digitallibrary.un.org/record/42943> (access: 13 XI 2020).

²⁸ *Report of The Secretary-General On The United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon (for the period 22 January 1992 to 21 July 1992)*, Security Council, Distr. General, S/24341, 21st July 1992, <https://digitallibrary.un.org/record/147305> (access: 15 XI 2020).




Fig. 2. Qana and its position in the area of responsibility of the Fiji Battalion in January 1994
 Source: *Report of The Secretary-general on The United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon (for the period 21 July 1993 – 20 January 1994)*, Security Council, Distr. General, S /1994/62, 20th January 1994, <https://undocs.org/pdf?symbol=en/S/1994/62> (access: 13 XI 2020)

Tensions increased in February 1992 when the secretary general of the Party of God, Sheikh Abbas Musawi, was killed in an attack by the Israel Defence Forces. Musawi’s wife and son were also killed in the attack. This Israeli operation led to an escalation of military action on both sides. The fire exchange caused a series of devastations in Lebanese cities in both the north and south of Lebanon.²⁹ In 1993 Israel carried out another operation, codenamed

²⁹ *Ibidem.*

Responsibility, launching airstrikes and artillery fire from both land and sea. These massive attacks did not cause major losses in the ranks of Hezbollah, but caused damage to infrastructure, agriculture, and caused over 200 000 people³⁰ to flee the dangerous zone. The harm done to the people of South Lebanon significantly contributed to the increase in sympathy for Hezbollah by not only the inhabitants themselves, but also by some representatives of the authorities.

The situation in South Lebanon remained largely unchanged, even after the agreement between Hezbollah and Israel. Reports to the Secretary General highlighted that the exchange of fire in the zone controlled by the United Nations Interim Forces in Lebanon, and the so-called Israeli “safe zone” continued. In the first half of 1995, the armed forces of Hezbollah carried out about 129 operations against the Israeli occupation forces. UNIFIL observation posts reported that, in response to these attacks, Israel fired more than 16 500 rocket, artillery, mortar, air, and armoured missiles³¹ in total over the same period.

In 1992–1996, Hezbollah increased its political activity. Amal competed with the Party of God for the votes of the people of Qana, especially the Shi‘ites. However, this did not change the fact that Qana, like other towns in the south of the country, still did not have legal local authorities.³² The only working office was the private home of a member of Amal, who forwarded the citizens’ requests to the Southern Council.³³

In the Secretary General’s report on the United Nations Interim Forces in Lebanon, the beginning of 1996 was noted as a period of increased activity by resistance groups against the Israeli occupation. In February and March, the Islamic Resistance (Hezbollah) launched a series of attacks against the Israel Defence Forces. Additionally, the report indicated an increased military activity of Amal and Palestinian fighters. UNIFIL observation posts recorded 24 armed incidents in February and 18 in March. A number of military operations were also carried out north of the Litani River.³⁴ As a result of roadside explosives

³⁰ H. JABER, *op. cit.*, p. 143.

³¹ *Report of The Secretary-General On The United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon (for the period 21 January 1992 to 19 July 1995)*, Security Council, Distr. General, S/1995/595, 19th July 1995, <https://digitallibrary.un.org/record/198728> (access: 13 XI 2020).

³² L. VOLK, *op. cit.*, p. 122.

³³ *Ibidem.*

³⁴ *Report of The Secretary-General On The United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon (for the period from 22 January 1996 to 20 July 1996)*, Security Council, Distr. General, S/1996/575, 20th July 1996, <https://digitallibrary.un.org/record/218489> (access: 13 XI 2020).

and suicide attacks, the number of killed and wounded Israeli soldiers increased. Military activity escalated in late March, when two men were killed by Israeli fire in the town of Jatar, near Qana. The conflict culminated in Operation Grapes of Wrath, carried out by the Israel Defence Forces on April 11–27, 1996. The operation was primarily a response to the military actions of the Party of God in both South Lebanon and northern Israel. Two hours later, Israel informed the then-Commander of the United Nations Interim Forces in Lebanon, General Stanisław Woźniak, about the start of the operation. The UNIFIL commander strongly opposed Israel's actions and called for the protection of civilians.

Israel attacked those localities and buildings that were strongly believed to have militants from the Party of God or were suspected of collaborating with them. Sectors controlled by UN soldiers from Fiji, Ghana, Nepal, Ireland, and Norway also came under heavy artillery fire. Over 400 000 South Lebanese residents left their homes and fled north. Those who remained sought refuge in the United Nations Interim Forces bases in Lebanon, located in the so-called “demarcation zone.” This was also the case with Qana, where the base and the Headquarters of the Fiji battalion were located. On April 18th, 1996, shortly after 2 p.m., the Fijian contingent, part of the United Nations Interim Forces in Lebanon, was attacked by Israeli artillery. At that time, more than 800 residents of Qana were at the base. Nearly 13 missiles equipped with proximity fuses fell on the UN barracks at checkpoint 1–20 and the Headquarters of the 19th Fiji Battalion,³⁵ where the residents of the town took refuge. Of the 106 victims killed, most were women and children. In addition, 120 people were injured. In total, according to the report of the Human Rights Organization, 154 civilians were killed and 351 injured during Operation Grapes of Wrath.³⁶

A report on the course of events was included in an annex dated May 1st, 1996 to the Military Adviser to the UN Secretary General, which concerned the shelling of the United Nations contingent in Qana on April 18th, 1996. Major General Franklin van Kappen arrived at the scene of the tragedy. The investigation focused mainly on determining the course of events and on finding out

³⁵ *FOCUS: Grapes Of Wrath: Our Peacekeepers Story*, FijiSun, <https://fijisun.com.fj/2015/04/18/focus-grapes-of-wrath-our-peacekeepers-story/> (access: 13 XI 2020).

³⁶ Report describes eight attacks by Israel's Defense Forces in South Lebanon that resulted in the highest death toll. *Israel/Lebanon “Operation Grapes of Wrath”. The Civilian Victims*, Human Rights Watch, September 1997, Vol. 9, No. 8(E), <https://www.hrw.org/reports/1997/isrleb/Isrleb.htm> (access: 13 XI 2020).




Fig. 3. Location of the UN base and the site of Israeli artillery fire
 Source: W.M. REISMAN, *The Lessons of Qana*, 22 *Yale J. Int'l L.* (1997),
<https://digitalcommons.law.yale.edu/yjil/vol22/iss2/5> (access: 13 XI 2020)

who was responsible for the “Qana massacre.” According to the UN Report, between 12:00 and 14:00 on April 18th, 1996, Hezbollah fighters fired 2 or 3 rockets from a location approximately 350 meters south-east of the UN buildings. Between 12:30 and 13:00, another five rockets were launched from a location 600 meters south-east of the Fijian contingent base. The next attack came 15 minutes before the Israeli fire. About 6 mortars were fired from about 220 meters south-west of the centre of the UN base. According to the information obtained, the mortars were located in this place between 11:00 and 12:00. The UN forces did not take any steps to prevent their setting up. The failure of UNIFIL soldiers to act may have been influenced by earlier events, when one of the Fijian soldiers was shot in the chest during an attempt to stop the Party of God’s fighters from firing missiles.³⁷

The report indicated that the attack by the Israeli Defence Forces was split into two strikes, one focused on targets 100 m south of the UN base in a group of buildings where there was a mortar stand, the other focused on the middle of the United Nations’ compound. These versions were confirmed by on-site tests and the missile fragments found. In the conclusion of the report, Major General F. Van Kappen stated that it was unlikely that the firing of the Fiji battalion base in Qana was a result of technical errors and procedures (as presented by the Israeli side, which also blamed UNIFIL forces for the massacre of civilians). He did not, however, completely rule out such a possibility.³⁸

A report on the course of events, based on information collected in Lebanon and Israel between May and August, was also presented by the Human Rights Organization, which indicated that Hezbollah was also to blame for this tragedy. The Party of God’s militants had long used civil infrastructure and civilian areas as a protective shield, while failing to comply with the additional protocols of the *Geneva Conventions of August 12, 1949, concerning the protection of victims of international armed conflicts (Protocol I) and protection of victims of international armed conflicts (Protocol II) (Article 51)*.³⁹ Some Qana residents

³⁷ Letter Dated 7 May 1996 From The Secretary. General Addressed to The President of The Security Council, United Nations, Distr. General, S/1996/337, 7th May 1996, <https://unispal.un.org/UNISPAL.NSF/0/62D5AA740C14293B85256324005179BE> (access: 13 XI 2020).

³⁸ *Ibidem*.

³⁹ *Additional Protocols to the Geneva Conventions of August 12, 1949, relating to the Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts (Protocol I) and to the Protection of Victims of Non-International Armed Conflicts (Protocol II), drawn in Geneva on June 8, 1977, “Journal of Laws” 1992, No. 41, item 17.*

also believed⁴⁰ that Hezbollah was partly responsible for the tragedy that took place in this small town.

The official funeral ceremony for the victims of the Israeli attack was held in Tyre in the area of the Hippodrome, due to the large number of participants – nearly 10 000 people – who attended the ceremony, conducted by Sheikh Muhammad Mahdi Shams ad-Din, chairman of the Supreme Shi'ite Council. In addition to Prime Minister Rafik Hariri and Chairman of the Chamber of Deputies Nabih Berri, there were also clergymen – representatives of all faiths and Lebanese political parties. L. Volk, in her study *Memorials and Martyrs in Modern Lebanon*, draws attention to the presence of diplomats from France, Italy, and Syria, and twelve soldiers of the United Nations representing all national contingents of UN peacekeeping forces. Addressing the gathered people, Sheikh Muhammad Mahdi Shams ad-Din spoke about the unification of all Lebanese and about the scale of the crime committed by Israel. During the ceremony, the then-Prime Minister of Lebanon, Rafik Hariri, declared the day of the tragedy in Qana, April 18th, as a National Day of Remembrance, and declared the creation of the “National Remembrance Committee on March 14th and April 18th.”⁴¹

The second part of the ceremony took place in Qana, where the bodies and remains of the dead were buried near the site of the tragedy. It was also there that the clergy representing various religions gathered and prayed with the local residents (mostly relatives of the deceased). Qana became a symbol of the martyrdom of Muslims and Christians⁴² and the centrepiece of Lebanese resistance against Israel. Banners and posters appeared at the memorial site, the content of which expressed not only the pain of the loss of loved ones, but also referred to the Holocaust or the Battle of Karbala, in which the grandson of the prophet Muhammad Hussein ibn Ali⁴³ died. Increasingly, however, the tragedy was used by Lebanese politicians to achieve their own goals.

⁴⁰ *Israel/Lebanon: “Operation Grapes of Wrath” – The Civilian Victims*, Human Rights Watch, 1st September 1997, <https://www.refworld.org/docid/3ae6a7e60.html> (access: 13 XI 2020).

⁴¹ L. VOLK, *op. cit.*, p. 124.

⁴² *Ibidem*, p.128.

⁴³ *Ibidem*, p. 137.

After the events at Qana, it was expected that sectarian and political divisions in society would begin to blur. Thousands of pilgrims⁴⁴ came every day to this small town, which before the tragedy had only 8000 inhabitants. For many of them, it was their first visit to this part of the country. Despite the fact that southern Lebanon was still controlled by Israel, Qana became a place of pilgrimage for people from all over the Middle East. The place was most likely visited by the daughter of the President of Iran, Ali Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani.⁴⁵ Every year, on the day of the tragedy, ceremonies dedicated to the victims of the Israeli attack on Qana are held, with The Martyrdom Remembrance Committee in Qana in charge of their organisation. For several years the ceremony was chaired by Nabih Berri, Lebanese Parliament Speaker.

In 2000, Israel withdrew its troops from South Lebanon.⁴⁶ It was also at this time that Berri's wife, Randa Berri, was involved in organising ceremonials to commemorate the victims of the massacre. Randa Berri tried to make the ceremonials a history lesson for the younger generation. Another prominent figure committed to preserving the memory of Qana was Bahia Hariri (Rafik Hariri's sister), who wrote the slogan "We will never forget." With financial help from Syria and Qatar, the Qana Museum was built on the site where the victims of war were buried. The Museum used to be festively decorated on the occasion of various events and ceremonials.⁴⁷ According to L. Volk's description, the *al-shahid* formula was introduced before the surnames of all victims, and

⁴⁴ J. WALSH, *Qana. Anatomy of Tragedy. Did Israel Wittingly Shell A U.N. Base In Qana? A Disturbing Investigation Is Hotly Disputed*, Radio Islam, https://www.islam-radio.net/historia/zionism/qana_time.html (access: 13 XI 2020).

⁴⁵ *Ibidem*. Lebanese media reported on Faizy Rafsanjani's visit and her meetings with Prime Minister R. Hariri and Hassan Nasrallah, Secretary General of Hezbollah. *News from Beirut May 27 1997*, News@Lebanon.Com, <http://www.lebanon.com/news/local/1997/5/27.htm> (access: 13 XI 2020).

⁴⁶ On April 17th, 2000, Israel's Minister of Foreign Affairs sent a formal note to the Secretary General of the planned withdrawal of troops from Lebanon in July 2000. In fact, Israel began withdrawing its troops from May 16th, 2000. The UN Secretary General informed the Security Council that on 16th June, the verification process was completed confirming the complete withdrawal of forces in accordance with Resolution 425. *Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon (for the period from 17 January to 17 July 2000)*, Security Council, Distr.: General 20th July 2000, <https://digitallibrary.un.org/record/419227> (access: 13 XI 2020).

⁴⁷ S. BONSEN, *Martyr Cults and Political Identities in Lebanon "Victory or Martyrdom" in the Struggle of the Amal Movement*, Wiesbaden 2020, p. 118.

the entire tombstone inscription ended with the phrase “was martyred (*istash-had*) in the Qana massacre on April 18th, 1996.”⁴⁸ The gradual politicization of the memorial site by Amal, associated with Syria, resulted in a decrease in the number of visitors and reduced interest in the tragedy of the inhabitants of Qana, who, deprived of state aid, faced a lack of money to rebuild their houses and damaged infrastructure.

After Israel left Lebanon, the situation did not improve. Hezbollah moved its operations significantly closer to the border of the country, which made it easier for the members of the organization both to perform attacks on the northern part of Israel, but also to infiltrate Israeli territory. Of course, Israel did not remain passive and responded accordingly to the threat. Although the Lebanese government had deployed a Joint Security Force to the south of the country, the actual control of the south was left to Hezbollah.⁴⁹ For a time, Hezbollah’s main activities focused on Israeli forces occupying the disputed territory of the Sheba farms. In 2005, the UN forces stationed in the south recorded an escalation of conflicts along the border (*Blue Line*). The increase in military activity resulted from – among others – the fact that Hezbollah increased the number of checkpoints at the border, taking control of the roads, including the road from Tyre to Naqoura (a town located on the border with Israel).⁵⁰

After Israel’s withdrawal from Lebanon, the zone controlled by the United Nations Transitional Armed Forces in Lebanon no longer included Qana. There was a Lebanese Army Liaison Office in Qana, which was transferred to Naqoura in 2005. The town itself was still in a difficult economic situation, as expressed by the mayor who accused the central authorities of total neglect of the town.⁵¹

2005 was a distinct year for Lebanon for two reasons: the terrorist attack on former Prime Minister Rafik Hariri on December 14th contributed to mass

⁴⁸ L. VOLK, *op. cit.*, p. 147.

⁴⁹ *Interim report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon*, Security Council, Distr.: General 31st October 2000, <https://digitallibrary.un.org/record/426089> (access: 13 XI 2020).

⁵⁰ *Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon (for the period from 21 January 2005 to 20 July 2005)*, Security Council, Distr.: General 21st July 2005, <https://documents-dds-ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N05/420/36/PDF/N0542036.pdf?OpenElement> (access: 14 XI 2020).

⁵¹ L. VOLK, *op. cit.*, p. 150.

protests (the Cedar Revolution), which then resulted in the withdrawal of Syrian troops from Lebanon in April 2005.⁵² Although Lebanon became a country free from the presence of foreign troops, it was still not free from divisions, which became even more tangible after Rafik Hariri's death.

Second massacre at Qana

In January 2006, due to the prevailing situation and the ongoing tensions between Israel and Hezbollah, the Secretary General UN once again recommended extending the mandate of the UN forces in Lebanon.⁵³ The turning point was the missile strike at the position of the Israeli Defence Forces near the city of Zarit and the crossing of the *Blue Line* by Hezbollah fighters to attack an Israeli patrol, which resulted in the kidnapping of two soldiers and the death of three others.⁵⁴ On July 12th, 2006, the Israeli Defence Forces launched a massive attack on selected targets in South Lebanon and rest of the country, including Beirut.⁵⁵ The strategy used resembled that of Operation Grapes of Wrath. Most cities were cut off as roads, bridges, and the airport were bombed. All ports were blocked and petrol stations were destroyed. Israel, using publicity and dropping leaflets, warned people in South Lebanon to avoid sites that would be associated with the presence of Hezbollah. These sites were on the Israeli target list.

Qana was one of the places of possible attack, which, similarly to other places in South Lebanon, was subject to military actions. However, Qana had been outside the UN's area of responsibility since 2000, as at that time it had a population of only about 12 000 (mainly shopkeepers, farmers, and

⁵² *Situation in the Area, January–July 2005*, UNIFIL, <https://unifil.unmissions.org/unifil-background#para15> (access: 14 XI 2020).

⁵³ *Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon (For the period from 21 January 2006 to 18 July 2006)*, Security Council, <https://documents-dds-ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N06/437/22/IMG/N0643722.pdf?OpenElement> (access: 14 XI 2020).

⁵⁴ *Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon (For the period from 21 January 2006 to 18 July 2006)*, Security Council, <https://documents-dds-ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N06/437/22/IMG/N0643722.pdf?OpenElement> (access: 14 XI 2020).

⁵⁵ This was the beginning of the Second Lebanon War, which lasted 34 days and ended with the adoption of Security Council Resolution 1701 on August 11th, 2006.

traders). The UN's nearest post was located in al-Hiniyah, about 20 km away.⁵⁶ During the first days of the Israeli operation, all access and exit roads from this small town were destroyed. According to the Israeli army, Hezbollah's regional headquarters were located in the town and the most missile attacks were carried out from there (the IDF indicated that there had been about 150 missile attacks in total). Moreover, according to Israeli services, it was alleged that there was a regional command centre responsible for planning operations against Israel in Qana.⁵⁷

The targets of the Israeli attack on Qana were sites identified as missile sites. There is a consensus however, that residents had been called earlier to leave their homes and move away from the positions identified as fire points. The first missile attack of the town took place on July 29th, 2006, at around 18:00. On July 30th, 2006 at 1:00 in the morning, after warning residents about the planned operation, Israel launched another air attack on Qana. In one of the buildings on the target list (in the IDF's opinion there was a weapons warehouse there), the two families of Shaloub and Hashim took refuge. There were 63 people in total in the building, mostly women and children. As a result of the attack, the building was destroyed. According to a Human Rights Watch (HRW) report, 28 people died (including one in hospital), out of whom 16 were children.⁵⁸ According to HRW findings, 22 people took refuge in the basement.

The whole event was reported by one of the survivors, Muhammad Mahmud Shaloub, who said that at that time there were no Hezbollah fighters in the vicinity of the building. The lack of evidence of militant Hezbollah presence in the vicinity of the building on that day was confirmed by research conducted by Human Rights Watch representatives along with journalists and representatives of emergency services present in the city at the time. No bodies of militants from the Party of God were found. It is worth noting that evacuation from Qana before the attack was not possible, as it was cut off from other towns. In addition, some of Qana's residents were elderly, without money or means

⁵⁶ *Letter dated 7 August 2006 from the Secretary-General addressed to the President of the Security Council*, Security Council, Distr.: General 7th August 2006, <https://unifil.unmissions.org/sites/default/files/626.40d7de06-6317-4bd5-ade4-10505d7035b1.pdf> (access: 14 XI 2020).

⁵⁷ *Ibidem*.

⁵⁸ *Civilian Casualties in Lebanon during the 2006 War*, Human Rights Watch, 5 September 2007, <https://www.hrw.org/node/255321/printable/print> (access: 18 XI 2020).

of transport. According to witnesses of the tragedy, Israel's strategy of cutting off cities ruled out the possibility of deploying rocket launchers in the town.⁵⁹

The first rescue teams did not arrive at the scene of the tragedy until about 7:00 in the morning on July 30th. The Lebanese Red Cross and UNIFIL's medical services were involved in the rescue operation.⁶⁰

The deaths of innocent people in Qana sparked massive demonstrations in Beirut. Many participants of the demonstrations expressed their support for Hezbollah. A mass funeral for 30 people (27 bombing victims and 3 Hezbollah fighters who died near Qana and were not linked to the death of civilians) took place on August 18th, 2006 in Qana. Became involved in the organization of funeral ceremonies. Of the 27 victims of the Israeli attack, only one was buried with the flag of Hezbollah. According to the victim's family, 17-year-old Ali Ahmad Mahmud Shaloub was a sympathizer of the Party of God. The remaining coffins were wrapped with Lebanese flags, symbolizing a death for Lebanon. Several thousand people took part in the funeral ceremonies in Qana.⁶¹

In total, according to HRW, 1109 people⁶² died during the entire conflict, mostly civilians. About 4500 were injured and a million people fled their homes. Israel fired and dropped nearly 7000 rockets and bombs in Lebanon. The United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs estimated that about one million people were displaced and seeking refuge.⁶³

After the Second Lebanon War, another monument was created in Qana to commemorate the victims of the war with Israel in 2006. This time its creators were members of the families of the dead and Hezbollah (two members of this organization were buried there), who provided financial support. On the walls surrounding the cemetery are images of people killed in the war. L. Volk draws

⁵⁹ *Ibidem*.

⁶⁰ *Letter dated 7 August 2006 from the Secretary-General addressed to the President of the Security Council*, Security Council, Distr.: General 7th August 2006, <https://unifil.unmissions.org/sites/default/files/626.40d7de06-6317-4bd5-ade4-10505d7035b1.pdf> (access: 18 XI 2020).

⁶¹ L. VOLK, *op. cit.*, p. 177.

⁶² In *the Secretary General's report of September 12th, 2006*, which cited official data, 1187 people were killed and 4092 were injured. *Report of the Secretary-General on the implementation of Security Council resolution 1701 (2006)*, Security Council, 12th September 2006, https://www.un.org/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=S/2006/730 (access: 18 XI 2020).

⁶³ *Civilian Casualties in Lebanon during the 2006 War*, Human Rights Watch, 5th September 2007, <https://www.hrw.org/node/255321/printable/print> (access: 18 XI 2020).

attention to the fact that while in the case of commemorating the victims of the first massacre in Qana there were references to both Islam and Christianity, in the place commemorating the second massacre in Qana, there were no references to the Christian heritage of Qana.⁶⁴

Certainly, this situation was influenced not only by Hezbollah's strong position in the town, but also by the decreasing number of the Christian community, who gradually left the town as a result of subsequent wars and tragedies affecting it. Due to the tragedy of 2006, Qana once again caught the attention of Iran, whose President Mahmoud Ahmedinejad visited this place in 2010 and paid tribute to the fallen.⁶⁵

Over the years, Qana served as a place of propaganda and politics for Lebanese politicians, where they demanded justice and the trial of those responsible for the death of innocent people. In order to commemorate the victims of Israeli aggression, the Bank of Lebanon issued a commemorative medal with the date of the tragedy in Qana and the image of a woman holding a child in her arms.⁶⁶

Residents of the town did not receive the expected help, and the benefits from tourism turned out to be symbolic. The interest in the tragedy in Qana decreased too, which had a direct impact on the number of visitors to the town and its development. In crisis-ridden Lebanon, Qana and similar towns struggle with economic difficulties. The agricultural sector of Qana (arable land covers 37% of the commune's area) employs less than 7% of the inhabitants. Some of the inhabitants who left the town (or left Lebanon altogether) continue to send funds to their relatives who still live in Qana and thus are an important source of money that supports the local economy.

⁶⁴ L. VOLK, *op. cit.*, p. 182.

⁶⁵ N. BLANFORD, *On Israel's doorstep, Ahmadinejad hurls taunts across the Lebanese border*, "The Christian Science Monitor", <https://www.csmonitor.com/World/Middle-East/2010/1014/On-Israel-s-doorstep-Ahmadinejad-hurls-taunts-across-the-Lebanese-border> (access: 20 IX 2020).

⁶⁶ *Cana memorial medal*, Banque Du Liban, <https://www.bdl.gov.lb/pages/index/2/269/Cana-Memorial.html> (access: 20 IX 2020).

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